What GAO Found The Department of Education provides student loan servicers with instruction for implementing program changes via formal documents known as change requests. Change requests outline new or modified requirements for servicers and can vary in their complexity. For example, Education could require servicers to carry out tasks ranging from sending straightforward borrower communications to implementing major repayment plan changes. Examples of Tasks Student Loan Servicers Carry Out for Education The servicers reported facing challenges in implementing Education’s instruction for program changes. All four servicers raised concerns about the number of clarifying questions they needed answered to implement some requested changes. GAO found that the lack of clear up-front instruction sometimes resulted in extensive back-and-forth between Education and servicers. For example, GAO observed a change request that resulted in six rounds of questions and answers with servicers over a 2-month period. All four servicers said instruction could be improved if Education coordinated with them before or immediately after requesting a change, such as by meeting to walk through new requirements. Education officials acknowledged the value of coordinating early with servicers, but the agency has not consistently undertaken such coordination. Education said that early coordination with servicers was done at staff discretion and was based on factors such as the change request’s complexity. In June 2025, officials said that early coordination was not common, citing insufficient time as a key barrier. Yet, three servicers said that early coordination allows them to respond more quickly to Education’s requests. In December 2025, Education officials said that early coordination with servicers had recently improved. For example, they said they proactively solicited servicer input on draft requirements related to new student loan repayment plans, which led them to revise the related change requests before formally sending them to servicers. Education guidance states that it can share information with servicers when developing new requirements, but it does not specify criteria for when staff should conduct early coordination. While recent reports of improved early coordination are a positive change, Education does not have formal criteria to ensure it consistently identifies early coordination opportunities and maintains increased coordination. Developing and implementing formal criteria could help ensure that Education provides servicers with the information they need to implement requested changes in a timely and efficient manner. Why GAO Did This Study As of September 2025, Education held over $1.6 trillion in outstanding federal student loans. To administer these loans, Education contracts with student loan servicers. Significant program changes have added new complexities to servicers’ responsibilities. For example, under Education’s direction, servicers implemented temporary initiatives and major changes to the repayment plans available to borrowers. GAO was asked to review Education’s instruction to loan servicers. This report examines Education’s instruction to servicers for program changes. GAO reviewed Education’s instruction to servicers, including 68 change requests associated with key program changes that the agency issued between the start of the COVID-19 payment pause in March 2020 and December 2024. GAO interviewed officials from Education and the four loan servicers it had contracts with when the payment pause ended in August 2023. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations.

What GAO Found The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) began posting its estimated savings on a web page known as the Wall of Receipts on February 17, 2025. As of July 7, 2026, the Wall of Receipts reported savings of $110 billion across contracts, grants, and leases, but some savings estimates are incorrect or lack supporting evidence. While DOGE provided some information about estimated savings, several issues limit the transparency and reliability of these reported savings. DOGE was not transparent regarding methodologies used to calculate savings. Specifically, DOGE did not use its stated methodology to calculate the majority of savings associated with the contracts reported as terminated. For grants, DOGE did not provide sufficient information to verify the method used to calculate 96 percent of DOGE-reported savings. Similarly, the Wall of Receipts does not include an explanation of how the savings from terminated leases were calculated. The Wall of Receipts includes leases identified for termination before DOGE was established. Specifically,108 of the 264 leases identified for termination on the Wall of Receipts, about $15.3 million of the total $53.5 million in savings, were already in process for termination when DOGE was established. GAO’s review of selected contracts identified potential cost savings, but the basis for some reported savings is unknown. For example, DOGE reported $1.7 billion in savings on the Department of Defense’s Defense Health Agency contract for IT services at more than 700 military treatment facilities worldwide. While DOGE initially identified the contract for termination, in the end, no action was taken to terminate the contract, or to reduce scope, value, or funding. Thus, no savings were achieved. While the Wall of Receipts includes some information about the data and sources underlying reported savings, it does not sufficiently disclose limitations affecting data quality. GAO’s key practices for transparently reporting government information state that federal government websites should disclose known data quality issues and limitations. DOGE launched the initial iteration of the Wall of Receipts in February 2025 less than a month after the entity was established in January 2025. Since the initial launch, there have been no updates on the site to shed additional light on the cost savings methodology or to disclose any data limitations. As of July 7, 2026, the web page remains live. Because U.S. DOGE Service officials did not respond to requests for information, GAO could not determine the reasons why DOGE did not disclose data quality issues and limitations when the website first went live or at any time since then. Publicly reporting government data, such as on the Wall of Receipts, can have significant value. However, conveying the methodologies used to calculate savings, as well as any data limitations on the Wall of Receipts, would provide policymakers and the public with the needed caveats to better interpret and use the information. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies obligated more than $2 trillion for contracts, grants, and leases in fiscal year 2025. In an effort to transform federal spending and ensure transparency, the President issued several executive orders, including Executive Order 14158 to establish DOGE. Additionally, agencies were directed to establish agency DOGE teams and consult with these teams to review federal contracts, grants, and real estate. GAO was asked to evaluate DOGE’s savings estimates listed on the Wall of Receipts for contract, grant, and lease terminations. This report assesses (1) the methodologies DOGE used to estimate savings from contracts, grants, and leases reported as terminated, and (2) the extent to which DOGE discloses any data limitations. This review covered savings data reported on the Wall of Receipts for contracts, grants, and leases from January 20, 2025, through July 7, 2026. GAO analyzed data from the Wall of Receipts, publicly available federal databases, and information sources such as USASpending.gov. GAO also interviewed officials from selected federal agencies about the contracts or leases in their purview. DOGE did not respond to GAO’s request for information or interviews.

