What GAO Found Service members can accrue a large volume of personnel and health records during their military careers. The custodians of these records are the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs. DOD and the military services developed policies and procedures to properly adhere to federal laws for safeguarding records and timely processing records requests. However, the risk of breaches and delays exists. For example, GAO covertly tested 26 requests for records from DOD; of the 18 processed requests, one was improperly released and did not redact personally identifiable information. Examples of Breaches of Military Records Among Record Custodians Personnel records. The military services have procedures intended to safeguard records, such as redacting personally identifiable information. However, of the thousands of requests received during fiscal years 2021 through 2025, the services reported 49 breaches. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires agencies to respond to requests within 20 business days, and Privacy Act requests are generally processed within 20 business days. According to military service officials, staffing limitations across the military services contribute to challenges with the proper and timely processing of records requests. For example, during the time of GAO’s review, the Navy had one employee processing FOIA requests, which officials stated contributed to an increased average processing time from 1.6 to 55.5 days. With a clearer understanding of the staffing levels needed to manage the volume and complexity of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, DOD and the services would be better prepared to improve response time, reduce the improper release of information, and minimize exposure to litigation costs. Health records. GAO found that the Defense Health Agency (DHA) relies on a complex record processing system to access service member health records, which leads to challenges in processing requests. Request processors identify health records among multiple data systems and review them to redact personally identifiable information. DHA officials stated that system issues and complex workflows challenged request processing. Multiple officials stated that the redaction process can be the most cumbersome part of fulfilling requests, particularly if the record is large or contains scanned documents. GAO previously reported that DOD determined the multiple legacy electronic health record systems that it implemented over the past 3 decades to manage patient health information required modernization, and that DOD sought to replace these legacy systems with a comprehensive electronic health record system. However, DOD has not assessed the current framework and systems for processing health records requests to identify opportunities to streamline them. Why GAO Did This Study Accessing military service records can be complex, due partly to the number of entities involved in creating, retrieving, and maintaining this information. FOIA entitles the public to request access to federal agency records, while the Privacy Act of 1974 governs how personally identifiable information is released. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) establishes national standards for safeguarding protected health information. House Report 118-125, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review DOD’s release of service member records pursuant to FOIA or other requests. This report examines the extent to which DOD has established policies and procedures and has taken steps to address any challenges in the proper and timely release of service members’ personnel and health records. GAO reviewed relevant laws and DOD policies and processes governing the release of service member records. GAO also reviewed data on records requests and breaches; interviewed relevant officials; visited all four military services’ personnel centers and selected military medical treatment facilities; and conducted a covert test of internal controls to protect personnel records for 26 records requests.

What GAO Found Since 2014, GAO has reported that enrollment in private health insurance plans has been concentrated, meaning a small number of issuers, such as health insurers, enrolled most of the people in a given market. Specifically, GAO considers a market concentrated in a state if three or fewer issuers hold at least 80 percent of the market share of enrollment. For this report, GAO examined the individual (coverage primarily sold to individuals who lack access to group coverage), small-group (coverage offered by small employers), and large-group (coverage offered by large employers) health insurance markets from 2011 through 2024 across states. GAO found that the number of states with concentrated markets generally increased, with recent decreases in the individual market (see figure). Number of States, Including the District of Columbia, Where the Three Largest Issuers Had at Least 80 Percent of Enrollment, 2011 Through 2024 Note: The most recent years in GAO’s series on market concentration, 2023 and 2024, are highlighted in this figure. GAO also examined concentration across the individual insurance exchanges, which are part of the overall individual market. Individual exchanges, which are marketplaces where consumers can compare and select among insurance plans offered by participating issuers, were established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Similar to the overall individual insurance market, the individual exchanges became more concentrated from 2015 through 2020 and then generally less concentrated through 2024. The number of states where the individual exchanges were concentrated increased from 47 states in 2015 to a peak of 51 states in 2020 and then decreased to 49 states in 2024. Why GAO Did This Study Private health insurance is the most common source of health insurance coverage in the United States. Individuals have various options for obtaining private health insurance, including through the individual, small-group, and large-group markets. A concentrated health insurance market may indicate less issuer competition and could affect consumers’ choices of issuers and the premiums they pay for insurance. PPACA includes a provision for GAO to periodically study health insurance market concentration. This report, the seventh in this series, describes changes in the concentration of enrollment among issuers in the overall individual, small-group, and large-group health insurance markets and in the individual insurance exchanges. GAO determined market share in each of the three overall markets and the individual insurance exchanges using enrollment data from 2011 through 2024 that issuers report to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services and enrollment data that GAO collected from individual states from 2015 to 2017. GAO used the most recent two years of data available at the time of its review and presented this information alongside its prior analyses beginning in 2011. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services. The department provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact John Dicken at DickenJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy (DOE) created initial future land use plans in coordination with local communities as early as 1992 at six cleanup sites GAO selected for review. These plans inform but do not bind assumptions about future land use that DOE and regulators make when selecting a cleanup remedy at a site. The remedy selected during the cleanup process has lasting consequences for how a parcel of land can be used, even after DOE transfers or leases it to another federal agency, a state or local government, or a private party. For example, any future use that would increase exposure to residual contamination above the contemplated level could undermine the protectiveness of the remedy. Accordingly, assumptions about future land use provide a framework for the range of uses that are safely available for a given parcel after cleanup. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) General Process for Identifying Future Land Use and Subsequent Cleanup and Transfer Decisions at Selected Cleanup Sites At the Oak Ridge, Paducah, Portsmouth, and Savannah River sites, DOE and regulators established cleanup levels that aligned with DOE’s initial future land use plans for these sites. DOE agreed to clean up most of the contaminated areas at these sites to support industrial use. For nearly a third of the Hanford site and most of the contaminated areas of the Idaho site, DOE and regulators set more stringent cleanup standards than needed to meet DOE’s anticipated conservation, preservation, or industrial uses for the land. However, while they agreed to cleanup standards based on residential use, future residential use is unlikely. They said it would be difficult to go back and calculate the cost difference between cleaning up to support residential and the other uses, but others noted cleaning up to support residential use is typically more costly. DOE has transferred or leased a small amount of land to the community or private entities for industrial use at five of the sites. DOE recently announced new initiatives for energy development, integrated hubs for nuclear fuel cycle activities, or co-located data centers to support artificial intelligence infrastructure. Some community stakeholders have expressed interest in more land transfers, and they generally expressed support for industrial reuse. DOE officials and stakeholders cited some potential benefits, such as economic growth, high-quality jobs, or local tax revenue. They also cited potential drawbacks, such as taking focus and resources away from cleanup, pollution and site recontamination risks, and future DOE liabilities. Why GAO Did This Study DOE is responsible for cleaning up sites contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons production and research. DOE estimates cleaning up 15 remaining sites will cost between $641 billion and $840 billion and be completed in 2100. When making cleanup decisions, DOE and its regulators assess risk to people who may use the land in the future—such as for industrial or residential purposes—to inform its approach and set cleanup standards. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to report on DOE’s future land use planning at cleanup sites. This report describes (1) DOE’s role in future land use determinations, (2) how cleanup decisions align with initial land use plans, and (3) what land DOE has transferred or leased to local communities. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and agency documents at six sites selected to represent a range of regulatory frameworks, stages of cleanup, and future land uses. GAO visited two of the sites and interviewed DOE officials, regulators, tribal officials, and community stakeholders.

What GAO Found Developing a textile circular economy includes repairing, reusing, and recycling textiles and making them last longer. Example of a Circular Economy for Textiles In the U.S., a textile circular economy may create potential benefits and involve challenges, according to reports by federal agencies and organizations and stakeholder interviews. Potential benefits could include creating new jobs and markets related to textile repair and recycling, reducing environmental harm, and changing consumer practices. Challenges could include limited funding and domestic infrastructure for nationwide textile collection and recycling efforts. GAO identified a number of policy options—based on relevant literature, site visits, and interviews with 49 stakeholders in the public and private sectors—that federal and state policymakers can consider if the U.S. chooses to develop a textile circular economy. Two of the options are: Developing a textile extended producer responsibility program: makes companies responsible for what happens to their products after use, along with other requirements. Creating tax credits related to a textile circular economy: reduces or offsets the amount of taxes paid by businesses when they contribute to textile circularity efforts, such as reusing textiles or reducing textile waste. Some U.S. states and other countries are proposing, enacting, or implementing most of the identified policy options that can help develop a textile circular economy. For example, U.S. states, the European Union, and others have proposed or enacted legislation to develop textile extended producer responsibility programs. When discussing policy options, stakeholders shared key observations. For example, several stakeholders, including industry groups, told GAO they prefer a federal approach to develop a textile circular economy. A federal approach may provide for coordination, compliance, and consistent implementation across U.S. states or other countries’ legal requirements, among other reasons, according to these stakeholders. However, this would require additional federal coordination and resources and depend on the government’s legal authority to implement a federal approach. Why GAO Did This Study The textile industry is part of a massive, global economic sector—including fiber sourcing, yarn production, and textile manufacturing. Textiles include apparel and other products, such as carpets, footwear, and towels. In response to global increases in the amount of textile consumption and waste, certain U.S. states and other countries have begun to consider and implement policies that can help develop a textile circular economy. GAO was asked to review aspects of developing a textile circular economy. This report continues GAO’s previous work from December 2024 on federal efforts to address textile waste. This report describes (1) the potential benefits and challenges with developing a textile circular economy in the U.S.; (2) the options that policymakers could consider to develop a textile circular economy; and (3) identified proposed, enacted, or implemented policies, both domestically and internationally, and stakeholders’ key observations. GAO reviewed legislation, regulations, federal agency documents, and academic reports. GAO also interviewed a range of stakeholder groups, including government entities (international, federal, and state), industry, academia, and other nonfederal stakeholders, such as representatives from nonprofit organizations. These stakeholders were selected because they have, or will have, a role in ongoing or planned efforts related to a textile circular economy or were recommended by knowledgeable officials. GAO also conducted site visits to the states of Washington and Oregon, as well as France and the Netherlands to meet with private sector organizations involved with various aspects of developing a textile circular economy. For more information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at gomezj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) initially planned for the Geostationary Extended Observations (GeoXO) program to be a series of six satellites with a projected lifecycle cost of $19.6 billion. In August 2025, Commerce directed the GeoXO program office to implement a major restructuring to reduce lifecycle costs, and in April 2026 Commerce approved the program’s new baseline. This new baseline reduces the number of satellites from six to four, decreases the number of instruments from five to two (see figure), and is expected to reduce the program’s lifecycle cost to $13 billion. Instrument Changes for the Geostationary Extended Observations Program, as of April 2026 If the first GeoXO satellite launches as expected in 2032, there is a risk of a gap in the continuity of satellite data. NOAA’s policy requires at least two operational satellites and one operational spare to be available to ensure the continuity of data. The current spare satellite is projected to meet the end of its life in October 2032, several months before the first GeoXO satellite is fully operational. There may be a period of several months when NOAA does not have an operational spare satellite. If either of the two operational satellites were impaired during that time, there would be a gap in geostationary weather data (see