What GAO Found According to U.S. Census Bureau data, an estimated 13.8 million adults enrolled in Medicaid and 10.6 million adults living in households that received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits worked at some point during 2024. This is out of approximately 28 million and 20 million adults ages 19–64 in these programs, respectively. GAO’s analysis of Census data showed that about two-thirds of these adults in each program worked full-time (35 hours or more a week). However, when compared to other wage-earning adults not participating in either program, wage-earning adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients were less likely to work full-time hours for 50 or more weeks per year. Estimated Percentage of Wage-Earning Adults Working Full-Time and Part-Time Work Schedules in 2024 Most of these wage-earning adults in both programs (88 percent) were employed in the private sector in 2024, which is higher than the percentage of wage-earning adults in the private sector who were not enrolled or not receiving benefits. Wage-earning adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients were also more likely than wage earners who did not participate in the programs to work in food service and food preparation occupations. According to GAO’s analysis of state-level data for September 2025, the employers with the most nondisabled, nonelderly Medicaid enrollees or SNAP beneficiaries varied across the 11 states that provided data. However, 46 companies (about one-third of the total companies across all 11 states) were among the top 25 employers of Medicaid enrollees or SNAP beneficiaries in at least two states. Seventeen of these 46 companies were among the 50 largest Fortune 500 companies by number of employees. Why GAO Did This Study Each year millions of wage-earning adults participate in federally funded social safety net programs to help pay for basic needs including health care and food assistance. GAO was asked to update information provided on wage-earning Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients in its October 2020 report (GAO-21-45). This report includes an analysis estimating (1) the labor characteristics of working adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients and (2) employers of adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients in selected states. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed recent Census data on the labor characteristics of wage-earning adults in the two programs. GAO also analyzed data on the employers of nondisabled, nonelderly working adult Medicaid enrollees and working adult SNAP recipients obtained from 15 state agencies across 11 states as of September 2025. For more information, contact Kathryn Larin at larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record (ILER) is a web application that links service members’ and veterans’ military toxic exposures and related information from Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) databases. DOD and VA intend ILER to be a multi-purpose tool to support clinicians in providing diagnoses and treatment decisions, researchers in conducting health surveillance and epidemiological research, and Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) claims benefits staff in processing disability claims. Use of the ILER web application among DOD and VA staff increased after the Honoring our PACT Act of 2022 (PACT Act) was enacted in August 2022. This act expanded eligibility for VA health care and disability benefits to veterans who experienced certain toxic exposures during their military service. The increase in ILER use after the PACT Act’s enactment was driven largely by VBA staff. VBA staff have also been the largest group of users since enactment. Percentage of Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record (ILER) Account Logins, by Agency as Identified by Staff During Account Registration, September 2022 Through January 2026 In March 2026, service members gained the ability to access the ILER web application and add self-reported updates to their record. ILER officials said they plan to also provide service members with a way to request corrections by September 2026. For veterans, officials said they plan to provide access to ILER and a way to request corrections by October 2026. ILER officials and officials from eight stakeholder organizations said some potential benefits of service member and veteran access to their ILER information include increased transparency and knowledge. For example, service members and veterans may be able to have more informed conversations with clinicians about diagnoses and risks of future health effects. Those officials said one of the potential challenges includes frustration if service members and veterans see missing or incomplete records. ILER officials are providing information about ILER’s capabilities and limitations in education and outreach efforts to help mitigate this challenge. Why GAO Did This Study Military service members and veterans may experience adverse health outcomes associated with toxic exposures experienced during military service. For example, those who deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11th have reported health concerns from toxic exposures, particularly to smoke and harmful emissions produced by open-air burn pits. In April 2026, VA estimated that about 48 percent of veterans who have been screened since 2022 (approximately 3.2 million of 6.8 million total veterans screened) had at least one potential toxic exposure during military service. DOD and VA launched ILER in 2019 as a tool to compile information on individuals’ service-related toxic exposures and health assessments from several databases. Staff can use ILER to process disability claims, provide health care, and conduct research. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review ILER. This report describes available information on the use of ILER by DOD and VA staff and service members’ and veterans’ access to their ILER record. GAO analyzed data on ILER use among DOD and VA staff from October 2019 through January 2026; reviewed related documents and interviewed officials managing ILER; and interviewed stakeholder organizations, including six military and veterans service organizations and two toxic exposure non-profit organizations. GAO selected these organizations as they represent service members or veterans and have knowledge or expertise related to military toxic exposures. For more information, contact Alyssa M. Hundrup at hundrupa@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided budget authorities for transportation, infrastructure, and energy projects. Together, the four agencies selected for this review—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of the Interior (Interior), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Department of Transportation (DOT)—obligated a majority of their IIJA or IRA funding. IIJA. Of the approximately $574.7 billion provided to them, the four agencies obligated about 76 percent and disbursed about 54 percent of obligated funds for fiscal years 2022 to 2025. IRA. Of the around $53.7 billion provided to them, EPA, Interior, and DOT obligated about 72 percent and disbursed about 60 percent of obligated funds for fiscal years 2022 through 2025. In July 2025, Congress rescinded $6.4 billion of the three agencies’ unobligated IRA funds per agencies’ data. Most selected agencies reported developing new processes to review IIJA and IRA funding in response to dozens of executive orders issued starting January 20, 2025. The agencies used a variety of approaches to implement reviews, such as searching for terms from executive orders like “diversity” or “environmental justice.” Senior leadership for all selected agencies made final decisions on whether awards should be approved without modification, modified (funded with changes to terms or amounts), or canceled (discontinued), according to selected agencies’ officials and documentation. The extent to which agencies continued to obligate and disburse IIJA and IRA funds during their reviews varied within and across agencies. As a result of their reviews, selected agencies reported approving about 9,500 awards ($128 billion) and canceling about 800 ($17.8 billion). More than 2,500 awards were pending a decision ($33.6 billion) as of varying dates shown below. Status of Selected Agencies’ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act Funding Reviews, as of the Dates Indicated Note: Canceled awards include terminated, rescinded, or withdrawn awards, or awards discontinued by a recipient. Why GAO Did This Study The IIJA and IRA provided billions in federal funding to agencies to distribute through mechanisms like grants and loans. Beginning in January 2025, executive orders directed agencies to pause this funding to review it for consistency with administration priorities. Grant recipients have raised concerns that delays in distributing these funds affect their ability to implement their projects. GAO was asked to review the status of IIJA and IRA funding. This report describes selected agencies’ (1) IIJA and IRA budget authority, obligations, rescissions, and disbursements for fiscal years 2022 to 2025; (2) processes for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding in response to executive orders; and (3) IIJA and IRA funding review status. To address these objectives, GAO selected agencies with among the highest amount of combined IIJA and IRA funding. Of these agencies, GAO selected EPA, Interior, NTIA, and DOT for this report. GAO will report on the Department of Energy and Department of Agriculture separately. GAO analyzed the IIJA and IRA and financial data from agencies’ accounting systems and the agencies’ policies and guidance for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding. GAO also analyzed and summarized selected agency review data and found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of describing the status of reviews with some limitations. For example, EPA and NTIA did not provide all requested data. GAO also interviewed selected agency officials for each of the objectives. For more information, contact Anne Sit-Williams at sitwilliamsa@gao.gov or Elizabeth Repko at repkoe@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO identified 117 cybersecurity regulations established by 37 federal agencies for private entities, spanning nine critical infrastructure sectors. Most of those regulations either contain the same kind of reporting requirement applicable to a sector or the same reporting requirement as at least one other regulation, which may lead to duplication. Specifically, 80 of the 117 regulations (about 70 percent) had at least 125 total reporting requirements (see figure), with some regulations requiring multiple types of reporting. Cybersecurity Regulations with Reporting Requirements, as of June 2026 These regulations included sector-specific and cross-sector reporting requirements for private sector entities that may be required to report similar or different cybersecurity information to multiple agencies. For example, a proposed rule from the Department of Homeland Security related to cybersecurity incident reporting by critical infrastructure sectors acknowledged that it may be potentially duplicative with one or more of the 15 existing financial