What GAO Found Each year, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processes millions of applications and petitions for persons seeking to visit or reside in the U.S. or become citizens. USCIS's Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) leads the agency’s efforts to combat fraud. In September 2022, GAO reported that USCIS could better ensure its antifraud efforts are effective and efficient by taking a strategic and risk-based approach that aligns with leading practices in three areas of GAO’s Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (see figure). Specifically, GAO found that USCIS had conducted fraud risk assessments for a small number of specific immigration benefits, but did not have a process for regularly conducting those assessments. In addition, GAO reported that FDNS had not developed an antifraud strategy to guide the design and implementation of antifraud activities, as well as the allocation of resources to respond to its highest-risk areas. GAO also found that FDNS had not evaluated its antifraud activities for efficiency and effectiveness. Taking action to implement these leading practices will help USCIS ensure that it is effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud. USCIS Should Take Action in Key Areas to Manage Fraud Risks In December 2025, GAO reported that from May 2022 through September 2024, about 774,000 noncitizens were granted parole—temporary permission to stay in the U.S.—across three humanitarian parole processes for noncitizens with U.S.-based supporters. These processes included Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans; Uniting for Ukraine; and family reunification parole. USCIS was responsible for reviewing supporter applications for evidence they had sufficient financial means to support prospective parole beneficiaries and met other requirements. In early 2024, FDNS officials analyzed 2.6 million supporter applications and found that fraud risks were widespread in Uniting for Ukraine and Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans parole processes. For example, fraud indicators included supporter information belonging to deceased individuals and thousands of applications with at least one piece of fictitious supporter information. USCIS attributed the fraud risks to insufficient internal controls in its supporter vetting process—for example, not having automated processes to prevent or detect possible fraudulent activity. DHS has since suspended or terminated the processes. However, GAO found that USCIS has not developed an internal control plan for new or changed programs in the future. Such a plan could include basic antifraud controls and mechanisms to help proactively identify and mitigate fraud risks. Why GAO Did This Study Granting immigration benefits to individuals with fraudulent claims can jeopardize the integrity of the immigration system by enabling individuals to remain in the U.S. and potentially apply for certain federal benefits or pursue a path to citizenship. In 2022 and 2023, DHS introduced new processes for humanitarian parole in response to increases in noncitizens arriving at the southwest border. The processes allowed eligible noncitizens from certain countries to travel to the U.S. to seek a grant of parole. To be eligible, noncitizens had to have a U.S.-based supporter apply to financially support them. As of December 2025, DHS had suspended or terminated the processes. This statement discusses USCIS efforts to manage fraud risks (1) across immigration benefits it adjudicates and (2) in humanitarian parole processes for noncitizens with U.S.-based supporters. This statement is based primarily on our September 2022 and December 2025 reports on these topics.

What GAO Found The Marine Corps and Air Force had higher rates of the most serious accidents in the last 2 fiscal years (2023 and 2024) with its Osprey aircraft compared with the average serious accident rate for the previous 8 years, based on available Department of Defense (DOD) data. In fiscal years 2023 and 2024, 18 serious, non-combat accidents occured involving death; permanent disability; extensive hospitalization; property damage of $600,000 or more; or a destroyed aircraft. Rates of serious accidents were between 36 percent and 88 percent higher than each service's average rate for the prior 8 fiscal years. Percent Difference of Serious Osprey Accident Rates in Fiscal Years 2023 and 2024 Compared to Service Average for Fiscal Years 2015–2022 Note: The accident rate equals the number of accidents per year divided by the number of flight hours per year and then multiplied by 100,000. Serious accidents refer to combined Class A and B accidents which are those accidents that involved death; permanent disability; extensive hospitalization; property damages of $600,000 or more; or a destroyed aircraft. The Navy had not experienced a Class A or Class B accident with its Osprey variant since it began operational use in fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2024. Rates of serious accidents with the Osprey aircraft generally exceeded those of the Departments of the Navy and Air Force fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft fleets for fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2024. Serious Accident Rate Comparisons for Marine Corps and Air Force Osprey with Departments of the Navy and Air Force Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing Fleets, Fiscal Years 2015–2024 Note: Serious accidents refer to combined Class A and B accidents which are those accidents that involved death; permanent disability; extensive hospitalization; property damages of $600,000 or more; or a destroyed aircraft. Most reported causes for serious