figure). Potential Gap in Data Continuity Without Operational Spare Satellite The effects of the rebaseline add uncertainty to the program’s cost, schedule, and instrument configuration. For example, the program office has yet to complete an independent cost estimate for its updated cost baseline, so it is unclear whether the $13 billion estimate for the restructuring is reasonable. GeoXO’s prior lifecycle cost estimate of $19.6 billion from 2022 partially met three and substantially met one of the best practices associated with a well-documented estimate. The gaps were due, in part, to the program’s lack of a separate narrative document that summarized the estimate and the methodology used. These gaps will make it difficult for GeoXO to replicate calculations and detect possible errors in the estimate and its ongoing revisions, and can undermine the ability to use the information to improve future cost estimates. The GeoXO program fully incorporated selected leading practices related to requirements management in its policies and procedures, which was a lesson learned from previous weather satellite programs. However, the program did not fully incorporate leading practices for other lessons learned: Contingency planning: NOAA partially incorporated leading practices for contingency planning into its plans to address potential satellite availability gaps. Specifically, the plan was missing key elements, such as an impact analysis for potential failure scenarios and specific actions needed to implement all contingency strategies. Until NOAA incorporates the missing key elements, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate potential gaps in geostationary weather satellite data, which would diminish its ability to track and monitor hazardous weather. Technology readiness: NOAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) did not incorporate leading practices related to documenting the results of its process to assess the readiness of key new technologies. Specifically, the GeoXO program did not document its assessment of the readiness of key technologies for three new instruments and did not develop a comprehensive report with the results of this assessment, which is required by NASA guidance. Thus, whether the program has enough information to determine if a technology is sufficiently mature is unclear, which increases the risk of delay and cost overruns. Why GAO Did This Study Geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in the nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites provide information on atmospheric conditions for monitoring Earth’s weather, including severe storms and hurricanes. NOAA, a component of the Department of Commerce, through collaboration with NASA, is procuring the next generation of geostationary weather satellites, called GeoXO. GeoXO satellites are intended to replace the current series of geostationary environmental satellites as they reach the end of their useful lives. The GeoXO mission was planned to continue the vital observations provided by the existing operational geostationary satellites and bring new and improved capabilities. GAO was asked to review the GeoXO program. This report addresses (1) the status of the GeoXO program, (2) the extent to which NOAA and NASA have implemented relevant best practices to establish cost estimates, and (3) the extent to which NOAA and NASA incorporated leading practices related to selected lessons learned from previous weather satellite programs into the development and organization of GeoXO program. GAO analyzed agency documents, including program office plans, management reports, documentation supporting the program’s December 2022 cost estimate, contingency plans, requirements policies and procedures, and documentation that provided the results of the technical readiness assessments. GAO then compared this documentation against leading practices and interviewed agency officials.

GAO’s Strategic Plan Goals and Objectives form the foundation of the agency’s strategic plan and lay out our long-term strategies to accomplish our goals. For more information, contact Stephen Sanford at SanfordS@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds extramural research through awards to universities and other institutions. Implementation of federal research security requirements helps safeguard this research from foreign interference, including misappropriation and unauthorized access by foreign countries and entities. NIH implemented 14 of the 15 federal research security requirements GAO reviewed that address: (1) disclosure, (2) malign foreign talent recruitment programs, (3) research security training and programs, and (4) collaboration and information sharing. These requirements apply across federal research agencies and include actions NIH must take, as well as requirements it must impose on grant applicants, recipients, and specified individuals. For the remaining requirement concerning certification by certain recipient institutions that they have established and operate research security programs, NIH is working with an interagency group to implement the requirement. NIH relies heavily on self-reported information disclosed by researchers and institutions to identify and manage foreign interference risks and generally does not verify such disclosures using sources outside those required during pre-award risk assessments unless it receives a foreign interference allegation. Additionally, NIH does not require disclosure of all past affiliations, and foreign component disclosures are only required when the collaboration involves the performance of a significant element or segment of the NIH-funded project outside of the United States. As a result, NIH may not identify risks when relevant information is not required to be disclosed or is left out. From 2017 through 2025, NIH received 697 allegations of potential foreign interference involving personnel on NIH awards. NIH identified disclosure violations in 264 cases, and NIH or recipient institutions took one or more actions in most of those cases, such as prohibiting individuals from participating on awards. NIH Allegations of Potential Foreign Interference and Outcomes, 2017–2025 Total number of allegations (697) Violations found (264) Action taken by NIH or recipient institution (223) No actions taken (41) No violations found (433)   Action taken by NIH or recipient institution (45) No actions taken (388) Source: GAO analysis of National Institutes of Health data. | GAO-27-107848 In seven nongeneralizable case studies, GAO used outside sources to identify publicly available information about foreign affiliations and coauthored publications that did not appear in the award documentation. These cases do not establish the prevalence of undisclosed information or foreign interference across NIH awards but illustrate potential limitations of NIH’s disclosure-based process. NIH’s risk management program is fully aligned with GAO’s enterprise risk management practices but not fully aligned with GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. Although NIH’s annual risk inventory considers fraud, it is not a documented extramural-program-specific assessment of fraud schemes, controls, and residual risks. Without such an assessment, NIH lacks a documented basis for determining whether its controls and monitoring activities address the most significant fraud risks and are adjusted as those risks evolve. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. has long promoted an open and collaborative research environment, but policymakers have raised concerns that foreign countries and entities may exploit the openness of the federally funded research enterprise to undermine national security and economic competitiveness. In fiscal year 2025 alone, NIH awarded about $35 billion in extramural funding. GAO was asked to review NIH’s efforts to safeguard extramural research from foreign interference and related ethical concerns. This report examines, among other things: (1) NIH’s implementation of selected federal research security requirements, (2) the extent to which NIH identifies and manages foreign interference risks in its extramural research program, and (3) the alignment of NIH’s risk management policies and practices with GAO risk management practices. GAO reviewed relevant legal authorities, policies, and NIH documentation; analyzed NIH foreign interference allegation data from 2017 through 2025; conducted seven nongeneralizable case studies of NIH awards selected based on their potential for heightened foreign interference risk; compared NIH practices with GAO risk management frameworks; and interviewed NIH and Department of Health and Human Services officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear waste cleanup is proceeding largely under three laws that set cleanup and waste management requirements. Each law has different requirements, applications, and regulators. Selected Cleanup and Waste Management Laws and Regulators for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Nuclear Waste Cleanup GAO and experts GAO convened with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine identified several legal and regulatory factors that affect the cost and schedule of DOE’s nuclear waste cleanup. Certain state regulatory actions may exceed state authority. According to experts who participated in GAO’s National Academies meetings, some states are taking legal and regulatory actions that address the radiological aspects of nuclear waste at DOE’s cleanup sites, which are generally regulated by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Such actions may exceed a state’s authority to regulate hazardous waste under authorizations from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (RCRA). These state actions have led to disagreements between DOE and states on requirements for the radiological portion of DOE’s waste, longer cleanup schedules, and billions in higher costs for the federal government, according to experts. Courts have recognized that DOE’s authority to manage and regulate its nuclear waste under the Atomic Energy Act preempts certain state regulatory actions that impact DOE’s management of nuclear waste during its cleanup efforts. However, based on GAO’s analysis, statutes and case law are unclear on what kinds of state actions that affect DOE’s management and cleanup of radioactive waste are appropriate under the law, in part because of the prevalence of mixed waste at DOE cleanup sites. According to experts, because states are often taking such actions under state programs that are authorized by EPA to implement a federal law (RCRA), EPA could play a more active role in addressing instances where states may be improperly seeking to regulate radioactive materials covered by the Atomic Energy Act. EPA officials told us they currently do not have authority to challenge such state actions, as long as those actions are at least as stringent as federal requirements. If Congress clarifies the scope of the Atomic Energy Act’s preemption—and creates a mechanism that allows for DOE to appeal to EPA to evaluate state actions that may infringe on federal authority over nuclear waste covered by the Atomic Energy Act—costly and resource-intensive legal disputes could be reduced and decision-making could be accelerated. Assumptions about anticipated future land and groundwater use are sometimes unrealistic and can unnecessarily increase costs and schedules. Under the applicable laws and regulations, DOE’s cleanup of its sites is based, in part, on the anticipated future uses of land and groundwater for an area. According to experts at GAO’s meetings, DOE is cleaning up some areas based on unrealistic assumptions about those future uses. For example, DOE has agreed with state regulators and EPA to clean up large portions of some sites to allow for future residential use, even though there are no plans for such use. DOE did not evaluate the costs associated with cleaning up to less stringent standards associated with different land uses in those cases. By comparison, realistic decisions about future land use have been critical to the successful cleanup of other DOE sites, such as at Rocky Flats in Colorado. After Congress designated that site as a national wildlife refuge in 2001, cleanup costs decreased from an estimated $23 billion for residential use to about $10 billion. Historical Disposal (left) and Its Cleanup (right) at Idaho National Laboratory According to experts, a better framework for making realistic assumptions about future land use at DOE’s cleanup sites is needed. For example, DOE could assess benefits and costs associated with cleanup based on a range of potential future land uses. Clarification from Congress, and additional guidance from EPA and DOE, on incorporating future land use assumptions into the cleanup process would better position DOE to select appropriate cleanup approaches that are realistic, cost-effective, and aligned with congressional expectations. The legal framework often requires DOE to clean up contaminated groundwater to meet drinking water standards, but, according to experts, the assumption that groundwater beneath contaminated sites will be used for drinking water in the future is sometimes unrealistic. Further, according to experts, standards for certain contaminants that can apply to groundwater are based on outdated information from the 1960s and may affect the feasibility of cleanup. By accounting for current scientific information, DOE may be able to achieve cleanup that is both protective and avoids unnecessary expenditures. Other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework for DOE’s nuclear cleanup are sources of conflict and affect costs and schedule. For example, DOE entered into various cleanup agreements with EPA and states in the 1990s before the extent of contamination was fully known. These agreements include hundreds of milestones that DOE has sometimes struggled to meet. In a poll, all experts at GAO’s meetings recommended that DOE and EPA create an interagency task force of experts to review high-priority cleanup decisions and areas of legal and regulatory disagreement for opportunities to make DOE’s cleanup approach more risk-informed and cost-effective. Having an independent task force provide recommendations to DOE and EPA—such as when disagreements occur over revising cleanup agreements—may help to allow for cleanup approaches that more efficiently complete DOE’s cleanup mission. Why GAO Did This Study DOE is cleaning up nuclear sites across the country, the majority of which were created during World War II and the Cold War to research and produce nuclear weapons. DOE has estimated it could take until 2100 and cost $641 billion to $840 billion dollars to complete its nuclear waste cleanup mission. Much of the waste at DOE sites is mixed waste, meaning that it includes both radiological and hazardous constituents. Radioactive waste emits radiation, sometimes for thousands of years. Hazardous waste may be toxic, corrosive, ignitable, or reactive. Under a complex legal and regulatory framework, DOE and regulators (EPA and states) make decisions that affect the cost and schedule of DOE’s nuclear cleanup efforts. For years, organizations have reported on the ways in which this framework has affected DOE’s ability to complete its nuclear waste cleanup mission, such as through inconsistent decision-making processes for similar risks across sites. GAO was asked to review the impact of the legal and regulatory framework on DOE’s nuclear waste cleanup mission. This report examines (1) how state legal and regulatory actions affect DOE’s ability to manage the radiological portions of nuclear waste at its cleanup sites, (2) how DOE’s cleanup efforts are affected by assumptions about future land and groundwater use under the applicable legal framework, and (3) other aspects of the legal and regulatory framework that can contribute to higher cleanup costs and longer schedules. GAO convened a series of expert meetings with the National Academies; conducted legal research, a literature review, and four case studies across six DOE cleanup sites; and interviewed DOE, EPA, and state officials.

