What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is overseeing the design or construction of 28 major construction projects—each estimated to cost $100 million or more—that collectively are estimated to cost more than $30 billion. Since GAO’s 2023 report, cumulative cost and schedule overruns have increased for NNSA’s portfolio of major projects in the execution phase (which have approved cost and schedule baselines). Specifically, as of June 2025, NNSA’s cumulative cost overrun for the portfolio had increased from $2.1 billion in 2023 to $4.8 billion, and the cumulative schedule delay increased from 9 years to 30 years (see figure). Cumulative Cost and Schedule Overruns for NNSA’s Portfolio of Major Projects in Execution Phase, 2023–2025 Two of NNSA’s 16 major projects in the execution phase—the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Main Process Building and UPF Salvage and Accountability Building at the Y-12 National Security Complex—are responsible for about 80 percent of the cumulative cost overrun and 40 percent of the cumulative schedule delay. However, seven other major projects in this phase have incurred or expect to incur a cost overrun of more than 20 percent compared with their originally approved cost baselines. According to NNSA documents and officials, cost or schedule overruns for major projects in the execution phase were often associated with inadequate project management by NNSA’s management and operating (M&O) contractors; poor performance by vendors or subcontractors overseen by M&O contractors; or increased costs of equipment, materials, or vendors. Of the 12 NNSA major projects in the definition phase (which do not yet have cost and schedule baselines), eight are either on hold, implementing design changes, experiencing design challenges, or assessing the effect of these issues on their cost and schedule estimates; and four have identified critical technologies and have met milestones for maturing these technologies, according to project documents and officials. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA—a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—plans to invest tens of billions of dollars in major construction projects to modernize the research and production infrastructure supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile. Senate Report 117-130, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA’s major projects on a biennial basis. GAO assessed (1) the performance of NNSA’s portfolio of major projects in the execution phase, and (2) the development and maturity of project designs and critical technologies for projects in the definition phase. This report also includes summaries of NNSA’s 28 major projects. GAO collected and analyzed data on NNSA’s 28 major projects and interviewed officials. GAO analyzed information on cost and schedule performance for 16 projects in the execution phase. GAO also collected information on the status of design and technology maturity for 12 projects in the definition phase. GAO’s review excluded major projects that did not have approved preliminary cost and schedule estimates or were not subject to certain DOE acquisition requirements.

What GAO Found The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the voluntary Medicare Part D Premium Stabilization Demonstration (Demonstration) in 2025 to stabilize beneficiary monthly premiums and enrollment in Part D standalone prescription drug plans. Nearly all plan sponsors opted to participate. Without the Demonstration, GAO’s analysis of CMS data showed that, if beneficiaries in standalone drug plans in 2024 remained in their plan in 2025, their monthly premium would have nearly doubled, on average. In addition, monthly premiums for 37 percent of these beneficiaries would have increased by more than $40 (see figure). If these premium increases had taken effect, CMS officials expected widespread changes in enrollment for beneficiaries in standalone drug plans, which could disrupt beneficiaries’ access to their medications. Potential Monthly Part D Standalone Premium Increases for Beneficiaries from 2024 to 2025, Absent Part D Demonstration Notes: Results indicate how premiums could have changed if beneficiaries in standalone Part D plans in 2024 had remained in the same plan or were transferred to another one in 2025. Results are weighted based on 2024 enrollment of beneficiaries who were not eligible for the low-income subsidy. To stabilize premiums with the goal of stabilizing enrollment in standalone drug plans, CMS (1) reduced beneficiary premiums in 2025 by up to $15 and then (2) limited each plan’s premium increases to $35 from 2024 to 2025. CMS also provided additional protection for plan sponsors in 2025. For 2026, CMS provides smaller premium reductions and allows for greater premium increases. Collectively, CMS officials estimated that the Demonstration would cost a total of $9.8 billion in 2025 and 2026. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), through an agreement with CMS, designed an evaluation framework to be used to determine whether the Demonstration achieved its goals. GAO’s analysis of CMS data showed that average premiums in standalone drug plans increased from $42 in 2024 to $43 in 2025 under the Demonstration for beneficiaries not eligible for the low-income subsidy. In addition, enrollment in these plans increased by 2 percent from 2024 to 2025, while the percentage of all Part D enrollees in standalone plans remained at 42 percent. However, an evaluation is necessary to determine the extent to which changes such as these were due to the Demonstration and not to other factors, such as changes to the Part D drug benefit. ASPE officials told GAO that they plan to continue their evaluation efforts in fiscal year 2026. GAO received a copy of the finalized evaluation framework in January 2026. Why GAO Did This Study The Medicare Part D program provides voluntary outpatient prescription drug coverage to beneficiaries, including those enrolled in standalone drug plans. The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 required significant changes to the Part D drug benefit, some of which took effect in 2025. CMS reported in July 2024 that increased variation in plan sponsors’ expected costs for providing drug coverage in 2025 could lead to substantial premium increases for beneficiaries. CMS subsequently announced in July 2024 the Demonstration for standalone drug plans, using its authority under section 402 of the Social Security Amendments of 1967 as amended. GAO was asked to review the legality of the Demonstration and issued a legal decision in May 2025 concluding that this Demonstration, as implemented for 2025, was consistent with this statutory authority. GAO was also asked to review other aspects of the Demonstration. This report describes CMS’s (1) implementation of the Demonstration, and (2) plan to evaluate the Demonstration. GAO reviewed CMS documents, such as those about the development and evaluation of the Demonstration, and CMS data on premiums for Part D standalone drug plans. In its analysis of standalone drug plan premiums, GAO focused on beneficiaries who were not eligible for the low-income subsidy and, therefore, were required to pay plan premiums. GAO also interviewed CMS and ASPE officials, Part D plan sponsors, and organizations representing Medicare beneficiaries. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at dickenj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) works to ensure a healthy, resilient defense industrial base. DOD has identified risks to the industrial base, including an overreliance on foreign suppliers. Biomanufacturing is potentially key to mitigating such risks. Biomanufacturing is a type of production that uses biologically derived components, such as living cells or microorganisms to create and produce new materials. According to DOD officials biomanufacturing has the potential to create material for a wide range of applications, such as explosives, body armor, and solvents to maintain weapon systems. Biomaterials can also expand or create new defense capabilities or replace other products and components that are critical to DOD with materials that are domestically sourced, cheaper, and safer. Notional Biomanufacturing Process Biomanufacturing development evolves over a multi-stage process. It starts with producing small quantities of materials through work in laboratories and advances to commercial-scale production through testing and demonstration. As projects scale up, researchers need appropriately sized and equipped facilities for each stage. Notional Biomanufacturing Development Stages and Production Quantities   DOD’s Office of Industrial Base Policy and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD (R&E)) identified that the U.S. does not have sufficient infrastructure necessary to support the advancement of promising biotechnology projects from the laboratory to commercial production and to establish new supply chains, particularly pilot-scale facilities. Since 2021, DOD has invested $965.2 million across three initiatives designed to support promising biotechnology projects and establish domestic biomanufacturing supply chains. These efforts include: investing in biomanufacturing projects developed in military department laboratories to further mature into products that the warfighter can use, collaborating with industry and other partners to build a network of biomanufacturing facilities across the U.S., and providing support for industry partners to plan and construct commercial-scale production facilities in the U.S. for biomaterials with both defense and commercial applications. DOD’s plans for supporting biomanufacturing in the future are pending but DOD’s forthcoming biotechnology roadmap will provide more insights. In the meantime, DOD plans to end two of the three initiatives after fiscal years 2027 and 2028, respectively. In addition, other efforts are many years away from being operational. Congress required DOD to develop the roadmap and include general strategic investment priorities, goals, funding requirements, and milestones for its biotechnology efforts. OUSD (R&E) expects to complete this roadmap by September 2026, which should provide more insight into its future investments. GAO will continue to monitor DOD’s progress toward completing this roadmap. Why GAO Did This Study A House Report accompanying a bill for the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD’s investments in biotechnology and biomanufacturing. In addition, the final bill includes a provision for GAO to evaluate a roadmap of DOD’s biotechnology efforts once DOD has completed it. This report describes DOD’s recent efforts to accelerate its use of biotechnology and strengthen the domestic biomanufacturing industrial base. To do this work, GAO reviewed DOD documents and data, conducted a site visit to an Army biomanufacturing facility that was constructed with support from one of the biomanufacturing initiatives, and interviewed agency officials. For more information, contact William Russell at russellw@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Periodically Listing Updates to Management (PLUM) Reporting website, maintained by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), publishes data on politically appointed and career senior positions for all executive branch agencies and certain legislative branch agencies. As of July 2025, the website reported information on 10,540 positions across 171 federal entities (including agencies, boards, commissions, and other organizations). GAO found that although OPM had procedures in place to help ensure the quality of data published on the website, the data did not include all elements required by the act. For example, GAO found at least seven federal entities were missing from the data, as well as at least 130 presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed positions. Additionally, unique identifier numbers used for tracking appointees’ movement within the federal workforce were not applied consistently in the data. GAO also found instances of errors and inconsistencies in the data, such as duplicative positions. Complete and accurate data would help Congress and the public identify and track individuals holding senior positions. Example of a Duplicative Position on the 2025 PLUM Reporting Website GAO found that the PLUM Reporting website, and OPM’s efforts to implement the website, only partially addressed three key practices for transparently reporting government data and certain relevant statutory requirements. GAO found: OPM did not proactively engage members of the public to solicit information on how they used and valued the website. OPM has not yet made the PLUM Reporting data available through its agency data inventory, though it has plans in place to do so. OPM did not fully describe the data and their known limitations. Non-governmental stakeholders cited concerns with the website including data timeliness, missing positions or errors, and a lack of potentially useful information. Stakeholders also suggested ways to make the website more valuable to users. By better engaging users and publicizing data quality limitations, OPM can improve the usefulness of the PLUM Reporting website and the data’s value as a transparency tool. Why GAO Did This Study Information about the federal government’s senior leaders is a critical tool for the public and Congress to understand who is serving in roles with significant decision-making authority and improve oversight. The PLUM Act of 2022 required OPM to establish a website, referred to as the PLUM Reporting website, to report data on senior positions. The act includes provisions for GAO to review implementation of the act. This report reviews (1) actions OPM took to ensure federal entities reported data on senior positions that met relevant quality requirements, and (2) the extent to which the PLUM Reporting website addressed key practices for transparently reporting government data and relevant statutes. GAO analyzed PLUM Reporting data for potential errors and compared data against other information on senior political appointees. GAO reviewed OPM documents and interviewed OPM officials about their efforts to ensure data quality. GAO also interviewed eight stakeholders from academia and civil society organizations about their experience using the website and data. Finally, GAO assessed the website against GAO criteria for data transparency.