sector regulations that also require such incident reporting. Additionally, cross-sector regulations may duplicate or conflict with regulations focused on a specific sector. For example, one from the Securities and Exchange Commission that requires publicly traded companies across different sectors to provide cybersecurity plans may duplicate or conflict with regulations focused on a specific sector. GAO has ongoing work to obtain additional industry perspectives on federal cybersecurity regulations, including where they perceive overlap and duplication within selected critical infrastructure sectors. Federal law and the April 2024 National Security Memorandum-22 established the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) as the lead agency responsible for coordinating efforts to streamline, or harmonize, the development and adoption of consistent standards and regulations. ONCD and other federal agencies have initiated actions in recent years to harmonize cybersecurity regulations but have made limited progress. In March 2026, the White House issued a new national cyber strategy which established harmonization and reducing compliance burdens as a priority. According to the strategy, the administration intends to release implementation plans, which could help identify clear lead agency roles, responsibilities, and next steps while enhancing the cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Why GAO Did This Study Nearly all the nation’s critical infrastructure are supported by computer-based information systems, and it is vital that public and private sectors work together to protect them. Federal agencies have issued numerous regulations to help protect the nation’s critical infrastructure, which is mostly owned by the private sector. However, according to ONCD, when critical infrastructure sectors are subject to multiple cybersecurity regulations, the result can lead to conflicting guidance, inconsistencies, increased compliance costs and redundancies for regulated entities. Consistency is important to avoid overlap, duplication, or conflicting requirements. GAO was asked to review federal cybersecurity regulations to identify opportunities for harmonization. This report determines the extent to which federal cybersecurity regulations and requirements are potentially duplicative or conflicting for regulated private sector entities. GAO reviewed the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations to identify cybersecurity regulations and assess them for potentially duplicative and conflicting reporting requirements. GAO also reviewed available harmonization plans and analyses from ONCD and the Department of Homeland Security. GAO also interviewed relevant officials. We provided a draft of this report to ONCD for review and comment. ONCD did not provide comments on the report. For more information, contact David Hinchman at hinchmand@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has not fully implemented selected leading planning and management practices for its enterprise software asset management (eSAM) program. eSAM is a department-wide effort intended to change how VA manages software assets by, among other things, requiring VA offices to coordinate with, and centrally report software license data to, VA’s IT management organization. This will require a change in organizational practices, given that VA programs have historically acquired their software independently. Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Implementation of Selected Leading Program Planning and Management Practice Areas for the Enterprise Software Asset Management (eSAM) Program Selected practice area Overall assessment Strategic alignment ◔ Minimally implemented Stakeholder engagement ◑ Partially implemented Life cycle management planning ◑Partially implemented Managing changes needed to support the program ◔ Minimally implemented Governance framework ○ Not implemented Software license management ◔ Minimally implemented Source: GAO analysis of VA eSAM program documentation. | GAO-26-108641 In addition, VA has not fully implemented selected leading planning and management practices for its software license inventory project. Of the six selected practice areas, VA partially implemented two areas (scope management and risk management) and minimally implemented the other four areas (project governance, stakeholder engagement, resource management, and software license management). For example, VA documented certain project risks but did not document all identified risks in a register. It also did not develop planned responses (e.g., mitigation strategies) for them all, which limits VA’s ability to address the risks before they become issues. Further, VA has not engaged with all stakeholders to identify their needs, nor developed plans for doing so. As such, eSAM is at risk of performing work that does not meet stakeholder needs. Part of the reason for the shortfalls noted in the practice areas is that VA did not perform oversight to ensure that eSAM and the inventory project (1) finalized and received approval for several key plans and (2) followed the leading practices. VA officials stated that turnover in the IT management organization—including the absence of a permanent Chief Information Officer (CIO) since January 2025—impacted VA’s oversight of eSAM and the project. VA officials anticipated that, once a permanent CIO is on board, VA would consider implementing a new (1) IT governance board to oversee programs such as eSAM and (2) IT governance process. However, there are opportunities for current VA officials to provide oversight to the program and inventory project to ensure they continue moving forward to meet intended outcomes. Until VA fully implements the selected practices for eSAM and the inventory project, it may not achieve departmentwide software asset management. As such, it is also at risk of missing opportunities to achieve significant cost savings possible from analyzing departmentwide software license data to make informed investment decisions. Why GAO Did This Study VA spends billions of dollars annually on its IT and cyber-related investments, including for purchases of commercial software licenses. For fiscal year 2025, the department planned to spend about $985 million on software, including commercial software licenses. In 2015, GAO identified the management of software licenses as a focus area in its High-Risk report. GAO has also previously reported on the need for VA to ensure better management of software licenses. VA has taken actions intended to improve its software license management, including establishing the eSAM program, which includes a project to implement a centralized software license inventory, among other things. GAO was asked to review VA’s software asset management policies and practices. This report examines the extent to which VA implemented selected leading planning and management practices for its (1) eSAM program and (2) software license inventory project. GAO reviewed industry guidance on program and project management and leading software license management practices identified in its prior work and selected 12 planning and management practice areas to review (six for the eSAM program and six for the inventory project). The selected areas and practices relate to early planning and execution of the program and inventory project. GAO compared the guidance in these 12 areas to VA documentation and interviewed VA officials.

What GAO Found Since 2000, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF) have managed and launched the Don’t Lie for the Other Guy campaign across various cities in the U.S. The campaign is intended to educate the public about the legal consequences of “straw purchases”—when someone who is prohibited from buying a firearm has someone else (a “straw buyer”) make the purchase for them. The campaign also educates federal firearms licensees (FFLs)—which include individuals or businesses that have obtained a federal firearm license to sell, manufacture, or import firearms—on how to identify and stop illegal straw purchases. ATF seeks to inform the public about these campaigns by conducting press conferences and advertising the campaign’s message. NSSF provides FFL retailers with training and education materials. In fiscal years 2023 through 2025, ATF launched at least 20 campaigns across the U.S. and expended over $870,000 each year to support them. ATF used most of the campaign funding to pay for costs associated with hiring a marketing firm to produce, advertise, and distribute campaign marketing materials, as well as costs associated with the use of digital ads and streaming audio. Examples of Don’t Lie for the Other Guy Campaign Marketing Materials ATF has established three broad program goals for the Don’t Lie for the Other Guy campaign. ATF also collects and tracks metrics for the campaign. However, as of June 2026, the agency has not used those metrics to fully assess progress towards meeting the campaign’s broader program goals, or to better inform programmatic decisions such as resource allocation. By developing measurable performance goals and using this performance information to assess progress towards achieving the campaign’s broader program goals, ATF will be in a better position to evaluate the campaign and make important management and resource allocation decisions, such as which marketing efforts are more cost-effective at increasing public awareness. According to ATF and NSSF officials, ATF does not manage or provide any federal funding for the Operation Secure Store firearms industry education and outreach campaign. These officials stated that NSSF manages and provides sole funding for this campaign, which provides FFLs with educational materials to help identify potential security risks and ways to deter and prevent thefts of firearms stored at FFL retail locations. During GAO’s review, ATF updated the agency’s public facing website to correct information about ATF’s role in NSSF’s Operation Secure Store campaign. Why GAO Did This Study According to a 2024 Department of Justice report, one of the most common sources of illegally trafficked firearms are straw purchases. While legislation has been passed to attempt to prevent these types of purchases, FFLs play an important role in safeguarding the public by helping to prevent straw purchasing. ATF issues and renews FFL licenses and investigates potential noncompliance with federal laws and regulations. ATF also works with firearms industry groups such as NSSF to deliver firearms education and outreach campaigns. GAO was asked to review ATF’s work with the firearms industry on education and outreach to better understand the impact of these campaigns. This report provides information about ATF’s role and federal funding provided for two such firearms education and outreach campaigns—Don’t Lie for the Other Guy and Operation Secure Store— including whether the efficacy of these campaigns has been evaluated. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed ATF program documentation, assessed funding data from fiscal year 2023 through fiscal year 2025, and interviewed ATF officials and firearms industry representatives. GAO compared actions taken to monitor and assess the campaign against selected key practices for evaluating the effectiveness of media campaigns and evidence-based policymaking.