What GAO Found The Department of Commerce has continued to implement the semiconductor facilities and equipment incentives program, and awardees have made progress on milestones. Since July 2025, Commerce has awarded nine new projects, for a total of 49 projects across 24 companies. When setting award amounts, Commerce considered new factors as compared to prior awards, such as whether the company would provide equity in exchange for funding. Commerce also amended existing awards for 14 companies. As of April 2026, awardees had completed all required milestones by their due dates, but some milestones had fallen behind anticipated schedules. Commerce has disbursed $13.1 billion to awardees—approximately 42 percent of the total $31.5 billion in direct funding. Commerce initially established key advanced microelectronics R&D activities but later canceled awards representing $7.8 billion of the $11 billion appropriated. The agency significantly revised its approach to align with current administration priorities but did not have a plan or timeline for fully meeting statutory requirements—specifically those related to the National Semiconductor Technology Center, National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program (NAPMP), and Industrial Advisory Committee. For example, Commerce canceled the center’s award in 2025, but its plan to reestablish the center is not sufficiently detailed to show how it will meet relevant statutory requirements. Commerce also canceled or paused NAPMP awards and has not renewed the advisory committee charter. Without a detailed plan for reestablishing these entities in line with statute, Commerce may miss opportunities to advance U.S. semiconductor technologies, leaving the U.S. reliant on other countries. Commerce’s Changes to Advanced Microelectronics R&D Activities Why GAO Did This Study Semiconductors, also called chips, are small electronic devices that are critical to nearly all industries. A recent global semiconductor shortage exposed long-term risks in the supply chain. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (as amended, the FY21 NDAA) authorized Commerce to incentivize semiconductor facilities and equipment projects and support advanced microelectronics R&D. The FY21 NDAA also includes a provision for GAO to issue a series of reports. This second report updates GAO’s December 2025 report on the status of financial assistance awards and projects funded under the semiconductor incentives program as of June 5, 2026, and assesses the status of Commerce’s efforts on the advanced microelectronics R&D programs, among other objectives. GAO analyzed Commerce documents, including project milestone and disbursement documentation. In addition, GAO reviewed requirements in the FY21 NDAA and compared Commerce’s efforts to those requirements. GAO also interviewed Commerce officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) uses international agreements and arrangements to achieve political, economic, and military objectives. For example, these could include cooperatively developing and producing a military system with a foreign partner. From fiscal years 2021 through 2025, DOD established 303 acquisition-related international arrangements with an associated dollar value of $64 billion. However, both the number and dollar value of these arrangements declined over this period. DOD officials said that factors like personnel shortages and lengthy review and approval timelines contributed to this decline. Decline in DOD International Arrangements, Fiscal Years (FY) 2021–2025 DOD’s internal coordination and communication for international arrangements varied. Apart from occasional difficulties, officials said that coordination between the Under Secretary of Defense (USD)-level offices—Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), Office of General Counsel, and Policy—is working relatively well. However, communication between USD-level offices and the military departments about some key changes has not been timely. For example, changes to the application of cost-sharing requirements were not broadly communicated when they occurred and were instead shared on an agreement-by-agreement basis. According to military department officials, they subsequently had to adjust and renegotiate multiple arrangements, and some foreign partners opted out of arrangements entirely. DOD has not yet fully identified or responded to the challenges it faces in establishing these arrangements, and its approach to managing these challenges has at times been ad hoc and reactive. Using a tailored version of GAO’s enterprise risk management framework, GAO identified benefits that DOD could realize by implementing a more systematic approach for managing challenges. For example, USD(A&S) could use available data to better leverage resources and pinpoint and monitor challenges to improve oversight. Ultimately, a more systematic approach could help ensure that DOD is better positioned to meet strategic goals for cost-sharing and defense industrial base improvements, while also reducing rework, wasted effort, and costs. Why GAO Did This Study DOD relies on international arrangements to achieve various purposes, including for acquisition activities like increasing access to needed parts, technologies, and resources. Responsibilities for developing these arrangements are dispersed throughout DOD, with the military departments developing and negotiating them, and USD offices reviewing and approving them. A Senate report includes a provision for GAO to review DOD’s coordination for international arrangements. GAO’s report examines (1) data trends for selected arrangements for fiscal years 2021–2025; and (2) the extent to which DOD offices coordinate and communicate regarding these arrangements; and (3) assesses DOD’s approach to identifying and addressing challenges for these arrangements. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed military department data for selected arrangements established during fiscal years 2021–2025; reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and DOD policies; and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found Wearable devices (wearables) with health-related features have the potential to be used in clinical decision-making (see figure). Wearables can be either medical or wellness devices, and their features can be augmented by artificial intelligence (AI). Wearables use sensors to track vital signs and establish patient health baselines; alert users, caregivers, or clinicians of medical events or suggested lifestyle changes; and provide additional assessments of user data that can be sent to a clinician for interpretation. Clinicians could use such data as a source of information when diagnosing and treating patients. Examples of wearables that could be used in clinical decision-making Wearables increase the amount of information considered during clinical decision-making, which may allow for quicker diagnoses by clinicians, more personalized care plans, and improved patient compliance. Wearables may also benefit underserved populations by expanding remote patient monitoring. However, wearables vary in accuracy and reliability. AI has the potential to increase the capabilities of wearables by, for example, improving autonomous decision-making. However, the extent to which wearables will be able to make clinical decisions autonomously is unclear at this time. GAO identified challenges to using wearables for clinical decision-making, including challenges related to ensuring wearables benefit patients as intended, integrating wearables into clinical workflows, and navigating the health technology market. GAO developed three policy options that could help address the challenges and enhance the benefits of using wearables in clinical decision-making. The first is the status quo, whereby policymakers would continue with current efforts and activities in the field. The other two policy options identify possible new actions by policymakers, which may include legislative bodies, government agencies, standards-setting organizations, industry, and other groups. See below for details of the policy options and relevant opportunities and considerations. Policy Options Help Address Challenges with Use of Wearables in Clinical Decision-Making   Continue the status quo (report page 24) Policymakers could continue ongoing digital health technology activities, and policymakers outside of government could continue voluntarily testing the use of wearables for clinical purposes.     Opportunities Monitoring and assessing recent and ongoing activities related to digital health technologies, including wearables, may help address some of the challenges GAO identified. Such challenges include ensuring patient health benefits, integrating wearables into clinical workflows, and navigating the health technology market. Considerations Some of the challenges GAO identified may remain unaddressed by recent or ongoing activities, and some activities may worsen some challenges.   Integration of wearables into clinical workflows (report page 26) Policymakers could refine the clinical workflows and technology infrastructure of medical facilities to support the integration of wearables into clinical decision-making.     Opportunities Improving clinical workflow integration could help establish common practices for receiving, responding to, and protecting patient health data, which could protect privacy and improve patient outcomes. It could also help clarify clinician responsibilities surrounding the use of wearables data in clinical decision-making, which could ease liability concerns. Considerations Resource requirements for wearables integration could shift resources away from other priorities. Patients and clinicians may experience variable results according to the local implementation strategy. If administrators improve the integration of selected wearables, the use of wearables not selected may decline.   Improvements to wearables performance (report page 27) Policymakers could incentivize manufacturers to improve the performance of wearables by building and maintaining a comprehensive public database of recommended wearables that have completed a selected, independent certification process. Clinicians and patients could then use the database to help find certified devices.     Opportunities Testing and disclosure of wearables performance could help medical facility administrators, clinicians, and patients make more informed decisions about the benefits and risks of selecting specific wearables. Encouraging companies to maintain a certification may increase manufacturer testing of wearables’ effect on patient health and safety. Considerations Incentivizing participation in a certification process that is separate from the Food and Drug Administration’s review process may create confusion for wearables manufacturers, clinicians, and patients, with potential effects on patient safety. Research and development costs may rise significantly, hindering the market for new wearables and potentially advantaging larger, established manufacturers. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-107847 Why GAO Did This Study Because wearables may facilitate more timely and personalized patient care, manufacturers and medical association representatives have suggested increasing their integration into clinical decision-making. In addition, in 2025 leaders at the Department of Health and Human Services announced support for increasing the use of wearables in health care. GAO was asked to review the potential role of wearables in clinical decision-making. This report examines (1) the potential benefits and challenges of using wearables in clinical decision-making, (2) the potential benefits and challenges of using AI to augment the decision-making capabilities of such wearables, and (3) what policy options might help address challenges and enhance benefits associated with the use of wearables in clinical decision-making. To conduct this engagement, GAO reviewed scientific literature, federal agency guidance, and other documents; interviewed a wide range of stakeholders and agency representatives; and conducted site visits to laboratories, medical and research centers, and manufacturers to better understand these technologies. For more information, contact Sarah Harvey at HarveyS@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Carbon Oxide Sequestration Credit (45Q) is a tax credit provided for certain carbon oxides that are captured at emission sources or directly from the air and either stored underground or used to produce products. The credit has been amended multiple times, including by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which added new credit features. More recently, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act created parity in credit values across uses of captured carbon. As of March 2026, there were 33 carbon capture facilities in the U.S., with additional facilities planned. The number of 45Q credit claims more than tripled from 2019 to 2023, according to IRS data. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken several actions to administer the 45Q credit and mitigate potential noncompliance. However, taxpayers using carbon to produce products face compliance burdens, delays, and uncertainty in claiming the credit. GAO identified areas in the approval process for carbon utilization where IRS and the Department of Energy (DOE) could potentially minimize compliance burden and improve certainty for taxpayers. Pursuing such opportunities—for example, streamlining certain processes, or clarifying acceptable datasets that can be used to calculate carbon displaced—could improve the process and help minimize delays for both agencies and taxpayers. Multiple potential goals, the lack of a designated agency to evaluate the effectiveness of the credit, and data limitations complicate Congress’s ability to understand the performance of the 45Q credit. Even so, periodic reviews of tax expenditures are crucial for informed oversight. GAO has previously recommended various actions Congress and agencies could take to improve oversight for other tax expenditures, such as identifying what should be analyzed and by whom. In this report, GAO identified key questions for Congress to consider directing agencies to analyze to help determine the performance of the credit. These key questions are: (1) how well the credit is working to achieve its goals, (2) how efficiently the credit is performing and (3) how the credit compares to other policy tools. Why GAO Did This Study The 45Q credit was created in 2008 to incentivize the development of carbon capture technology and reduce carbon emissions. Carbon capture involves complex and novel technology, and the 45Q credit could result in potentially substantial revenue expenditures. The IRA includes a provision for GAO to review the distribution and use of IRA funds. This report assesses (1) IRS’s administration of the 45Q credit, and (2) the challenges in evaluating the effectiveness of the credit. GAO reviewed agency policies and procedures and interviewed officials from IRS, DOE, and the Environmental Protection Agency. GAO also interviewed selected external stakeholders knowledgeable about the 45Q credit, representing advocacy, research, and industry. GAO also conducted two site visits to carbon capture sites in Houston, Texas.

What GAO Found Intercollegiate athletics at four-year colleges in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) are organized into divisions, subdivisions, and conferences. Division I (DI) colleges compete at the highest level and can offer students full athletics scholarships. Division II (DII) colleges typically offer partial athletics scholarships. In both divisions, expenses for most athletic programs were greater than the revenue they generated, according to GAO’s analysis of NCAA data for the 2014–15 and 2023–24 academic years. In the 2023–24 academic year, the 352 DI colleges reported spending a total of $20.8 billion on athletics, which largely went to team and game expenses (including travel, equipment, and medical expenses), coach and support staff compensation, and athletics scholarships. The 69 “Power” colleges in the most competitive DI conferences accounted for more than half of this spending. To help cover athletics expenses, DI college athletics programs generated $13.1 billion in revenue during the 2023–24 academic year. Power colleges generated $10 billion of this total amount, primarily through the sale of media rights to broadcast games, game day revenue (including ticket sales), and donations. Across DI colleges, 94 percent of athletics programs, including 49 of the 69 Power colleges, spent more than they generated in revenue in the 2023–24 academic year. The median college reported a gap of $20.6 million. This gap was larger than the median a decade earlier ($12.3 million). Over this period, spending increased more than generated revenue in all DI subdivisions. As generated revenue generally did not cover program expenses, most DI colleges reported contributing substantial funding to support athletics programs. Colleges contributed a total of $7.2 billion in the 2023–24 academic year. These college contributions are funded by tuition and fees paid by students, as well as other unrestricted funds from the college, such as income from investments. College contributions indirectly include federal funds students receive in federal student aid to pay their tuition and fees (see figure). College Contributions for Division I College Athletics Programs, Based on Academic Year 2023–24 Data Note: Amounts reflected are illustrative estimates and do not reflect actual student payments to athletics programs. All DII athletics programs spent more than the revenue they generated in the 2023–24 academic year. Combined, they spent $2.7 billion that year. To help cover this spending, they generated $0.4 billion and received $2.3 billion in college contributions. Why GAO Did This Study Many colleges spend millions of dollars on their athletics programs. Under the 2025 settlement of the In re College Athlete NIL Litigation case (House settlement), DI colleges can now share up to $20.5 million of revenue with student-athletes, starting with the 2025–26 academic year. Most DI colleges opted to participate in revenue sharing in that first year, which may impact finances for some college athletics programs. There has been recent federal interest in college athletics as reflected in Executive Orders and proposed legislation. GAO was asked to examine college athletics costs given that colleges may use funds to support athletics programs that come partly from federal aid students receive to pay their tuition and fees. This report provides information about DI and DII intercollegiate athletics finances prior to the House settlement to depict the landscape before revenue sharing took effect. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DI and DII aggregated data from the NCAA’s membership financial database for the 2014–2015 and 2023–2024 (the most recent available data at the time of the analysis) academic years. These years were selected to analyze points in time over a ten-year period. The NCAA provided data to GAO but otherwise had no role in the development of this report; the findings and conclusions are GAO’s alone. GAO also interviewed representatives from four national stakeholder organizations knowledgeable about college athletics programs finances and operations. For more information, contact Melissa Emrey-Arras at emreyarrasm@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO identified 206 Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) personnel who held positions in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) from January 20, 2025, through January 31, 2026. These individuals held positions at the U.S. DOGE Service (USDS), White House Office, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Some of these DOGE personnel were also detailed to other executive agencies outside of EOP. USDS is responsible for coordinating with executive agencies to advance DOGE’s initiatives. Coordination Between U.S. DOGE Service and Other Federal Entities Of the 206 personnel GAO identified, administration officials characterized four as DOGE leaders. The other 202 personnel held positions at either USDS or the White House Office. These personnel held positions as employees, as detailees to these components from other federal agencies, and as volunteers. Twenty-seven of the 206 were special government employees (SGE). At least 128, including one SGE, had separated from their EOP positions by January 31, 2026. EOP officials told GAO that DOGE personnel within EOP receive the same ethics and records management training as other EOP personnel. However, EOP did not respond to GAO’s requests for access to training records and financial disclosures for DOGE personnel. As a result, GAO could not determine all DOGE personnel who received training or completed financial disclosures with EOP. Nine executive agencies provided information on ethics and records management activities for 64 DOGE personnel who held positions at those agencies and also within EOP. According to this information, 49 completed ethics training, 18 completed records management training, and 38 filed financial disclosures with those agencies during the time frame of GAO’s review. Officials from the nine agencies told GAO that some of the 28 personnel they identified as detailees should have completed these activities with their home agencies. Officials from six agencies told GAO that no individuals at those agencies met GAO’s scoping criteria. Ten did not provide requested information timely or at all. As a result, GAO could not determine all DOGE personnel who held positions, received training, or completed financial disclosures with these 10 agencies. Officials from the Office of Government Ethics, the supervising ethics office for the executive branch, told GAO that they have limited responsibilities concerning the activities of DOGE personnel and do not oversee executive branch employees. Officials said their office has not reviewed an EOP ethics program since 2023 and has no plans to review USDS’s program in the next 4 years because the temporary organization within USDS terminated on July 4, 2026. Why GAO Did This Study In January and February 2025, several executive orders directed DOGE to implement a series of government reform initiatives, including to reform the federal workforce and reduce spending. DOGE personnel include SGEs. SGEs may have substantial financial interests outside the federal government that can conflict with their federal responsibilities. Appropriate ethics and records management practices can help support ethical behavior. GAO was asked to review the employment status of selected DOGE personnel and their activities. This report examines information about (1) the federal positions of EOP DOGE personnel, and (2) their completion of ethics and records management training and their filing of financial disclosures. For this review, GAO defined EOP DOGE personnel as those who held positions (1) as USDS personnel from January 20, 2025, through January 31, 2026; or (2) as personnel at other EOP components (White House Office or OMB) who assisted USDS or federal agencies in advancing DOGE’s initiatives during this time frame. This included individuals who were detailed from EOP to other agencies or from other agencies to EOP. GAO reviewed information from court filings, the administration, and executive agencies about identified personnel’s federal positions. GAO also reviewed information from these sources about identified personnel’s ethics and records management training and their filing of financial disclosures. In addition, GAO interviewed Office of Government Ethics and National Archives and Records Administration officials about their efforts to support EOP ethics and records management activities for DOGE personnel. GAO requested interviews with EOP, but EOP did not respond to these requests. For more information, contact Jessica Lucas-Judy at lucasjudyj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 79 priority recommendations for the Department of Defense. Since then, the Department has implemented 17 of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified an additional seven priority recommendations and removed the priority designation from 16 recommendations, bringing the total to 53 priority recommendations. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention:  Sustaining U.S. military readiness,  Ensuring weapon system acquisition and modernization, and  Improving financial and fraud risk management. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would support combat readiness by maintaining the Department's current weapon capabilities; address challenges with its high-risk weapon systems acquisition; and contribute to the Department's goal of an unmodified financial audit. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across the Department. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at berrickc@gao.gov