accidents related to materiel failure of airframe or engine components and human error during aircraft operations or maintenance, according to GAO's analysis of safety data. Osprey program stakeholders have not fully identified, analyzed, or responded with procedural or materiel mitigations to all safety risks. For example, program stakeholders, which include the Osprey Joint Program Office and military services that operate the aircraft, had closed 45 risk assessments at the time of our review, but had not fully responded to 34 known system-related risks related to the potential failure of airframe and engine components. Stakeholders also had not identified actions to respond to non-system safety risks associated with aircraft maintenance and operations, such as mismatches in maintenance skill levels and limited training time to build aircrew experience. Without refining the joint program's process for identifying, analyzing, and responding to Osprey safety risks to incorporate and prioritize system and non-system safety risks, program stakeholders cannot adequately mitigate risks that can contribute to death, injury, or loss of mission capability and resources. Program stakeholders described factors that affected their ability to fully resolve Osprey safety risks, including challenges with how program stakeholders developed priorities and plans for addressing safety issues. These stakeholders identified costly, long-term engineering solutions and safety improvements that were required across a joint program with varied fleet sizes, which created longer risk mitigation timelines. GAO found that the median age for 28 unresolved serious and medium system risks was about 9 years, and over half (17 of 28) had been unresolved for between 6 and 14 years. Summary and Median Age of Unresolved Osprey System Safety Risk Assessments, by Assessment Type as of June 2025 Note: The Department of Defense (DOD) designates risk assessments as serious and medium based on their assessment of the severity (e.g., catatsrophic) and frequency (e.g., remote). The figure does not include six additional risk assessments for general military aviation risks (e.g., bird strikes) that are not specific to the Osprey and have been accepted for the life of the program. New initiatives established in 2024 are intended to address several of these factors, but these efforts did not comprehensively address non-system safety risks or include information for each service's Osprey variant. Without determining an oversight structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for resolving known safety risks or conducting periodic reviews of efforts to resolve them, DOD cannot have reasonable assurance that program stakeholders will fully resolve the interrelated system and non-system safety risks affecting the Osprey. GAO found that the Osprey program stakeholders have not routinely shared information in three areas to promote the safe operation of the aircraft.  Hazard and accident reporting. Program stakeholders have not proactively shared hazard and accident reporting information with Osprey units and unit safety personnel in the other services that operate the aircraft. Determining a process to proactively share relevant safety information with these personnel would provide greater assurance that Osprey units have the information needed to update their safety procedures. Aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures. Program stakeholders did not convene a multi-service conference or other forum to share Osprey aircraft knowledge and emergency procedures for 5 years (from 2020 to 2025). Service-specific changes to operational practices included safety related information, but these changes were not readily shared among the services, according to unit personnel with whom GAO spoke. The military services that operate the aircraft held a conference in May 2025, but they had not formalized plans to continue to do so. Without such a routine method, Osprey units have missed out on opportunities to share information that would enhance the safe operations of the aircraft. Maintenance data for common aircraft components and parts. Program stakeholders have taken steps to address maintenance data integrity issues for the hundreds of common Osprey aircraft components and parts that are shared across the services, but they have yet to confirm that all implementation steps have been completed. Without conducting a comprehensive review of Osprey maintenance guidance and inspection procedures, program stakeholders do not have assurance that efforts to improve maintenance information sharing have resolved data integrity issues, including for critical life-limited Osprey components, which has hindered their ability to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft. Why GAO Did This Study This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's December 2025 report, entitled Osprey Aircraft: Additional Oversight and Information Sharing Would Improve Safety Effort (GAO-26-107285). For more information, contact Diana Moldafsky at moldafskyd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found To understand, prevent, and treat infectious diseases, researchers study biological agents, such as bacteria and viruses. In the U.S., federal agencies have established guidelines to help ensure that U.S. biomedical research labs minimize biosafety and biosecurity risks. Certain principles or “key components” of biosafety and biosecurity may help reduce risks of all biological agents and research. GAO identified 10 key components that describe key steps a U.S. lab should take to mitigate the risks of biological agent research. The comparability of the selected Group of Twenty (G20) members’ relevant guidance documents to the 10 U.S. key components varied widely. Nine of the 10 selected G20 members in GAO’s review had documents that were comparable to one or more of the U.S key components for all biological agents and research. The U.S. key components include additional precautions for specified high-risk agents—such as Ebola virus—and research. Guidance documents from Australia, Canada, and China included comparable language to most of the additional precautions GAO identified for U.S. key components of biosafety and biosecurity. National guidance documents addressing biosafety and biosecurity are important, but other factors might also influence a G20 member’s biosafety and biosecurity. For example, Australian officials told GAO that state and territory governments play a role in managing biosecurity, such as responding to animal disease outbreaks. Why GAO Did This Study Governments use laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines to help achieve goals, such as protecting public health and safety. Biosafety helps protect lab workers, the community, and the environment from accidental exposure to or release of biological agents. Biosecurity helps protect against the loss, theft, deliberate release, or misuse of biological agents. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to monitor federal efforts in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. GAO was also asked to compare the biosafety and biosecurity standards of G20 members with U.S. standards. This report examines the extent to which selected G20 members’ publicly available guidance documents reflect (1) selected key components of U.S. biosafety and biosecurity for all biological agents and research and (2) additional precautions of the U.S. biosafety and biosecurity key components specific to high-risk biological agents and research. GAO analyzed core U.S. biosafety and biosecurity documents to identify 10 selected key components of U.S. biosafety and biosecurity for biomedical research labs. For each key component, GAO identified subcomponents or additional precautions for high-risk agents and research. GAO analyzed selected G20 members’ publicly available guidance documents, such as national laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines. GAO examined whether members’ documents had components that were comparable, somewhat comparable, or not comparable to the 10 U.S. key components. GAO did not evaluate the extent to which each member implements or enforces these documents. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD at HowardK@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Over the past decade, housing finance increasingly relied on nonbank mortgage companies (nondepository institutions specializing in mortgage lending). Nonbanks now originate and service most loans in the over $9 trillion in securities guaranteed by Ginnie Mae, a government-owned corporation, and by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are under Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) conservatorship. From 2014 to 2024, the share of such loans serviced by nonbanks grew from 27 percent to 66 percent. But nonbanks have certain risks, such as reliance on short-term credit that may become unavailable during economic downturns. The failure of a large nonbank—or multiple smaller ones—could disrupt mortgage markets and increase federal fiscal exposure. Percentage of Mortgage Loans in Federally Backed Securities Serviced by Nonbanks, by Dollar Volume, 2014–2024 Ginnie Mae and FHFA have processes to assess the financial condition of nonbanks, but opportunities exist to enhance their processes. Financial data. Both agencies analyze nonbanks’ self-reported financial data to support their nonbank monitoring. However, GAO found that FHFA does not have written procedures to assess the reliability of these data, reducing assurance that its analytical results are dependable. Watch lists. Both agencies produce watch lists of nonbanks that pose relatively higher risks, based partly on financial data. But, based on GAO’s analysis, both agencies’ processes do not fully assess key risks of certain short-term credit lines. As a result, the agencies may not be fully considering information material to watch list determinations. Scenario analyses. Both agencies analyze the effect of changing economic conditions on nonbank financial health. To help manage its counterparty risk from nonbanks, Ginnie Mae performs a detailed analysis and uses a comprehensive economic stress scenario. But Ginnie Mae’s focus on a single adverse scenario does not reflect a fuller range of possible outcomes—potentially diminishing its ability to prepare for how different scenarios could affect its portfolio and financial exposure. Why GAO Did This Study Nonbank mortgage companies generally do not have a federal regulator overseeing their safety and soundness. But Ginnie Mae and FHFA, which support the stability of markets for mortgage-backed securities, play a role in monitoring these entities. Since 2013, GAO has designated the federal role in housing finance as a high-risk area. This report examines the (1) role of nonbanks in the mortgage market since 2014, including their benefits and risks; and (2) extent to which Ginnie Mae and FHFA designed processes to assess the financial condition of nonbank mortgage companies. GAO reviewed Ginnie Mae and FHFA policies, procedures, and analysis of nonbanks. GAO analyzed industry and government data on mortgage loans originated or serviced by nonbanks in 2014–2024. GAO also interviewed FHFA, Ginnie Mae, and Financial Stability Oversight Council officials, as well as researchers and subject matter experts from industry and consumer groups.

