What GAO Found The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. From fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025, the Secret Service’s budget increased while the number of its protectees fluctuated, particularly around changes in presidential administrations. During this time, there were 83 security incidents. The Secret Service updated its protection policies in response to 25 of them. Secret Service Policy Changes in Response to Incidents, Fiscal Years 2015–2025 Secret Service policy does not require that personnel document their rationale when they determine an incident does not warrant a protection policy update. However, Secret Service officials told GAO that doing so would be important because it shows an incident was fully reviewed. In the absence of this information, it is sometimes unclear why the Secret Service maintained the status quo. For example, the Secret Service encountered drone incidents from 2015 to 2021, but did not update its policies to address civilian use of drones prior to July 2024, when a shooter used a drone in an assassination attempt of then-former President Trump. Revising its policy to require personnel to document the rationale for not making policy changes after incidents would provide the Secret Service with more complete information when considering protection policy updates to mitigate future threats. Further, the Secret Service has not reviewed and updated protection policies in a timely manner. These policies are to be reviewed and updated within 4 years of issuance, but the Secret Service has not reviewed or updated eight of 22 protection policies within the required time frame. Secret Service officials said they try to make timely updates but are not always able to identify personnel available to do so. Revising its policy to assign responsibility to specific positions for updating protection policies within required time frames could help the Secret Service incorporate the most current techniques into advance planning. Finally, since 1991, the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service, the protective division within the Department of State, have not updated a key memorandum of understanding that delineates the two entities’ roles and responsibilities for securing the President and others traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the United States. Much has changed over the intervening years, such as the emergence of drone threats, and updating the memorandum would provide the two entities an opportunity to respond to evolving roles, responsibilities, and advance techniques. Why GAO Did This Study Recent attacks and threats of violence against Secret Service protectees highlight the importance of the Secret Service’s protective mission. These incidents include the July 2024 assassination attempt of then-former President Trump, the alleged assassination attempt of President Trump at the April 2026 White House Correspondents’ Dinner, and the shooting near Vice President Vance’s motorcade in May 2026. GAO was asked to examine the Secret Service’s protection policies. This report addresses, among other things, (1) how the Secret Service protection budget and number of protectees changed from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025; and (2) the extent to which the Secret Service has updated its protection policies. GAO analyzed data and reviewed documentation related to protection policies for the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025. GAO also conducted interviews with officials from the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service, as well as eight other selected federal, state, and local entities with protection responsibilities.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) has not recently met statutory requirements to review and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of its defense agencies and DOD field activities (DAFA). Between April 2023 and September 2024, DOD conducted a review of four DAFAs. However, the department did not finalize the reports based on its reviews or submit the reports to Congress as required. DOD did not have formalized guidance, such as an instruction, in place when conducting these four DAFA reviews. In May 2026, DOD issued a memorandum for future DAFA reviews that includes responsibilities and deadlines. While this is a positive step, DOD previously issued a memorandum for this effort that did not ensure the completion of the reviews. Formalizing guidance for the process would better position DOD to meet its reporting requirements and would provide Congress with better information to inform decision-making related to DOD’s efficiency and effectiveness. Timeline of Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity Reviews Since 2018 DOD has not assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of its DAFAs, including the Defense Human Resources Agency (DHRA), because the department did not clearly define measures to be used for its most recent DAFA reviews. In its May 2026 memorandum, DOD included standard measures for efficiency and effectiveness, but the memorandum lacks detail on these measures. Moreover, the measures are not clearly defined or established in formalized guidance. Clearly defining how to assess efficiency and effectiveness in formalized guidance for the DAFA reviews would enable DOD to more comprehensively assess DHRA and the other DAFAs’ performance. As part