What GAO Found An estimated 2.8 million children worked in the U.S. in 2023, according to GAO’s analysis. The Department of Labor (DOL) publishes statistical data that provide information on working children’s fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. These data are used to develop workplace safety strategies and policies, but data limitations and discontinued data sets have contributed to information gaps. For example: In DOL’s dataset on workplace fatalities, some data on the cause of death or industry in which the child worked are not publicly available. DOL changed how it collects data on working children’s injuries and illnesses, so data since 2021 cannot be compared to earlier years. Between 2015 and 2023, one DOL survey and two other federal datasets that contained child labor injury data ended. By mitigating child labor data gaps, DOL would be better positioned to identify and respond to dangerous working conditions for children. Since fiscal year 2015, the number of annual child labor violations that DOL cited and the number of children affected by their employers’ violations has generally increased, according to GAO’s analysis (see figure). Examples of violations include children working later than allowed or doing hazardous work such as operating meat processing machines. Cited Child Labor Violations and Children Affected, Fiscal Years 2015−2025 DOL recently launched an initiative to enhance its enforcement of child labor laws, but it faces some challenges. For example: DOL regional and district officials expressed concern with the data DOL recommended for targeting egregious child labor violations, including that the data were not detailed enough to provide useful investigation leads. DOL does not have a process to identify and evaluate additional data sources. DOL officials described persistent knowledge gaps among employers and the public on child labor laws. DOL implemented a communications strategy to raise awareness, but taking steps to measure and assess its outreach would help DOL understand whether its efforts are achieving its goals. In 2023 and 2024, DOL’s interagency collaboration on child labor did not fully follow leading collaboration practices, according to GAO’s analysis. Although DOL works with other agencies to protect children, it discontinued its interagency task force in 2025. Strengthening future collaboration and ensuring key information is shared could enhance DOL’s efforts to protect working children. Why GAO Did This Study The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 included provisions to protect the safety and health of working children under 18. Almost 90 years later, DOL continues to find numerous child labor law violations. GAO was asked to review child labor data and enforcement. Among other things, this report addresses (1) information gaps in data about fatalities, injuries, and illnesses among working children; (2) trends in child labor violations; (3) recent changes DOL has made in its child labor enforcement practices, and how DOL has addressed related challenges; and (4) the extent to which DOL has collaborated with other federal agencies on child labor. GAO analyzed federal data on working children from 2023; child labor fatalities, injuries, and illnesses since 2013; and cited child labor violations from 2015 to 2025 (the most recent data available). GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documentation on enforcement and collaboration. To gather information on enforcement and challenges, GAO interviewed officials at DOL’s Wage and Hour Division, including at five regional and six district offices selected to capture a variety of enforcement experiences. GAO also analyzed information from DOL and seven other agencies on child labor collaboration.