What GAO Found As of June 2025, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processed nearly 5 million Employee Retention Credit (ERC) claims. IRS moved quickly to administer ERC but was less prepared to assess improper payment risks and process a surge in claims. To address improper claims, IRS implemented a processing moratorium in September 2023. IRS closed most claims by December 31, 2025, according to IRS officials. GAO identified six lessons from ERC design and administration. Lessons Learned from the Design and Administration of Employee Retention Credit Offering Relief Through Employment Taxes Provides Benefits and Challenges Benefits include availability to employers without tax liability. Challenges include interactions with income tax. Some Design Decisions Increased Complexity and Improper Payment Risk Complex and retroactive eligibility criteria complicated eligibility determination. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Would Have Benefitted from a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Employee Retention Credit (ERC) Risks Timely implementing a 2022 GAO recommendation on project planning could have better prepared IRS for a later surge in claims. IRS Would Have Benefitted from Additional Eligibility Reporting Key eligibility information was not required on employment tax returns. Manual Processing for Amended Returns Complicated Compliance Efforts Paper-only amended returns limited IRS’s ability to capture key data. ERC Implementation Could Have Benefitted from More Timely and Consistent Communication with Stakeholders. IRS did not regularly communicate status of ERC processing. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-107456 These lessons could help policymakers consider future emergency employment tax relief, and help IRS better prepare for it. IRS did not complete an improper payment estimate for ERC, as required in law. The Department of the Treasury said it would not do so for pandemic programs as they are short term. However, a timely estimate could have helped identify root causes of improper payments earlier and developing one now could guide future decisions on employment tax relief. The statute of limitations for assessing tax on certain paid improper ERCs has expired. However, IRS can still pursue fraud cases indefinitely. Employers primarily claimed ERC on paper amended returns. IRS enabled electronic filing in mid-2024 but continued to process the returns manually. Automated processing would yield cost savings and expedite refunds. IRS’s last public update on ERC processing status was in October 2024, leaving uncertainties about cash flow among some employers. IRS also did not follow all risk management and internal control principles from GAO’s A Framework for Managing Improper Payments in Emergency Assistance Programs. IRS could reduce future improper payments by incorporating this framework into its policies. As a consequence of its design and administrative challenges, most ERC claims were not paid in 2020 or 2021, the eligibility period for the credit. About 83 percent of ERC refunds—about $235 billion—were issued in 2022 through June 2025, well after unemployment had returned to its pre-pandemic level. Why GAO Did This Study The ERC—which encouraged employers to keep paying employees during the COVID-19 pandemic—had provided about $283 billion to employers as of June 2025. GAO previously found that implementing new initiatives—such as the ERC—is a challenge for IRS. A law passed in July 2025 affected ERC by, in part, disallowing certain unpaid claims made after January 31, 2024. In response to a request, this report presents lessons learned on the ERC’s design and administration, examines actions IRS can take to be better prepared for emergency employment tax relief, and describes economic conditions—such as unemployment levels—surrounding ERC. To identify lessons learned, GAO reviewed literature and interviewed experts and agency officials about the ERC’s design and implementation. GAO observed ERC processing at an IRS campus. GAO compared documents with selected practices for managing payments in emergency programs (GAO-23-105876). GAO also analyzed IRS data on ERC processing and compared it with economic data.