of its DAFA reviews, DOD is statutorily required to identify each activity of a DAFA that is substantially similar to, or duplicative of, an activity carried out by another organization within DOD. GAO found overlap in two training areas within the DAFAs: (1) the leader development programs at DHRA, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Washington Headquarters Services; and (2) the sexual assault prevention and response training directed by DOD and developed by the military services. However, DOD has not assessed if there are negative effects on efficiency or effectiveness resulting from this overlap. If DOD were to evaluate these training programs, it may find opportunities to streamline them and reduce any inefficient overlap. Why GAO Did This Study DOD’s 27 DAFAs play a critical role in supporting the department’s business operations. For example, DHRA—which DOD renamed the Personnel Readiness Management Agency in June 2026—is a DOD field activity with a stated mission of enhancing the operational efficiency and effectiveness of diverse programs supporting DOD. DOD is required to conduct reviews of each DAFA’s efficiency and effectiveness at least once every 4 years. The House report accompanying a bill for the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD’s DAFA reviews, with a focus on DHRA. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD is reviewing and reporting on the DAFAs as required by law; (2) DOD has assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of DHRA as part of these reviews; and (3) DHRA provides training services that are duplicative, overlapping, or fragmented with other select DAFAs and the military services. GAO reviewed DOD guidance, reports, and relevant statutory requirements and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require public companies to disclose information that investors would find important when making investment decisions. Disclosures include an annual audited financial statement and a description of risk factors and financial performance. Accounting firms that audit public companies must register with the nonprofit Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which Congress created in 2002 to focus on audit quality. Certain auditor responsibilities—such as evaluating a company’s accounting estimates and ability to continue as a going concern—can be particularly challenging in bank audits, according to PCAOB staff, auditors, and others. SEC is required by law to review public companies’ disclosures. However, 11 public banks—including two with more than $80 billion in assets—are not subject to SEC review because they operate without a corporate parent known as a bank holding company. (Two of the three banks that failed in spring 2023 operated without a holding company. Shareholders lost more than $29 billion in investments in these two banks between the end of 2022 and May 2023.) For those banks, Congress charged banking regulators with certain functions and duties of SEC. However, GAO found that banking regulators’ review processes, unlike SEC’s, do not assess disclosures for investors’ benefit. Reassessing disclosure review authority could help Congress determine whether changes are needed to strengthen investor protection. Comparison of Federal Regulators’ Processes for Annual Disclosure Reviews Note: Annual disclosures include details on a company’s business, its risks, and operating and financial results. GAO reviewed 2021 and 2022 disclosures for the three banks that failed in spring 2023 to analyze the information they provided about interest rate and liquidity risks. GAO and banking regulators previously found that weak management of these risks contributed to the banks’ failures. Although each bank described setting thresholds for interest rate or liquidity risk, they did not disclose when thresholds were breached or how they addressed the breaches. SEC also identified other banks whose disclosures on these risk topics could be improved. However, SEC staff have not provided public guidance on how companies could assess whether breaches of interest rate or liquidity risk tolerances are material to investors. Such guidance could help companies assess the materiality of these details and may provide investors with the information they need to make informed decisions. Why GAO Did This Study The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and federal regulations require public companies to provide investors with periodic disclosures about business risks and financial results. Three of the 30 largest U.S. banks failed in spring 2023, shortly after their financial statement audits were completed. Some observers raised questions about whether auditors had properly fulfilled their roles and whether the banks had clearly disclosed material information. GAO was asked to review oversight of bank financial disclosures and external audits. Among other objectives, this report examines auditing standards relevant for bank audits; oversight of audit quality; SEC and banking regulators’ reviews of public companies’ annual disclosures; and the failed banks’ disclosures about selected risks before they failed. GAO reviewed PCAOB auditing standards, SEC and banking regulators’ disclosure review processes, SEC public comments to bank holding companies, and the failed banks’ annual disclosures. GAO also interviewed staff from SEC, banking regulators, PCAOB, and accounting firms, among others.