What GAO Found Within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is responsible for providing enrolled veterans access to reproductive health care, including fertility care. From fiscal years 2022 through 2025, VHA data show that approximately 8 million veterans used some type of VHA health care. Around 30,000 veterans had an infertility diagnosis in fiscal year 2025, an increase from the approximately 19,000 veterans with an infertility diagnosis in fiscal year 2022. VHA officials said there may be several reasons for the increase, such as expansions VHA made to eligibility for fertility care in 2024. Number of Veterans with an Infertility Diagnosis, Fiscal Years 2022-2025 VHA’s Office of Women’s Health communicates about available fertility care through various methods, such as a fertility webpage and brochures. GAO found some interested veterans may be unaware of VHA’s fertility care. For example, stakeholders said male veterans may not seek out or may find it difficult to seek out eligibility information because it comes from Office of Women’s Health. GAO determined that VHA has not implemented key performance practices related to its communication. By implementing such practices, VHA could better assess progress towards its communication goals and increase the effectiveness of its outreach to veterans about fertility care. This would allow VHA to identify and make any needed adjustments to better ensure its efforts reach veterans who may need fertility care. VHA changed its process for determining veterans’ eligibility for fertility care in October 2024. Under the change, VA medical center fertility teams are responsible for making these decisions instead of VHA at the national level. However, GAO identified challenges with the process after October 2024. For example, GAO found fertility team composition and skill level varied at selected facilities. VHA officials from these facilities said that it can be challenging to determine veterans’ eligibility, which can affect the care they receive. GAO also found that teams at two facilities did not consistently provide written notifications of eligibility decisions to veterans as required. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies are to identify, analyze, and respond to change as part of their risk assessment efforts. Assessing the changes it made to its eligibility determination process would allow VHA to determine whether the process is working as intended or whether adjustments are needed, in turn, ensuring it is best serving veterans. Why GAO Did This Study Infertility—the inability to conceive or sustain a pregnancy—can affect both men and women. Research suggests veterans may experience infertility for a variety of reasons including injuries in combat, environmental exposures, or trauma sustained during military service, which impacts treatment options. To be eligible to receive certain fertility care, such as in vitro fertilization, a veteran’s infertility must be causally related to a service-connected disability—an injury or illness incurred or aggravated during military service—or to the treatment of one. GAO was asked to review issues related to infertility among veterans. This report, among other objectives, describes (1) available data on infertility among veterans for fiscal years 2022 through 2025; examines (2) VHA’s efforts to provide information to veterans and providers about available fertility care; and (3) VHA’s eligibility determination process for fertility care. GAO reviewed VHA documentation and data for fiscal years 2022 through 2025; interviewed VHA officials, staff involved with fertility care at four VA medical centers, and four veterans integrated service networks (selected based on presence of fertility staff, geography, and facility complexity); and interviewed eight veterans, six veterans service organizations, and two national organizations (selected based on focus on infertility and national reach).

What GAO Found In fiscal year (FY) 2024, the most recent data available at the time of review, 11 federal agencies issued $4.4 billion in Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) awards, split almost equally between open and conventional topics. For open topics, agencies define broad areas of interest, and small businesses submit proposals defining potential agency needs and solutions. In contrast, for conventional topics, agencies define specific problems, and small businesses submit proposals that address those needs. One goal of SBIR and STTR is to increase commercialization of federally funded research and development (R&D), such as by selling to private industry or to federal agencies. To help achieve this goal, Congress began requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) to release open topic solicitations in FY 2023. Open Topic Awards in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs, Fiscal Years 2019–2024 Incomplete data prevent agencies from evaluating commercialization outcomes for open and conventional topic awards. At specific milestones, small businesses are required to report to the Small Business Administration (SBA) on commercial activity resulting from past awards. SBA maintains this information in a statutorily required database. However, GAO’s review of FY 2019 through FY 2024 awards showed small businesses submitted required data for less than half of their prior awards. Not all agencies communicate reporting requirements to applicants or ensure that applicants submitted required reports. Better conveying requirements to small businesses and ensuring compliance with these requirements could improve the completeness of the commercialization database. Even if the share of companies submitting information increased, SBA officials said that they would not view the commercialization data as sufficiently reliable without validation and verification. They identified options to increase data reliability, such as incorporating information from other sources (like the Internal Revenue Service’s revenue data) or obtaining additional resources to validate the data. Statutory changes would be needed to change the commercialization data SBA collects. Reliable data would potentially enable SBA to provide decision makers with clearer insights into the different outcomes for open and conventional topic awards and the overall economic return on federal R&D. Why GAO Did This Study To help drive economic growth, 11 participating agencies provide SBIR and STTR funding to support small businesses that might otherwise face difficulties securing capital for R&D. SBA oversees the programs, including issuing guidance and reporting to Congress. In connection with requirements for DOD to release open topics, the SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 included a provision for GAO to review open topics in the programs. This fourth report examines FY 2024 awards, how open and conventional topic awards differ in terms of small businesses’ commercialization outcomes, and other objectives. GAO analyzed data from the 11 participating agencies and SBA for over 6,000 awards issued in FY 2024. GAO examined SBA’s commercialization database for awards issued in FY 2019 through FY 2024. GAO reviewed statutory requirements and interviewed officials from SBA and participating agencies, as well as representatives from 20 randomly selected small businesses that received SBIR or STTR awards.