What GAO Found Technologies like batteries and semiconductors are essential to the U.S. economy but rely on imports of lithium, gallium, and other critical minerals. GAO found that substitution and recycling technologies could help reduce U.S. reliance on these imports. But progress is likely to take many years in some cases. Potential for technologies to reduce critical mineral import reliance For batteries, substitution and recycling technologies offer near-term potential. For example, using lithium iron phosphate batteries for stationary grid energy storage might reduce imports of cobalt, manganese, and nickel in the next 2 to 3 years. But these batteries do not perform as well in other applications, like long-haul electric vehicles, due to their lower energy density. Lithium-free batteries are not yet commercially mature. Battery recycling technologies are mature and offer a pathway to reduce imports for copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel in 2 to 3 years. These technologies aim to recover critical minerals at high rates through chemical leaching and smelting. Experts told GAO, however, that U.S. battery recyclers lack capacity. Additionally, available inputs for recycling (referred to as feedstock) are often landfilled or exported for processing. For semiconductors, most substitution and recycling technologies are likely years away from maturity. Substitution is unlikely to have a near-term effect on import reliance of minerals, such as gallium and indium, because other materials do not perform as well as these critical minerals across the same conditions. Experts told GAO that industry will not adopt substitutes until they can perform at the same level as current semiconductor materials in the intended application. Technologies to recycle minerals from semiconductors also face challenges, such as an underdeveloped market. Semiconductor manufacturing scrap is a potential source of recycled minerals, though this is not yet standard practice in the U.S. Discarded electronics are another potentially large source, but their critical mineral content is low, and those minerals are generally mixed and bonded with other materials. Technologies to recycle this form of electronic waste are in pilot-stage development.   GAO identified four policy options that could support the goal of reducing critical mineral import reliance and help address challenges to recycling and substitution technologies. These options identify possible actions by policymakers, which include legislative bodies, government agencies (federal, state, and local), academia, standards-setting organizations, industry, and other groups. In general, these technologies have potential, with policy action, to reduce some of this reliance in the near, medium, or long term. See below for details on these options. Policymakers could also choose to pursue non-technological policy approaches, such as increased domestic mining. Many non-technological approaches are the subject of current and proposed legislation and executive action (see report p. 6). Policy options to support reducing critical mineral import reliance and address challenges to substitution and recycling technologies Establish domestic manufacturing capacity for viable substitutes (report p. 23) Policymakers could consider building or repurposing existing manufacturing capacity to produce substitute technologies for batteries and semiconductors. Potential implementation approaches Providing support for private capital investments in manufacturing plants for commercially available battery technologies. Establishing facilities or partnerships to perform pilot-scale testing of semiconductor substitutes. Opportunities and Considerations Domestic manufacturing capacity could allow for near-term production of commercially available substitute technologies like lithium iron phosphate batteries, which could reduce import reliance on critical minerals like cobalt and nickel. Battery and semiconductor production facilities are costly and tend to be specialized for the production of a particular technology. Establish domestic recycling capacity (report p. 24) Policymakers could build domestic infrastructure to bolster the domestic capacity to recycle batteries and semiconductors. Potential implementation approaches Providing support for private investment in factories for new battery recycling. Collecting and sharing data on manufacturing scrap and end-of-life devices containing batteries and semiconductors. Reviewing and streamlining permitting requirements and hazardous waste designations. Opportunities and Considerations Expanded domestic infrastructure could reduce or eliminate the need to ship partially processed batteries overseas for recycling. Building domestic recycling infrastructure may not reduce import reliance for selected critical minerals in the near term, since building new or repurposing existing infrastructure can take a decade or more and require significant investment. Secure inputs for recycling (report p. 24) Policymakers could support efforts to collect, sort, transport, and store manufacturing scrap and end-of-life devices for recycling and reuse. Potential implementation approaches Establishing and overseeing national and local electronic waste collection programs that provide education and resources (e.g., drop-off locations) for consumers. Providing financial incentives for industry to collect or retain manufacturing scrap and end-of-life devices for recycling. Opportunities and Considerations Securing a consistent supply of inputs for recycling and reuse could help reduce the need for critical mineral importation in the near term. Although mature battery recycling technologies exist, securing additional inputs may exacerbate challenges related to the safety, transportation, and handling of hazardous materials. Without demand and competitively priced recycled semiconductor materials, it may be difficult for recyclers to scale their operations and offset the amount of imported minerals required in the near term. Support research, development, and testing (report p. 25) Policymakers could continue or grow support for research, development, and testing of substitution and recycling technologies. Potential implementation approaches Supporting research to improve performance of lithium-free batteries. Supporting research into battery recycling technologies that reduce or avoid the cost, waste issues, and environmental impact of current techniques. Encouraging targeted materials research focused on semiconductor substitutes that maintain or enhance material performance and reduce the use of critical minerals when possible. Supporting research on more efficient semiconductor recycling technologies that recover more critical minerals. Opportunities and Considerations Increased research could help overcome current limitations of existing technologies, resulting in better performance (e.g., higher energy density batteries, larger bandgap semiconductors) or higher commercialization potential (e.g., improved recovery of minerals from semiconductors). Research, development, and testing efforts may not yield mature technologies in the near term. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-108687 Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. considers 60 minerals as critical because they are essential to the nation’s economy or security and have supply chains vulnerable to disruption. Several critical minerals are key to the functioning of batteries and semiconductors, which have applications in electric vehicles, stationary grid energy storage, consumer electronics, and the defense industry. For example, lithium is a key component of modern batteries that are both lightweight and energy-dense. Semiconductors rely on the unique electrical properties of critical minerals such as gallium, germanium, arsenic, and indium. U.S. executive and legislative branch policymakers have a long-standing goal to reduce critical mineral import reliance, through technological innovations and other approaches. This report examines: (1) substitution and recycling technologies to reduce import reliance on critical minerals within the battery and semiconductor industries, (2) challenges to the development and adoption of these technologies, and (3) policy options to support reducing reliance. To conduct this technology assessment, GAO interviewed federal officials and experts and reviewed academic papers, agency and expert documentation, and federal policy. GAO identified four policy options in this report (see next page). For more information, contact Sarah Harvey at HarveyS@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Federal broadband efforts are fragmented, with over 100 programs administered by 15 agencies, as GAO reported in May 2022. Some programs support broadband as their main purpose, while others support broadband as one possible purpose (see figure). The Mosaic of Federal Programs with Broadband as a Main Purpose as of November 2021, by Purpose Category GAO has found that a national strategy, continued interagency coordination, and better mapping data could strengthen federal broadband efforts. National Strategy. Strategies to coordinate programs that address issues of broad national need can help mitigate the negative effects of fragmented federal programs, but no national strategy exists for federal broadband efforts. In May 2022, GAO recommended creating such a strategy to synchronize these efforts. Interagency Coordination. With or without a national strategy, effective coordination among agencies that administer broadband programs is also important. In April 2025, GAO reported that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and the Treasury coordinate to administer the bulk of federal broadband funding and have mechanisms in place to do so. GAO recommended improvements to further strengthen those efforts. Agency officials reported taking steps to implement these recommendations, but have not yet fully addressed them, as of July 2026. Mapping Data. Agencies rely on FCC’s National Broadband Map—which displays where broadband is already available—to target tens of billions of dollars in federal broadband funding, but the accuracy of the map’s availability data is uncertain. In April 2025, GAO recommended FCC document and evaluate the effectiveness of its processes for ensuring the map’s data quality. Not doing so could increase the risk of inaccurate data on the map, which could jeopardize agencies’ ability to make effective funding decisions. FCC has not yet addressed the recommendations as of July 2026, but officials reported taking steps to do so. Why GAO Did This Study Access to broadband is critical for employment, education, health care, and other daily activities. The federal government has invested tens of billions of dollars over the past decade across a myriad of broadband-related programs managed by different agencies. Yet millions of Americans lack broadband access. Information on where broadband is already available is key to expanding access. Coordination among the federal agencies that administer the various federal programs is also key, particularly since U.S. broadband efforts are not guided by an overarching national strategy. This testimony discusses findings from GAO’s previous reports on (1) a national broadband strategy and interagency coordination efforts, and (2) FCC’s efforts to ensure the quality of data in its National Broadband Map. It is primarily based on GAO’s May 2022 and April 2025 reports.

