What GAO Found In July 2025, GAO identified 11 priority recommendations for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Since then, NTIA has implemented one of those recommendations, bringing the total to 10 as of June 2026. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Managing radio-frequency spectrum, Managing IT and cybersecurity risks to spectrum infrastructure, and Managing federal broadband programs. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would enhance NTIA's efforts to collaborate with other federal agencies; better ensure the success of its IT modernization efforts; and improve the financial sustainability of the agency's grant programs. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help NTIA enhance the effectiveness and security of its programs. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Andrew Von Ah at vonaha@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) maintain the Financial Audit Manual (FAM). For more information, please visit the main FAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonDB@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) maintain the Financial Audit Manual (FAM). For more information, please visit the main FAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at SimpsonDB@gao.gov.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) worked jointly on this revision of the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM), marking a major milestone in partnership and a shared commitment to strengthening and clarifying audit guidance. For more information, please visit the main FISCAM page, or contact Dawn B. Simpson at simpsondb@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) reported approximately $1 billion in cumulative estimated improper payments—including overpayments, underpayments, and unknown payments—across the Beneficiary Travel (BT) Program from fiscal years 2018 through 2024. During that period, 10 cases of fraud related to the BT Program were adjudicated. The cases involved at least 892 fraudulent claims and totaled at least $219,000. Most of the cases involved beneficiaries that fraudulently reported addresses. VA has implemented data systems partly to mitigate fraud and improper payment risks in the BT Program. Examples include automatically verifying certain claim information before claims can be processed and flagging claims for further review if information is missing or does not appear to meet eligibility requirements. GAO tested specific areas of risk for improper payments or fraud and found VA potentially made improper payments from fiscal years 2018 through 2023 totaling over $10 million in these areas. Specifically, GAO found instances in which VA potentially improperly paid beneficiaries who provided ineligible departure addresses, such as post office boxes rather than residential addresses; VA potentially made duplicate payments to special mode transportation (SMT) vendors for the same invoice; and VA staff manually modified BT claims, resulting in potentially improper payments to beneficiaries and SMT vendors, such as instances in which SMT vendors were paid amounts that exceeded the claimed amount. Ineligible Departure Addresses May Result in Improper Payments Since GAO’s analysis, VA has made changes to prevent potential duplicate and improper payments. For example, VA began transitioning to a new system for processing certain SMT invoices and implemented new controls to prevent overpayments. However, VA has not ensured that existing controls have been implemented effectively, such as ensuring that staff use acceptable documentation to verify residential addresses to reduce the risk of improper payments. VA also has not monitored and evaluated its new controls to ensure they are operating effectively to reduce the risk of improper payments. Why GAO Did This Study VA reported spending over $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2025 to reimburse eligible veterans and others for certain necessary transportation costs associated with veteran health care through the BT Program. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to examine potential fraud and improper payments in this program. Among other things, this report examines VA’s reported improper payments and adjudicated fraud in the BT Program and indicators of potential improper payments or fraud in the BT Program identified from selected data sources and VA’s controls to mitigate related risks. GAO reviewed relevant VA documents and adjudicated fraud cases and interviewed knowledgeable officials. To identify instances of potential improper payments, GAO analyzed information from VA’s data systems used to process BT claims from fiscal years 2018 through 2023, the most recent full fiscal year for which data were available at the time of GAO’s analysis. Further, GAO compared VA’s efforts against leading practices from GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework, BT Program requirements, and VA’s financial policies.

What GAO Found Safety and sanitation conditions have been long-standing concerns at fishing access sites that the federal government developed, beginning in the 1950s, for four Tribes with treaty fishing rights in the Columbia River Basin. In 2011, the federal government completed its development of 31 sites, 29 of which are administered by the Department of the Interior. As of February 2026, Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Northwest Regional Office had spent $17.3 million since 2020 to assess site conditions and design and construct sanitation and safety improvement projects. A 2022 site assessment identified several urgent sanitation and safety issues across the sites, including dilapidated restrooms, outdated fish-cleaning stations, and the accumulation of abandoned property. Some sanitation projects have been completed while others are in the design phase. The improvement projects include water line replacement, well drilling, and restroom construction. According to Interior officials, safety infrastructure has not been improved due to funding constraints, but there are plans to add security features such as lights and cameras over the next few years. Fish-Cleaning Stations at Columbia River Fishing Access Sites in June 2025 BIA uses a facility management system to track reoccurring operations and maintenance (O&M) needs and to allocate both annual O&M and project-based funding for its fishing