What GAO Found The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers mining claims that grant the exclusive right to extract critical and other hardrock minerals from most federal lands. U.S. mining laws include citizenship requirements for individuals and business entities holding such claims, known as mining claimants. Under these laws, mining claimants generally must be U.S. citizens, which can include individuals as well as business entities incorporated in a U.S. state or territory. Foreign entities are not qualified to be claimants, but their subsidiaries can hold claims if they are incorporated in the U.S. Mining claimants are not required to disclose to BLM if they are a subsidiary of another entity, foreign or domestic, and they do not have to provide information on any foreign investment they may receive. Under BLM’s regulations and guidance, the agency collects basic identifying information from individuals and business entities holding mining claims. However, BLM generally does not collect citizenship information and does not document if mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements. In addition, BLM officials said the agency rarely verifies the citizenship of mining claimants. As a result, BLM generally does not know whether mining claimants are qualified to hold mining claims. Information the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Collects from Mining Claimants GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 15 mining claimants that appeared to be business entities and could not find evidence that seven of the claimants were incorporated in the U.S., as required. BLM was unable to help determine if these entities met the requirement to be incorporated in the U.S. because it did not have the necessary information to do so. Until BLM directs staff to collect citizenship information and document that mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements, BLM lacks reasonable assurance that only qualified individuals and business entities hold mining claims that allow them to extract and profit from the minerals produced on federal lands. Australia and Canada—examples of top mineral-producing countries—collect detailed information on foreign investors in businesses in their countries. They can use this information to restrict foreign investments in mining and other sectors by prohibiting certain investments or imposing conditions, as each country has done in some cases in recent years. In addition, both countries limit the ability of foreign state-owned enterprises and other foreign investors to acquire control of businesses involving critical minerals. Why GAO Did This Study Critical minerals are vital to the U.S. economy and national security. Federal lands are a significant source of hardrock minerals and include some mining operations supported by foreign investments, according to BLM officials. The administration and Congress have expressed concern about U.S. reliance on foreign sources for critical minerals, and the President has called for expanding mineral production from federal lands. GAO was asked to review issues related to foreign entities’ involvement in mining on federal lands. This report examines (1) the extent to which BLM collects, documents, and reviews mining claimants’ citizenship information and (2) how selected mineral-producing countries address foreign investments in mining. GAO was also asked to report on the extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands (see GAO-27-108094). GAO reviewed U.S. laws and regulations; analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of mining claimants to assess if they appear to meet citizenship requirements; examined BLM documents; visited three BLM state offices; and interviewed officials and representatives from BLM and other federal and nonfederal entities. GAO also reviewed Australian and Canadian laws, guidance, reports, and written responses to questions.

What GAO Found The U.S critical mineral supply chain faces numerous constraints, including the need for substantial capital investment and limited domestic processing capacity. The U.S. exports large quantities of domestically extracted ore to Canada, Mexico, and China, among other countries. Copper Mine on Federal Lands The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service oversee hardrock mines on federal land. As of February 2026, there were 632 approved hardrock mining plans of operation on federal land. The 1872 Mining Law generally requires mining claimants to be U.S. citizens or business entities incorporated in the U.S. Foreign businesses can meet this requirement by having a U.S. subsidiary serve as the claimant. While there is limited available information on the full extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands and parent-subsidiary relationships, GAO reviewed ownership information of 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines on federal lands. GAO determined ownership for 32 of those companies and found that 14 were subsidiaries of foreign entities. GAO found that none of the 14 had Chinese-owned parent companies, but in at least two cases, Chinese entities had financial interest in the foreign parent companies. The 1872 Mining Law does not contain a provision requiring BLM or Forest Service to collect information on foreign parent companies nor does it require claimants or operators to submit information regarding foreign ownership. However, other federal agencies have some authorities and processes to identify foreign investment in mining. For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, chaired by the Department of the Treasury, can review foreign investment in mining as it relates to potential national security concerns. Why GAO Did This Study Critical minerals are essential to the economic and national security of the United States. These minerals, including copper, lithium, and zinc, are key components in advanced technologies and have vulnerable supply chains. As demand for these minerals increases, U.S. access to critical minerals has become a key topic in domestic policymaking and international relations. Recently, the administration and Congressional entities have expressed concerns over U.S. dependence on imports and the role of potential adversary nations, such as the People’s Republic of China (China), in the U.S. supply chain of critical minerals. Most critical minerals that can be mined in the U.S. are obtained through hardrock mining, some of which occurs on federal lands. However, policymakers have raised questions about the full amount and extent of foreign investment in those mines. This report provides information on hardrock mining that occurs on federal lands, foreign investment in mining on federal lands, and steps federal agencies take to identify foreign investment. It also provides information on the amount of extracted critical minerals exported from the U.S. from 2019 through 2025. GAO reviewed ownership information using