What GAO Found The Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed 236 tax regulations and finalized 231 regulations between January 21, 2017, and March 31, 2026. These regulations included those that implemented provisions of the sweeping tax law changes of 2017, 2022, and 2025. IRS rulemaking procedures generally provided the public with an opportunity to comment on proposed tax regulations. GAO found that Treasury and IRS could improve the usefulness of regulatory economic analyses required for economically significant tax regulations which have $100 million or more in economic effects, with 28 tax regulations designated as such in the period GAO reviewed. Treasury and IRS consistently used one of the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) recommended practices for the economically significant regulations reviewed. This practice of analyzing alternative ways to design the regulations resulted in decisions that made it easier for taxpayers to claim new tax benefits. However, Treasury and IRS used other recommended practices less consistently. These practices, if used, would help Treasury and IRS make more informed selections of regulatory alternatives by providing specific cost, benefit, and revenue estimates. Use of Recommended Analysis Practices for Selected Final Tax Regulations Treasury and IRS are not following leading practices for public engagement in rulemaking and risk not being prepared to address voluminous public comments, sometimes tens of thousands, on proposed tax regulations. IRS faces increasing challenges with AI-generated public comments which make it more difficult for IRS to identify duplicate comments. IRS has not developed policies for addressing mass public comments or comments written with the assistance of AI. Treasury and IRS hold public hearings on proposed regulations in Washington, D.C., upon request. Effective virtual participation by members of the public from across the United States is challenging because IRS only uses dial-in technology rather than widely available video conferencing technology. A federal advisory agency recommends that agencies reduce barriers to public regulatory participation. GAO also identified additional opportunities to document public comments made at hearings to ensure important concerns are considered. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, Treasury and IRS have been affected by significant legal decisions, changes in the requirements for rulemaking, and rapidly evolving technologies that enable mass public comments. The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) directed GAO to oversee the use of IRA funds including Treasury and IRS regulatory actions. GAO’s objectives included assessing: (1) the development of regulations in light of recent tax law changes, (2) the extent to which Treasury and IRS perform economic analysis for major tax regulations and measure revenue effects, and (3) the extent to which Treasury and IRS follow leading practices for public engagement in rulemaking. GAO analyzed regulatory activity between January 2017 and March 2026; compared four selected regulatory economic analyses against recommended practices by OMB with the regulations selected, in part, because the economic analyses were the most relevant examples in selecting alternative regulatory designs; and compared public comment and regulatory hearing procedures against leading practices.

What GAO Found In May 2025, GAO identified 14 priority recommendations for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Since then, ODNI has implemented one of those recommendations. In June 2026, GAO identified one additional priority recommendation, and removed the priority status from eight recommendations, bringing the total to six. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention: Mitigating personnel vetting risks Addressing intelligence enterprise management challenges Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would improve the personnel security clearance process and enhance programs that have impacts across the intelligence community (IC). Taking action to implement all of GAO's open recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across the IC. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cathy Berrick at berrickc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates and determines the probable cause of transportation accidents in the United States, among other responsibilities, thus playing a vital role in advancing transportation safety. To support its mission, NTSB procures a variety of products (e.g., laboratory equipment) and services (e.g., services to develop and maintain systems and applications used to investigate accidents). NTSB is generally required to promote full and open competition in awarding contracts. However, in some cases, NTSB may award contracts through noncompetitive procedures. According to NTSB officials, the agency awards contracts pursuant to applicable statutes, federal regulations, executive orders, and internal guidance. NTSB’s policies and procedures for contracts include multiple reviews. Additional reviews or senior-level approvals are required for noncompetitive contract awards valued over $100,000 and for competitive contract awards valued over $500,000. In response to a February 2025 executive order, NTSB changed its policies to include that all new NTSB contract requirements with a value greater than $100,000 are approved by NTSB’s Chairwoman prior to awarding a contract, unless approval has been delegated to NTSB’s Managing Director. For fiscal years 2020 through 2024, NTSB obligated a total of about $86 million on awarded contracts, adjusted for inflation to fiscal year 2024 dollars. About 84 percent of these obligations were on competitively awarded contracts and about 16 percent were on noncompetitively awarded contracts. Obligations on competitively awarded contracts nearly doubled from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024, from about $10 million in fiscal year 2020 to nearly $20 million in fiscal year 2024. NTSB officials attributed most of the increase in obligations on competitively awarded contracts to increased investments in information technology products and services. According to NTSB officials, these investments have allowed NTSB to improve investigation timeliness and to meet congressional expectations for efficient data and knowledge sharing. Obligations on noncompetitively awarded contracts also increased, though slightly, rising from about $2.5 million to about $2.6 million over that same time frame. National Transportation Safety Board’s Obligations on Competitively and Noncompetitively Awarded Contracts, Fiscal Years 2020–2024 Why GAO Did This Study The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review NTSB’s procurement and contracting planning, policies, and practices. This report describes NTSB’s policies and procedures for competitively and noncompetitively awarded contracts and provides information on NTSB’s obligations on awarded contracts for fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024. GAO reviewed NTSB’s contract obligation data for fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024, the most recent years of complete data available at the time of GAO’s analysis. GAO downloaded the data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), as of September 25, 2025, and determined that FPDS’s obligation data were sufficiently reliable for GAO’s purposes of describing NTSB’s obligations on awarded contracts. GAO also reviewed statutes, regulations, an executive order, and guidance documents governing NTSB’s contracting activities and interviewed NTSB officials about (1) contracting policies and procedures and (2) the reasons for obligation changes over time. For more information, contact Derrick Collins at CollinsD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Office of Management and Budget annually designates a list of programs considered high-priority for improper payments. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Community Care program and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare Advantage program are two of the 30 programs designated as high priority for fiscal year 2025. VA reported a Community Care improper payment estimate of $608 million for fiscal year 2025, or 2.4 percent of the program’s outlays. CMS reported a Medicare Advantage improper payment estimate of $23.7 billion for fiscal year 2025, or 6.1 percent of the program’s outlays. GAO found gaps in the agencies’ efforts to reduce improper payment and fraud risks. Agency Efforts to Reduce Improper Payments and Fraud Risks   Community Care Program Medicare Advantage Program Developed and implemented a process to identify and assess the root causes of improper payments ● ● Developed, implemented, and monitored corrective action plans that adequately address the identified root causes of improper payments ● ◐ Conducted a fraud risk assessment that identifies inherent fraud risks, assesses their likelihood and impact, determines risk tolerance, evaluates controls, and documents a fraud risk profile ○ ○ Legend: ● Met; ◐ Partially met; ○ Not met. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-107946 Note: Analysis based on the results of GAO work completed from November 2024 through June 2026. For the fiscal years included in GAO’s review, VA developed and implemented a process to identify and assess the root causes of improper payments in the Community Care program. VA also developed, implemented, and monitored corrective action plans that adequately address the identified root causes. While VA has taken steps to identify and assess fraud risks, these efforts do not meet the key elements of a fraud risk assessment and have not resulted in a comprehensive fraud risk assessment for the program, leaving it vulnerable to fraud. For the fiscal years included in GAO’s review, CMS developed and implemented a process to identify and assess the root causes of improper payments in the Medicare Advantage program. However, its estimated improper payment rate has not decreased but remained steady. CMS’s corrective action plans are not sufficiently detailed and do not adequately monitor progress. Specifically, CMS does not have a detailed plan for expediting Risk Adjustment Data Validation (RADV) audits. These audits are CMS’s primary corrective action for identifying and recovering improper payments. CMS’s backlog of RADV audits contributes to significant delays in its recovery efforts. Furthermore, CMS has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment for the program. CMS’s efforts to reduce improper payments and fraud in the Medicare Advantage program will be inadequate without comprehensive corrective action plans and fraud risk assessments. Why GAO Did This Study Reducing improper payments and fraud is critical to safeguarding federal funds and could help achieve cost savings and improve the government’s fiscal position. GAO was asked to assess agency efforts to identify and address root causes of improper payments and fraud. In this report, GAO examines to what extent (1) VA has taken steps to identify and address the root causes of improper payments and mitigate fraud risks in the Community Care program and (2) CMS has taken steps to identify and address the root causes of improper payments and mitigate fraud risks in the Medicare Advantage program. GAO examined documentation from VA, CMS, PaymentAccuracy.gov, and prior reports from agency Offices of Inspector General (OIG). GAO also interviewed agency officials, OIG staff, and trade association representatives.

What GAO Found The size of passenger vehicles on U.S. roads has grown over the past 30 years. Selected studies that GAO reviewed generally found that larger vehicles, certain design features (see figure), and turning maneuvers may limit a driver’s visibility and pose greater risks to pedestrians and cyclists. Data on driver visibility, such as the size of blind zones around a vehicle, are not readily available. As such, GAO used turning maneuvers to analyze the potential relationship between vehicle type and involvement in fatal pedestrian crashes. GAO found that larger vehicles had higher odds of turning compared with going straight in fatal pedestrian crashes than cars in the same scenarios. For example, heavy-duty trucks (e.g., semi-trucks) had at least 12 times the odds compared with cars. Vehicle Design Features and Their Potential Relationship to Driver Visibility Auto and truck manufacturers that GAO interviewed have developed technologies to help mitigate limited driver visibility, such as side bicyclist alerts and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Manufacturers have also conducted testing and benchmarking of their vehicles to assess driver visibility. Two selected foreign jurisdictions—the European Union (EU) and London, England—have taken steps to reduce risks to pedestrians and cyclists related to limited driver visibility. The EU has adopted driver visibility standards that auto and truck manufacturers must meet. While similar regulations also apply in the United Kingdom, London has developed a driver visibility standard that requires some commercial truck operators to install additional safety equipment. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has recognized risks to pedestrians and cyclists related to driver visibility but has not fully analyzed those risks or developed responses. DOT has conducted some research and begun to collect data that could be useful in conducting such an analysis. However, it has not analyzed specific risks that limited driver visibility may pose to pedestrians and cyclists, such as those related to turning maneuvers or vehicle design features. DOT has not done so because, in part, it has not determined a method to measure driver visibility in cars and trucks. Such a method could provide data on the size of blind zones and enable DOT to fully analyze the extent to which they pose risks to pedestrians and cyclists. Fully analyzing specific risks would also provide DOT with the information it needs to respond to them, and would better position DOT to meet its goal of reducing roadway fatalities Why GAO Did This Study In 2024, about 9,200 pedestrians and cyclists were killed on U.S. roadways—an increase of about 65 percent since 2010. A range of factors can contribute to increased pedestrian and cyclist fatalities, including larger vehicles, which make up an increasing share of vehicles on U.S. roadways and may limit driver visibility. GAO was asked to review issues related to driver visibility. This report examines (1) what studies and federal data show about the relationship between vehicle characteristics, driver visibility, and pedestrian and cyclist fatalities; (2) actions selected auto and truck manufacturers have taken related to driver visibility; (3) approaches selected foreign jurisdictions have used to reduce driver visibility–related risks to pedestrians and cyclists; and (4) the extent to which DOT has analyzed and responded to potential driver visibility–related risks to pedestrians and cyclists. GAO reviewed selected studies published from 2015 to 2025, analyzed DOT pedestrian fatality data, and selected and interviewed five auto and five truck manufacturers. GAO also reviewed driver visibility standards adopted by the EU and London and interviewed officials about their approaches. Finally, GAO reviewed DOT studies and planning documents and interviewed DOT officials.