access sites. However, regional BIA officials said the system may not include all BIA-administered sites due to incomplete data, making those sites ineligible for funding. Including the remaining sites in the system could help BIA better inform funding decisions. Additionally, Interior’s O&M funding formula does not account for grounds and structures unique to fishing access sites, such as fish-cleaning stations and wastewater treatment systems. Updating BIA’s O&M funding formula, in consultation with Tribes, could help ensure that all property at the sites is factored into funding decisions for each site. Finally, BIA faces challenges completing improvements at the sites due to unclear policies and implementation guidance that cause inefficient communication, unclear roles, and unleveraged resources, such as overly narrow pools of staff who may conduct needed inspections. Updating policies and developing implementation guidance could facilitate actions to help improve conditions at fishing access sites for tribal members and site users and ensure agency-wide compliance with health and safety standards. Why GAO Did This Study Four Tribes—the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, and the Nez Perce Tribe—signed treaties with the United States in 1855 that reserved the right to fish along the Columbia River. However, beginning in the 1930s, construction of federal dams in the area submerged traditional tribal fishing sites and hindered Tribes' ability to exercise their treaty rights. To help mitigate the dams’ impacts on these rights, the U.S. government created fishing access sites. Since the 1960s, the four Treaty Tribes have expressed concerns about federal construction and maintenance of the sites. These concerns included health hazards and lack of sanitation facilities. Deferred maintenance and heavy usage have caused significant wear and tear on the sites’ infrastructure over several decades. The 2019 Columbia River In-Lieu and Treaty Fishing Access Sites Improvement Act (Pub. L. No. 116-99) authorized Interior to assess current sanitation and safety conditions of lands that were set aside as fishing access sites. It also included a provision for GAO to evaluate whether Interior's actions improved these sites. This report examines Interior’s efforts to identify and assess sanitary and safety conditions, consult with the Tribes and coordinate with other entities, improve conditions at the sites, and manage future needs. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, agency documents, funding data, interviews, and project reports, and applied agency policy and GAO internal control and collaboration criteria to findings. GAO visited 13 fishing access sites and conducted outreach to the four Tribes.

What GAO Found One in three older Americans dies with Alzheimer’s disease or a related dementia. A 2011 law created the National Alzheimer’s Project, which has been reauthorized through 2035. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has led the National Alzheimer’s Project, which encompasses a range of federal agencies and activities to address Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias. The law did not provide appropriations for the project. The project has contributed to numerous key achievements in combatting Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias. For example, research related to the project has led to the first two approved treatments aimed at slowing disease progression for early-stage Alzheimer’s disease. The project also contributed to areas such as diagnostic testing and risk reduction, among others. An Advisory Council was established as part of the project to develop recommendations to HHS and others to improve project efforts. HHS provides periodic updates on recent federal actions informed by some of these recommendations, but having more detailed information on the implementation status of individual recommendations would help the council identify remaining gaps and focus future recommendations to improve project efforts. HHS collects updates on agency efforts to assess the project’s progress. While HHS has set long-term goals for the project, such as reducing risk of Alzheimer’s, it has not followed other key practices for performance management. Specifically: Setting near-term goals: HHS has not set near-term goals in alignment with the project’s long-term goals (e.g., reducing risk of Alzheimer’s disease). Near-term goals are tangible, measurable results that the agency expects the National Alzheimer’s Project to achieve. Setting project-level near-term goals would help HHS assess the progress of the project as a whole. Information collection and use: Without near-term goals, HHS is unable to collect the information needed to assess progress and inform management decisions to adjust project efforts, as appropriate. Furthermore, HHS cannot effectively communicate progress to project stakeholders. HHS officials noted that resource constraints may make it challenging to follow these key practices. However, doing so would help HHS more effectively assess its progress towards the project’s goals, determine whether and where changes may be necessary, and more clearly communicate the results of this assessment. Clearly communicating the extent of progress would in turn help stakeholders better understand the returns on federal investments in the project and is particularly important given that the project is spread across multiple agencies and activities. Why GAO Did This Study The number of individuals with Alzheimer’s and related dementias in the U.S. is expected to nearly double by 2050. GAO was asked to review the National Alzheimer’s Project. This report describes the project’s achievements to date and examines HHS efforts to provide updates on council recommendations and assess project progress. To do this work, GAO reviewed HHS project documentation, including HHS’s updates to the National Plan and Advisory Council recommendations. GAO interviewed HHS officials and recent non-federal members of the Advisory Council, selected based on factors including their background and role on the council. GAO also interviewed non-federal stakeholders engaged in this issue, including groups representing health care providers, state aging and disability agencies, caregivers, and patients. GAO also evaluated project efforts against GAO’s prior work on key practices for performance management.