What GAO Found Joint military bases are installations with more than one military service. For example, at Joint Base San Antonio, the Air Force is the lead service, and the Army is the supported service. Eleven of the 12 joint bases received less funding in fiscal years 2018 through 2022 than the Department of Defense’s (DOD) facility sustainment funding goal. However, DOD was unable to obtain data on how this funding was allocated to specific components on joint bases and therefore was unable to determine if the impact of funding below DOD’s goal led to disparities in facility conditions between lead and supported military services on bases. Joint base senior leaders whom GAO surveyed stated that facility management offices do not receive sufficient funding to keep facilities in good working order. During site visits to five joint bases, GAO observed examples of facility degradation due to deferred maintenance (see fig.). Broken Aircraft Hangar Roof Tiles on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam DOD has issued numerous guidance documents for joint base facility management, but senior joint base officials expressed confusion about how responsibilities for funding joint base facilities are allocated between the military services. Joint bases have multiple, ongoing cost-sharing disputes between the military services involving projects totaling over a billion dollars, and these disputes have not been resolved through DOD’s formal oversight structure. In July 2025, DOD finalized a department instruction that adds more detail regarding facility funding responsibilities on joint bases and could improve officials’ understanding of this issue. GAO found that all joint bases with available workforce data have facility management workforce shortages and that workforce requirements have not been reassessed to reflect increasing workloads as military units on joint bases have grown. Improving the availability of data on facility funding and reassessing workforce requirements could help DOD to address risks to unit missions from facility degradation on joint bases. Why GAO Did This Study DOD consolidated 26 installations into 12 joint bases over a decade ago to increase readiness, reduce duplication of efforts, and generate cost savings and efficiencies. However, DOD has faced challenges in sustaining its facilities on its 12 joint bases. On joint bases, the lead and supported military services share responsibility for managing facilities and supporting missions. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to assess sustainment of facilities on joint bases. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which DOD (1) met its funding goal for joint base facility sustainment in fiscal years 2018 through 2022, (2) assessed funding levels for supported component facilities on joint bases, (3) provided guidance and oversight to facility management offices for joint base facility maintenance, and (4) determined whether joint base facility management offices have sufficient workforces to meet their responsibilities. GAO conducted site visits to five joint bases, surveyed senior leaders at all 12 joint bases (with a 100 percent response rate), analyzed facility investment and workforce data, and reviewed applicable guidance.

What GAO Found Behavioral health issues, including substance misuse, mental health, and suicide affect millions of people in the U.S., representing a serious risk to public health. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), received $8.5 billion in supplemental appropriations in fiscal years 2020 and 2021 to address behavioral health needs related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Of the $8.5 billion in COVID-19 supplemental funding for behavioral health, SAMHSA awarded approximately $8.3 billion in grants to recipients including Tribes and tribal organizations, states, territories, and non-governmental organizations for projects beginning in fiscal years 2020 through 2025. Supported activities from the awards included community mental health services and programs to address substance use and mental health issues during the COVID-19 pandemic. SAMHSA used about $195 million for internal purposes that included administrative costs. As of July 2025, recipients had spent about $6.9 billion of the $8.3 billion. About $1.4 billion remained unspent. Of the remaining unspent funds, about $616.5 million were available for awardees to spend. About $787.7 million of the unspent funds were no longer available for awardees to spend because the planned project period for those awards had ended or the awards were terminated. Additionally, according to SAMHSA, of the $1.6 billion SAMHSA awarded in fiscal year 2021 through July 2025 to create and support the 988 Lifeline, SAMHSA awarded a total of about $1.2 billion for six cooperative agreements to a network administrator, Tribes and tribal organizations, states, territories, and 988 Lifeline contact centers to implement, expand, and support the 988 Lifeline. The 988 Lifeline provides free and confidential emotional support to people in suicidal or emotional distress via call, text, and chat. According to SAMHSA, the agency uses cooperative agreements, a type of federal assistance similar to grants, for funding when the federal government expects to have substantial involvement in a program, along with the recipient. SAMHSA used about $400 million for additional grants, internally for staffing and program management, and other activities to support the 988 Lifeline. As of July 2025, recipients had spent about $906.3 million of the $1.2 billion. About $298.9 million remained unspent. Of these unspent funds, about $22 million were no longer available to be spent as the funds had been awarded to a project that had ended. SAMHSA also hired additional staff—some of them temporary—to manage increased administration responsibilities connected with the COVID-19 supplemental funding and established a new office to support the 988 Lifeline. To monitor the use of the COVID-19 supplemental and 988 Lifeline funding, SAMHSA officials said they followed the same grant program monitoring processes used for all SAMHSA grants. These processes included award recipients collecting and reporting performance measurement data to SAMHSA, as well as submitting performance progress and financial reports to SAMHSA on a regular basis, such as quarterly or annually. Why GAO Did This Study The additional COVID-19 supplemental appropriations in fiscal year 2021 more than doubled SAMHSA's budget from the preceding year, and the 988 Lifeline funding further increased SAMHSA's budget during this period. In light of these large increases in SAMHSA's funding, GAO was asked to examine the use of COVID-19 and 988 Lifeline funding and adjustments SAMHSA made to accommodate this influx of funding. This report provides information on the funding SAMHSA received and distributed related to COVID-19 and the 988 Lifeline. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed SAMHSA evaluation plans and progress reports, and obtained and analyzed spending data as of July 2025, the most recent period for which data were available at the time of our review. GAO also conducted an interview with and obtained written responses from SAMHSA officials about how SAMHSA managed the COVID-19 supplemental and 988 Lifeline funding. For more information, contact Alyssa M. Hundrup at hundrupa@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) leads federal efforts to advance behavioral health. This includes providing grant funding and technical assistance to states and behavioral health providers to implement behavioral health prevention and treatment programs. Selected SAMHSA state and provider awardees said they made various changes to continue delivering behavioral health services during the COVID-19 pandemic. Examples of Selected State and Provider Awardees’ Changes to Behavioral Health Services During the COVID-19 Pandemic SAMHSA also provided technical assistance and flexibilities to assist awardees with grant administration and program implementation during the COVID-19 pandemic, according to agency documentation, as well as agency officials, selected state and provider awardees, and national associations. For example: SAMHSA provided one-on-one assistance, connected awardees with one another and with partners, and disseminated resources including webinars and published documents; nearly all selected awardees found this support helpful during the COVID-19 pandemic. SAMHSA provided grant administration flexibilities to help awardees meet pandemic needs. For example, SAMHSA extended COVID-19 supplemental funding project periods for its mental health and substance use block grants to allow awardees additional time to complete grant-funded activities. SAMHSA, in partnership with other federal agencies, provided program flexibilities to help awardees deliver services during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such flexibilities included allowing clinicians to prescribe certain medication to treat opioid use disorder via telehealth. Why GAO Did This Study Behavioral health conditions, which include mental and substance use disorders, affect millions of people in the U.S. and these numbers continue to grow. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated needs for behavioral health services and affected service availability and delivery. In fiscal years 2020 through 2023, SAMHSA awarded over $32 billion in grant funding to support behavioral health services. This included approximately $8.3 billion in COVID-19 supplemental funding that SAMHSA awarded to help grant awardees address behavioral health needs due to the pandemic. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review SAMHSA programs and activities to support the continued provision of behavioral health services during the COVID-19 pandemic. Among other topics, this report describes how selected SAMHSA awardees provided services during the COVID-19 pandemic and how SAMHSA assisted awardees to support their response to the pandemic. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from seven states and one territory (which we refer to collectively as selected states) and 16 behavioral health providers about experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic from January 2020 through May 2023. GAO selected states to obtain a mix of geographic regions, among other criteria, and selected two providers from each state to reflect receipt of certain SAMHSA grants. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, interviewed SAMHSA officials, and interviewed representatives from four national associations with behavioral health expertise. For more information, contact Alyssa M. Hundrup at HundrupA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Science Foundation (NSF) has 21 research infrastructure projects funded through its Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) and Research and Related Activities accounts, as of July 2025. This includes 13 major projects ($100 million or more) and eight midscale projects ($20 million to $100 million) at various stages of design, construction, and implementation. While all of these research infrastructure projects remained within their NSF-authorized total cost since GAO’s June 2024 report, several have experienced schedule delays or scope changes. Specifically, as of July 2025, four of the seven major projects in construction reported delays of 4 to 27 months relative to schedules GAO reported in June 2024 (see table below). NSF attributed delays to numerous factors, such as labor shortages, contractor underperformance, and budgetary uncertainty. Further, NSF reported reductions in scope for two of these projects, as well as three of eight midscale projects. Status of NSF’s Major Research Infrastructure Projects Under Construction, as of July 2025 Project Authorized cost Estimated completion Scope reduction Antarctic Infrastructure Recapitalization Program $155.4 million August 2029   -   Vera C. Rubin Observatory $571 million January 2026 ▲ 10 months - Antarctic Infrastructure Modernization for Science $410.4 million May 2027 ▲ 4 months ✓ Regional Class Research Vessels $400 million April 2029 ▲ 27 months ✓   Large Hadron Collider High Luminosity Upgrade Program       ATLAS Detector $82.8 million December 2028 ▲ 5 months - CMS Detector $88 million June 2028 ▼ 1 month - Leadership-Class Computing Facility $457.4 million March 2028 - Total $2,165 million     Legend: ATLAS = A Toroidal Large Hadron Collider Apparatus; CMS = Compact Muon Solenoid; ▲ = increase since June 2024; ▼ = decrease since June 2024; ✓ = scope reduced since June 2024. Source: GAO analysis of National Science Foundation (NSF) information. | GAO-26-107842 NSF considers several factors when selecting and awarding new research infrastructure projects. Specifically, NSF examines the scale and maturity of the proposed project, the availability and stability of annual appropriations, and external economic conditions. NSF has two separate processes for selecting major and midscale projects. Major facilities undergo an extensive, multiphase review and selection process, including consultation with the National Science Board. Midscale projects undergo a merit review and selection process led by NSF. Why GAO Did This Study Modern and effective research infrastructure, including facilities and equipment, is critical to maintaining U.S. global leadership in science and engineering. NSF provides funding for the design, construction, and operations of this infrastructure. This infrastructure spans a wide range of projects, from oceanographic research vessels to telescopes and supercomputers. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review projects funded from NSF's MREFC account. This is the eighth report in this series and builds on GAO’s previous work. This report describes (1) the cost and schedule performance for NSF’s major and midscale projects funded through the MREFC account and (2) NSF’s process for selecting which projects receive MREFC funding and the key factors that contribute to NSF’s ability to select new projects. GAO examined NSF policies and documents for projects that were in design, construction, and implementation and interviewed agency officials. For more information, contact Hilary Benedict at benedicth@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Since 2016, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been developing the National Background Investigation Services (NBIS)—an IT system for conducting background investigations for most federal agencies and over 13,000 industry organizations that work with the government. DOD originally expected NBIS to be complete in 2019, but repeated delays have hindered deployment. GAO has also found that the previous NBIS cost estimate and schedules were unreliable. After missing multiple targets, DOD’s Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) paused NBIS development in 2024 to revise its approach. In 2025, it developed a new cost estimate and changed its approach to scheduling. GAO reviewed DCSA’s 2025 NBIS cost estimate and found it to be reliable because it at least substantially met four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. DOD now projects spending an additional $2.2 billion on NBIS development through fiscal year 2031, which is in addition to $2.4 billion previously spent on NBIS and legacy systems through fiscal year 2024. A reliable cost estimate should help prevent unexpected cost overruns and provide needed visibility. GAO also found that DCSA continues to lack a reliable schedule for NBIS. The program’s schedule showed improvements, substantially meeting two characteristics of a reliable schedule. However, it only partially met the credible and well-constructed characteristics. For example, a risk analysis can help the program prioritize those risks that may lead to delays. Not having a reliable schedule is likely to continue to affect the NBIS program’s ability to meet milestones, including the goal to complete development in fiscal year 2027. Assessment of Department of Defense’s 2025 NBIS Cost Estimate and Schedule Against Best Practices Continued prioritization of NBIS development will be critical to successfully implement government-wide personnel vetting reforms and address persistent challenges. For example, GAO has found federal agencies have not met timeliness goals for nearly all phases of the security clearance process. In particular, average times for initial Top Secret clearances have consistently trended longer from fiscal year 2022 to 2025. Sustained leadership attention is key to fully deploying the NBIS system and achieving personnel vetting reform. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. government personnel vetting processes, such as background investigations, rely on IT systems to process data on millions of federal employees and contractor personnel. DOD has been developing NBIS as the new IT system for personnel vetting since 2016. In 2018, the government initiated a major reform of personnel vetting to better protect national security called Trusted Workforce 2.0. GAO placed the personnel vetting process on its High-Risk List in the same year. This statement discusses (1) the reliability of DCSA’s 2025 cost estimate for the NBIS program, (2) the extent to which the NBIS program has met scheduling best practices, and (3) the importance of NBIS to achieve personnel vetting reforms under Trusted Workforce 2.0. This statement is based on GAO’s analysis of DCSA’s 2025 cost estimate and schedule, prior GAO reports on NBIS from December 2021 through September 2025, and ongoing work assessing NBIS development. To perform prior and ongoing work, GAO analyzed information on NBIS from DCSA and interviewed knowledgeable officials.

What GAO Found Paid preparers have differing levels of skills, education, and expertise. Tax practitioners include enrolled agents, certified public accountants, attorneys, and other individuals who possess some level of qualification or credentials issued by either Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or states. All other paid preparers without professional credentials are considered unenrolled preparers. While all paid preparers are required to have and use a Preparer Tax Identification Number (PTIN) and are subject to various requirements in the Internal Revenue Code, IRS only has the authority to regulate the practice of tax practitioners. Generally, unenrolled preparers are not subject to IRS regulation, including testing and education requirements. Number and Type of Credentials Held by Paid Preparers for 2025 In prior work, GAO found that paid preparers can make serious errors on the tax returns they prepare. In addition, GAO’s prior work indicates that unenrolled preparers can make errors at a higher rate than taxpayers who prepare their own returns or who use other categories of paid preparers. When paid preparers make errors, taxpayers may overpay and lose out on tax benefits. Alternatively, when preparers understate tax liabilities, taxpayers may be subject to penalties and the government may collect less revenue. GAO has previously reported that IRS uses various tools, including outreach and education, civil and criminal investigations, and penalties to oversee all paid preparers and bring them into compliance. For example, IRS’s Refundable Credits Return Preparer Strategy program identifies preparers who were potentially noncompliant with due diligence requirements and encourages them to comply. Actions IRS may take range from issuing warning letters and phone calls to preparers to more serious actions such as audits of preparers’ clients and IRS staff visits to preparers. IRS conducts civil and criminal investigations of abusive tax schemes, including those involving paid preparers. Paid preparers may be subject to penalties for noncompliance with certain requirements in the Internal Revenue Code. Why GAO Did This Study During fiscal year 2024, more than half of all individual taxpayers used a paid preparer, according to IRS data. Paid preparer errors can lead to billions of dollars in improper claims of refundable tax credits and can have negative consequences for individual taxpayers. GAO was asked to examine IRS’s ability to oversee preparers. This report describes what GAO and other IRS oversight groups have previously reported on IRS’s oversight of paid preparers and recommended to improve its efforts. GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Code, relevant regulations and case law, information on paid preparer credentials, GAO’s previous issued work on paid preparer topics, and reports by other IRS oversight groups. Additionally, GAO analyzed data on numbers of preparers with a current PTIN and interviewed IRS officials.