What GAO Found The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses the National Simulator Program (NSP) to evaluate and oversee an increasing number of flight simulators. NSP’s oversight ensures that simulators accurately replicate the aircraft they simulate. From 1990 to 2025, the number of simulators increased by more than 500 percent, while the number of NSP staff remained steady. From 2019 through 2024, the number and type of simulator evaluations that NSP conducted remained relatively steady, as NSP implemented the Extended Evaluation Interval (EEI) program, among other strategies, to oversee the growing number of simulators. This program allows FAA to extend intervals between evaluations—from the standard 12 months up to 36 months—for simulators that demonstrate consistent, high-quality performance. Trends in the Number of Simulators Under Federal Aviation Administration Oversight and National Simulator Program Staff, 1990–2025 However, GAO found that NSP has not communicated with simulator sponsors about its process for determining simulators’ eligibility for the EEI program and the intervals between evaluations of simulators in the program. Six of 10 selected sponsors raised concerns about communication, including insufficient opportunity to provide information that could help improve EEI determinations. For example, two sponsors cited potential safety issues that could result from extending the intervals between evaluations. Communicating with sponsors could help NSP make more informed decisions about eligibility and evaluation intervals, and identify and address risks associated with those determinations. GAO found that NSP has identified staffing and skills gaps but has not addressed all mission-critical skills gaps, including in standards development. Developing and implementing a process to address all identified mission-critical skills gaps would help NSP ensure its staff has the requisite skills to keep pace with evolving technology while handling an increased oversight workload. Why GAO Did This Study NSP plays a critical role in aviation safety, as it oversees the flight simulators that airlines and flight schools use to train pilots to operate aircraft in a variety of situations. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review FAA’s oversight of simulators. This report examines, among other objectives, how the number and type of simulator evaluations NSP conducts annually has changed in recent years, and how NSP has addressed increased demand; the extent to which NSP has communicated with sponsors in its process for making EEI program determinations; and the extent to which NSP has identified and addressed gaps in staffing levels and staff skill sets. GAO reviewed FAA policies, guidance, and data, as well as relevant federal laws and regulations. GAO also interviewed FAA officials and simulator sponsors, such as major and regional airlines. For these interviews, GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 10 sponsors that own or operate over 62 percent of all flight simulators. In addition, GAO conducted two site visits to observe simulators managed by a flight simulator manufacturer and a flight training organization.

What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers have key responsibilities for disaster response and recovery activities. Contracting with local businesses—those that reside or primarily do business in declared major disaster areas—is one way to fulfill their responsibilities. Both have policies and guidance to promote local vendor use, but they do not monitor associated data on this use. As a result, they do not know the extent to which they are using local vendors or helping jump-start the local economy. Further, the contracting officers that GAO interviewed were not always aware of how to identify the local disaster area. Under federal regulations, a major disaster area is generally defined in the official presidential disaster declaration. However, some contracting officers identified the local area incorrectly or did not understand how to do so. For example: FEMA. One contracting officer stated that they identified the entire state of Tennessee as the local area instead of staying within the declared disaster area in anticipation that other parts of the state might be added later. Corps. One contracting officer responsible for four contracts for the Maui Wildfires stated that there was not an official way to identify a local area. Example of a Contracting Officer Incorrectly Identifying the Local Disaster Area The Corps has taken efforts to ensure that its contracting officers correctly identify the local area, but FEMA has yet to fully address the issue. For example, its three contracting officers who identified the local area incorrectly had received training on local vendor use. This indicates a need for additional action. Until FEMA takes additional steps to ensure that its contracting officers correctly identify the local area, it could miss opportunities to both award contracts to local vendors and help communities jump-start economic recovery after a disaster. Additionally, all the selected Corps’s contracts were missing documents related to the use of local vendors. Federal regulations require contracting officers who award a post-disaster contract to a nonlocal vendor to document their justification in the contract file. Without these justifications, the Corps lacks assurance its contracting officers are making an effort to use local vendors as appropriate. Ensuring that contracting officers fully comply with federal regulations can provide the Corps with greater certainty that it is succeeding in its efforts to contract with local vendors and assist with the economic recovery of a local area. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. communities devastated by natural disasters often rely on federal aid for their recovery. To meet their disaster response and recovery responsibilities, FEMA and the Corps contract with businesses to obtain some of the goods and services needed for these recovery activities. Under federal law, they are required to provide a preference for contracting with businesses defined by regulation as local—relative to the declared disaster area—to the extent feasible and practicable. This preference may help jump-start the local economy. The American Relief Act of 2025 includes a provision for GAO to conduct work related to certain natural disasters. GAO’s report assesses the extent to which (1) FEMA and the Corps promote and monitor the use of local vendors for disaster response, and (2) contracting officers followed requirements for local vendor use for selected contracts. GAO selected three major disasters: Hurricane Helene, the Maui wildfires, and Hurricane Ian; collected, analyzed, and confirmed the reliability of relevant data; reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and guidance; interviewed agency officials and contracting officers; and assessed a nongeneralizable sample of contracts from the three selected disasters.

