What GAO Found Each year, the federal government spends trillions of dollars on federal programs that support the American people and address policy goals. Statutory provisions first enacted in 2011 require the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop and annually update an inventory of all federal programs. OMB’s January 2025 update to the federal program inventory website demonstrates continued progress in fulfilling statutory requirements. However, OMB has not yet fully addressed 13 of the 20 requirements. For example, the inventory does not yet include all federal programs, such as foreign assistance or defense programs. It also does not provide all required program, spending, and performance information for the more than 2,600 programs currently included in it. Without a complete inventory, decision-makers lack a critical tool to help them better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication across the federal government. GAO identified opportunities for OMB to improve the transparency and usefulness of the inventory. GAO found that the inventory was not fully consistent with four out of five related key practices GAO’s work previously identified, which can help ensure federal websites address relevant requirements. Inventory Consistency with Key Practices for Transparent and Useful Websites For example, the practice to fully describe the data involves an action to disclose known data quality issues and limitations. GAO found that OMB had disclosed some inventory data quality issues, such as potential discrepancies between two different sources of program spending data. GAO’s assessment identified additional quality issues, such as inactive programs being included in the inventory and missing spending data. GAO also sought perspectives from 10 organizations that represented actual and potential inventory users. Their feedback at times aligned with GAO’s assessment. For example, five stated that the inventory would be more useful if it more clearly stated its limitations, such as identifying the types of programs not yet included and the proportion of federal spending those programs represent. Without fully incorporating the key practices into its activities for managing the website, OMB cannot ensure that the inventory addresses relevant federal requirements or provides transparent and useful information that meets the needs of various users, such as Congress, agency leaders, and the public. Why GAO Did This Study A comprehensive listing of programs, along with related funding and performance information, would help federal decision-makers and the public better understand what the government does, spends, and achieves each year. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes provisions for GAO to review program inventory implementation. This is the second report in a series of products responding to those provisions and assesses the extent to which (1) the inventory provides information consistent with statutory requirements, and (2) opportunities exist to improve the transparency and usefulness of the inventory. To address these objectives, GAO compared the information on the January 2025 inventory website to statutory requirements and key practices for transparent and useful websites. GAO also obtained perspectives from 10 selected organizations that represented a range of actual and potential users, such as recipients of federal awards and federal agency management.

What GAO Found Our nation depends on computer-based information systems and electronic data to execute fundamental operations and to process, maintain, and report crucial information. Nearly all federal and nonfederal operations, including the nation’s critical infrastructures, are supported by these systems and data. The 16 critical infrastructure sectors provide essential services—such as electricity distribution, transportation, and health care—that underpin American society (see figure). The safety of these systems and data is critical to public confidence and the nation’s security, economy, and welfare. The 16 Critical Infrastructure Sectors Federal agencies have issued a variety of regulations to help protect the nation’s critical infrastructure. However, these can result in conflicting guidance, inconsistencies, and redundancies. Harmonization refers to the development and adoption of consistent standards and regulations. Such consistency is important when critical infrastructure sectors are subject to multiple cybersecurity regulations so that these requirements will not overlap, duplicate, or contradict each other. Because the private sector owns most of the nation’s critical infrastructure, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to protect these assets and systems. To this end, various federal agencies are responsible for assisting the private sector in protecting critical infrastructure, including enhancing cybersecurity. GAO has long identified cybersecurity as a government-wide high-risk area. In May 2020, we identified adverse impacts that varying cybersecurity requirements issued by selected federal agencies and related compliance assessments had on state government agencies. Of the 12 recommendations we made to improve