What GAO Found Since January 2025, the President has issued several directives for federal agencies to restrict hiring and reduce the size of the federal government’s workforce (see figure below for examples). However, agencies were still allowed to hire new staff for certain positions, including those related to national security and public safety. Timeline of Selected Directives and Government-wide Guidance on Federal Workforce Changes, January to June 2025 Data reported by major federal agencies showed that from January to June 2025, staffing declined at nearly all of them. Across these agencies, about 134,000 employees (or 6 percent of the workforce) separated during this period, while about 66,000 employees (including temporary employees) were hired. Agencies reported that another roughly 144,000 employees were approved for a deferred resignation program and would end their federal employment by the end of 2025. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has updated how it reports federal workforce data. OPM has broad responsibilities for collecting and sharing workforce data. In January 2026, the agency launched a website with new features and more frequent data releases to make workforce data more accessible and useful for Congress and others. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to provide quarterly updates on workforce changes at the 24 federal Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies. This report (1) provides information on workforce changes at CFO Act agencies from January to June 2025, and (2) describes actions OPM has taken to modernize how it reports workforce data. To address these objectives, GAO collected data from CFO Act agencies on workforce changes during this period, and information from OPM on updates to how it collects and presents agency data. GAO will provide updates to the information in this product in future reports on these issues. For more information, contact Dawn G. Locke at LockeD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Anyone conducting weather modification operations in the U.S. is required to notify and update the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which is in turn required to maintain a record of the activities and share it with the public. Weather modification includes cloud seeding (which seeks to alter local precipitation) and solar geoengineering (which seeks larger scale changes in climate). Several states use cloud seeding to address an ongoing lack of precipitation in the western U.S. Cloud seeding is the most common weather modification technique, but recently, more organizations have begun to conduct solar geoengineering operations or research. NOAA has a statutory requirement to provide oversight of weather modification reporting, but the agency is not fully meeting its responsibilities to maintain and share weather modification reports. Weather modification operators may report inconsistent information or fail to report, and we estimate that over half of all the reports filed with NOAA likely have errors, including missing required information (e.g., maps). NOAA does not have written agency guidance for reviewing reports or maintaining its database. Such guidance could help NOAA meet its responsibilities and provide useful, complete, and transparent information to the public. Estimated Errors in Initial, Interim, and Final Reports from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Modification Reports Database NOAA is also required to maintain a record of emerging solar geoengineering activities, but its forms and processes are not well-suited to those activities. Operators had challenges with the forms and reporting process and may also be unaware of the reporting requirement. State and local officials engaging with weather modification activities may likewise be unaware of NOAA’s reporting process, even though the reports could contain information they need to make decisions about weather modification. Improved instructions and outreach from NOAA could help ensure operators are reporting their activities and providing better-quality information to improve understanding of this emerging technology. Implementing measures to increase the quality of the information NOAA collects from operators could help provide transparent information to the public about weather modification activities, including solar geoengineering. This could also provide more assurance that these activities are being properly overseen, and may help address increased public concern, canceled projects, or bans. Why GAO Did This Study NOAA, within the Department of Commerce, is the only federal agency with responsibilities under the Weather Modification Reporting Act of 1972 (the Act). This report examines the extent to which NOAA is meeting its statutory responsibilities for overseeing current U.S. weather modification reporting and is prepared to oversee an emerging approach like solar geoengineering. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed a representative sample of weather modification reports filed with NOAA and available on its website and compared reports to information from other sources. GAO reviewed 54 articles from a structured literature search, visited nine locations across two states, and held 24 interviews with agency officials, operators, and other stakeholders.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) leads the federal public health and medical preparedness for, response to, and recovery from public health emergencies. HHS awarded almost $900 million in fiscal year 2024 to states and other jurisdictions to help them prepare for a range of public health threats and emergencies through two programs. First, the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program supports jurisdictions’ public health systems, which includes public health agencies at all government levels. Second, the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) supports health care systems, which include a community’s health care organizations such as hospitals. Jurisdictions distribute HPP funds to health care coalitions—made up of health care and other entities to support preparedness. HHS requires jurisdictions and health care coalitions to complete activities. These include exercises to help ensure that jurisdictions are prepared to respond to public health threats, such as infectious diseases and extreme weather events (e.g., hurricanes). Debris from Damaged Homes Following Hurricanes Helene and Milton, 2024, Florida The two HHS agencies that administer these programs lack a formal mechanism, such as joint exercises, written agreements, or working groups, to coordinate them. Coordinating these preparedness programs could allow HHS to better manage them and support jurisdictions as they prepare both their public health and health care systems to respond to public health threats and emergencies. Lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic have demonstrated the importance of coordination between these systems, such as between state health departments and hospitals, if jurisdictions are to be effectively prepared. Additionally, officials from selected jurisdictions said that greater interagency coordination could help reduce resource inefficiencies associated with implementation of PHEP and HPP. Further, HHS does not collect or analyze information on jurisdictions’ ability to meet the 15 public health and four health care preparedness capabilities and any related gaps. According to HHS documentation, it identified these capabilities to serve as national guidance. The capabilities describe skills and abilities jurisdictions need to effectively respond to, and recover from, public health threats and emergencies. For example, they include providing mass medical care and laboratory testing at scale for emerging pathogens. Collecting and analyzing such information would help HHS understand the extent to which jurisdictions are prepared to respond to public health threats and emergencies and whether any changes are needed. Why GAO Did This Study The United States faces ongoing risks from future public health threats, such as infectious diseases; extreme weather events; and biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological events. In fiscal year 2024, HHS, through PHEP, provided $654 million, and through HPP, provided $240 million, to jurisdictions to aid preparedness for such threats. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to examine public health preparedness and response efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report examines, among other objectives, the extent to which HHS agencies (1) coordinate PHEP and HPP and (2) collect and analyze information on jurisdictions’ capabilities. GAO reviewed HHS documentation, including notices of funding opportunity, templates, and examples of documents submitted by eight selected jurisdictions. GAO also interviewed officials from HHS and the eight selected jurisdictions. GAO selected these jurisdictions to include variation among geographic location, percent of the population living in a rural setting, and public health governance structure.