What GAO Found In the first half of 2025, the President issued a series of executive orders directing federal agency heads—in consultation with the United States DOGE Service (also known as the Department of Government Efficiency) agency team leads—to review and terminate contracts in order to reduce federal spending, among other things. In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a department-wide review of over 17,000 contracts to assess their level of importance to the agency’s mission. This assessment resulted in DHS components completely or partially terminating contracts for cost savings. In addition, in March 2025, DHS began requiring approval by the Deputy Secretary for all contract terminations regardless of value and for awards of any contracts worth $25 million or more. The requirement for Deputy Secretary approval of contract terminations was rescinded in April 2026. GAO analysis shows that from January 20, 2025, through September 30, 2025, DHS completely or partially terminated 438 contracts for convenience—meaning that termination of work under the contracts was determined to be in the federal government’s interest. DHS had obligated over $1.6 billion for these contracts prior to termination. Since these contracts were terminated, GAO analysis shows that DHS deobligated a net total of over $92 million on these contracts. These funds represent cost savings in that they reduce federal obligations and may be available for other purposes. However, if DHS should subsequently obligate additional funds to perform similar work associated with terminated contracts, the amount of cost savings or avoidance would be further diminshed. DHS publicly reported on its website that its contract terminations over this time frame could allow the department to potentially avoid over $10.5 billion in costs. However, this overstates actual costs avoided for two reasons. First, it represents the maximum that could be obligated on these contracts, not how much would have actually been obligated. Second, if DHS continues to need the goods and services covered by those contracts and meets those needs through other contracts, then those costs would not be avoided but incurred through those contracts. In fact, GAO found that 95 percent of DHS’s reported $10.5 billion in potential cost avoidance was attributable to 30 terminated indefinite delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts in place for DHS to meet information technology requirements. These contracts had a 10-year period of performance, from fiscal years 2025 through 2034. According to DHS, the agency obligated over $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2025 through existing government-wide contracts to meet those requirements. Thus, $1.7 billion in costs were not avoided but were incurred through other contracts. Additionally, any future obligations for the same requirements against the government-wide contracts in future years, through fiscal year 2034, would further reduce actual cost avoidance. As a result, DHS will not fully achieve the amount of reported potential cost avoidance. Why GAO Did This Study In early 2025, the President directed the heads of federal agencies to implement a series of initiatives to reform government operations, including reviewing federal contracts and grants for termination or modification to potentially save costs. To advance these initiatives, the President established the United States DOGE Service and directed agencies to establish DOGE teams to assist in carrying out administration priorities. GAO was asked to review DHS and DOGE efforts to terminate contracts and grant awards and make reductions to its workforce in 2025. This report, the first in a series, provides information on DHS actions to review and terminate contracts from January through September 2025, and the number and value of contracts terminated. GAO reviewed and analyzed documents such as executive orders directing federal agencies to review and terminate contracts and agency documents directing components on how to conduct these efforts. GAO analyzed federal procurement data to determine the number of contracts terminated by DHS and dollar amounts obligated or deobligated on those contracts. GAO also interviewed officials with DHS’s Offices of the Chief Procurement Officer and Chief Financial Officer about these efforts. For more information, contact Chris Currie at CurrieC@gao.gov.