GAO’s work regularly finds that federal programs are unable to assess their performance to determine if they are solving the problem they were created to fix. By defining goals and collecting and using relevant data, agencies could make informed decisions to improve their programs’ results. The Big Picture Each year, the federal government spends trillions of dollars on programs that Americans depend on, such as health care, public safety, and disaster support. Our recent reports have found that many federal programs do not have clearly defined goals to identify what they seek to achieve or relevant data to assess progress. Without this information, Congress and agency leaders cannot determine if federal programs funded by taxpayer dollars are delivering intended results and supporting the American people. What GAO’s Work Shows Through a three-step process, federal agencies can monitor and manage the results of their programs. The program performance management process Federal programs do not consistently manage their performance. Our work often finds programs are focused on inputs (such as money to spend) and outputs (such as number of individuals who received benefits). By contrast, outcomes are the results of a program (such as number of individuals whose lives improved in an intended way). Programs often lack information on outcomes because they operate without clear, measurable goals or data to assess their results. Agency leaders and Congress need this information to determine if programs are solving the problems they were created to fix, and in turn, if they are a good return on investment for taxpayer money. Selected Federal Programs that GAO Previously Found Had Incomplete Performance Management Processes Moreover, federal programs rarely work in isolation. Our work often identifies sets of related programs—within an agency or across multiple agencies—that seek to achieve the same outcomes and may create overlapping efforts. We also find these related programs have not always defined goals or collected data to manage their performance. This creates the potential for waste and inefficiency. It limits decision-makers’ abilities to (1) assess relative performance across programs and (2) make informed decisions to streamline efforts or provide resources to more effective programs. Most Programs that Solely Support Pregnant Women, Young Children, and Their Families Had Established Performance Management Processes Many pregnant women, children through age 5, and their families use support services like food assistance or childcare. In 2026, we identified 15 federal programs at five agencies that provide direct services only to this population. Twelve of these 15 programs had performance management processes that set goals, collect data, and use the information to assess whether the programs are meeting goals. We recommended that the remaining three programs without these processes—one each at the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs—fully develop them to ensure programs are meeting goals, identifying potential improvements, and targeting resources appropriately. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-109130 When we have identified opportunities to improve program performance by developing goals and collecting and using data, agencies have taken action to implement our recommendations. Actions to Improve Performance Management for the Securing the Cities Program The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Securing the Cities program seeks to help state and local governments detect and deter nuclear terrorism. In 2019, we found that DHS did not collect information to fully track cities' use of the program’s funds or assess performance. We recommended DHS do so. Subsequently, we found in 2024 that the program had established goals, performance measures, and milestones, and conducted quarterly financial assessments. DHS is now better positioned to monitor the program’s performance and identify any needed actions to improve results. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-109130 Additional evidence is needed to determine program effectiveness. Because of its ongoing nature, performance management can serve as an early-warning system to identify the need for real-time improvements. Collecting evidence beyond performance data can help determine whether a program is working and why. This includes robust studies known as program evaluations, which can provide valuable insights on program performance. Types of Program Evaluations and Insights Process evaluations assess the extent to which a program is being implemented as intended. Outcome evaluations assess whether (1) program activities are aligned with desired outcomes and (2) changes in outcomes are consistent with program goals. Impact evaluations assess the effect of a program by comparing results to what would have happened in its absence. Source: GAO. | GAO-26-109130 When we asked federal managers in a 2020 survey about these robust evaluations, about one-third of respondents reported having access to them to help manage their programs. Challenges and Opportunities Statutory requirements provide a solid foundation for effective federal performance management. They have also increased agencies’ use of performance data in decision-making, such as identifying program problems to address and developing new strategies. In contrast, Congress and the administration often do not have the performance data and evidence they need to make informed improvements and target resources to individual programs or across related programs. Our work has identified approaches to help ensure decision makers have sufficient information, including practices to help individual or sets of related programs manage performance and build evidence; practices to effectively coordinate, and a guide to evaluate and manage, related programs; and a guide to design program evaluations. Consistently using these approaches could help agencies manage and assess their programs and provide policymakers and the public with vital information about federal program performance. For more information, contact Lori Atkinson at atkinsonl@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System is a government-sponsored enterprise that consists of 11 federally chartered FHLBanks that support liquidity in the financial system by making loans—known as advances—to member financial institutions, including banks. These advances offer member institutions a low-cost source of funding to make mortgage loans or manage the risk of not meeting financial obligations in a timely and cost-efficient manner (liquidity risk). A December 2025 GAO report found that as of June 2025, 93 percent of banks were FHLBank members and more than three-quarters had taken out at least one advance from June 2015 through June 2025. GAO’s analysis of banks’ quarterly Call Report data found that large banks—those with more than $10 billion in total assets—were responsible for a majority of banks’ FHLBank borrowing in this period. These banks represented approximately 3 percent of active FHLBanks members and held, on average, nearly 74 percent of all outstanding FHLBank borrowing during the period. A March 2024 GAO report found that Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank had borrowed substantial advances before their failures in spring 2023. Silicon Valley Bank increased the balance of its outstanding advances by 50 percent in the first week of March 2023 before its failure on March 10. Signature Bank increased its outstanding advances by 37 percent in March 2023 before its failure on March 12. The two FHLBanks continued to assess risk and provide advances to the two banks before they failed. FHLBanks generally lend to members if the requested amount is within the member’s available borrowing capacity based on its pledged collateral or credit limit. FHLBanks may limit or deny advances based on supervisory information from the member’s primary regulator. The FHLBanks and federal banking regulators increased their frequency of communication in March 2023, but the banks’ relatively fast decline limited further action. Timely coordination between FHLBanks and Federal Reserve Banks is critical when a bank is at risk. This coordination must negotiate overlap in membership between the two systems. The March 2023 bank failures revealed such coordination challenges. After March 2023, the FHLBanks and Federal Reserve System initiated two efforts to improve coordination during periods of stress: (1) increasing engagement between FHLBanks and Federal Reserve Banks and (2) establishing a working group to improve interoperability. These efforts are intended to address the coordination challenges experienced during the March 2023 bank failures and are consistent with federal internal control standards related to control activities and information and communication. At the time of GAO’s December 2025 report, these efforts were in the early stages. Continued commitment to these coordination efforts will be important to help ensure that the FHLBanks and Federal Reserve Banks are prepared to respond quickly to member liquidity needs during future periods of financial stress. Why GAO Did This Study The failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in March 2023 renewed questions about the FHLBanks’ role in providing liquidity during periods of financial stress. In the weeks leading up to the failures, these banks had borrowed large sums from their FHLBanks. That same month, total advances outstanding to all members reached about $1 trillion, exceeding levels reached during previous financial market disruptions. This statement discusses (1) the FHLBank System's role in providing financial system liquidity through advances, (2) banks’ use of advances during the March 2023 bank failures, and (3) efforts to improve emergency coordination between FHLBanks and Federal Reserve Banks. This statement is based on reports GAO issued from April 2023 to December 2025. For those reports, GAO reviewed relevant legislation, regulations, policies, and agency reports, and interviewed federal officials, representatives of FHLBanks and member banks, and other stakeholders. For more information, contact Jill Naamane at NaamaneJ@gao.gov.