coordination in this area, agencies have implemented 11 and partially addressed the remaining recommendation. In June 2024, GAO testified on the efforts initiated to harmonize cybersecurity regulations and the adverse impacts that can occur without such harmonization. GAO convened a panel discussion to gather industry perspectives on the harmonization of cybersecurity regulations. Specifically, participants noted that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s effort to provide free guidance, cybersecurity tools, and risk assessments has been helpful. They also said that selected federal agencies have adopted other federal assessment tools to help provide cybersecurity evaluations. However, participants identified negative impacts that their industries experience with multiple and overlapping cybersecurity regulations and how these can result in redundant work and conflicts. These include: Regulation overlap. Sectors are often subject to multiple regulatory frameworks that can result in potentially burdensome and duplicative cybersecurity requirements. Definitions and requirements. Different federal frameworks have similar controls and reporting requirements but have small differences within regulations that create overlap and confusion. Incident reporting requirements. Differences in the amount of detail, time frames, and thresholds required by agencies for reporting cyber incidents make it difficult and technically burdensome to collect and meet reporting requirements with short time frames. Participants noted that progress in harmonizing federal cybersecurity regulations has been made, such as federal agencies providing cybersecurity guidance; however, several participants agreed that this progress was limited. Industry participants discussed challenges federal agencies face in harmonizing cybersecurity regulations. Specifically, they noted that agency reporting requirements can compete with industry priorities. However, many opportunities for harmonizing federal cybersecurity regulations were identified. For example, in the near-term, participants identified opportunities to harmonize existing regulations by renewing or revising existing legislation such as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. They also noted that an expected regulation on cyber incident reporting could help streamline various other regulations. Further, participants stated that long-term opportunities include establishing a federal working group and metrics for regulatory effectiveness, focusing on deconflicting existing regulations, standardizing terminology, and making shared cybersecurity information confidential. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to gather perspectives of industry participants on the progress that federal agencies are making to harmonize cybersecurity regulations. This report summarizes the perspectives that selected industry participants shared on the impact of federal cybersecurity regulations and federal agencies’ progress, challenges, and opportunities in harmonizing them. GAO convened a panel discussion on September 17, 2025. The panel included seven representatives from different industry organizations across multiple critical infrastructure sectors. The representatives included directors of information technology and cybersecurity, chief information officers, and general counsel and regulatory affairs specialists. For more information, contact David (Dave) Hinchman at HinchmanD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found To maintain its reputation as the dominant military force worldwide, the Department of Defense (DOD) must balance efforts to improve the readiness of its forces with meeting ongoing demands, modernizing its capabilities, and addressing priorities identified in the 2026 National Defense Strategy. GAO’s body of work has shown that U.S. military readiness has been degraded over the last 2 decades due to a variety of challenges, including maintaining existing systems while acquiring new capabilities. Implementing GAO’s open recommendations—such as those shown in the figure below—will help DOD address these challenges and enhance readiness. Selected Open GAO Recommendations to Address Persistent Military Readiness Challenges Why GAO Did This Study DOD’s efforts to improve military readiness require the department to make difficult decisions on how best to address ongoing operational demands, adapt to shifting priorities, and prepare for future challenges. DOD has taken steps to address persistent readiness challenges, but significant work remains to make a range of needed improvements that GAO has identified. This statement provides information on readiness challenges across the air, sea, ground, and space warfighting domains. This statement is primarily based on published GAO reports since 2022 that have examined aspects of military readiness, operations, and sustainment in the air, sea, ground, and space domains. This statement also includes information on related work ongoing during fiscal year 2026. To perform all this work, GAO analyzed Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force readiness, maintenance, personnel, and training information and interviewed cognizant officials.