What GAO Found After three unsuccessful attempts over two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) undertook a fourth effort in 2017—the Electronic Health Record Modernization (EHRM) program—to modernize its legacy health information system. GAO has previously reported on the challenges VA has experienced with this effort. In these reports, GAO made 18 recommendations to improve cost estimating, schedule, program management, user adoption and satisfaction, and operational testing. GAO deemed 12 of these as priority recommendations because of their criticality to successful future deployments. As of August 2026, VA has not yet fully implemented 14 of the 18 recommendations. Implementation Status of GAO Electronic Health Record System-Related Recommendations to the Department of Veterans Affairs as of August 2026 Report Total number of recommendations Number of priority recommendations Implementation status of recommendations GAO-25-106874 (March 2025) 3 2 2 priority open (not implemented) 1 closed (implemented) GAO-23-106731 (May 2023) 10 10 6 priority open (not implemented) 4 priority open (partially implemented) GAO-22-103718 (February 2022) 2 0 1 open (not implemented) 1 closed (implemented) GAO-21-224 (February 2021) 2 0 2 closed (implemented) GAO-20-473 (June 2020) 1 0 1 open (not implemented) Source: GAO reports. I GAO-26-109393 In March 2025, GAO reported that VA had made improvements at five initial sites but noted that the department’s actions to address challenges had impacted the program’s total cost estimate and schedule. Accordingly, GAO made two priority recommendations to update the cost estimate and schedule. Senate and House Authorizing and Appropriations Committees subsequently sent a letter to VA requesting a detailed cost estimate and schedule before September 30, 2025. While VA has delivered a notional schedule to congressional committees, it has not provided a cost estimate or detailed documentation of its schedule necessary to determine the extent to which it is consistent with leading practices. In May 2023, GAO reported that users expressed dissatisfaction with the new system and VA did not adequately identify and address system issues. GAO made 10 priority recommendations to address user satisfaction, system trouble ticket, and independent operational assessment deficiencies. As of August 2026, VA has not yet fully addressed the 10 recommendations. Until VA fully implements the recommendations, future deployments risk prolonging management challenges like those experienced in the initial deployments and users will likely not be positioned to achieve optimal usage of the new electronic health record (EHR) system. Why GAO Did This Study VA depends on its EHR system to manage health care for its patients. Since 2017, the department’s EHRM program has undertaken efforts to replace its legacy EHR system with a modernized, commercial system. VA first deployed its new EHR system in 2020 and followed up with further deployments to four additional sites in 2022. However, in 2023, it halted future system deployments due to feedback from veterans and clinicians that the new system was not meeting expectations. In December 2024, VA announced plans to restart deployments beginning with four facilities in Michigan. The department plans for nine additional site deployments in 2026. VA plans to accelerate deployments to complete approximately 170 sites by 2031. GAO has previously designated VA health care as a High-Risk area for the federal government, in part due to its challenges implementing EHRM initiatives. GAO was asked to testify on its key prior reports and related recommendations to improve VA’s EHRM program. GAO summarized the results of five prior reports from June 2020 through March 2025 and followed up with VA on its actions to implement GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issues certificates to aircraft mechanics and to the more than 200 aviation maintenance schools that train them. Eleven of these certificated schools are high schools, and 43 are colleges, universities, or career and technical centers that serve high school students. In addition, at least 43 high schools offer programs in aviation maintenance but are not certificated by FAA. The school representatives that GAO interviewed had little data on career outcomes but cited a range of pathways that graduates have pursued, including further training and enrolling in 4-year colleges. FAA-Certificated Schools That Train High School Students in Aviation Maintenance Stakeholders identified several barriers to students becoming aircraft mechanics, especially limited awareness of the career option among students entering high school. Stakeholders also offered options to address these barriers, such as internships with aviation industry partners to increase awareness. Some stakeholders cited as a barrier the ineligibility of students from uncertificated schools, who do not have the requisite work experience or additional education, to take the general written knowledge test—typically the first in a series of FAA tests that students must pass to become an FAA-certificated aircraft mechanic. For example, one stakeholder said that having to take courses at a certificated school can be costly after taking courses at an uncertificated school. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 requires FAA to task the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee to establish the Airman Knowledge Testing Working Group by May 2025, to assess whether students who have successfully completed an aviation maintenance curriculum should be allowed to take the general written knowledge test. FAA has not established this working group or obtained this assessment. FAA officials said they were unable to do so because, according to the Department of Transportation, it terminated all members of the advisory committee pursuant to an executive order, which required termination of advisory committees deemed to be unnecessary. Convening a group of industry stakeholders and aviation experts to conduct an assessment, through the advisory committee or other mechanism, could help FAA obtain a range of perspectives on the potential benefits and drawbacks of allowing graduates of uncertificated schools to take the test. Through this assessment, FAA could also determine whether expanding access to the test could help address future workforce demand. Why GAO Did This Study A sufficient supply of aircraft mechanics, who service and repair aircraft, is necessary to ensure a safe aviation system. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates there will be about 11,300 open positions for aircraft mechanics annually through 2034. One way to meet this need is to recruit and train younger workers. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review programs that train high school students in aviation maintenance and identify certain barriers for program graduates. This report discusses, among other things, (1) the number of such programs and the career outcomes of their graduates; and (2) barriers to students becoming aircraft mechanics through these programs, and options to address those barriers. GAO analyzed FAA data and conducted a literature search to identify high school aviation maintenance programs, including those partnering with schools certificated by FAA. GAO also interviewed aviation industry stakeholders, including representatives of 12 certificated or uncertificated schools, selected based on type of school and geographic diversity. In addition, GAO compared FAA’s actions with statutory requirements.