a variety of sources for 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines, analyzed federal laws, and interviewed officials. In a related report (GAO-27-108196), GAO reports on BLM’s role in collecting citizenship information from mining claimants. For more information, contact Dr. Nagla'a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Ghost preparers are paid tax preparers who do not comply with requirements to identify themselves on tax returns they prepare for others. Ghost preparers may intentionally leave identifying information off to get away with filing fraudulent income tax returns, stealing taxpayers’ refunds, and stealing taxpayers’ identities. Courts have ordered individual ghost preparers to pay millions in restitution to the government, but according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials, the total effect of ghost preparers is likely greater, in part, because ghost preparers are difficult to detect. IRS maintains some data on identified ghost preparers, but the systems IRS uses to track ghost preparer cases and outcomes are not connected and have limitations that impede their usefulness. As a result, IRS does not know how many ghost preparers it has identified, investigated, and addressed. Better understanding existing data, including its limitations, would help IRS direct enforcement resources and protect taxpayers from fraudulent returns or stolen refunds. IRS identifies and addresses ghost preparers through data analysis, referrals, taxpayer education, and enforcement actions such as investigations. However, these efforts are fragmented across six offices and IRS is missing opportunities to share information and better address risks. A comprehensive, coordinated preparer strategy, including efforts addressing ghost preparers, could help IRS better align resources with risks and identify additional needs. Notional Example of Fragmented Activities Compared to a Comprehensive, Coordinated Strategy While IRS has some activities to address ghost preparers, including data analysis and taxpayer education, it has not developed measurable objectives or performance goals. Defining objectives, goals, and performance measures could help IRS reliably assess whether its efforts are reducing ghost preparer activity and adjust its strategy and allocate resources more effectively. Why GAO Did This Study Paid tax preparers prepared more than half of all tax returns in fiscal year 2025 and have an enormous effect on IRS’s ability to administer tax laws effectively. However, ghost preparers may hide their identities to avoid accountability and leave taxpayers responsible for inaccurate or fraudulent returns they prepare. GAO was asked to examine IRS’s efforts to address ghost preparers. This report (1) describes how ghost preparers have harmed taxpayers and IRS, (2) assesses the extent to which IRS maintains data on ghost preparers, and (3) evaluates IRS actions to identify and address ghost preparers. GAO reviewed federal court cases, and IRS documentation and data. GAO compared IRS’s efforts to leading practices for evidence-based policymaking and consumer education planning. GAO also interviewed IRS and Department of Justice officials and stakeholder groups, such as IRS oversight and industry groups.

What GAO Found According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), non-traditional intelligence collectors (NTCs) are individuals whose primary profession is not intelligence collection, but who actively or passively collect sensitive U.S. information on behalf of foreign entities. For example, researchers and students at universities may act as NTCs if they collect non-public research on behalf of a foreign entity. According to the FBI, unlike intelligence officers, NTCs function independently of established intelligence organizations. FBI officials and representatives from academic associations identified several challenges in addressing threats posed by NTCs. For example, FBI officials said that it is difficult to identify and investigate NTCs because their activities may not constitute a violation of the law until information is transferred to foreign entities. Also, there are cultural differences between the FBI and academia that may impede communication, as academic institutions promote the free exchange of information, and, according to FBI officials, may not want to be perceived as “turning over” their students. FBI offices involved in mitigating and investigating threats posed by NTCs are the Office of Private Sector, which leads information-sharing and engagement with the private sector, and the Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. The FBI also uses the National Counterintelligence Task Force and field office-based Counterintelligence Task Forces to coordinate with partner agencies. Interplay Between FBI’s Headquarters and Field Offices in Mitigating Threats Posed by NTCs According to FBI officials, building relationships between field offices and academic institutions is important, so academic institutions come to the FBI for assistance in addressing NTCs. FBI officials also said they rely on tips from academia to identify potential NTCs. Publicly, FBI officials have stated that relationships with academic institutions need strengthening to address research security issues. Academic association representatives similarly have said the FBI could improve outreach efforts and that relationships between the FBI and universities are stronger at some universities than others. However, the FBI did not identify a plan for strengthening partnerships with academic institutions. Without strong partnerships, the FBI’s ability to counter NTC threats and protect U.S. research, intellectual property, and technological advantage is hindered. Why GAO Did This Study U.S. national security and economic interests are heavily dependent on technological innovation and advantage. According to FBI officials, NTCs pose a significant insider threat to U.S. information, intellectual property, and technological advantage. GAO was asked to review the FBI’s efforts to investigate and address threats posed by NTCs. This report provides information on the challenges posed by NTCs, the FBI offices involved in mitigating and investigating threats posed by NTCs, and the relationships between the FBI and academic institutions relative to NTC threats, among other things. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed laws and statutes related to the FBI’s authorities to investigate federal crimes and national security threats, analyzed documentary evidence to understand how key offices interact and coordinate with each other, and reviewed the mechanisms the FBI uses to coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies, academia, and the private sector. GAO also interviewed FBI officials and representatives from academic associations and private industry, selected based on their experiences in addressing NTC activities in academia and the private sector.