What GAO Found The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) met increasingly frequent and large drawdown directives. Since 1985, the Department of Energy (DOE) has released more than 500 million barrels of crude oil from the SPR. More than half of the amount released through 2025 was for emergencies—such as wars—and nearly 70 percent of all releases occurred from 2014 through 2025. A 180-million-barrel emergency release in 2022 after Russia invaded Ukraine tested the SPR’s capabilities, as it was both the largest drawdown ever and occurred in the context of an extended backlog of deferred maintenance. In March 2026, DOE began a 172-million-barrel emergency release planned in response to the war in Iran. U.S. Crude Oil Held in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve 1985–2025 The SPR’s operational capability to meet mission demands is at risk. DOE has completed some life extension work, triaged major maintenance needs, and continued to monitor and assess risks to the SPR. However, investments in the SPR are again not keeping pace with the aging reserve’s needs, resulting in a growing backlog and looming operational limitations—as in 2014 when DOE last identified the need to invest in a life extension project. DOE has identified concerns that significant remaining issues with aging SPR infrastructure will increasingly limit the SPR’s capability to meet fill or drawdown directives. Congress and DOE lack a unified long-term plan for the SPR. DOE last completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR in 2016, after Congress directed it to do so. Since then, DOE has drafted but not completed several similar reviews. Congress has not mandated a timeline or requirements for the next long-term plan or set a target SPR size. Without an updated long-term plan or target size for the SPR, DOE and Congress are making operational and investment decisions amidst uncertainty about what the SPR is capable of at present, what it should be capable of in the future to meet changing U.S. needs and obligations, and what investments and other actions may be required to bridge any gaps. Relatedly, DOE has not reassessed the technical and performance criteria that establish the SPR’s operational requirements for drawdown and fill rates to reflect significant changes in crude oil markets over the last three decades. Doing so would inform congressional and DOE strategic planning and investment decisions for the SPR to better ensure it can meet U.S. energy security needs and obligations. Why GAO Did This Study In the aftermath of international oil embargoes, Congress authorized DOE to create the SPR in 1975 to reduce the impact of disruptions in petroleum supplies. Members of Congress, GAO, and others have long raised questions about the SPR’s optimal size and configuration to meet evolving energy security needs and international obligations. Additionally, in 2015 Congress directed DOE to begin a large project to extend the operational life of the aging SPR infrastructure, after DOE found in 2014 that a large portion of it required replacement. GAO was asked to review DOE’s management of the SPR. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the SPR has met mission demands, (2) DOE has ensured its operational capability, and (3) DOE has completed long-term plans in consultation with Congress. GAO reviewed legal and policy requirements, analyzed DOE data and documents, interviewed agency officials and contractors, and visited SPR sites in Texas and Louisiana.

What GAO Found To strengthen the United States’ and its foreign partners’ security, the U.S. government sells or provides defense articles and services to more than 100 foreign governments and international organizations that request them. The Department of Defense (DOD), with other agencies, uses technology release and foreign disclosure policies and procedures—the TRFD processes—to determine whether to share sensitive military technology and intelligence with foreign partners. Generally, the TRFD processes start when a foreign partner submits a request to DOD. Designated officials manage the request to obtain approval from the relevant military departments and interagency stakeholders. Example of Items Procured Through Technology Release and Foreign Disclosure Processes DOD officials identified operational challenges affecting the execution of the TRFD processes and described steps DOD is taking to mitigate them. According to officials, weighing the national security implications of releasing sensitive technology is inherently time consuming and specialized. Moreover, decision-making is distributed among multiple stakeholders, with different authorities, which may complicate coordination among these processes. To facilitate coordination, DOD is taking some mitigating steps and considering establishing a knowledge repository system to track TRFD policies and decisions. DOD has taken steps to enact reforms of the TRFD processes. In November 2025, according to officials, DOD began implementing TRFD reforms that, according to officials, it intended to complete within a year. Officials also said that DOD was tracking progress on the reforms and, as of May 2026, had completed 26 of 33 reform action items. While DOD will likely undertake additional TRFD reforms in the future, it is on track to complete the current efforts by November 2026 because of support from senior DOD leadership and effective prioritization of the reforms, according to officials.  Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, Congress and others have raised questions about the transparency and accountability of the TRFD processes. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 required DOD to submit a report to Congress assessing various aspects of the TRFD processes. In December 2024, DOD submitted the report. In addition, in April 2025, Executive Order 14268 directed DOD to implement TRFD reforms as part of an effort to facilitate foreign military sales. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the 2025 NDAA included a provision for GAO to conduct an independent assessment of DOD’s TRFD reform initiative. This report describes (1) DOD’s TRFD processes, (2) challenges related to the TRFD processes and steps DOD is taking to mitigate them, and (3) DOD’s progress in implementing organizational reforms proposed in its December 2024 report and directed in Executive Order 14268. GAO reviewed documents from DOD, including DOD’s Security Assistance Management Manual. In addition, GAO met with DOD officials and attended a course for foreign disclosure officers. For more information, contact James Reynolds at reynoldsj@gao.gov.