What GAO Found Four agencies in GAO’s review—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Department of Education, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—established Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) teams and collectively reported that those teams had access to more than 23 systems. These systems were used to manage contracts, grants, human resources, and finances and contained sensitive information, including personally identifiable information (PII). However, whether DOGE team members had specific system permissions or were allowed certain actions (e.g., view PII or modify data) could not be determined based on the information provided. The other two agencies in GAO’s review—Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—did not respond to requests for information to which systems DOGE team members had access to. CFPB, Education, and SEC provided limited documentation related to the extent to which they implemented controls for ensuring adherence to their IT security rules and their DOGE team members followed the rules. For example, CFPB demonstrated that six DOGE team members received a privacy briefing and four completed security training. Such training is important for ensuring that system users are aware of their responsibilities for addressing cyber and privacy risks. However, the bureau did not provide evidence that the remaining team members completed the necessary training. Education provided IT system rules of behavior documents signed by five of the six DOGE team members. Acknowledgment of these documents is key to holding system users accountable for not following IT security rules. However, the department did not respond to GAO’s repeated requests for the document signed by the remaining team member. SEC demonstrated that a background check was underway for one team member and had been conducted for another team member in 2017. These investigations are important for ensuring that system users can be trusted with sensitive information. However, the agency did not respond to GAO’s requests to confirm that the 2017 investigation was favorably adjudicated. In addition, NOAA, SBA, and VA did not respond to requests for information on whether they implemented controls for ensuring adherence to the IT security rules and their DOGE team members followed those rules. Without the ability to examine the requested information, Congress and the public lack assurance that the six reviewed agencies implemented controls needed to ensure DOGE team members appropriately secured information. GAO has ample statutory authority to both conduct this work and obtain the information in support of Congress. Despite this clear authority, the agencies did not respond to GAO’s requests for the information needed to fully answer the questions posed by members of Congress. Agencies cited various reasons for not fully responding to GAO’s requests, but their stated reasons do not alter or diminish GAO’s statutory right of access to this information. Why GAO Did This Study The United States DOGE Service (USDS) was created by executive order to maximize government efficiency by modernizing technology. The order also called for the heads of executive branch agencies to establish DOGE teams that work with USDS. GAO was asked to review efforts to ensure that agency DOGE teams appropriately protected the systems and information they accessed at multiple agencies. The objectives of this review were to (1) describe the systems to which the DOGE teams at six agencies had been provided access and (2) evaluate the extent to which these agencies implemented controls to ensure that the DOGE team followed the agency’s IT security rules and the DOGE team followed those rules. This report focuses on the following agencies: Education, VA, CFPB, NOAA, SEC, and SBA. GAO analyzed documentation related to DOGE access to agency systems, IT security rules, security and privacy training, and background investigations. GAO provided a draft of this report to the six agencies for review and comment. Education, NOAA, SBA, SEC, and VA stated that they did not have any comments. CFPB expressed concerns with the accuracy of the report. GAO stands by the accuracy of the facts presented in the report. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Fires on vessels are among the most dangerous and challenging incidents to which firefighters can respond. Vessels may also carry hazardous cargo, like lithium-ion batteries, further complicating marine firefighting responses. According to U.S. Coast Guard data, there were 886 nearshore marine fires that occurred between 2015 and 2025. About one quarter (206) of these resulted in either death, injury, over $200,000 in damage, or a total loss of the vessel. The U.S. Coast Guard is the principal federal agency responsible for overseeing marine safety. For marine firefighting, the Coast Guard plays a coordinating role while land-based fire departments extinguish fires. Following a marine fire that resulted in two firefighter deaths in 2023, the Coast Guard established a task force to address various marine firefighting challenges. The task force has taken several steps to address them but gaps