What GAO Found Since February 2025, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has taken actions to reduce the size and scope of its activities and staffing. These actions included issuing stop-work orders; closing supervisory examinations; and terminating employees, contracts, and enforcement cases. Some of these actions, such as employee termination, are the subject of ongoing litigation and have not been finalized. On August 15, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the district court's injunction that prevented CFPB from taking various personnel actions, terminating certain contracts, and other actions related to downsizing the agency. The circuit court delayed the effective date of its order to allow the plaintiffs time to request a rehearing. Why GAO Did This Study CFPB's statutory duties include enforcing compliance with federal consumer financial laws, handling consumer complaints, promoting financial education, and monitoring financial products markets to identify risks to consumers. According to CFPB's acting leadership, in response to executive orders, the agency has been assessing ways to fulfill its statutory duties as a smaller, more efficient operation. GAO was asked to review the effect of recent stop-work orders, workforce reductions, contract terminations, and other related actions on CFPB's ability to fulfill its statutorily mandated functions. This report describes the status of CFPB's significant reorganization efforts as of August 2025. GAO will examine the effects of these actions as the subject of a future report. GAO reviewed publicly available information on CFPB's reorganization efforts, including court filings involving CFPB, Federal Register notices, press releases, executive orders, memorandums from the Office of Personnel Management and Office of Management and Budget, and nonpublic CFPB documents regarding detailees to the agency.  CFPB expressed concerns with the accuracy of this report. GAO stands by the accuracy of the facts presented, as discussed in the report. For more information, contact Alicia Puente Cackley at cackleya@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO found (1) the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) financial statements as of and for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025, are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; (2) CFPB maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2025; and (3) no reportable noncompliance for fiscal year 2025 with provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements GAO tested. In commenting on a draft of this report, CFPB stated that it was pleased to receive an unmodified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2025 financial statements and on its internal control over financial reporting. In addition, CFPB stated that it will continue to work to enhance its system of internal control and ensure the reliability of its financial reporting. Why GAO Did This Study Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, both require CFPB to prepare financial statements annually and require GAO to audit the agency's financial statements. This report responds to these requirements. For more information, contact James R. Dalkin at dalkinj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) seeks to outpace foreign adversaries’ capabilities by quickly adopting innovative technologies. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) helps DOD reach that goal. OUSD(R&E) is generally implementing processes and programs, consistent with its authorities to manage and oversee innovation-related investments. For example, it developed a National Defense Science & Technology Strategy in accordance with the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The military departments have department-focused strategies, but the extent to which those strategies are updated and aligned with DOD’s strategy varies. Consequently, DOD risks the military departments pursuing technologies that do not match its vision. Further, OUSD(R&E) faces several challenges ensuring that the military departments are well-positioned to quickly deliver technologies to the warfighter. For example, OUSD(R&E): has not, according to officials, issued guidance for the development of Critical Technology Area roadmaps, including identifying stakeholders who should be involved or identifying the content to include in those roadmaps. has not determined how the military departments should balance investments in critical technologies between the joint force and military department priorities. This is because it has not provided guidance to the military departments on the amount of investment in each critical technology area to align with corresponding roadmaps, despite military department investments in those critical technologies, as shown below. is limited in its ability to influence military departments’ budgets to ensure they align with DOD-wide priorities through the annual budgeting process. This is because OUSD(R&E) does not have statutory authority to certify the military departments’ budget. Having this authority would better position DOD to ensure priorities align. Without addressing these challenges, OUSD(R&E) risks being unable to effectively execute its responsiblities to manage and oversee technology efforts. Military Department Science and Technology Investments in Critical Technology Areas for Fiscal Year 2025 Why GAO Did This Study DOD requested nearly $180 billion in the President’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget for managing, overseeing, and improving technology. Members of Congress have raised questions about OUSD(R&E)’s ability to oversee this technology as a counter to the rising threat of adversaries such as China and Russia. The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review how OUSD(R&E) manages, oversees, and improves DOD’s innovation investments and outcomes. This report evaluates (1) the extent to which OUSD(R&E) has taken steps to implement its authorities, and (2) the extent to which these authorities position it to effectively manage these investments. GAO reviewed DOD documentation and data as well as selected legislative provisions. GAO also interviewed officials from OUSD(R&E) and the military departments.