Why This Matters The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is the federal government's central agency for human resources and workforce management. Since December 2024, in alignment with presidential directives on the closure of certain offices and the reduction of the size of the federal workforce, OPM has undergone significant workforce and organizational structure changes. These actions have reduced institutional knowledge and operational capacity at the agency. OPM’s Headcount Decreased by 35 Percent Between December 2024 and March 2026 GAO analysis of OPM’s Federal Workforce Data (FWD) found that OPM’s headcount decreased by 1,052 people (35 percent) between December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2026, with those 60 years and older particularly affected (see fig. 1). Figure 1: OPM Headcount by Age, December 31, 2024–March 31, 2026 Note: Data obtained from OPM website in June 2026. Workforce statistics may not reflect updates made after that date. Looking back, OPM’s headcount increased by 450 people (17 percent) between 2019 and 2024. Even so, OPM’s March 2026 headcount is down 602 people (23 percent) from 2019 levels. Of those who separated between December 2024 and March 2026, 59 percent did so through a deferred resignation program and 10 percent through a reduction in force, according to analysis of FWD. Separations particularly affected older and younger employees at OPM. The number of employees aged 60 or older decreased by 49 percent from December 2024 to March 2026. Also, among employees under age 30 who separated, 60 percent were within their probationary period. For all separating employees, only 23 percent were within their probationary period. OPM also reduced and eliminated certain offices. In its fiscal year (FY) 2026 Congressional Budget Justification, OPM reported that it eliminated 10 offices, such as the Office of Procurement Operations. These offices covered a range of responsibilities both within OPM and across the federal government. From FYs 2024 to 2026, only two offices had an increase in full-time equivalents (FTE) (see table 1). For example, the Office of the Chief Information Officer manages OPM’s IT and Retirement Services administers the federal civilian retirement systems. OPM reported that it experienced a historic surge of retirements in 2025 and responded by expanding the team. However, overall, Retirement Services shrunk 16 percent from FYs 2024 to 2026. The two offices with FTE increases assumed functions from other offices. Table 1: Changes in OPM-Reported Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) at Selected OPM Offices, Fiscal Years 2024–2026 Office Change in FTEs Percent Change Human Resources Solutions -189 -36% Office of the Chief Information Officer -167 -49% Retirement Services -165 -16% Workforce Policy and Innovation -102 -45% Merit System Accountability & Compliance -38 -41% Office of the General Counsel 8 21% Office of the Director 23 79% Source: GAO analysis of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Congressional Budget Justifications. | GAO-26-108916 Despite the reductions, some offices are assuming additional responsibilities. For example, while Merit System Accountability & Compliance experienced a 41 percent decline in FTEs from FYs 2024 to 2026, OPM has proposed transferring appeals of employees who have been separated by a reduction in force from the Merit Systems Protection Board to OPM, stating that the change is meant to improve efficiency. In its FY 2027 Congressional Budget Justification, OPM proposed using AI tools and modernizing its IT systems in offices with fewer staff. For example, the agency proposed exploring opportunities to leverage AI to enhance financial reporting and internal customer experience in the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. OPM’s Workforce Reductions Risk Contributing to OPM’s Existing Skills Gaps GAO and OPM have identified skills gaps as a long-standing challenge. The federal government's efforts to address government-wide and agency-specific skills gaps have been on GAO's High-Risk List since 2001. In March 2022, an OPM-sponsored assessment found that OPM had skills gaps that could compromise its ability to implement its strategic plan. In February 2023, GAO recommended that OPM establish an action plan to address these gaps (see GAO-23-105528). According to agency officials responding to that open GAO recommendation, OPM has not implemented the recommendation because it is prioritizing making workforce changes to align with its FY 2026–2030 strategic plan. In November 2025, the OPM Office of the Inspector General (OIG) identified OPM’s workforce reduction as a top management challenge for 2026 (see OPM OIG annual report). The report says that staff reductions have created immediate gaps in operational capacity at the agency. GAO and OPM have both reported that it is important to build a stronger pipeline of talent into mission-critical roles across government (GAO-19-181). In March 2026, OPM launched a new initiative to connect emerging professionals with career opportunities across the federal government. Leading up to this, from December 2024 to March 2026, 41 percent of OPM’s staff under age 30 separated. Additionally, GAO’s analysis of FWD found that of those who separated from OPM from December 2024 to March 2026, 18 percent had at least 31 years of service and 57 percent had 11 or more years of service, representing a significant loss of institutional knowledge (see table 2). GAO has previously reported that if turnover is not strategically managed and succession plans are not in place, gaps can develop in an agency’s institutional knowledge and leadership as experienced employees retire (see GAO-19-181). Table 2: Length of Service of Employees Separated from OPM, December 2024–March 2026 Length of service in years Less than 2 2-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31 or more Number of employees 185 199 149 271 205 226 Percent 15% 16% 12% 22% 17% 18% Source: GAO analysis of the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) Federal Workforce Data. | GAO-26-108916 To supplement GAO’s analysis of publicly available data, GAO requested documentation from OPM regarding changes made to offices or programs since 2025, the rationale behind the closure or consolidation of offices, and processes for strategic workforce planning, among other information. Other than comments on a preliminary draft of this report, OPM did not provide any requested documents or information, nor did it agree to meet with GAO or respond to written questions. As a result, in this report, GAO is unable to provide complete information on what changes OPM made, its rationale, the expected costs and benefits, and any effect on OPM’s ability to fulfil its mission. For more information, contact Dawn G. Locke at LockeD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Navy is currently 24 months behind in its efforts to modernize three DDG 1000 Zumwalt class destroyers to host the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic missile as part of its surface strike mission. Both the DDG 1000 and CPS efforts face challenges: Although modernization of the first ship in the class, USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), was 94 percent complete as of January 2026, it is behind schedule due to unplanned work. The DDG 1000 class ships have unique systems, such as its radar, combat, and network systems, that are costly and difficult to sustain and maintain. The CPS effort was originally scheduled to begin flight testing on the DDG 1000 class in 2025 but this is now planned for 2027 due to funding and testing challenges. The CPS program encountered quality and production issues putting the current rate well below the production goal of 12 missile rounds per year. USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) DOD is planning to invest at least $50 billion into developing, testing, producing, and fielding CPS capability across several programs, including: CPS, Virginia class submarine, and the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, among others. While Navy and Army officials told GAO that they coordinate with each other, the services largely manage investment decisions for these programs separately, which contributes to inefficiencies and delays. DOD does not have a comprehensive strategy across all programs that ensures that each program’s investments achieve CPS’s common objectives. Without a comprehensive investment strategy that includes more formal coordination, the Army and Navy are not well-positioned to make timely and efficient investments in key areas, such as addressing shortfalls on their shared production lines or ensuring the economical sustainment and performance of the DDG 1000. Why GAO Did This Study The Navy intends to provide its three DDG 1000 Zumwalt class ships with the ability to strike surface targets. In 2021, the Navy decided to add hypersonic CPS missiles—at a planned cost of nearly $50 million per missile—to the DDG 1000 class destroyers to enable the U.S. to strike valuable, heavily defended targets from a distance with a non-nuclear payload. To do so, the Navy is modernizing the ships to include installing a vertical launch system for CPS missiles. The Navy plans to add the CPS missile system to some Virginia class submarines. The Army is developing its own version of the CPS, called the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, and is responsible for producing the missile glide body for both services, among other responsibilities. A House report includes a provision for GAO to review the Navy’s large surface combatant program, including efforts to modify the DDG 1000 for its new mission. This report examines (1) the status of the DDG 1000 modernization, including CPS development, testing, and integration, and what risks these programs face; and (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive strategy across various programs needed to field the CPS missile capability. GAO reviewed relevant Navy and Army documentation and interviewed Navy and Army officials and contractor representatives. GAO also visited ship and missile contractor facilities in Mississippi and Alabama.