What GAO Found Natural disasters at military installations have resulted in significant costs and damages since 2015, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not comprehensively tracked data related to those costs. In 2024, DOD began an effort to track the effects of extreme weather at military installations. However, GAO identified gaps in the scope of DOD’s data collection and its ability to collect complete and accurate data on disaster recovery costs. Specifically, DOD’s data collection is limited to the effects of extreme weather, which does not include the full scope of natural disasters, including seismic events such as earthquakes. Also, data DOD collects on the cost of extreme weather at installations may be inaccurate or incomplete in some cases, in part due to the timing of when installations are expected to report the information. Expanding the scope of its data collection to include all types of natural disasters and establishing a process to ensure cost data are complete and accurate can improve DOD’s ability to anticipate future disaster recovery needs. Figure: Examples of Natural Disasters at Military Installations DOD has taken steps to increase installations’ disaster resilience—including implementing resilience improvements at the 12 installations GAO examined—but gaps in planning may limit these efforts. GAO identified some instances when installations were unable to pursue resilience improvements due to not having necessary data or sufficient funding. Installations are working to implement a statutory requirement to include resilience information as part of their master plans. This includes the identification of current and future risks and ongoing or planned projects to mitigate those risks. DOD policy reflects this requirement and addresses how resilience should be incorporated into construction projects, such as by adhering to Unified Facilities Criteria (DOD’s standards for design and construction of facilities). However, existing DOD and military department guidance does not address how installations should use the master plan resilience information when recovering from a disaster. By including such information in guidance, the military departments can help ensure that installations affected by disasters are better able to incorporate resilience improvements while quickly restoring essential capabilities. Why GAO Did This Study Extreme weather and natural disasters have resulted in billions of dollars of damages to military installations over the past decade. Such damages can affect DOD’s ability to execute its mission and disrupt installation resources that support service members and their families. Senate Report 118-58, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to assess DOD’s recovery from natural disasters at military installations. GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1) tracked costs and damages associated with natural disasters since 2015 and (2) increased resilience of selected installations affected by natural disasters. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of 12 installations on disaster damages and resilience improvement efforts and conducted in-person site visits at three of these installations. GAO analyzed annual and supplemental appropriations to identify funds designated for disaster recovery. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed DOD and military department officials related to installations’ recovery efforts and collection of related data.

What GAO Found The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) uses risk-based approaches to target children’s products that may contain toxic substances for examination at U.S. ports. For example, it uses U.S. Customs and Border Protection systems that analyze national shipment and law enforcement data to target high-risk products. Examinations include screening products with handheld devices for lead and other toxic substances and reviewing importer documentation to verify that products were tested by third-party labs and meet CPSC safety standards. CPSC’s Process for Examining Children’s Products at U.S. Ports Starting July 2026, CPSC will require importers to electronically submit (“e-file”) key data (including product identification and place of testing) when products enter U.S. ports. According to CPSC officials, e-filing may help address challenges, such as delays in completing examinations when importers lack lab testing documentation. However, CPSC has not developed an oversight plan to ensure that importers file timely, accurate data. Establishing such a plan would help CPSC ensure that e-filing achieves its intended objectives, such as making targeting more effective and examinations more efficient. CPSC has review processes to verify that third-party labs that test children’s products meet its accreditation and other requirements. For example, labs owned or controlled by a manufacturer or government entity must provide information about their safeguards from undue influence. However, CPSC has not proactively analyzed data across all types of labs to assess potential risks, such as inaccurate testing or misreported results. CPSC recently began analyzing violations data for labs owned by manufacturers to better evaluate their safeguards from undue influence, but it does not do so for independent or government labs. By better leveraging its violations data for these labs, CPSC would be better positioned to identify and address potential problems associated with all types of labs, which could help prevent violative products from entering the market. CPSC has reviewed and updated some testing requirements for children’s products, but not its requirements for lead or phthalates (toxic substances used to make plastics more pliable). The Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 requires CPSC to review its lead requirements at least every 5 years; however, it has not done so. In addition, CPSC does not have written procedures for how staff should monitor changes related to phthalates and other toxic substances in children’s products. By reviewing its lead requirements and documenting a process for staying up-to-date on toxic substances, CPSC could help ensure that it does not miss opportunities to strengthen its standards and protect children from harm. Why GAO Did This Study CPSC is responsible for regulating the safety of thousands of consumer products, including children’s products. It requires manufacturers and importers to have certain toys and other children’s products tested by labs for lead and other toxic substances before they can enter the U.S. market. However, the large volume of products entering U.S. ports makes it challenging to ensure compliance. GAO was asked to review how CPSC addresses children’s products that contain toxic substances. This report examines CPSC’s (1) processes for examining children’s products and planning for an electronic data filing system; (2) processes for approving and assessing risks of third-party labs that test children’s products; and (3) efforts to keep safety standards for lead and other toxic substances up-to-date. GAO reviewed CPSC’s third-party testing and lab accreditation requirements; analyzed CPSC policies and procedures; and visited a nongeneralizable sample of four ports to observe product examinations. Ports were selected to prioritize those with higher volumes of children’s products entering the U.S. and to provide a mix of geographic locations.