What GAO Found The increasing number and complexity of disasters demonstrates the need to ensure that the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) workforce can meet its core mission to help people before, during, and after disasters. In response to 2025 presidential directives, many federal agencies have taken steps to reduce the size of their workforces. In fiscal year 2025, FEMA employed about 25,134 employees, on average. However, over 4,300 employees separated from FEMA in fiscal year 2025—a 55 percent increase in separations from fiscal year 2024 (see figure). These separations have resulted in a loss of institutional knowledge and experienced personnel, according to FEMA officials, and have exacerbated longstanding workforce challenges. In 2025, FEMA rescinded its strategic plan. As a result, the agency has no overall strategic direction on which to base workforce planning—a systematic and continuous process for identifying the size and composition of a workforce needed to achieve an agency’s mission. Without a strategic plan that outlines clear goals and objectives, FEMA cannot effectively determine its future workforce needs, potentially putting its mission at risk. In addition, GAO found that FEMA did not base its 2025 and 2026 workforce reduction decisions, proposed future workforce actions, or workforce policy changes on the results of a workforce analysis—an assessment of the current state of the workforce and a forecast of future organizational requirements. FEMA took these actions without assessing whether it had the necessary staffing capacity to meet its mission, including its statutory requirements. Without workforce planning, FEMA is not positioned to determine whether it has the right number of people with the right skills in the right positions at the right time to meet its mission. Further, for more than a decade, GAO has identified challenges FEMA has encountered in maintaining a sufficient workforce to effectively meet its mission. Although FEMA has made progress towards addressing some of these challenges, actions by Congress would provide additional accountability to ensure that FEMA maintains a workforce capable of meeting its mission while addressing long-standing workforce management challenges. Percentage of Headquarters and Regional FEMA Staff Separations Due to Voluntary Workforce Reduction Programs, Jan. 20, 2025–Jan. 10, 2026 Why GAO Did This Study FEMA has long-standing workforce management challenges that make supporting disaster response and recovery difficult. As such, GAO added strengthening FEMA’s disaster workforce and capacity to its High Risk List in February 2025. GAO was asked to review FEMA’s ability to provide effective staffing for disaster response and recovery and how FEMA is addressing any workforce challenges. This report examines (1) how FEMA’s workforce changed in 2025 and 2026; (2) the extent to which FEMA has strategic direction to identify workforce needs; and (3) the extent to which FEMA has assessed the ability of its workforce to meet its mission needs. GAO evaluated FEMA’s workforce planning efforts against key practices for workforce planning and analyzed data on FEMA’s workforce size and composition. GAO also reviewed documentation related to (1) workforce changes and decisions in 2025 and 2026 and (2) FEMA’s strategic direction. Lastly, GAO interviewed FEMA officials in headquarters and all 10 regions.

What GAO Found The Department of Justice (DOJ) routinely forms task forces to investigate national security issues and criminal activity, including various forms of trafficking, terrorist threats, and violent gang activity. Through these task forces, DOJ law enforcement agencies partner with thousands of nonfederal officers from state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies. Number and Types of Active Department of Justice Task Forces, as of April 2026 All four of the DOJ components GAO reviewed—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals Service—use training to communicate task force officer roles and responsibilities. This training includes the DOJ components’ legal authorities and policies, including how to conduct federal investigations or exercise federal law enforcement authorities. However, ATF, DEA, and FBI allow nonfederal officers to engage in task force operations (e.g., serve warrants) before they have completed their initial task force officer training. Requiring nonfederal task force officers to complete training on relevant legal authorities and policies before engaging in task force operations would ensure components achieve the intent of their training and reduce the risk that officers will participate in task force operations without fully understanding the federal authorities they were deputized to exercise. ATF, DEA, FBI, and the U.S. Marshals Service policies require federal supervision of nonfederal task force officers, such as reviewing investigative reports and monitoring performance. These policies also require employees to report allegations of misconduct by nonfederal task force officers to their management. However, GAO found the four DOJ components do not have guidelines and criteria for field managers (such as the special agent in charge of a field office) to apply in adjudicating such allegations. By establishing guidelines field managers can use to adjudicate misconduct allegations, such as the conditions under which nonfederal officers should be removed from a task force, DOJ components can ensure they are applying the same criteria across their task forces. In the absence of such guidelines, there is increased risk of inconsistent adjudications, which could jeopardize the integrity of task force operations and erode public trust in task force effectiveness. Why GAO Did This Study DOJ deputizes nonfederal officers to serve on federal task forces to obtain valuable insights into regional or local criminal activity and assist the investigative work of DOJ’s federal law enforcement officers. GAO was asked to review DOJ task force policies for nonfederal officers. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which DOJ components have policies and procedures to (1) communicate task force roles and responsibilities and (2) supervise nonfederal task force officers. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed component-level policies, task force agreements, and laws; and interviewed officials from the four components DOJ identified as leading task forces. To identify policies and procedures implemented at the field- and task force-levels, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed members of a nongeneralizable sample of eight task forces, based on task force type and location.