What GAO Found The Department of the Interior’s Indian Affairs took actions to reduce its workforce in 2025 after presidential directives, executive branch-wide guidance, and directives from the Secretary of the Interior. Its total workforce, which was 7,470 in January 2025, decreased by a net 11 percent (846 staff) to 6,624 as of July 2025. Net Decrease in Staff Across Indian Affairs Components Since January 2025 Staff separations through two deferred resignation programs accounted for most of the decrease. Indian Affairs implemented the first program, as directed by the Office of Personnel Management for executive agencies, in January and February 2025. Indian Affairs offered another program in May to (1) comply with executive direction and (2) offer voluntary separation to staff concerned about potential involuntary reductions in force. Some positions were excluded from the May program—such as positions in law enforcement, social work, and permitting—because of the nature of their job functions and responsibilities. Indian Affairs officials said they had not yet analyzed projected cost savings or operational impacts from these staff reductions. However, officials observed that many staff who separated through the two programs were already eligible for retirement. Some remaining staff took on additional responsibilities to mitigate the effects of reductions. Some Indian Affairs staff said the reductions would exacerbate preexisting staffing limitations in their offices and make it more difficult to carry out their responsibilities serving Tribes. Tribal leaders voiced concerns about the effects of the staff reductions. Some stated that Indian Affairs already did not have adequate staff to effectively carry out U.S. trust responsibilities and that service delivery was impaired. GAO has previously reported on the effect of long-standing shortcomings in workforce capacity at Indian Affairs and has several open recommendations to the agency to improve workforce planning. Indian Affairs officials said there were no plans to reorganize or further reduce the workforce as of December 2025, but existing functions might need to be restructured or realigned to achieve administration priorities. Officials said they would develop supporting plans, if needed, to satisfy future policy decisions. Indian Affairs did not provide any comments on this report. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. has undertaken a unique trust responsibility to protect and support Tribes and their members through treaties, statutes, and historical relations with Tribes. Federal laws require federal agencies to provide a variety of services and benefits to Tribes and their members. Indian Affairs provides services directly to Tribes or funding for tribally administered programs, including support for tribal government operations, law enforcement, and natural resources management. GAO was asked to review Indian Affairs’ actions to downsize its workforce since January 2025. This report describes actions taken by Indian Affairs to reduce the size of the workforce, the number of staff reductions in 2025, initial observations from Tribes and Indian Affairs employees, and any Indian Affairs plans for additional workforce reductions. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, executive orders, guidance, and information from ongoing and prior work on Indian Affairs’ capacity and workforce planning. GAO reviewed workforce data from January 25, 2025, through July 31, 2025. GAO interviewed officials from Indian Affairs about actions, data, observations, and plans for downsizing its workforce and reviewed published comments that Tribes provided at tribal consultations. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at OrtizA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In January 2026, GAO identified 95 open recommendations under the purview of the Department of State's Chief Information Officer (CIO), including 71 that are sensitive, from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated two of the 95 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that State develop and maintain a department-wide risk portfolio to prioritize significant cybersecurity risks per federal guidance. Further, GAO recommended that State fully implement all event logging requirements as directed by the Office of Management and Budget. GAO also previously recommended that the department develop a plan to monitor the progress of its IT recruitment programs and processes. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the department. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is working to further enable drone operations such as drone delivery. Currently, drone operators must obtain a waiver or exemption from FAA to fly beyond their visual line of sight and show, among other things, how they will detect and avoid other aircraft. Existing technologies that can be used for that purpose include those that use GPS, sensors, or radar. Specifically, drones can use Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) to detect and avoid manned aircraft that use ADS-B to broadcast their position information using GPS. Camera or acoustic sensors, or ground radar, can also be used to detect aircraft that are not broadcasting. FAA-approved waivers have mostly relied on ADS-B, which drone stakeholders said is more effective than sensors or radar. Some stakeholders said that using other technologies with ADS-B could be a safer option but presents challenges such as increased weight, affecting safety. Drone Receiving an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Signal and Using a Camera to Detect Aircraft FAA envisions a future National Airspace System (NAS) that is information-centric, where