What GAO Found Twenty-six of 49 states have not decreased the use of congregate care for youth in foster care despite provisions in the Family First Prevention Services Act (Family First) that limit funding for such placements. Family First limits the time states can claim federal Title IV-E foster care funds for certain congregate care placements to 14 days, as of October 1, 2021. Given these limitations, many states increased the use of state, county, or local funds to support these placements. Changes in Percentage of Youth Placed in State Child Welfare Congregate Care Since October 2021 All 49 states that responded to GAO’s survey of child welfare agencies reported challenges securing appropriate foster care placements for youth. Capacity challenges in non-congregate care settings, such as foster homes, can result in greater reliance on congregate care. A smaller number of states (20) reported benefits from Family First’s congregate care provisions. Some youth are involved in both the child welfare and juvenile justice systems (known as dually involved). Twenty-five state child welfare and 26 state juvenile justice agencies did not know if the percentage of these youth in juvenile justice placements had increased since Family First, according to GAO’s surveys. Among states with this information, 10 of 20 states reported an increase in the percentage of dually involved youth in detention (i.e., in a facility where a youth is housed while they await the outcome of their delinquency case) since October 1, 2021. During that same time, 12 of 26 states reported an increase in youth placed in secure placements (i.e., in a locked facility where a youth is housed after the disposition of their case). Family First requires states to certify that they will not enact or advance policies or practices that significantly increase their state’s juvenile justice population in response to the limitation on the use of Title IV-E funds for congregate care. According to Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials, all states submitted this certification, and it is the state’s responsibility to ensure it does not violate the certification. HHS monitors state spending under Title IV-E including whether states adhere to Family First’s 14-day limit on congregate care. One exemption to the 14-day limit is for facilities serving youth who have been found to be, or are at risk of becoming, sex trafficking victims. However, there is not detailed guidance regarding when to apply this exemption, and states have interpreted the exemption differently. These different interpretations may result in some states claiming less funds than they are eligible for, while other states claim all funds for which they are eligible. Without additional clarification of its guidance on using this exemption, states may continue to interpret these rules differently. This could result in a disparity in the amount of Title IV-E funding that states receive. Why GAO Did This Study Research has found that youth in foster care congregate settings (e.g., group homes and institutions) may have worse outcomes across a range of measures—such as emotional well-being and educational achievement— than youth placed in foster family homes. Over the last 20 years, states have taken steps to reduce the use of congregate care. Congress included a provision in Family First for GAO to evaluate the impact of limiting the use of Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments to support congregate care. This report addresses: (1) how congregate care use by states has changed since Family First implementation, (2) challenges states faced and benefits states experienced related to Family First's congregate care provisions, (3) how these provisions affected dually involved youth, and (4) HHS monitoring of the use of federal funds for youth in congregate care. GAO conducted surveys of the child welfare and juvenile justice agencies in the 50 states and Washington, D.C. We received responses from 49 child welfare agencies and 50 juvenile justice agencies. GAO also conducted an anonymous, non-generalizable survey of young adults with lived experience in congregate care. GAO conducted site visits to four states, selected on a variety of criteria, including that the state’s percentage of youth in congregate care was above the national average. GAO also reviewed relevant HHS documentation and interviewed HHS officials.

What GAO Found Tips and disclosures from the public, including workers, are an important source of information for agencies that enforce the law or issue regulations. However, workers who wish to notify agencies of potential wrongdoing risk reprisals from their employers and may have concerns about what their organizations’ non-disclosure and employment agreements allow. Differences in mission and statutory authority mean that federal agencies use a variety of mechanisms to protect disclosers and encourage them to report wrongdoing. These range from providing confidentiality to those who come forward with information to incentivizing disclosures through award programs. In addition, some agencies have warned that organizations’ overly broad non-disclosure agreements are unenforceable if they contain language that restricts employees’ ability to report concerns about wrongdoing to the government. Mechanisms Selected Federal Agencies Report Using to Protect Disclosers Agency Pays Awards for Disclosures Investigates Retaliation Provides Relief for Retaliation Provides Confidentiality Internal Revenue Service Yes N/A N/A Yes Securities and Exchange Commission Yes Yes N/A Yes Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) N/A Yes Yes Yes Federal Trade Commission (FTC) N/A N/A N/A Yes Source: GAO Analysis of Agency Statutes and Annual Reports. | GAO-26-107650 Notes: For OSHA, confidentiality is only offered to certain non-complainant witnesses. FTC officials told us that, depending on circumstances, some instances of retaliation may violate the laws they enforce. Use of “N/A” indicates that the agency did not report using the mechanism. Agency officials noted that accepting disclosures from the public may lead to challenges. For example, serving as a witness may risk revealing the discloser’s identity, and agencies generally consult with disclosers about these risks. Disclosures also lead to benefits, for both the government and disclosers. Enforcement work by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), using information from the public, has resulted in billions of dollars in collections returned to the U.S. Treasury since 2019. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) findings in retaliation cases have also led to employee reinstatement, as well as awards of backpay, attorney fees, and compensatory damages. Why GAO Did This Study Private sector employment practices can have adverse impacts on employees' willingness to report potentially illegal activity to federal authorities. However, federal law offers protections for disclosures and some agencies provide monetary incentives for information that leads to recovered funds that can help to encourage disclosures. GAO was asked to review issues related to the potential effects of non-disclosure agreements on disclosures to FTC and other federal agencies. This report describes (1) employment practices that provide incentives or disincentives to employees who disclose potential wrongdoing, (2) mechanisms used to enforce private sector whistleblower protections, and (3) challenges selected federal agencies say they face in receiving tips and disclosures as well as the benefits of enforcing whistleblower protections. GAO selected agencies using judgmental criteria to ensure representation across agency programs: 1) providing retaliation protection in the employment context, 2) acting against NDAs that prevent disclosure to the federal government, or 3) providing monetary rewards to individuals who disclose wrongdoing. GAO analyzed documents and collected testimonial information from four agencies and six organizations with direct experience of issues relating to making and receiving disclosures. We used this to describe incentives and disincentives to disclosures, protections for disclosers, enforcement mechanisms used to protect disclosers, as well as challenges and benefits experienced by these agencies. For more information, contact Yvonne Jones at JonesY@gao.gov.

What GAO Found High development costs and limited markets have led to a lack of U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved animal drugs for minor animal species. These are all animals other than the most common pets, livestock, and poultry (major species). There are also few approved drugs for rare conditions in major species (called “minor uses”) or for serious or life-threatening conditions where showing a drug’s effectiveness requires complex or difficult studies. From fiscal years 2018 through 2025, FDA conditionally approved 11 new animal drugs, all of which were for major species. Nine were for pets, and two were for cattle. As of January 31, 2026, FDA conditionally approved two additional drugs. To get full or conditional FDA approval, sponsors must conduct studies showing evidence of the drug’s effectiveness. These studies, particularly those needed for full approval, can be expensive and difficult for some conditions and species. FDA developed guidance for alternative approaches that sponsors can use, such as foreign-generated data or adjustable sample sizes. However, FDA has not developed a benefit-risk assessment that would help it evaluate sponsors’ use of alternative approaches to demonstrating a drug’s effectiveness. Doing so, and developing related guidance for industry, could encourage sponsors to address unmet animal health needs and address the lack of FDA-approved drugs. Examples of Unmet Animal Health Needs The conditional approval pathway and other incentives have had a limited effect on new animal drug development. Many of the unmet animal health needs that existed when the conditional approval pathway was created in 2004 remain unmet. These include the need for FDA-approved drugs to treat parasites in sheep and goats and bacterial infections in fish. Sponsors and others said that conditional approval’s flexibilities were not enough to overcome the drugs’ limited return on investment. For example, they said that conditional approval’s statutory 5-year limit for sponsors to gather enough effectiveness data to obtain full approval of their drugs is too short. FDA officials are considering policy changes to further incentivize drug development, but changing the 5-year limit on conditional approval would require congressional action. Considering an expansion to this time frame could help Congress determine whether the current limit balances multiple objectives, including increasing animal drug availability, protecting animal and human health, and maintaining incentives for sponsors to develop drugs for markets with limited profitability. Why GAO Did This Study Animal drugs play a vital role in preventing and treating diseases in animals. FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of new animal drugs. Noting the scarcity of approved drugs for minor species and minor uses, in 2004, Congress established economic incentives to encourage drug sponsors (e.g., companies) to fill this gap. These incentives included a conditional approval pathway for new animal drugs for minor species and uses. Conditional approval allows sponsors to legally sell a drug for up to 5 years while completing studies to demonstrate substantial evidence of the drug’s effectiveness. In 2018, Congress expanded this pathway to include serious conditions or unmet needs. The Animal Drug and Animal Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2018 included a provision for GAO to review, by 2026, FDA’s conditional approval pathway and how it could be improved. This report (1) describes the animal drugs FDA conditionally approved in fiscal years 2018 through 2025; (2) evaluates the extent to which FDA has accepted alternative study designs for new drugs; and (3) evaluates the extent to which conditional approval has incentivized new drug development. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and FDA data and documents. GAO also interviewed FDA officials, animal drug sponsors, researchers, and other stakeholders, and made two site visits.