What GAO Found Ten of the 13 B-52 modernizations are experiencing cost, schedule, or performance challenges. The Air Force’s most expensive B-52 modernization effort, the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) will likely continue to face significant challenges as the Air Force plans to begin production with little to no developmental flight testing. While the Air Force analyzed and accepted increased risks from this approach in 2023, since then CERP costs increased by about $3 billion and initial operational capability was delayed more than 15 months. Department of Defense (DOD) policy states cost estimates should consider risk and include an analysis that identifies and evaluates alternative courses of action that may reduce cost and risk. Reassessing these risks would better inform decision-makers as they consider when to begin production. B-52 Transporting an X-15 Rocket Research Aircraft in 1959 In addition, as the Air Force develops its 13 modernizations, it is not consistently using digital engineering tools that provide decision-makers real-time data to assess overall performance allowing them to make timely and well-informed decisions. DOD issued guidance in 2023 stating programs in development should incorporate digital tools, such as digital twins, when it’s practical, beneficial, and affordable. The Air Force has not assessed the potential use of digital engineering on all B-52 modernizations. As a result, the Air Force may be missing opportunities to take advantage of efficiencies that digital engineering can provide, including avoiding future sustainment and supportability challenges. The Air Force conducts planned maintenance on B-52s at a repair depot about every 4 years and has developed analyses to ensure it has sufficient capacity to perform planned modernization. However, the current maintenance plans assume that the Air Force will complete CERP and install new engines on time and do not account for risks from further schedule delays. B-52 maintenance is already struggling with finding sufficient parts for the current engines. Without planning for the possibility of engine delays from CERP, the Air Force risks falling behind on planned B-52 maintenance, which could impact readiness. Why GAO Did This Study The B-52 bomber is an aircraft capable of performing conventional and nuclear missions. The B-52 was originally introduced in 1955 with a projected lifespan of 20 years. The Air Force has since extended the aircraft’s lifespan through 2050. To maintain the B-52’s strategic edge, the Air Force is projected to spend an estimated $21 billion for modernizations including new engines, radar, and communications. A Senate report included a provision for GAO to assess B-52 modernization. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which (1) B-52 modernizations are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance goals, and (2) the Air Force has developed plans to ensure sufficient depot capacity for the modernizations. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in July 2026. DOD deemed some schedule and mission capable information sensitive, and GAO omitted it from this report. To conduct this review, GAO evaluated Air Force acquisition and sustainment documentation. GAO conducted site visits to the B-52 program office, depot, and logistics center. GAO also analyzed data and interviewed officials on depot performance, spare part and support equipment needs, and B-52 availability.

What GAO Found The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) provided about $41.5 billion in supplemental appropriations to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for grants and other investments to reduce air pollution and enhance national climate resilience. EPA primarily used the appropriations to create new grant programs and has awarded hundreds of grants. In 2025, EPA terminated grants funded by $30 billion of IRA appropriations and several grant recipients were challenging the terminations in court as of June 2026. Of the roughly $11.5 billion in appropriations unaffected by the terminations and related litigation, Public Law 119-21, commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), rescinded the budget authority for about $1.2 billion that EPA had not yet obligated. As of March 2026, EPA was overseeing about $10.2 billion in appropriations it obligated before OBBBA was enacted and which are not affected by ongoing litigation. EPA has expended about $686 million of these obligated funds. Status of About $11.5 Billion in Appropriations Provided to EPA in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA), as of March 2026 Note: Percentages exceed 100 percent because expenditures are a subset of obligations. The unobligated balance reflects the amount EPA has not yet obligated from the appropriations unaffected by OBBBA’s rescissions. EPA’s obligations are mostly for competitive grants, and state governments received the largest number of grants. Of the about $10.2 billion in total obligations, EPA obligated about $8.6 billion from fiscal years 2023 to 2026 for efforts to reduce air pollution across the country, including replacing certain heavy-duty vehicles with emissions-free equivalents such as battery-electric or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, deploying emissions-free equipment at U.S. ports, and improving energy efficiency in commercial and public buildings. EPA used the agency’s standard policies and procedures when it reviewed and selected recipients for competitive grants. Specifically, GAO found that EPA followed its competition policy by providing notice to potential applicants of its program goals, eligibility requirements, and evaluation criteria. EPA reviewers ranked the merit of eligible applicants using points-based scoring systems and made recommendations to agency selection officials, who made the final selection decisions. GAO found that EPA is using its standard processes for overseeing recipients’ use of funds. EPA requires that grant recipients submit periodic performance reports. According to the agency, it plans to conduct an additional level of oversight for all its IRA grants through an in-depth assessment at least once during their performance periods. EPA officials stated they are assessing the agency’s resource needs in light of staff reductions that have occurred since January 2025 and are using contractor support to fill in gaps where necessary. Why GAO Did This Study The appropriations provided by the IRA constitute a significant increase in funds available to EPA, which typically have been about $9 billion per year. GAO was asked to review EPA’s use of IRA appropriations, including any related changes to the agency’s staffing. Additionally, the IRA includes a provision for GAO to support oversight of the distribution and use of IRA appropriations. This report provides information about EPA’s use and oversight of the $10.2 billion the agency