This Scroll-Driven Narrative tells the story of how pharmaceutical companies and the federal government work together to turn ideas into innovative medical treatments. It is a companion to GAO’s report Biomedical Research: NIH Should Publicly Report More Information about the Licensing of Its Intellectual Property, GAO-21-52. This product highlights key themes from GAO’s prior work—particularly the lack of publicly available information on licensing of intellectual property developed through National Institutes of Health (NIH) research. It also highlights recommendations from GAO’s prior work and NIH efforts to implement them. For more information, contact Candice N. Wright at wrightc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Four selected agencies—the Departments of State, Transportation, Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA)—varied in their efforts to implement and ensure contractor compliance with three key cloud security practices. Specifically, one agency had fully implemented all three practices for two of its systems and one agency had fully implemented the practices for one of its systems. The agencies partially implemented the practices for the remaining five systems (see figure). Agencies’ Implementation of Key Cloud Security Practices aDue to sensitivity concerns, GAO is not disclosing the names of the selected systems in this report. Systems are identified by their cloud service model. For example, agencies fully performed continuous monitoring for three of the eight selected systems. Although most of the agencies developed and implemented a plan for continuous monitoring, they did not always review continuous monitoring deliverables from the provider. Agencies fully implemented the practice regarding service level agreements for five out of eight systems. For the remaining three systems, agencies’ agreements did not consistently define performance metrics, including how they would be measured and the enforcement mechanisms. Fully implementing the key practices will support the agencies’ efforts to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of agency information in their cloud systems. For example, without a robust continuous monitoring program, the agencies may have diminished ability to identify and mitigate control deficiencies and emerging threats. Additionally, the agencies may not promptly detect unauthorized access attempts or anomalous activity, leaving critical systems and data exposed to compromise. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies are faced with the need to accelerate their adoption of cloud services while ensuring the systems that support their missions are secure. Consequently, working with cloud service providers to effectively implement information security controls is a vital part of reducing risks to agency systems. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 includes a provision for GAO to periodically evaluate federal agencies’ information security policies and practices. This report assesses the extent to which selected agencies are ensuring contractor compliance with key cloud computing security practices. To do so, GAO selected four agencies (State, Transportation, VA, SBA) based on their number of cloud authorizations, excluding agencies profiled in recent GAO reports. GAO reviewed two cloud systems at each agency, each of which represented a range of services. GAO administered a standard set of questions, compared documentation on the implementation of key cloud-related practices for each system identified in federal policies and guidance, and interviewed agency officials. GAO rated each agency as having fully, partially, or not implemented each practice for the selected systems.

The Big Picture The Department of Defense (DOD) military health system provides medical care to 9.4 million beneficiaries, including service members and their families around the globe. This care is delivered through over 700 medical facilities with more than 100,000 military, civilian, and contractor employees, and a vast network of private sector health care providers. DOD estimates that it will spend over $72.5 billion for the military health system in fiscal year 2027. For more than a decade, DOD has taken actions to reform its health system in response to legislative requirements and to more effectively manage the system. For example, in response to December 2016 legislation, the Defense Health Agency (DHA)—a combat support agency—took over the administration and management of DOD’s medical facilities from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In making this change, DOD sought to create a more efficient oversight structure for the medical facilities that would help lower costs and improve beneficiary care, in part by shifting some patients to private sector care. Military Health System Organizational Reforms Since 2016 However, as GAO reported in July 2025, the ability to supply health care across the military health system remains constrained by insufficient numbers of medical personnel and allocation of fiscal resources to other readiness priorities, according to DHA officials. DOD continued to examine the need for further reform and adopted a new strategy to increase the capacity of DOD’s medical facilities to provide both beneficiary care and training opportunities for military medical personnel. According to DOD, such efforts are intended to stabilize the military health system by reattracting beneficiaries to its facilities from private sector care. Key Challenges Identified by GAO GAO’s work has identified various organizational reform and personnel management challenges that affect the success of the military health system. Organizational reform challenges. DOD has not identified the necessary resources or conducted sufficient oversight to support its reform efforts. Personnel management challenges. DOD does not have key information needed to manage and oversee its military medical personnel nor sufficient metrics to assess their clinical readiness. Implications for National Security The military health system supports the health of service members so that they are ready to deploy. In addition, the system exists to ensure that military medical personnel are prepared to provide medical care in support of missions that include operational, wartime, and mass casualty events. This is referred to as clinical readiness. GAO has reported on a long-standing concern that DOD’s medical facilities may not be able to provide sufficient opportunities to sustain the skills of some military medical personnel, such as those who provide trauma and critical care services. DOD’s efforts to address legislative reforms over time have been, in part, intended to address this concern by increasing the clinical readiness of military medical personnel. Addressing the persistent challenges identified in this product, such as by implementing GAO’s related recommendations, would enhance DOD’s ability to ensure the clinical readiness of its medical personnel in operational and wartime environments. This would further help DOD achieve its goal of stabilizing and improving the health system. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations listed in this product and has stated plans to address them over time. GAO Recommendations Selected GAO Open Recommendations Related to DOD’s Military Health System from Fiscal Year 2019 Through June 2026 Resources needed to support organizational reform efforts The Department of Defense (DOD) has not fully determined the resources necessary for implementing its organizational reform. DOD should validate headquarters-level personnel requirements and identify the least costly mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel needed to achieve mission objectives. (GAO-19-53) DOD should issue guidance detailing processes to determine and validate the number of personnel needed to manage and support its medical facilities. (GAO-25-107432) DOD should review Defense Health Agency business functions to determine which ones it will consolidate to manage and support its medical facilities. (GAO-25-107432) Oversight of organizational reform efforts DOD has not comprehensively monitored or involved Congress in the development of its organizational reform efforts. DOD should establish a systematic process to comprehensively monitor actions taken to address statutory requirements for military health system reforms, such as by consolidating responsible leaders, actions taken, and time frames into a single data source. (GAO-23-105710) DOD should continuously involve key stakeholders including Congress in developing and implementing its network structure to manage its medical facilities and ensure congressional views are reflected. (GAO-25-107432) Management and oversight of medical personnel DOD does not have key information needed to better monitor medical facility staffing and address staffing gaps. DOD should develop a strategic total workforce plan which includes, among other things, strategies, tools, and metrics to monitor and evaluate progress toward reducing personnel gaps. (GAO-19-102) DOD should issue guidance to assess the potential effect of medical personnel reductions on medical facilities. (GAO-23-106094) DOD should take actions, such as issuing guidance and addressing data quality issues, to improve the use of timecard data to monitor military medical personnel work time at medical facilities. (GAO-25-106988) Efforts to monitor clinical readiness of medical personnel DOD has not developed sufficient metrics to assess and monitor clinical readiness of medical personnel. DOD should develop metrics to assess medical facility contributions toward enlisted medical personnel wartime medical skills sustainment. (GAO-21-337) DOD should issue guidance for collecting complete clinical activity data from military-civilian partnerships for certain personnel. (GAO-26-107677) The military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) should each establish processes to fully assess the contributions of civilian training partnerships to the clinical readiness of military medical personnel. (GAO-26-107677) For more information, contact Rashmi Agarwal at AgarwalR@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Empirical studies assessing the effects of domestic airline mergers generally found that, in the short run, consumers faced higher fares and lower service quality (e.g., on-time performance) on routes where the merger resulted in fewer competitors. For example, based on three studies that used particularly strong methodologies, fares increased between 1 and 8 percent following the merger. Other studies found mergers sometimes led to some improvements in airlines’ efficiencies (e.g., cost reductions), but challenges, such as combining workforces, sometimes reduced or eliminated anticipated gains. GAO’s analyses of airline competition metrics provide a longer-term perspective than the studies and suggest that there has been increased competition in the past two decades. For example, estimated domestic fares that incorporated available airline ancillary fees were lower in 2024 as compared to 2007—even after they were higher in 2012, around the time of a wave of domestic airline mergers. In addition, market share and other key market structure indicators show increased presence of ultra-low-cost airlines in 2022 compared to 2007. These indicators remained largely unchanged from 2022 through 2024. Note: GAO divided domestic routes into five “quintiles” (based on number of passengers), where the first quintile generally includes the most-travelled routes, and the fifth generally includes the least. Stakeholders identified five key factors that affect airline competition, including airport access and introduction of basic economy fares by network airlines. Most stakeholders GAO interviewed described intense competition in an uneven environment, posing challenges for lower-cost airlines going forward. They also pointed to a relatively recent development: the increasing importance of airline credit card revenue. This helps airlines weather industry volatility, while also bolstering passenger loyalty by providing rewards (e.g., seat upgrades). Some stakeholders said these cards provide competitive advantages for larger airlines because consumers are less attracted to cards offered by lower-cost airlines, which generally have smaller operations and reward programs. Why GAO Did This Study Domestic airlines carried nearly 850 million passengers throughout the U.S. in 2025, according to Department of Transportation (DOT) data. Robust competition in the air transportation industry can promote lower fares and provide consumers with more travel options and destinations. Some observers, however, have raised questions about the effects of mergers, suggesting that consumers may ultimately face higher airfares and reduced service. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review competition and consolidation in the U.S. airline industry. This report examines (1) findings from empirical studies since 2005 on the effects of U.S. airline mergers on consumers and on airlines’ efficiency, (2) the current state (2022-2024) of airline competition in the U.S. compared to 5, 10, and 15 years prior, and (3) stakeholders’ views on the factors affecting the evolution of competition in the U.S. airline industry. GAO summarized the findings of 40 empirical studies with sufficiently rigorous methodologies that assessed the effects of U.S. airline mergers. Of those, GAO found 13 studies particularly robust and reported quantitative effects that are statistically significant. GAO also analyzed airline data collected by DOT to examine U.S. airline competition over time. GAO interviewed or obtained written responses from all 12 major U.S. airlines and 19 other knowledgeable stakeholders, including academic researchers, consumer advocacy groups, and equity analysts. GAO selected stakeholders based on its prior work, recommendations from others, and the stakeholders’ knowledge of the U.S. airline industry. GAO also interviewed officials from DOT and the Department of Justice. For more information, contact: Danielle T. Giese at GieseD@gao.gov or Michael Hoffman at HoffmanME@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In fiscal year 2025 FraudNet processed over 9,350 allegations and referred about 3,100 of these to various organizations for further inquiry. FraudNet also conducted over 900 queries of commercial and law enforcement databases to assist GAO audits and investigations. FraudNet Processed over 