What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversees a $25 billion annual budget and approximately 70,000 management and operating contractor personnel to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. NNSA took steps to build its federal workforce to meet mission needs in 2024, with its workforce peaking at 1,991 early in fiscal year 2025. However, since then through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, NNSA has reduced its federal workforce by 236 employees—or 11.9 percent. These reductions have impacted NNSA’s mission critical workforce, including occupations like nuclear engineers and contract specialists. Number of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Federal Employees and Annual Appropriations, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023–FY 2026 Quarter (Q) 2 Note: The Federal Salaries and Expenses appropriation account funds the salaries, benefits, and other related expenses for most of NNSA’s federal workforce. The reduction of NNSA’s workforce occurred because of two primary reasons: (1) very limited hiring and (2) employee separations—primarily employees choosing to retire or resign. Hiring was limited during the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2026. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA—a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has a current workload that is at its highest level since the Cold War as the agency oversees a $200 billion, 2-decades-long effort to modernize nuclear weapons and related infrastructure. In May 2024 (GAO-24-106167), GAO found NNSA continued to face challenges recruiting and retaining federal staff to meet the agency's mission needs, even though a statutory cap limiting the number of its federal employees was eliminated in fiscal year 2023. NNSA committed to developing a workforce planning process intended to inform future budget requests in response to its increased workload, the elimination of the cap, and consistent with GAO’s May 2024 report. The agency began building its workforce to meet mission needs in 2024. However, in response to presidential directives in early 2025, NNSA reduced the size of its federal workforce. GAO was asked to examine NNSA’s retirements, resignations, terminations, and other voluntary or involuntary workforce reductions since January 2025. This report describes changes to NNSA’s federal workforce from the beginning of fiscal year 2023 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026. GAO analyzed relevant NNSA data for workforce and personnel actions, including hires and separations, by program, office, and location. GAO also reviewed NNSA budget information and interviewed NNSA officials. For more information, contact John Bumgarner at BumgarnerJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Under the Utilizing Space Efficiently and Improving Technologies (USE IT) Act, enacted in January 2025, federal agencies are now required to collect and report occupancy data. This data is used to calculate utilization rates for agencies’ office space in federally owned buildings and leased locations. While 20 of the 23 agencies that responded to GAO’s survey reported using existing badging systems for this purpose, 16 of these 20 agencies reported supplementing that information with data from other sources such as daily check-in surveys. Nearly all agencies surveyed noted the importance of having easy to implement, cost-effective data collection approaches that they could put in place by the act’s July 2025 implementation deadline. Most agencies reported minimal costs associated with collecting and reporting USE IT Act data—collectively $16 million across 23 agencies in 2025. Agencies’ Use of Approaches to Collect Occupancy Data, as of September 2025 Many agencies told GAO they are either using or plan to use their USE IT Act data to identify and dispose of unneeded real property. Some agency officials told GAO that they have already made decisions to consolidate or dispose of underutilized spaces, informed in part by USE IT Act data, and that they expect to save millions of dollars annually as a result. However, the USE IT Act data submitted to Congress and the public in March 2026 does not have important context—including on GSA-controlled vacant space—needed to fully reflect office space utilization. Without this information, Congress and the public may have an inaccurate impression of the extent to which owned and leased office spaces are being utilized, including some locations that are likely being utilized at lower or higher rates than reported. While surveyed agencies generally agreed that USE IT Act data are helpful, about one-third expressed concerns about how GSA data collection and reporting guidelines affect their utilization rate calculations. Further, some agencies described approaches to collecting and reporting their occupancy data that are inconsistent with GSA guidelines, resulting in data that are incomplete. For example, one agency reported the number of employees that are assigned to each location rather than measuring the extent to which employees were present in those spaces. By coordinating with agencies to improve the consistency and completeness of their occupancy data, GSA could better position agencies to make informed decisions about which underused spaces to prioritize for disposal, potentially leading to tens of millions of dollars in financial savings. Why GAO Did This Study Chronic underutilization of federal buildings is one of the main reasons that the management of federal real property has been on GAO’s High Risk list for more than 20 years. The USE IT Act requires the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies to collect and report occupancy data on the number of employees working in certain owned and leased spaces. It also contains a provision for GAO to review the costs to these agencies of this requirement to measure the occupancy and utilization rates of their spaces. This report examines 1) the approaches CFO Act agencies reported using to collect the occupancy data required by the USE IT Act and their associated costs; 2) how agencies are using USE IT Act data to inform real property decisions and what additional information, if any, may help Congress and the public better understand federal office space utilization; and 3) agencies’ concerns about USE IT Act data collection and reporting and GSA’s actions to address these concerns. GAO surveyed the CFO Act agencies about their data collection approaches, associated costs, and any limitations to their data or selected approaches. GAO also reviewed GSA guidelines for USE IT Act data collection, analyzed GSA data on vacant spaces, and conducted in-depth interviews with five agencies selected based on the variety of approaches to collecting occupancy data and the size of their real property portfolios.

What GAO Found The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reduced its workforce by 29 percent in 2025 and modified the types of programs it funds in response to presidential directives and executive branch guidance. HUD largely achieved workforce reductions through deferred resignation programs. Over half the employees who separated had at least 10 years of service at HUD, including 41 percent with more than 20 years of service. HUD did not publish notice of any reorganization plans that led to field office closures in 2025, though in 2026 it announced plans to consolidate one field office into a nearby regional office. Workforce Changes at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 2025 Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. About half of HUD’s 68 active grant programs made new awards in fiscal year 2025, but the median value of those awards was higher than in previous years. HUD also terminated about 21 percent of its active contracts in 2025, valued at about $367 million. Most terminated contracts involved professional or IT services. Representatives of 20 stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed—including fair housing grantees and agencies, public housing agencies, and Section 8 project-based rental assistance property managers—reported confusion, delays, and operational disruptions following HUD’s changes. Nearly all said that experienced points of contact had left, making it harder to navigate HUD programs. Fair housing stakeholders reported reducing services or staffing during monthslong funding gaps. Stakeholders also reported delays with physical inspections of HUD-assisted properties. Since January 2025, HUD has reported launching