all airspace users, including drones, share location information electronically. According to FAA, limitations with existing technologies require the development of a new technology that, unlike ADS-B, enables two-way communication between drones and other aircraft. FAA officials said it intends to develop performance-based standards and safety requirements for industry to use in developing that technology. In August 2025, FAA proposed new regulations that would require drones flying beyond visual line of sight of the operator to detect and avoid other aircraft. However, FAA has not identified specific actions such as clear roles or technical milestones timelines, which could help FAA and industry move toward two-way communication between drones and other aircraft. Congress tasked FAA with the responsibility to develop an information-centric NAS and develop an integrated plan for the future NAS by May 2027. Developing specific actions could build upon FAA’s drone integration efforts and help ensure safety for all airspace users in the future NAS. Why GAO Did This Study Drones are the fastest-growing segment of U.S. aviation, according to FAA. In 2025, FAA forecasted that the commercial drone fleet would exceed one million by the end of 2025 and grow to 1.18 million by 2029. Operators are starting to use drones for activities including package delivery and public safety. With increasing drone activity, there are growing concerns about potential collisions between drones and other aircraft. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires GAO to review technologies for drones to detect and avoid manned aircraft at low altitudes. This report examines technologies available for drones to detect and avoid manned aircraft, stakeholder perspectives on these technologies; and FAA’s plans for drone operations in an information-centric NAS. GAO reviewed FAA documents related to integrating drones into the national airspace, including documents related to detect and avoid technology. GAO interviewed FAA and 24 stakeholders from industry and government. GAO focused on small drones (defined as those weighing less than 55 pounds) because they fly at low altitude and provisions for this review in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 specified that GAO focus on low-altitude airspace.

What GAO Found GAO found that the Air Force accurately accounted for general equipment that contractors hold, at selected locations, in two of its accountable property systems of record. Specifically, GAO was able to verify all 187 records that Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability for Pods & Integrated Systems reported as being maintained at the Raytheon Missile Systems facility. That system had accurate records for the pods that are normally affixed to a variety of aircraft the Air Force operates. In addition, GAO was able to verify all sample items tested from the Defense Property Accountability System, which had accurate records for items such as trucks and other vehicles used by Air Force contractors. However, GAO found that the Air Force has not accurately accounted for general equipment that contractors hold, at selected locations, in its Stock Control System (D035) accountable property systems. Specifically, GAO could not locate 18 of the 96 sampled items at the Reliance Test & Technology facility at Eglin Air Force Base in Valparaiso, Florida. In addition, GAO could not locate 58 of the104 sampled items at the Standard Aero facility in San Antonio, Texas, such as a torque adapter, an electric synthesizer, and a gear assembly adapter. In addition, the D035 system lacks item descriptions and serial numbers, making it impossible to track and distinguish between items that share the same national stock number. Specifically, if a contractor has multiple of the same general equipment item provided to it, the Air Force cannot determine when one of the items is returned, or which item should be updated in the D035 system. The Air Force could see a significant improvement in the accuracy of general equipment information in the D035 system by ensuring that all equipment records have item descriptions and serial numbers. GAO also found that the Air Force’s D035 system did not accurately record equipment that contractors returned when no longer needed for contract performance. This is because the Air Force Program Office did not establish an integrated product team to create proper disposition instructions and system updates as required by policy. As a result, the Air Force may be unaware of general equipment it has in stock and risks purchasing items unnecessarily. Why GAO Did This Study In fiscal year 2024, the Air Force reported $118.4 billion of the Department of Defense (DOD) consolidated $443.5 billion of general equipment, a portion of which is in the possession of a contractor. DOD has long-standing issues with tracking and reporting equipment for financial reporting purposes. GAO performed this audit related to its statutory requirement to audit the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements. This report examines the extent to which the Air Force has properly recorded general equipment contractors hold in its accountable property systems of record. GAO reviewed relevant annual financial reports and DOD and Air Force guidance, regulations, manuals, and instructions. In addition, GAO visited five locations to test samples of general equipment contractors hold. GAO’s testing focused on locating items at the contractor location and selecting a sample of general equipment that was physically observed at the location to trace back to the Air Force accountable property system of record. GAO also interviewed Air Force and contractor officials.