What GAO Found Seven percent of participants in the Department of Labor (DOL) workforce programs GAO reviewed reported having disabilities, according to DOL data from July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024. Participants with disabilities had worse employment outcomes. Of those reporting a disability, 43 percent did not report their disability type (e.g., a physical or cognitive disability). GAO found that the completeness of these data varied widely by state. DOL has taken steps to improve the completeness of these state-collected data, which could help it improve outcomes for participants with different types of disabilities. However, officials said they do not plan to target assistance to states with less complete data. State and local workforce agencies GAO visited have made various efforts to ensure their programs are accessible to participants with disabilities. For example, officials GAO interviewed said they have provided assistive technology such as computers that are accessible to people with visual impairments (see figure). However, officials also reported challenges ensuring that training provided outside of job centers is accessible and providing certain accommodations such as sign language interpreters. Computer Workstation with Accessibility Features at a Job Center DOL monitors state and local workforce agencies to help ensure its programs are accessible but does not routinely analyze monitoring results. DOL’s monitoring reports include an examination of state and local accessibility efforts, but the agency has not developed a procedure to analyze them at an aggregate level, which increases the risk the agency will fail to identify and address widespread issues. Also, DOL has provided guidance and technical assistance on a range of accessibility topics. However, officials GAO interviewed in several local areas were not aware of or do not use these resources. Without evaluating awareness or use of its guidance and assistance, DOL may miss opportunities to improve dissemination of materials or take other actions to promote them. Why GAO Did This Study The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act authorizes programs that help job seekers access services at locations called job centers. It prohibits discrimination, requiring that services be accessible to people with disabilities. GAO was asked to examine efforts to ensure programs are accessible. This report addresses (1) the share of participants in selected DOL workforce programs that report disabilities and use services, and their employment outcomes, (2) the efforts made and challenges faced by state and local workforce agencies to ensure the programs’ services are accessible to people with disabilities, and (3) DOL’s efforts to ensure the programs are accessible. GAO analyzed participant-level DOL data from July 1, 2023 through June 30, 2024, the most recent year available; reviewed relevant federal laws, policies, and agency documents; interviewed DOL and state officials, disability organizations, and participants with disabilities; and visited a non-generalizable sample of 12 job centers in Arkansas, Oregon, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, selected for variation in geographic location, urban or rural population, and percentage of participants with disabilities.

What GAO Found The Department of the Interior has a goal to improve data sharing, which is vital to its oversight of oil and gas development on federal and Tribal lands. Three bureaus within Interior share oversight responsibilities—the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and Office of Natural Resources Revenue. Interior and the bureaus have reported spending about $206 million since 2021 to modernize data systems. However, GAO identified challenges in three selected business processes—leasing land for oil and gas exploration, verifying that production is reported accurately, and reviewing bonds to ensure they are sufficient to cover cleanup costs. For example: Manual data sharing. To update data on oil and gas leases, BIA receives lease data in paper documents from companies that it then manually enters into its data system. BIA then emails or mails these data to other Interior bureaus, whose staff must manually enter the data into their systems. Inability to accept electronic data. To help ensure accurate royalty payments for extraction of natural gas, BLM verifies selected gas analysis reports submitted by operators. Since 2019, federal regulations have required operators to submit these reports electronically to BLM’s Gas Analysis Reporting and Verification System. However, this system has never been operational, and BLM has discontinued estimating when it will be. As a result, BLM manually collects data from operators as needed and still does not have a system to receive and store reports and data automatically. Oil and Gas Data-Sharing Challenges Identified at the Department of the Interior Business process Bureau of Indian Affairs Bureau of Land Management Office of Natural Resources Revenue Leasing • Manual data sharing • Manual data sharing • Manual data sharing Production verification N/A • Manual data sharing • Data not accepted by systems No challenges identified Reviewing bonds • Data not accepted by systems • Manual data sharing N/A Legend: N/A = not applicable. The bureau does not perform this business process. Source: GAO analysis of Interior data systems. | GAO-26-106475 Note: Some automated data sharing may also be used for other aspects of these business processes. Interior issued a 2023 data-sharing policy that targeted further enhancements across the department. However, this strategy does not have time frames and measurable performance goals for improving data sharing. Accordingly, Interior does not know when needed improvements will materialize. Without enhanced automated data sharing, highly inefficient and error-prone manual processes will continue unabated. Interior and its oil and gas bureaus have generally followed internal data governance policies but have not completed data-sharing agreements as required by Interior policy. These agreements are supposed to guide how officials use and manage shared data. They also could help officials address the inherent challenges of manual processing. Without such agreements, Interior is likely missing opportunities to automate and electronically share information. Why GAO Did This Study Development of oil and gas resources on federal lands helps supply the U.S. with energy and generates billions of dollars annually in revenues. Within Interior, selected bureaus use data systems to oversee oil and gas development, such as by issuing drilling permits and inspecting wells. GAO was asked to review Interior’s oil and gas data systems. This report (1) describes data sharing challenges, (2) examines Interior’s plans for improving data sharing, and (3) examines the extent to which Interior followed policies for data sharing. GAO reviewed three selected oil and gas business processes that Interior uses. GAO examined data system documentation and interviewed officials who carry out these three business processes to identify challenges. GAO reviewed agency data-sharing policies, documentation, and strategy documents and interviewed system administrators and agency leadership.