What GAO Found During the first year of the COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (COVID-19 EIDL) program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) was statutorily prohibited from requiring taxpayer information to verify applicant eligibility and application details. In April 2021, after receiving authorization, SBA began requesting tax data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). SBA and IRS established a legal framework and enhanced processes for sharing tax data. The agencies approved an administrative agreement for the COVID-19 EIDL program that identified the tax information IRS would provide to SBA. To process the large volume of requests, both agencies upgraded IT system components and implemented process changes, including for obtaining applicants’ consent to access their tax information. However, IRS backlogs led SBA to request taxpayer information from some applicants directly. SBA and IRS Data-Sharing Process for COVID-19 EIDL Program GAO analyzed SBA COVID-19 EIDL data on almost 3.7 million approved loans totaling about $360 billion. About half of the loans had tax-related documents in their application records and these loans accounted for about 73 percent of COVID-19 EIDL funding (about $261 billion). But some tax-related documents may not have contained actual tax data (i.e., they contained IRS messages that tax records were not available). SBA and IRS actions to share data for COVID-19 EIDL and the ongoing Disaster Loan Program (which uses tax data for similar purposes) generally reflected relevant leading practices for data sharing and interagency collaboration. For example, the agencies conducted periodic data quality control reviews and documented roles and responsibilities. SBA does not have the statutory authority to receive tax information from IRS without the loan applicant first providing consent through tax request forms. Both agencies manually verify these forms, a process that requires time and staff resources and carries the risk of backlogs or delays. The challenges could be mitigated if SBA were authorized to receive taxpayer information directly from IRS through an amendment to section 6103(l) of the Internal Revenue Code. SBA and IRS have begun to explore opportunities for technological improvements that could introduce efficiencies. By taking steps to improve the efficiency of tax data sharing for the Disaster Loan Program, SBA would be better positioned to leverage existing federal data to serve applicants during future disasters and emergencies and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Why GAO Did This Study From March 2020 through May 2022, the temporary COVID-19 EIDL program assisted small businesses and nonprofits affected by the pandemic. SBA’s ongoing Disaster Loan program, which offers similar loans, continues to assist businesses and nonprofits affected by disasters. Since March 2021, COVID-19 EIDL has been on GAO’s High Risk List due to control deficiencies that make it susceptable to improper payments and fraud. The explanatory statement accompanying the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, includes a provision for GAO to examine SBA and IRS data sharing for COVID-19 EIDL. This report examines (1) SBA and IRS processes for sharing tax information, (2) available data on the extent to which SBA obtained this information, and (3) the extent to which the agencies’ data sharing reflected relevant leading practices. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and agency agreements for sharing tax data and analyzed application-level COVID-19 EIDL data covering the full application period (March 2020–May 2022). GAO also assessed the agencies’ data-sharing process against leading practices and interviewed SBA and IRS officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) allows eligible veterans to receive health care from community providers through the Veterans Community Care Program. Since 2020, GAO has made several recommendations to improve access to the Veterans Community Care Program in areas also highlighted by the 2025 Senator Elizabeth Dole 21st Century Veterans Healthcare and Benefits Improvement Act (Dole Act). As of February 2026, VA has not fully implemented GAO’s recommendations. For example: Timely appointment scheduling. In 2020, GAO found that most Veterans Health Administration (VHA) facilities from the region included in its review did not have the recommended number of staff needed to manage community care referrals, creating potential risks to timely scheduling. GAO recommended that VHA assess community care staffing needs to identify and address any risks. VHA agreed with this recommendation and is working to enable its staffing tool to identify and report such risks, according to officials. GAO also recommended that VHA establish a wait time measure for community care appointments and align its performance metrics. VHA disagreed with this recommendation but has defined time frames for some steps. VHA has not fully implemented these recommendations. The Dole Act requires VA to take action on its staffing model and performance metrics to ensure timely care for veterans. Referral coordination and communication. In 2025, GAO reported that VHA facilities had mixed results in implementing the Referral Coordination Initiative, which aimed to improve referral coordination and streamline