9,350 Allegations In FY 2025, FraudNet processed over 9,350 allegations received from the public, as well as government employees and contractors. Of these, FraudNet referred about 3,100 to other entities for potential action, including investigation. FraudNet referred allegations to over 60 entities, including the Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) at the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Veterans Affairs. FraudNet’s Investigative Research Analysts (IRA) review and document each allegation received. If IRAs determine an allegation should be referred elsewhere, they send it to federal OIGs or other federal, state, and local entities for potential action. The receiving entities determine whether and how they will address the allegation. To avoid duplication of efforts, FraudNet generally does not refer allegations when the complainant indicates that the matter has already been submitted to another entity. GAO does not independently investigate allegations of fraud, waste, or abuse submitted to FraudNet. Instead, FraudNet records all allegations in its case management system and makes them available to inform ongoing or future GAO work. FraudNet IRAs Provided Research Support to GAO Audits and Investigations In FY 2025, FraudNet conducted over 900 queries of commercial and law enforcement databases to support 10 GAO audits and investigations. For example, information from FraudNet queries aided GAO investigators when they made covert calls to ineligible providers with a history of billing insurance carriers participating in the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program. As discussed in the April 2026 report (GAO-26-108139), these calls identified instances when ineligible providers were willing to accept patients with FEHB insurance, demonstrating ongoing fraud and improper payment risks within the program. FraudNet IRAs do not alter any information submitted via the Online Complaint Form. When necessary, IRAs may contact complainants to request additional information. GAO cannot accept classified information through the Online Complaint Form. Please call 1-800-424-5454 for guidance on submitting allegations that involve classified information. Why This Matters FraudNet’s primary mission is to facilitate the reporting of allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement of federal funds. It also supports GAO audits and investigations. This is a summary of FraudNet’s activities for fiscal year (FY) 2025. Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse FraudNet’s preferred method for receiving allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement involving unclassified information is the Online Complaint Form. The form’s prepopulated questions guide complainants in providing the key elements IRAs need to effectively assess and, as appropriate, refer allegations. The form is always available and allows complainants to upload supporting documentation at the time of submission. For more information, contact Howard Arp at arpj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (2017 NDAA) requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop an annual report containing 43 specific metrics to measure the effectiveness of border security. DHS reported on 40 of these metrics in its 2023 Border Security Metrics Report, which it submitted in January 2025. These 40 metrics included two that DHS first included in its 2022 report and one that it first included in its 2023 report. Of the 40 metrics, 21 generally corresponded with their 2017 NDAA definitions, while 19—including the three additional metrics—differed in scope or calculation. GAO previously reviewed DHS's Border Security Metrics Reports in 2019, 2021, and 2023. Six of the recommendations GAO made in these reports remain open. DHS agreed with these recommendations, which highlight an ongoing opportunity for DHS to improve its reporting on border security metrics. Fully addressing these recommendations will help DHS ensure the information it reports is useful to Congress. For example: DHS's Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS)—which is responsible for developing the report—has taken some steps to engage with DHS components, such as by working with the Coast Guard to include two of the newly reported metrics related to maritime threat response. However, OHSS officials have not engaged with components to ensure that certain previously reported metrics—such as those related to illicit drug removal—corresponded with the 2017 NDAA definitions. OHSS officials also have not engaged with Congress on metrics that have been challenging to report, as we previously recommended. By doing so, OHSS could help clarify definitions for these metrics and identify opportunities to refine them. OHSS identified some data limitations in its 2023 Border Security Metrics Report but has not developed a process to systematically review the reliability of data and communicate limitations in its report, as we previously recommended. Such a process would involve OHSS assessing whether the data underlying each of the metrics in the report are reliable and whether any limitations exist that would affect how they are used in the report. Having such a process may help to improve the quality of the metrics in the report and Congress, policymakers, and the public's understanding of the metrics. OHSS has not assessed a statistical model it uses to estimate certain metrics related to unlawful entries into the U.S. since its development in 2016, raising questions about the extent to which the model reflects current southwest border conditions. While OHSS used historical data to account for unavailable survey data in its 2023 Border Security Metrics Report, this modification did not assess whether the inputs to the model or model type remain sufficiently predictive, as we previously recommended. OHSS officials told us they plan to continue using their current statistical model until an alternative model's estimates are valid. Assessing or updating aspects of OHSS's current model could help ensure that it remains predictive and reflects current southwest border conditions. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. has approximately 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,000 miles of coastline, and more than 300 ports of entry where travelers and cargo are inspected. Securing U.S. border areas is a key part of DHS's mission. Its ability to measure border security activities is essential to managing its responsibilities effectively. The 2017 NDAA requires DHS to report annually on 43 border security metrics. The act also includes a provision for GAO to review and report on DHS's first report and complete biennial reviews for the following 10 years. Since March 2019, we have issued three reports on this topic. This fourth report assesses the extent DHS took steps in its 2023 Border Security Metrics Report to (1) more fully report and increase the usefulness of the metrics reported and (2) improve the quality of the information underlying the metrics reported, as previously recommended. GAO assessed the methodology and data in DHS's report, analyzed DHS's use of statistical models, and interviewed officials from DHS offices and components involved in developing the metrics.