What GAO Found The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) awarded about $276 million from fiscal years 2022 through 2025 to implement the Accelerating Access to Critical Therapies for ALS Act (ACT for ALS Act). Most of this funding was awarded by (1) NIH for grants that supported access to investigational drugs—drugs not yet approved for marketing by FDA—for individuals with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and related research (45 percent) and (2) NIH and FDA for a public-private partnership focused on rare neurodegenerative disease research (45 percent). FDA also awarded grants and contracts for research to further scientific knowledge on ALS and other rare neurodegenerative diseases and for the clinical development of therapies (10 percent). About 750 individuals with ALS are expected to receive access to investigational drugs through the NIH grants. Summary of Funding Awarded by NIH and FDA to Implement the Accelerating Critical Therapies for ALS Act, Fiscal Years (FY) 2022 through 2025 (in millions)   FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 TOTAL NIH grants for access to amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) investigational drugs and related research $18.1 $32.5 $39.2 $35.4 $125.3 (45%) NIH and FDA funding for rare neurodegenerative disease public-private partnership $5.5 $42.3 $36.0 $40.6 $124.4 (45%) FDA grants and contracts for ALS and other rare neurodegenerative disease research $5.8 $5.1 $5.5 $10.1 $26.5 (10%) TOTAL $29.4 $79.9 $80.7 $86.2 $276.3 Source: GAO analysis of documentation from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and interviews with agency officials, as of December 2025. | GAO-26-107691 Note: The awarded funds include those appropriated by Congress specifically to implement the act, as well as funds identified by FDA from other sources. Totals may not add up due to rounding and do not include funds used to administer the funding awarded. NIH and FDA officials identified challenges to implementing the ACT for ALS Act (particularly in fiscal year 2022) and took actions to address those within their control. For example, applicants had limited time to apply for NIH grants in fiscal year 2022 because appropriations were not available until midway through the fiscal year. As a result, in later years NIH posted requests for grant applications prior to appropriations being enacted. However, other challenges were outside the agencies’ control—including no direct appropriations to FDA to support its priorities for other rare neurodegenerative diseases for the public-private partnership, according to agency officials. Stakeholder interviews, available literature, and NIH data indicated benefits of NIH and FDA funding, such as increases in the number and geographic diversity of clinic sites providing access to ALS investigational drugs. However, most of the research funded by NIH and FDA is ongoing and the full effects are not yet known. Anticipated benefits include increased data on ALS and addressing research gaps for ALS and other rare neurodegenerative diseases. For example, stakeholders expect these data to be useful to ALS research because the data will meet high data quality standards and will be available for other researchers. Why GAO Did This Study ALS is a rare, progressive, and ultimately fatal neurological disorder. As with other rare diseases, diagnosis may be delayed, affecting the eligibility of individuals with ALS to participate in clinical trials. ALS has no cure and limited treatment options. Physicians or drug sponsors can request FDA authorization to make investigational drugs available outside of clinical trials for individuals with serious or life-threatening diseases through FDA’s expanded access pathway. The ACT for ALS Act includes a provision for GAO to report on the funding NIH and FDA awarded to implement the act. This report describes the funding NIH and FDA awarded to implement the act, challenges NIH and FDA identified in awarding that funding, and what is known about the effect of the funding on research and development of therapies for ALS and other rare neurodegenerative diseases. GAO reviewed relevant laws, congressional reports, NIH and FDA documentation, and grant and contract applications and progress reports. GAO also reviewed relevant data in NIH databases as of November 2025 on the research studies funded to implement the act. GAO interviewed NIH and FDA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of 21 stakeholders—including national associations, NIH and FDA grant recipients, drug sponsors, clinic sites, public-private partnership entities, and a committee of individuals with ALS and caregivers. GAO selected stakeholders to attain variation in perspectives on ALS research implemented through the act and in organization type involved in clinical research. GAO also reviewed research relevant to the awarded funding published from January 2019 through September 2025. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at dickenj@gao.gov.