appointment scheduling. VHA had not documented key elements of the initiative in policy, which may contribute to inconsistences in implementation and limit staff and veterans’ understanding of community care options. GAO recommended that VHA include this initiative in its national policy. VHA concurred in principle with the recommendation, but has not yet implemented it. GAO also reported in 2025 that the Office of Integrated Veteran Care, which VHA created to improve coordination of community care, did not always clearly communicate information to its facilities. GAO recommended that VHA ensure this information is clearly communicated. VHA concurred with this recommendation but has not yet implemented it. The Dole Act also requires VA to review facilities’ processes for making such referrals. GAO also has ongoing work on VHA’s Caregiver Support Program. Preliminary results show that VHA responded to challenges caregivers reported with accessing in-person support by implementing a virtual therapy program. VHA also established goals to assess the effectiveness of its outreach efforts. These include a goal to increase program enrollment by 15 percent each fiscal year, which it met in fiscal year 2025. However, VHA has not set quantitative targets and time frames for its other goals. Doing so would better position VHA to assess its efforts and make any needed adjustments. The Dole Act also includes provisions addressing caregivers’ access to and awareness of VHA’s Caregiver Support Program. Why GAO Did This Study The Dole Act authorized significant expansions of health care programs for veterans and support for their caregivers. These programs are administered by VHA. An increasing number of veterans receive their care from providers outside of VHA facilities through the Veterans Community Care Program; in 2024, about 3.1 million veterans received such care. VHA also provides services and support to nearly 100,000 caregivers of veterans who suffered serious injuries in the line of duty through its Caregiver Support Program. Concerns have been raised about the mental health of veterans’ caregivers who often provide around the clock care that enables veterans to live at home and help with their recovery. GAO has a large body of work related to aspects of the community care and caregiver programs, both of which were addressed in the Dole Act. This statement summarizes recommendations and related work on the Community Care program. It is based on three GAO reports issued from 2020 through 2025 (GAO-20-643, GAO-25-106678, and GAO-25-107212). This statement also includes preliminary results from GAO’s ongoing work examining VA’s efforts to provide mental health support to caregivers. To do this work, GAO reviewed VHA documents on its caregiver program and interviewed VHA officials, program staff, and participating caregivers at four selected VHA facilities. For more information, contact Sharon M. Silas at silass@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers sexual risk avoidance education (SRAE) grants to states and other entities, such as community organizations. SRAE is a type of sexual health education that focuses on abstaining from non-marital sexual activity and other risky behaviors, such as alcohol use. SRAE programs are typically provided to youths aged 10 to 19 in schools during the day. Stakeholders, such as sexual health educators GAO interviewed, had various perspectives on whether SRAE was effective, medically accurate and complete, or culturally appropriate. GAO identified one peer-reviewed study on SRAE, which concluded it was effective for some outcomes. HHS collects and reviews information of sufficient coverage and quality to assess SRAE grantees’ adherence to medical accuracy and cultural appropriateness program requirements. For example, HHS has a contractor-led process in place to review the medical accuracy of proposed program curricula. HHS also reviews information in grant applications that describe how grantees plan to serve certain populations and ensure program materials are culturally and linguistically appropriate. HHS’s Medical Accuracy Review Process for Sexual Risk Avoidance Education Grantees’ Selected Curricula HHS has assessed SRAE program results through a number of studies. For example, one study examined if implementation features—such as a non-school setting—were associated with intentions to delay sexual initiation. HHS also uses performance measures to assess whether grantees are meeting program objectives. However, HHS only has near-term goals for three of its performance measures. These are related to program reach and implementation. For example, its near-term goal for measuring the number of youth who attend a program session is to maintain the previous year’s number. HHS does not have near-term goals related to measuring youth outcomes and program experiences, such as the percent of participants that plan to abstain from sex. According to HHS officials, it is piloting additional near-term goals for another pregnancy prevention program it manages and intends to adapt them for SRAE programs. However, the early results of this effort had not identified any near-term goals for performance measures related to youth outcomes and experiences. Setting near-term goals for these measures will help HHS more effectively assess the performance of SRAE grantees in influencing participants’ behavior intentions and their experiences in the programs over time. Why GAO Did This Study Preventing unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections among youth is an important public health goal. Although the overall U.S. birth rate for youth aged 15 to 19 years has steadily declined since the early 1990s, it has remained higher than that of comparable high-income countries. Youth pregnancy can have high health and economic costs for the parents, their children, and society more generally. Sexual health education aims to provide youth with the knowledge and skills they need to protect themselves from these potential health and economic risks. GAO was asked to examine issues related to SRAE. This report examines perspectives on the effectiveness, medical accuracy, and cultural appropriateness of SRAE; HHS’s use of information to assess grantee adherence to statutory and HHS requirements regarding medical accuracy and cultural appropriateness; and how HHS assesses the results of its SRAE programs. GAO reviewed relevant published literature and HHS documentation, including procedures, grant applications, and performance measure documentation. GAO also interviewed HHS officials, and non-generalizable samples of 14 SRAE grantees in five states and eight stakeholders, including national advocacy organizations, professional medical or health associations, sexual health educators, and an academic researcher.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) manages cleanup of hazardous and radioactive waste through capital asset projects and operations activities. Capital asset projects have defined start and end points, whereas operations activities are typically routine or reoccurring. As of August 2025, EM estimated costs for the most expensive capital asset projects ranging from $69 million to $18.5 billion, and costs for the most expensive operations activities ranging from $1 billion to $177 billion. EM’s data indicated that combined costs for the most expensive capital asset projects increased by more than $2 billion, and combined costs for the most expensive operations activities increased by about $75 billion since GAO last reported in 2022. EM officials said that these cost increases were already known to the agency and accounted for in previous life-cycle cost estimates that were communicated to Congress. As of May 2025, EM estimated that the remaining cleanup work at all its sites would cost more than half a trillion dollars. EM has seen cost increases and schedule delays due to multiple factors, and the office struggles to maintain complete documentation and reconcile data discrepancies. Specifically, key project documents are not consistently accessible for headquarters review in DOE’s project management database. These documents could provide valuable information on reasons behind increases and recommendations to address underlying issues. Similarly, EM faces challenges providing current cost and schedule information for operations activities that is consistent across headquarters and sites, and EM officials could not easily coordinate to reconcile the inconsistencies. Ensuring availability of complete project information and improving coordination to address the accuracy and consistency of cost and schedule information will help EM manage its projects and activities, report more accurate information to Congress, and provide support to sites. Even if EM improves the completeness and consistency of information on its projects and activities, its cost and schedule estimates may still reflect significant uncertainty. EM officials from several sites told GAO that final cleanup remedies at their sites still need to be determined, which may increase costs and schedules. GAO has reported that significant cost and schedule savings are still possible on several cleanup projects and activities. Table: Potential Savings Identified for Selected Office of Environmental Management Capital Asset Projects and Operations Activities Grouting closed tanks at Hanford $18 billion Grouting remaining low-activity waste at Hanford up to $210 billion Optimizing transuranic waste shipments $700 million Optimizing high-level waste treatment at Hanford Tens of billions Source: GAO analysis of Department of Energy data. | GAO-26-107820 Why GAO Did This Study EM is responsible for the cleanup of sites and facilities contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons production and nuclear energy research. GAO has identified DOE’s project management and environmental liability—or expected cleanup costs—as High-Risk areas. The department’s management and oversight record has left DOE vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, and its expected future cleanup costs have ballooned over the last several decades. Senate Report 118-58 includes a provision for GAO to provide a biennial report on the status of EM’s major projects and operations activities. This report (1) describes the status of EM's largest capital asset projects and operations activities, including changes since GAO’s 2022 report; and (2) examines challenges and opportunities to improve the performance of EM's largest capital asset projects and operations activities. GAO analyzed documents and data and compared information with DOE and EM requirements for managing projects and operations activities. GAO also interviewed EM officials.