What GAO Found In June 2025, GAO identified six priority recommendations for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Since then, OSTP has implemented three of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified one additional priority recommendation, bringing the total to four. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Planning and tracking progress toward national science and technology goals, and Addressing research security risks. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would help OSTP better marshal interagency efforts to plan for, or track progress toward, national goals and overcome challenges with sharing information on research security risks across agencies. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact John Neumann at neumannj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 12 priority recommendations for the Department of Labor (DOL). Since then, DOL has implemented two of those recommendations, bringing the total to 10 priority recommendations in June 2026. GAO is highlighting the following three areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Protecting sensitive information, Enhancing unemployment insurance (UI), and Strengthening worker safety and health protections. Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would better ensure effective implementation of critical protections for sensitive personal information; help the agency stabilize the UI system for future economic downturns and monitor whether states' UI systems are performing efficiently and effectively; and better protect workers at warehouses, delivery companies and health care facilities from harm. Taking action to implement all of GAO's open priority recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across DOL. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cindy Brown Barnes at brownbarnesc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Senior agency officials from 22 of 24 selected agencies reported primarily relying on historical procurement data to help make cloud decisions. Timely implementation of the many recommendations GAO has made to federal agencies to improve these data could result in high-quality information. Senior officials in the 24 agencies most frequently reported the following cloud procurement challenges. Challenges Reported by 24 Selected Federal Agencies on Cloud Procurement Challenge identified Number of agencies reporting challenge Control of cloud costs required changes in IT management approaches. 17 Conflicting Office of Management and Budget and National Institute of Standards and Technology-issued software guidance caused confusion. 17 Outdated Federal Acquisition Regulations impeded cloud procurements. 15 Agencies encountered difficulties in obtaining authorized cloud solutions. 15 Multi-vendor cloud adoption faced new technical considerations such as interoperability. 11 Resource constraints hindered cloud workforce acquisition. 10 Source: GAO analysis of agency interviews and federal guidance documentation. | GAO-26-107530 Agencies are addressing challenges in controlling cloud costs, obtaining authorized cloud solutions, and issuing guidance and responding to cloud staffing limitations. Agencies’ ongoing and planned actions, if implemented effectively, demonstrate promise for tackling these challenges and could lead to substantial savings. In contrast, the challenges of conflicting software guidance, outdated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and multi-vendor cloud solutions remain. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and National Institute of Standards and Technology issued conflicting guidance to agencies that created unnecessary burdens for collecting and storing key software components. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is well positioned to address this conflict by providing additional guidance on implementation to agencies. The FAR remains out of date in areas impacting cloud procurement. Although significant changes were made to the FAR between April 2025 and October 2025, the FAR still does not have a definition of cloud computing, the definition of IT is 20 years old, and the definition of a commercial product or service does not align with cloud computing. Updating the FAR to reflect present day computing is essential to effectively contracting for cloud services. Several larger agencies are using multiple cloud vendors to achieve efficiencies but are also experiencing new challenges such as interoperability. Sharing multi-cloud leading practices would enable other agencies to learn from each other and improve implementation efforts. Why GAO Did This Study Federal IT acquisitions of cloud services have the potential to reduce costs and improve operational efficiencies. Cloud computing enables on-demand access to shared computing resources. Cloud services use a consumption-based model, and providers generally bill customers based on actual usage of resources (i.e., data storage, computing power, backup, development tools, applications). GAO was asked to review agencies’ efforts to address cloud procurement. This report assesses, among other things, (1) the cloud procurement data agencies and OMB use and collect to inform acquisition decision making, and (2) agency challenges procuring cloud services and efforts to address the challenges. For each of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies, GAO analyzed relevant cloud procurement data, policies, and guidance. Further, GAO interviewed senior officials in the 24 agencies’ Offices of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Senior Procurement Executive. GAO also interviewed staff in OMB’s Office of the Federal CIO and Office of Federal Procurement Policy and staff in the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Office of Government-wide Policy and Federal Acquisition Service.

