What GAO Found The Army relies on what it calls vertical lift systems, primarily helicopters, to accomplish reconnaissance and attack missions and move troops and equipment to and around the battlefield. In its 2019 modernization strategy, the Army identified developing its Future Vertical Lift portfolio as a priority. This portfolio included two crewed and one uncrewed aircraft. Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA)—intended to provide reconnaissance, attack, and aerial security capabilities, and estimated to cost $5.3 billion for development and procurement. Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA)—a medium-sized assault and utility aircraft that would deliver speed, range, agility, endurance, and sustainability improvements compared to current Black Hawk helicopters. Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (FTUAS)—intended to execute reconnaissance operations as a rapidly deployable uncrewed aircraft with vertical take-off and landing capabilities. The portfolio also included a variety of aircraft to be deployed from larger aircraft and development of an improved turbine engine. Aircraft in the Future Vertical Lift Portfolio prior to February 2024 In February 2024, the Army made significant changes to this portfolio. According to Army officials, Army leadership collaborated with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to restructure the portfolio. This restructuring ended the development of FARA, continued investment in FLRAA, and increased investment in FTUAS. In addition, the restructuring increased investment in uncrewed aircraft while delaying production of the improved turbine engine. Army budget officials stated that these changes were due to concerns about the long-term affordability of developing and acquiring FARA and FLRAA simultaneously. Army officials stated that the restructuring decision shifted about $7.3 billion in planned spending to other priorities. These priorities included other programs with vertical lift capabilities as well as improvements to Army barracks. Planned Spending from Fiscal Years 2025 through 2029 as a Result of Future Vertical Lift Portfolio Restructuring Because of its decision to end development of FARA, the Army reduced planned capabilities for crewed reconnaissance and attack missions. The Army plans to rely on future uncrewed systems for some reconnaissance and attack missions and existing helicopters for attack. The Army is currently considering further changes to its vertical lift capabilities. In April 2025, the Secretary of Defense announced the Army Transformation Initiative. This Initiative directs the Army to consider changes to both its acquisitions and force structure. As a result, the Army has proposed a number of other changes to its aviation portfolio, including: accelerating FLRAA development and fielding, accelerating fielding of launched uncrewed aircraft, distributing existing vertical lift capabilities across the Army, and ending development of FTUAS. In GAO’s discussions with Army officials, the officials stated that none of these decisions have been finalized and will depend on the outcome of the fiscal year 2026 budget. Why GAO Did This Study In 2019, the Army identified six modernization priority areas – including capabilities for Future Vertical Lift – to improve its ability to operate in the modern battlefield. In 2024, the Army made significant changes to the portfolio of vertical lift systems it had been developing. A Senate Report contains a provision for GAO to review and assess the capabilities affected by the Army’s restructuring decisions and the analyses that informed them. GAO’s report describes the revisions resulting from the restructuring, the reasons for the changes, how the changes impacted programs and vertical lift capabilities, and Army plans to address potential capability gaps. To identify why the restructuring decision was made, who made it, what analyses may have been used, and potential effects on capabilities, GAO assessed and compared requirements documents preceding and subsequent to the Army’s 2024 restructuring decision, traced funding by analyzing budget documents, and interviewed numerous Army officials. These officials included the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, officials from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology; the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, which is the office responsible for aligning funding to the Army’s acquisition plans; and the Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional Team, as well as officials from individual vertical lift-related programs. For more information, contact Alex Winograd at winograda@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up waste resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, a process used to produce plutonium. Generally, EM manages this waste associated with reprocessing as if it is high-level radioactive waste (HLW) unless the waste can be classified as low-level radioactive waste (LLW) or transuranic (TRU) waste. LLW and TRU waste are expected to be less expensive to treat and dispose of compared with HLW. To classify its waste, EM relies in part on the statutory definition of HLW in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. However, GAO, DOE, and others have raised concerns that ambiguities in this definition have impeded EM’s cleanup progress. Examples of Waste Associated with Reprocessing EM has three processes—known as waste classification tools—it can use to determine that certain waste associated with reprocessing can be treated and disposed of as LLW or TRU waste, rather than HLW. While these tools help EM address ambiguities in the HLW definition, they have shortcomings that hinder EM’s progress. For example, one tool cannot be used at the Hanford Site, EM’s most complex and expensive site. EM also faces the risk of litigation due to the lack of clarity in the HLW definition, which could affect EM’s ability to successfully use the tools. Until the HLW definition is clarified, EM will continue to face significant barriers to completing its cleanup mission. Given the complexity of this issue, any efforts to revise the HLW definition would benefit from input and ideas from experts across government, industry, and academia. While EM has applied the three tools to treat and dispose of some waste associated with reprocessing as non-HLW, EM has not pursued additional opportunities that GAO and others have identified. Many studies over the last 2 decades—including analyses conducted by EM—have shown that opportunities exist for EM to expedite its cleanup efforts and realize significant cost savings while ensuring safe disposal. For example, in a 2020 report, EM estimated that classifying a portion of tank waste as LLW at its Hanford Site could potentially generate a cost savings of $73 to $210 billion. By systematically evaluating these opportunities and pursuing them to the maximum extent possible, EM could accelerate its cleanup mission and save at least tens of billions of dollars. Why GAO Did This Study Since 1989, EM has been responsible for cleaning up waste resulting from plutonium production for the nation’s nuclear arsenal. EM has faced many challenges in determining how best to treat and dispose of this waste, and the estimated future cost for addressing this and other waste is more than half a trillion dollars. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to review DOE’s implementation of certain tools to treat and dispose of waste associated with reprocessing as something other than HLW. GAO’s report examines (1) EM’s efforts to treat and dispose of such waste and the barriers it faces in doing so and (2) potential opportunities to realize cost savings by treating certain waste as something other than HLW. GAO analyzed laws, EM policies and documentation, and prior GAO and independent entities’ studies. GAO interviewed EM officials regarding EM’s plans to treat and dispose of waste associated with reprocessing. GAO also visited two EM sites and evaluated documentation to identify opportunities for EM to treat and dispose of certain waste as LLW or TRU waste.