initiatives aimed at increasing efficiency and streamlining operations. For example, HUD reported developing a unified grants system to standardize grant administration and a project voucher initiative to automate aspects of rental assistance processing. HUD did not respond to GAO’s requests to discuss these initiatives or provide supporting documentation. As a result, Congress and the public have limited information on the status or effectiveness of these initiatives. Why GAO Did This Study HUD administers programs related to housing assistance, community development, and fair housing. To carry out these programs, HUD headquarters and field staff work with public housing agencies, private property owners, nonprofit organizations, and other stakeholders. Executive orders and other actions issued in 2025 called for workforce and program changes at HUD. GAO was asked to examine the effects of these changes. This report describes (1) changes HUD made to its workforce, field office structure, and grant and contract spending in 2025; (2) effects of those changes on selected HUD functions reported by housing stakeholders; and (3) steps HUD has publicly reported to manage the changes. HUD did not respond to GAO’s requests for information throughout the audit. GAO analyzed publicly available 2025 data on HUD’s workforce, terminated contracts, and grant spending. GAO selected three HUD functions for review, chosen to reflect a mix of funding levels and other criteria: (1) enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and Violence Against Women Act of 1994, (2) administration of the Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance Program, and (3) coordination of inspections of HUD-assisted properties. GAO also conducted four site visits and interviewed representatives of a nongeneralizable selection of 20 local and national housing organizations, including public housing agencies and fair housing organizations. GAO also reviewed court documents and publicly available data, and agency documentation related to HUD’s workforce and efficiency planning. For more information, contact Jill Naamane at naamanej@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Body-worn cameras provide law enforcement personnel with the capability to record interactions with the public. When initiating their body-worn camera programs, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) each developed a plan that included key components of a comprehensive program management plan. However, CBP and ICE have not updated their program plans since 2022 and 2024, respectively. They have therefore not taken into account significant changes in the program, such as increases in the number of cameras scheduled for deployment and a 2025 pause in further camera deployment. Body-Worn Camera and Functional Buttons CBP and ICE have stated desired results for their programs, including enhancing officer safety, transparency, accountability, and public trust. Although CBP and ICE implemented some measures to track information about camera availability and reliability, they have not implemented results-oriented performance goals and measures. Doing so would help them assess the results of their body-worn camera programs. For example, potential goals and measures might involve use of footage in use of force investigations. CBP and ICE have established policies related to camera use and the management of footage and implemented related oversight mechanisms to help ensure compliance with policy. These include supervisory controls on camera use and monthly reviews of footage to help ensure proper categorization. However, additional controls—such as mechanisms that automatically activate the camera when a related action occurs (e.g., when emergency lights are engaged)—would provide better assurance that ICE personnel capture footage in accordance with policy. Most CBP and ICE offices have not developed specific operational guidance that explains how personnel should use, or not use, cameras under their unique operational circumstances. The lack of guidance at this operational level increases the risk that CBP and ICE personnel will fail to use the cameras as required under policy. Why GAO Did This Study CBP and ICE began deploying cameras in fiscal years 2021 and 2024, respectively. As of June 2026, CBP had deployed approximately 11,500 cameras, with nearly all of these deployments to Border Patrol. As of April 2026, ICE had deployed approximately 4,800 cameras, almost evenly to Enforcement and Removal Operations and Homeland Security Investigations. GAO was asked to review CBP and ICE’s (1) body-worn camera program planning; (2) measures to assess program impact; and (3) mechanisms that help ensure that personnel carry out related responsibilities appropriately. GAO reviewed agency documents, including Department of Homeland Security, CBP, and ICE directives on body-worn camera use. GAO also analyzed CBP and ICE data on actual and planned deployment of cameras to component personnel. GAO interviewed DHS, CBP, and ICE headquarters officials and users of the cameras at 10 field locations that vary in geographic location and status of camera deployment.

What GAO Found Artificial intelligence (AI) is being used in a variety of scenarios, or use cases, in the Department of Defense (DOD). In guidance, DOD established AI Ethical Principles and the concept of Responsible AI to ensure the safety and trustworthiness of AI systems. DOD further defined six tenets to guide Responsible AI implementation. Most of the 10 DOD components GAO surveyed reported taking at least initial steps to establish oversight and implement Responsible AI tenets in the selected surveyed use cases. The Office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), through its Responsible AI Division, established the Responsible AI Working Council as the working-level collaborative group for Responsible AI. However, CDAO officials said the council did not meet from late 2024 until August 2025. Officials from four DOD components told GAO they faced Responsible AI implementation challenges during this time that would have benefited from collaboration. Six of 10 surveyed components reported that sharing Responsible AI resources and best practices would benefit their implementation efforts. Although officials said the council resumed meetings in August 2025, it is at risk of lapsing again as it does not have a charter that defines roles and responsibilities and specifies meeting frequency. Another lapse could increase the risk of DOD facing Responsible AI implementation issues, such as inconsistent interpretation of related guidance, that it would not have the collaborative capacity to swiftly and effectively resolve. CDAO officials identified additional actions that could help DOD implement Responsible AI. However, CDAO has experienced staffing shortages that have hindered its ability to take these actions. Specifically, officials said that as of February 2026, only three of the 10 authorized positions for the Responsible AI Division were filled. Responsible AI enables DOD to more quickly adopt AI. By addressing current workforce needs for the Responsible AI Division, CDAO could make more progress toward its goal of accelerating AI across DOD. GAO previously made recommendations on issues related to DOD’s AI collaboration and workforce. DOD has not fully addressed those recommendations. Congressional action to ensure that DOD takes steps to fully address those prior recommendations would help position the department to meet its AI goals. U.S. Marine Corps Service Members Conduct Training Using an Artificial Intelligence-Enabled System Why GAO Did This Study AI has changed the national security landscape. U.S. adversaries and competitors are investing heavily in AI and AI-enabled capabilities in ways that threaten global security. As DOD speeds AI development, it is critical for the department to do so responsibly so that warfighters can quickly and confidently adopt it. Senate Report 118-188 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes a provision for GAO to review the implementation and oversight of DOD’s Responsible AI guidance, among other things. This report discusses DOD’s approach to the responsible use of AI, including related guidance, implementation, and oversight. GAO collected and reviewed DOD documentation related to Responsible AI. GAO also conducted a survey of 10 DOD components to understand how they have implemented Responsible AI tenets in 10 selected use cases. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD officials.