What GAO Found Rural communities that are not currently served by drinking water or wastewater utilities (unserved communities) often face challenges addressing their drinking water or wastewater infrastructure needs. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have limited data about these unserved communities but can obtain some information through their agencies’ programs and datasets. The rural unserved communities known to USDA and EPA are often in unincorporated areas and frequently have financial and other constraints that limit their ability to address their water infrastructure needs, according to agency officials. Homes Without Wastewater Services in Alabama and West Virginia in 2024 GAO identified 28 USDA and EPA programs that can provide rural unserved communities with financial and technical assistance to help build or improve drinking water or wastewater infrastructure. However, these communities sometimes face difficulty accessing this assistance. For example, communities or their representatives often need to apply for multiple grants from various federal and state funding sources, which can be difficult because of varying application and funding timelines and restrictions on how and when funds can be used. Delays with funding from one source can jeopardize other funding sources and the project itself. For example, one community that was awarded a federal grant did not receive the funding in time to get a matching state grant. To help rural communities access financial resources for water infrastructure, USDA and EPA have taken steps to improve coordination with each other and states, including signing a 2017 joint memorandum. The memorandum outlines best practices states can use to help rural communities access federal and state financial assistance, such as reviewing processes for opportunities to streamline applications for financial assistance and increase coordination among funding partners. However, USDA and EPA have not collaborated to update and monitor the memorandum. Regularly updating and monitoring the joint memorandum, in consultation with states, would help the agencies better collaborate with each other to address the challenges rural communities face with accessing financial assistance for these projects. In addition, EPA’s technical assistance providers can help rural unserved communities navigate available resources, but EPA does not provide them with guidance or other resources to ensure these providers are aware of local capacity and incorporate local knowledge. Doing so could help providers work with rural unserved communities more effectively. Why GAO Did This Study Some rural unserved communities across the U.S. lack water infrastructure or rely on private wells and wastewater treated through septic or onsite systems. Lack of access to safe drinking water or treated wastewater poses risks to public health. GAO was asked to review issues related to rural water infrastructure. This report examines, among other things, (1) what USDA and EPA know about rural unserved communities; (2) which USDA and EPA programs can provide financial and technical assistance to these communities; (3) and challenges these communities face in accessing this assistance. GAO reviewed USDA and EPA program documents and data; interviewed federal agency officials and officials from 10 selected states; and conducted site visits with rural unserved communities in three of these states and one Tribe.

What GAO Found The Department of State must report to Congress all international agreements and qualifying nonbinding instruments twice: (1) after being signed, concluded, or otherwise finalized, including their authorizing authority, and (2) after entering into force or becoming operative, including any implementing authority. This twofold reporting enables Congress to provide oversight of U.S. government agencies’ agreements and instruments before and after they enter into force or become operative. State reported 311 agreements and instruments to Congress between October 2023 and March 2025, but nearly one-third were reported late at one or both points. Late-reported agreements and instruments were on average 2.3 reporting cycles late. For example, an agreement concluded on November 4, 2024, was to have been reported by the end of December 2024 but was not reported until the end of March 2025 (three reporting cycles late). This means Congress was notified about the agreement about 5 months after its conclusion. GAO found that State does not track the timeliness of State bureaus or offices or other federal agencies in submitting their agreements or instruments for State to report to Congress. Doing so would better position State to identify and address potential related challenges. State also does not collect, from agencies or State bureaus or offices, the legal authorities for their instruments, although it is required to report this information to Congress. The timing and completeness of State’s reporting is critical for Congress to meaningfully oversee the agreements and instruments, including to evaluate whether they align with U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Timeliness of State Reporting of International Agreements and Qualifying Nonbinding Instruments to Congress Between October 2023 and March 2025 Note: A late-reported agreement or instrument is one that was signed, concluded, or otherwise finalized during the prior month, or that entered into force or became operative during the prior month, but was not reported during the following month. GAO’s analysis of a generalizable sample of agreements and instruments found that State generally published text and legal authority information for agreements and instruments on its website but missed the 120-day statutorily mandated deadline about half of the time. GAO also found State’s website for agreements and instruments does not enable Congress or the public to find information efficiently, when compared to best practices. Specifically, State posted fragmented information on agreements, instruments, and their legal authorities across four webpages on its website, without a way to search across the universe of agreements and instruments, such as by country, agency, or subject. By establishing written, standard operating procedures to help ensure information is published within the 120-day deadline, and optimizing its website for efficiency and searchability, State could maximize transparency for Congress and the public, and the usability of its website. Why GAO Did This Study Amendments in the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which took effect on September 19, 2023, expanded the Case-Zablocki Act’s transparency provisions. For the first time, qualifying nonbinding instruments—commitments that do not legally bind the U.S. to their terms—must generally be reported to Congress and made available to the public. Previously, reporting and publishing requirements applied only to international agreements, which are legally binding under international law. The statute mandates that U.S. government agencies report their agreements and instruments to State. State is responsible for reporting them to Congress and publishing them on State’s website. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review State’s implementation of the amended requirements. This report examines the extent to which State addressed reporting and publishing requirements related to international agreements and qualifying nonbinding instruments and any challenges to meeting those requirements. GAO assessed information State reported to Congress between October 2023 and March 2025 and posted to its website in relation to statutory requirements. GAO interviewed officials from State and six other agencies about late reporting.