What GAO Found Statutory Maintenance of Equity (MOEquity) requirements generally prohibited states and districts from disproportionately cutting funds from districts or schools serving high percentages of low-income students. Beginning in July 2021, the Department of Education provided guidance and technical assistance to help states and districts meet these requirements as part of receiving certain COVID-19 relief funding. Education officials said they developed and refined this guidance in real time. As a result, the agency did not develop internal written procedures for its staff to use when providing related technical assistance. Federal oversight and performance principles and practices note the importance of internal guidance and written documentation to ensure consistency. Without these, Education could not ensure states received consistent information on implementing MOEquity. Moreover, the risk of inconsistently applying guidance may increase with staff turnover, which Education said occurred during MOEquity implementation. Selected State and District Maintenance of Equity Requirements GAO's analysis of six states' data found that districts generally identified their poorest schools; however, Education lacked reliable data on how states implemented the state MOEquity requirements to identify their poorest districts. On average, high-poverty schools had more factors associated with need—for example, free or reduced-price lunch eligibility and students with disabilities—than other schools. However, because MOEquity required schools to be identified by district rather than statewide, MOEquity-identified high-poverty schools in a district were not always the poorest schools in the state. GAO could not determine if states paid appropriate districts or the total amounts paid in supplemental payments because of data reliability issues, such as duplicative or missing data. Education could not explain the data issues or provide documentation of data reliability procedures. Without reliable data, neither GAO nor Education could assess whether MOEquity requirements fully achieved their intended results. Selected states and districts described challenges implementing MOEquity—e.g., staff capacity issues and limited access to data—and expressed interest in lessons learned, but Education officials said they did not document and share them because the agency does not have procedures ensuring it does so and it was not a priority at the time. Yet, Education officials noted that MOEquity provided an opportunity to inform how they may handle similar situations going forward. Key practices for effectively managing federal efforts include identifying and applying lessons learned for future decision making. Doing so limits the chance of recurrence of failures or difficulties. Absent a way to ensure Education identifies, documents, and shares lessons learned, insights from such efforts may be limited or lost. Why GAO Did This Study To receive certain funds under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, states and districts generally agreed to not make certain cuts. These include disproportionately cutting funds from districts or schools serving high percentages of economically disadvantaged students for fiscal years 2022 and 2023. GAO was asked to examine MOEquity implementation. This report addresses (1) how Education assisted states and districts in complying with MOEquity requirements; (2) what data show about state and district implementation of MOEquity; and (3) what challenges states and districts faced in implementing MOEquity and what lessons Education learned. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and analyzed Education's MOEquity guidance and data. GAO also interviewed Education officials, as well as officials from seven states. GAO selected states for varied approaches to implementing MOEquity. In three of these states, GAO interviewed officials from districts that received the most supplemental funding. GAO also analyzed school-level data from six of these states that had reliable data for this analysis.