obligated and the processes EPA used to make funding decisions. GAO reviewed EPA obligations and expenditures data through March 2026. GAO also reviewed legal requirements, relevant EPA documents, and recipients’ single audit reports. GAO interviewed selected grant recipients based on factors such as geographic variation, as well as EPA officials. For more information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at gomezj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Various federal land and water management agencies and Tribes have entered into shared decision-making agreements. Under these agreements, Tribes provide substantive input on federal natural and cultural resource management decisions over many years. The relevant federal agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, the Interior, and their subcomponents. The subcomponents include the U.S. Forest Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service. GAO identified five lessons learned from the implementation of shared decision-making agreements between federal agencies and Tribes. Five Lessons Federal Agency and Tribal Officials Learned from Implementing Shared Decision-Making Agreements These lessons are important for various reasons. For example, with respect to developing mutual understanding and trust, tribal officials party to an agreement said agency staff met with them in person, had open minds, and treated them with respect. This encouraged candid conversations and helped participants better understand one another’s perspectives. In developing and implementing shared decision-making agreements, there are key questions related to each lesson learned that would be useful for federal agencies and Tribes to consider. For example, Does the agreement or supporting documents clearly identify how the parties will implement the agreement? Have parties taken concerted efforts to understand each other’s approaches to natural and cultural resource management, and recognize constraints on their participation, such as legal limitations? Have parties identified existing policies and procedures that can create challenges to working together, such as contrasting definitions or differing timelines? Have parties identified the appropriate knowledge and skills federal staff need to implement the agreement? Have parties determined what resources are available? Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies manage public lands and waters, including national forests and parks, that are tribal ancestral territories and have special importance to Tribes. Agencies collaborate with Tribes to help achieve their missions and fulfill the unique federal trust and treaty responsibilities. GAO was asked to examine issues related to agencies developing and implementing shared decision-making agreements with Tribes. In a January 2026 report, GAO reported on factors that affected development of shared decision-making agreements. This report identifies lessons that federal agencies and Tribes learned during the implementation of shared decision-making agreements for managing public lands and waters. It also includes related key questions. GAO reviewed information collected in interviews with the parties to shared decision-making agreements discussed in the previous report (GAO-26-106626). GAO analyzed statements related to implementing agreements, and identified lessons learned, their importance, and related key questions. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at OrtizA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for planning, designing, and constructing much of the nation’s federally funded flood risk management infrastructure. The Corps usually does not request funds for disaster response during the annual budget cycle but instead receives supplemental appropriations for such activities after a disaster has occurred. In fiscal year (FY) 2004 through FY 2025, Congress appropriated more than $60 billion to the Corps for disaster response through 19 post-disaster supplemental appropriations acts and $450 million through annual appropriations acts. Post-Disaster Supplemental Appropriations to the Corps for Disaster Response, FYs 2004–2025 If necessary to address disasters, the Corps can transfer funds from certain other appropriations accounts to the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies account, which funds the Corps’s disaster work. The Corps has transferred about $910 million into this account since FY 2004. Officials said they reimburse funds transferred once they receive an appropriation. The Corps spent more than $34 billion on disasters from FY 2006 through FY 2025. Because the Corps has historically received “no-year” appropriations that are available for obligation indefinitely, the Corps does not have to immediately expend funds. Disaster spending during this period included activities related to preparedness (such as supplies and equipment, planning, and training), emergency response, and project repair. After a disaster, the Corps gathers information by assessing damage to projects. The Corps may use this information to support flood risk management and emergency response. This includes activities such as improving flood risk management models and informing early warnings systems and evacuation protocols. The Corps has also used this information to make decisions about modifications to damaged projects to provide greater protection and improve resilience, such as increasing the height of a levee. The Corps’s Emergency Response to Natural Disasters program has exercised its authority under P.L. 84-99 to modify several projects. Why GAO Did This Study Many of the nation’s dams and levees were built over 50 years ago and, like other aging infrastructure, may be more vulnerable to failure, especially given the rise in the number of disasters and increasing challenges related to delivery of federal disaster assistance. The Thomas R. Carper Water Resources Development Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to analyze Corps disaster preparedness and response activities. This report provides information on how Corps disaster response and praeparedness activities have been funded since FY 2004 and how the Corps uses information about the effects of natural disasters when making decisions on flood risk management projects. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed budget requests, appropriations acts, and Corps expenditure data and reviewed Corps documents, including agency guidance and webpages. GAO is reporting expenditure data from post-disaster supplemental appropriations beginning in FY 2006 rather than FY 2004 because that is when the Corps began using specific codes in its financial system of record to link expenditures to post-disaster supplemental appropriations acts. GAO also examined publicly available information on levees and dams and interviewed Corps officials. For more information, contact Rachel Frisk at FriskR@gao.gov.