What GAO Found The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to telecommunications services. Six agencies GAO selected to review recently completed their transitions from expired, legacy telecommunications contracts to the replacement Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions (EIS) contract. However, their transitions were delayed by more than three years past GSA’s September 2022 revised deadline. Due to continued delays, GSA took actions to extend the service period of the legacy contracts until May 2026 at the latest to avoid service disruptions. The delays exposed the agencies to price increases due to the ability of vendors to raise prices during the extended service periods and the phasing out of legacy telecommunications technologies. In particular, there was a total 206 percent price increase from February to March 2025 for the selected agencies’ Networx contracts—the largest of the legacy contracts. Amount Billed for Selected Agencies’ Legacy Networx Contracts in February 2025 and March 2025 Agency February 2025 costs March 2025 costs Percent change Department of Agriculture $227,986.93 $543,645.43 138% Department of Commerce $1,768,695.34 $5,761,127.10 226% Department of Defense $4,842,079.74 $15,012,896.07 210% Department of Homeland Security $5,855,206.65 $16,853,049.42 188% Department of the Interior $399,435.26 $1,858,077.70 365% Department of Transportation $282,652.93 $896,799.13 217% Total $13,376,056.85 $40,925,594.85 206% Source: GAO analysis of billing data provided by the General Services Administration. | GAO-26-107919 Note: Agencies’ increases varied due to prevalence of legacy telecommunication technologies. The six agencies collectively identified 21 factors that contributed to their transition delays. The most commonly reported factors included performance issues with EIS vendors, the COVID-19 pandemic, and legacy connections. For example, officials from four selected agencies identified supply chain disruptions and staffing challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Three of the six agencies identified and mitigated risks related to over half of their cited delay factors. Further, GSA and the six agencies were inconsistent in identifying and mitigating the risk of service disruptions due to missed final deadlines. For example, two of the six agencies’ related risks were either closed (i.e., resolved) or did not specify the final 2026 deadlines. GSA does not currently know whether all selected agencies experienced service disruptions due to these inconsistent risk mitigation efforts. This is because, among other reasons, GSA is not notified whether a replacement service was in place before an expiring legacy service was disconnected. GSA has begun planning for the follow-on to EIS but has not determined which agencies had disruptions, if there were any impacts, and the effectiveness of any mitigation efforts. Until GSA determines the success of agencies’ mitigation efforts, it will be missing key information that could help inform the next transition and ultimately prevent excess costs and delays going forward. Why GAO Did This Study GSA was responsible for successfully managing 221 agencies’ transitions from expired legacy telecommunications contracts to the replacement contract: EIS. Agencies’ transitions to EIS were marked with significant delays, prompting GSA to extend the deadlines of the expiring legacy contracts multiple times. The final deadline was May 31, 2026. GAO was asked to review federal agencies’ efforts to transition to EIS. This report (1) describes the status and cost implications of selected agencies' efforts to transition to EIS, (2) identifies key factors that selected agencies reported contributing to delays in transitioning, and (3) determines the extent to which these agencies and GSA mitigated risks related to the identified delay factors and the risk of missing final transition deadlines. GAO reviewed transition billing data and interviewed agency officials to identify transition status and key delay factors. GAO also analyzed risk management documentation from GSA, as well as six agencies that had a significant amount of transition work remaining as of September 2024: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Transportation.