Why This Matters U.S. clinicians average a 57-hour workweek, including 7 hours of administrative work. Time spent on tasks like drafting patient visit notes or reviewing billing paperwork may contribute to clinician burnout. New AI tools could increase efficiency and reduce administrative burdens during and after patient visits. Key Takeaways Some health care providers are adopting AI tools to assist with note taking and medical coding, which may save time and reduce burnout. The accuracy of these tools may be difficult to verify, and the overall effects on health care spending are uncertain. Policymakers need more information about the performance of these tools to determine the appropriate level of oversight needed to help minimize mistakes and ensure proper billing. The Technology What is it? Accurate documentation and billing are vital administrative tasks in health care. Health care providers are adopting AI tools to automate these tasks. AI scribes can be used to draft clinical documentation during a patient’s visit and medical coding tools can automatically generate an insurance claim afterward for reimbursement. How does it work? Traditionally, clinicians take notes during a patient visit and then elaborate on and clarify their notes later to develop a clinical summary. AI “scribes” record the conversation between a patient and clinician and, using conventional and generative AI, create a written summary of the visit for the clinician to review for accuracy. This technology is called “ambient” listening, because the AI tool can operate in the background during a patient visit. After a visit, medical coders review the summary and other patient documentation and assign standardized codes to include in the insurance claim, which represent a patient’s diagnosis and the services rendered by a clinician. AI tools that analyze patient records and suggest codes for review by medical coders are already in widespread use. New AI tools may use generative and agentic AI technologies to review patient records and assign codes autonomously. This capability could make human coders faster or replace them entirely. Figure 1. AI Tools for Medical Notes and Coding How mature is it? The underlying technologies for both AI scribes and medical coding tools have existed for more than a decade. However, more advanced AI technologies, such as generative AI, are enabling companies and health care systems to build new, more capable AI software tools. According to one AI medical coding software developer, when its software was deployed at a health system with five hospitals, it generated medical codes with more than 95 percent accuracy, and the system’s emergency departments reduced annual coding costs by more than $1 million. In 2026, the American Medical Association found that between 2024 and 2026, the share of clinicians surveyed who use AI tools to assist with clinical documentation or medical coding increased from 21 to 28 percent. Opportunities Reduced administrative burden. AI scribe and medical coding tools could decrease the amount of time clinicians spend on administrative tasks and reduce burnout. In one study, clinicians reduced their documentation time by 20 percent, or two minutes per appointment, using AI scribes. More detailed clinical summaries. AI scribe tools may improve accuracy and reduce clinicians’ cognitive load. For example, they may capture more details than manual note taking, while helping a clinician focus on the patient. Increased operational efficiency. AI medical coding tools could streamline administrative processes, reducing the number of staff needed for administrative tasks. Challenges Difficulties verifying accuracy. There are few independent studies evaluating the accuracy of these tools. Some tools may not store patient recordings and transcripts, which may limit the extent to which health care providers can conduct independent assessments. Inaccuracies may result in patient harm or over- or under-reimbursement from insurers to providers. Limited access due to costs. Under-resourced hospitals, health centers, clinics, and small medical practices may not be able to adopt AI scribe or medical coding tools because of constraints such as costs and the need for technical support or training. Reimbursement and cost implications. AI scribing and medical coding tools could increase health care costs if they capture more diagnoses and services rendered during visits than non-AI approaches. While this could result in higher reimbursement to providers, it could also increase health care spending with costs borne by insurers, employers, patients, or taxpayers (the latter via federal programs like Medicare). Data privacy and patient consent. Collecting patient data carries security and privacy risks, like breaches of personal information. Additionally, data retention practices vary across AI scribe vendors and patients may not always be informed that recordings are occurring. Policy Context and Questions As emerging technologies can cross multiple agencies’ jurisdictions, they can present oversight and regulation challenges. Key questions for stakeholders include: What information do health care providers or policymakers need to ensure AI scribe and coding tools minimize mistakes and unintended consequences? How can federal agencies and health insurers provide adequate oversight of the use of AI tools to ensure appropriate reimbursement? Selected GAO Work Science & Tech Spotlight: AI Agents, GAO-25-108519. Science & Tech Spotlight: Generative AI in Health Care, GAO-24-107634. Selected Reference National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, An Artificial Intelligence Code of Conduct for Health and Medicine: Essential Guidance for Aligned Action (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2025). https://doi.org/10.17226/29087. For more information, contact Sarah Harvey at HarveyS@gao.gov.

What GAO Found A Secretary of Energy memorandum directed revisions to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) construction order (known as 413.3B) to (1) allow increased delegation of approval authority for projects estimated to cost up to $300 million; and (2) limit independent reviews for projects estimated to cost between $300 million and $1 billion. As of January 2026, DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) were managing 80 capital asset projects at laboratories and sites where daily operations are carried out by management and operating (M&O) contractors. The projects are collectively estimated to cost as much as $65.5 billion. Revisions could affect 66 of the ongoing projects and future ones. Figure 1: Locations of Relevant Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration Laboratories, Plants, and Sites As of March 2026, officials said revising the order was on hold. However, some DOE offices and NNSA have taken steps to implement the changes. DOE’s Office of Science (Science) delegated critical decision approval authority to national laboratory directors, who are M&O contractor employees, for 20 projects at nine laboratories. NNSA is developing guidance on changes to independent reviews. The changes are too recent to have yet demonstrated an effect. Science and NNSA officials said streamlining project approvals and conducting fewer independent reviews could improve efficiency and save costs. GAO’s analysis of DOE and NNSA guidance additionally found that eliminating certain independent reviews could reduce confidence in the reliability of cost and schedule estimates and result in late identification of potential problems. For example, a 2026 peer review helped support planning efforts to address expected cost increases for an NNSA project in New Mexico. Science and NNSA officials said they will use the existing process for evaluating individual M&O contractors’ performance to assess the effectiveness of the revisions. But these evaluations do not assess agencywide progress toward achieving desired goals. By establishing specific goals, outcomes, and measures, the agencies would be better positioned to determine whether the revisions are achieving improved efficiency and cost savings. Why GAO Did This Study DOE and NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, carry out capital asset acquisitions for construction projects to modernize laboratory and site infrastructure and to acquire certain major items of equipment. Projects estimated to cost more than $50 million are managed according to DOE Order 413.3B. The order requires increasingly senior leadership officials to approve projects as they progress through various critical decision points (e.g., design approval) depending on the cost of the project. In March 2025, the Secretary of Energy issued a memorandum directing revisions to this order to streamline capital asset project management and reduce unnecessary administrative burdens for the national laboratories operated by M&O contractors. GAO was asked to examine the potential implications of the Secretary’s March 2025 memorandum. This report provides information on how DOE program offices and NNSA are implementing the memorandum for ongoing projects, and potential implications for project oversight. GAO reviewed project data and documents from DOE and NNSA and interviewed officials responsible for project management and oversight.

What GAO Found A resilient and skilled cybersecurity workforce is essential to protecting federal information technology (IT) systems and enabling the government’s day-to-day functions. The Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce program, managed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), provides opportunities for members of the federal cyber workforce to gain experience in IT, cybersecurity, and other cyber-related positions. Agencies can participate in the program by either advertising a position or by having an employee serve in a position at an outside agency. As of May 2026, 13 agencies participated in the program, at least 106 positions were advertised, and 634 employees applied for rotational positions. Eight employees were approved to serve a rotation. OPM has effectively suspended the program. It did not advertise any positions in 2025 and officials stated that the agency does not intend to post advertised positions in 2026, due to low participation. Number of Applicants, Positions, and Approved Employees in the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program, 2023-2025   In October 2024, OPM issued a report on the challenges it experienced in implementing the rotational program. These challenges included a lack of applicants deemed eligible for cyber rotations and a lack of managerial support for the rotational program at the employees’ home agencies. OPM also outlined recommendations for improving program performance—such as encouraging agency leadership to approve participation in the program and advertising positions with lower qualification thresholds—and it did not take steps to implement the recommendations. Due to resources and shifting government-wide priorities, the program has effectively been halted. Why GAO Did This Study In 2022, Congress passed the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program Act to help federal agencies enhance their cyber workforce. The program provides opportunities for cyber employees to serve 6- to 12-month voluntary reassignments at other agencies and develop knowledge and skills that they can bring back to their home agencies. As prescribed by the act, the program will sunset in June 2027. The act includes a provision for GAO to assess the operation and effectiveness of the program. This report addresses (1) the extent to which agencies have participated in the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program and (2) the extent to which OPM identified opportunities to improve the Federal Rotational Cyber Workforce Program. GAO collected and analyzed OPM data to determine what positions were made available in the program, and how many employee requests to participate were made and approved. GAO reviewed OPM’s lessons learned report to identify the challenges facing the program, summarize lessons learned as identified by OPM, and describe what actions OPM took to address identified program weaknesses. GAO also interviewed OPM officials. For more information, contact David Hinchman at hinchmand@gao.gov.