What GAO Found Since 2020, four federal agencies administered the bulk of federal funding for broadband deployment through the nine programs GAO reviewed. These were the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Departments of Agriculture and the Treasury. For example, NTIA oversees the over $42-billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program, which provides grants to states and territories that select providers to deploy broadband networks to underserved areas. As of February 2026, all nine programs had begun distributing funding. Expected Completion Date for Selected Programs’ Broadband Deployment Program (agency) Date State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (Treasury) 2026 Broadband Infrastructure Program (NTIA); Capital Projects Fund (Treasury) 2027 Selected High Cost subprograms (FCC) 2028 Tribal Broadband Connectivity Program rounds one and two (NTIA) 2029 Tribal Broadband Connectivity Program round three (NTIA); selected High Cost subprograms (FCC); Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment Program (NTIA) 2030 and beyond Source: Documentation and officials from National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Department of the Treasury. | GAO-26-107725 Note: Table excludes the U.S. Department of Agriculture programs that GAO reviewed because expected completion dates vary by funding round. Federal agencies target funding to underserved areas using FCC mapping data showing which locations do and do not have broadband access, as reported by providers. To improve data accuracy, FCC accepts challenges from the public and makes updates if needed. Some program participants and stakeholders said this challenge process was burdensome and unclear. For example, challenging a large number of locations in an area could be difficult for smaller communities and providers with limited resources. Without targeted outreach to smaller communities and providers to address such difficulties, FCC may not be able to obtain the most accurate information about broadband availability and therefore may not be able to effectively identify and target funding to underserved areas. As one of the largest programs focused on broadband deployment GAO reviewed, BEAD holds great potential to make broadband available to areas that have been underserved. GAO has previously reported on issues providers face in high-cost areas, including financial sustainability. In October 2025, NTIA announced a requirement that BEAD providers certify that they will not accept federal funding from other sources for broadband deployment and operations costs for locations funded by BEAD for at least 10 years. This provision is intended to ensure that BEAD projects are financially self-sustainable without additional federal funding. NTIA’s BEAD documentation for states and territories states that there may be a basis for them to request certain data from providers. However, NTIA did not detail the circumstances that could warrant such a request. By providing more details, NTIA would help states anticipate potential problems and prevent service lapses to underserved areas when providers cannot continue providing services due to financial issues. Why GAO Did This Study Federal programs have received billions of dollars in recent years, including over $50 billion from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, to deploy broadband networks to areas that lack service. These areas are typically remote and harder or more expensive to serve than other areas. This effort involves multiple federal agencies, states, territories, Tribes, and broadband providers. House Report 118-124 includes a provision for GAO to review the efficacy of recent federal broadband deployment programs. This report examines selected agencies’ progress in deploying broadband, their approaches to targeting underserved areas, and NTIA’s efforts to encourage sustainability in its BEAD program, among other things. GAO analyzed broadband program data, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials from the four selected broadband funding agencies. GAO selected seven programs administered by these agencies with broadband deployment as a main purpose and two Treasury programs due to the significant amount of funding used for broadband deployment. GAO compared FCC’s efforts to improve data in its maps and NTIA’s efforts to encourage sustainability to relevant federal internal control standards.

What the OIG Found In 2021, GAO established a 5-year IT modernization plan with initiatives that were projected to cost about $29 million. As GAO’s IT modernization efforts evolved, the agency transitioned from a comprehensive 5-year IT modernization plan to an ongoing modernization strategy. The decision to evolve away from the approximately $1 million plan occurred less than 18 months after it was finalized. However, due to a lack of documentation, current officials were not fully aware of the decision-making process that led to the transition. Documenting strategic changes as they occur is critical for ensuring decisions are justified, preserving institutional knowledge, and keeping stakeholders informed. GAO incorporated most of the initiatives from the plan into the modernization strategy. As of May 2026, the agency reported that 39 of the 61 initiatives had been completed. While GAO tracked its IT modernization costs, some smaller initiatives were tracked under larger projects in the cost-tracking system. As a result, it would be difficult to determine the actual costs for all IT modernization initiatives. Fully tracking the costs of future IT projects would help ensure more effective reporting to stakeholders. By designing controls to document significant changes and identify all costs for efforts, GAO could help ensure that decisions are justified and costs are easily reportable. Why the OIG Did This Audit GAO is working to modernize its IT systems. In its public Fiscal Year 2024 Performance Plan, the agency identified IT modernization as a management challenge due to the effort required. In fiscal year 2021, GAO paid $1 million to establish an IT modernization plan with initiatives to prepare the agency’s workforce for cloud capabilities, develop governance processes, and migrate applications to the cloud. The plan roadmap estimated a 5-year time frame at a cost of about $29 million. The OIG conducted this audit to assess GAO’s progress implementing its IT modernization plan. Recommendations GAO concurred with the OIG’s recommendations to enhance controls to ensure that major decisions are appropriately documented and design controls to ensure that costs for major future projects are fully tracked and can be reported to key stakeholders. For more information, contact at oig@gao.gov.