remain. Examples of Firefighting Challenges, Coast Guard Actions, and Gaps Designating consistent Coast Guard field personnel to lead coordination before marine fires occur, facilitating more hands-on training for firefighters on vessels, and establishing an information sharing mechanism would help ensure firefighters have the knowledge and skills necessary to safely and effectively extinguish vessel fires. Further, developing guidance on what warrants vessel response plan activation would help ensure resources are quickly mobilized and better ensure the safety of firefighters. The number of vessels that use alternative fuels continues to grow. However, legal limitations prevent the Coast Guard from requiring nontank vessels that use alternative fuels—such as ferries powered by lithium-ion batteries—to have vessel response plans related to hazardous substance discharges. These limitations predate the widespread use of alternative fuels. Having that authority would empower the Coast Guard to better ensure vessels and firefighters can quickly receive assistance in the event of a fire. Why GAO Did This Study The Coast Guard has issued regulations requiring certain vessels to have response plans that identify the resources that would respond to marine fires related to oil discharges. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 includes a provision for GAO to review, among other things, the Coast Guard’s efforts related to marine firefighting. This report examines (1) how frequently nearshore marine fires occur and the characteristics of those fires and (2) what challenges exist in marine firefighting and how the Coast Guard is addressing them. GAO analyzed Coast Guard data for 2015 through 2025; reviewed Coast Guard guidance and investigative reports; and interviewed Coast Guard officials, fire chiefs based in seven Coast Guard sectors, and representatives from maritime and firefighting stakeholder associations.

What GAO Found GAO convened a panel discussion to gather industry perspectives on potential duplication or conflict among federal cybersecurity regulations affecting selected critical infrastructure sectors. The industry participants identified multiple federal cybersecurity regulations within their sectors as duplicative or conflicting with other regulations (see figure below). In such cases, participants said it could be difficult to fully satisfy all reporting requirements while remediating cyber threats. Number of Duplicative or Conflicting Federal Cybersecurity Regulations Identified by Selected Industry Sector Representatives For example, participants in all three sectors noted that the Department of Homeland Security’s proposed rule for cyber incident reporting or the Securities and Exchange Commission’s cybersecurity disclosure rules were duplicative and in conflict with their own sector’s regulations. Participants also identified duplication or conflict in sector-specific cybersecurity reporting requirements. While participants in all three sectors noted that progress in harmonizing federal cybersecurity regulations has been made over the past year—such as federal agencies providing increased regulatory guidance for financial institutions—half the participants agreed that this progress was limited. Participants also identified several opportunities for harmonizing federal cybersecurity regulations, including those related to cybersecurity incident reporting. Participants stated that defining reporting timeframes and thresholds in consistent ways could streamline requirements and reduce duplication. Participants also stated that having a lead agency to coordinate and receive incident reports would increase collaboration between government agencies and industry. Why GAO Did This Study Nearly all the nation’s critical infrastructure is supported by computer-based information systems. Because this infrastructure is mostly owned by the private sector, having the public and private sectors work together to protect the information systems is vital. Cognizant federal agencies have issued numerous regulations to help protect health data and ensure smooth operation of financial systems, among other things. However, according to the Office of the National Cyber Director, when critical infrastructure sectors are subject to multiple cybersecurity regulations, it can lead to conflicting guidance, inconsistencies, increased compliance costs, and redundancies for regulated entities. GAO was asked to gather perspectives of industry participants on the progress that federal agencies are making to harmonize cybersecurity regulations. This report summarizes industry views from selected sectors on duplication or conflicts among federal cybersecurity regulations that affect critical infrastructure sectors. GAO convened a panel discussion on July 16, 2026. The panel included six representatives from different industry organizations within three critical infrastructure sectors that GAO’s prior work has identified as subject to a significant number of cybersecurity regulations: energy, financial services, and healthcare and public health. The representatives included chief and senior executives overseeing cybersecurity, medical, and industry operations, as well as regulatory affairs and legal specialists. For more information, contact David B. Hinchman at HinchmanD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The average number of noncitizens incarcerated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) each year decreased 44 percent from fiscal year 2017 (approximately 36,300) through fiscal year 2024 (approximately 20,300). This includes noncitizens with lawful immigration status. During this time, noncitizens, as a proportion of all BOP-incarcerated individuals, also decreased. Immigration-related offenses accounted for more than half of the offenses for which BOP-incarcerated noncitizens were convicted; another 30 percent were drug-related. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed approximately 84,800 (76 percent) of the 111,200 noncitizens who completed, at least one term of BOP incarceration from fiscal years 2017 through 2024, as of December 2025. Individuals Incarcerated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons by U.S. Citizenship Status, Fiscal Years 2017 – 2024 There are no reliable comprehensive data on all noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities. GAO analyzed data from the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). SCAAP is a Department of Justice (DOJ) program that reimburses jurisdictions for a portion of the eligible costs attributable to incarcerating noncitizens who meet program requirements. Though SCAAP data represent only a portion of all noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities, it provides valuable insights. In state fiscal year 2022, there were a total of approximately 73,500 SCAAP-eligible incarcerations, a decrease of 43 percent from state fiscal year 2016 when there were approximately 128,000 such incarcerations. SCAAP-eligible noncitizens incarcerated by the five state prison systems with the greatest number of SCAAP-eligible incarcerations were convicted of various offenses, including sex crimes, homicide, and drug offenses. DOJ spent more than $9 billion incarcerating noncitizens from fiscal years 2016 through 2023 (the most recent cost information available at the time of our audit work). This includes approximately $8 billion for BOP’s incarceration of noncitizens from fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2023 and approximately $1.44 billion for SCAAP reimbursements to states and localities for incarcerations in state fiscal years 2016 through 2022. This does not reflect costs paid by state and localities that were not reimbursed by the federal government. Why GAO Did This Study Depending on the nature of the offense, noncitizens who are arrested and convicted of crimes may be incarcerated by federal, state, or local authorities. These entities each bear the costs of incarcerating them. Following their incarceration, noncitizens may be subject to removal from the U.S. Since 2005, GAO has periodically reported available information on noncitizens incarcerated in the U.S. GAO was asked to update its body of work on this topic (including, GAO-18-433). This report addresses, among other things, the number and citizenship of noncitizens incarcerated in the U.S., and the cost of incarcerating them. Noncitizens, in the context of this report, refers to all individuals who are not U.S. citizens, regardless of their immigration status. GAO analyzed data separately for noncitizens incarcerated by BOP and for SCAAP-eligible noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities. GAO analyzed the most recent data available for each group at the time of our audit work. Generally, analyses of BOP-incarcerated noncitizens span fiscal years 2017 through 2024; analyses of SCAAP-eligible noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities span state fiscal years 2016 through 2022. To calculate the costs of incarcerating noncitizens, GAO analyzed BOP data and information on the annual per person cost of incarcerating an individual in various types of BOP facilities. GAO also analyzed data from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and information collected directly from selected states and localities. For more information, contact Gretta L. Goodwin at GoodwinG@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) in Mexico seek to acquire semi-automatic firearms—AR-15s, AK-47s, and .50-caliber rifles—which they often convert to fully automatic firearms, according to agency officials. Armed with these weapons, TCOs pose a serious threat to Mexican law enforcement and military. TCOs acquire firearms from the U.S. primarily through straw purchasers—third parties who buy them on the TCOs’ behalf—and middlemen who smuggle the firearms through ports of entry on the border. U.S. agencies collect data on trafficked firearms, but some data have limitations that limit their utility. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) reported that 68 percent (82,785) of firearms recovered in Mexico and traced from January 2020 to December 2024 had a U.S. source. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data show that CBP seized 4,944 firearms bound for Mexico at land ports of entry on the border from January 2020 through December 2025. However, CBP’s data system does not consistently capture information on the semi-automatic rifles sought by TCOs, and some officers may have difficulty identifying specific types. Improved data on these types of rifles would strengthen federal agencies’ ability to generate intelligence to combat firearms trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico. U.S. agencies conduct various efforts to combat firearms trafficking but do not assess effectiveness. For example, in the U.S., CBP conducts targeted outbound inspections along the U.S.–Mexican border and DHS’s Homeland Security Investigations and ATF seek to disrupt firearms trafficking along the border. In Mexico, ATF helps Mexican authorities conduct investigations and trace firearms. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides security assistance to Mexican authorities to combat firearms trafficking. In fiscal years 2020–2025, ATF and INL provided about $126 million for these efforts. But DHS has not established goals, desired outcomes, or performance measures that include baselines and targets for its efforts. ATF also lacks performance measures, after discontinuing measures it established in fiscal year 2023, and INL lacks baselines, targets, and results for some of its measures. As a result, the agencies do not know the extent to which their efforts are meeting objectives and cannot determine whether they are directing resources to the most effective programs. This could lead to waste and, potentially, missed opportunities to more effectively counter firearms trafficking. Vehicle Inspected, Hidden Compartment, and Firearms Seized at U.S.–Mexican Border Why GAO Did This Study Estimates indicate that hundreds of thousands of firearms are trafficked from the U.S. into Mexico each year, presenting a serious threat to Mexican and U.S. security. TCOs in Mexico use increasingly deadly firearms as well as technology and drones. In February 2025, State designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations and as specially designated global terrorists. GAO was asked to review U.S. efforts to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. This report examines (1) the types of firearms TCOs in Mexico seek in the U.S. and the methods they use to illegally acquire and transport them into Mexico; (2) data U.S. agencies have collected on Mexico-bound firearms seized in the U.S. and on U.S.-sourced firearms recovered in Mexico, as well as the agencies’ uses of these data; and (3) efforts that U.S. agencies have made to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico, as well as the extent to which they have monitored these efforts’ performance. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; El Paso, Dallas, and Houston, Texas; and Nogales, Tucson, and Phoenix, Arizona. GAO also interviewed U.S. and Mexican officials at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City. GAO analyzed CBP data on seizures of southbound firearms at the U.S.–Mexican border in 2020–2025 as well as ATF data on firearms recovered in Mexico and submitted to ATF for tracing in 2020–2024.

What GAO Found The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has faced longstanding challenges in hiring and retaining adequate staff. NRC officials and most of the stakeholders GAO interviewed stated that increased attrition and industry competition have affected NRC’s workforce more in recent years. GAO found that from July 2024 through June 2026, NRC lost, on net, about 500 staff in various positions, most of which were due to voluntary retirements. This loss of staff has increased concerns about the stability of NRC’s workforce. Total Number of NRC Employees from July 2024 Through June 2026 In July 2024, the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (ADVANCE Act), was enacted, granting NRC three enhanced authorities to support its workforce: (1) direct hire, (2) compensation flexibility, and (3) bonuses for hiring and performance. Between July 2024 and July 2026, NRC used the authority to award a total of $335,000 in performance bonuses to 18 staff but had not used the other two authorities. NRC officials cited various reasons for not using all of the authorities, including a recently completed agency reorganization and the need to conduct a comprehensive workforce evaluation and inventory to identify current workforce, project critical staffing needs, and forecast agency performance using its new strategic workforce planning tool. According to officials, the results can clarify the agency’s current and future workforce needs to effectively carry out licensing and oversight activities. However, NRC’s time frame for finalizing the tool has been delayed multiple times and is now planned for the first quarter of fiscal year 2027. Until it is finalized, NRC may not be able to effectively conduct strategic workforce management and planning to best use the ADVANCE Act authorities to enhance its workforce going forward. NRC officials and most of the stakeholders GAO interviewed agreed that the ADVANCE Act authorities offer NRC additional flexibilities to better meet agency needs in the future. However, they were unsure if these authorities are enough to fully address NRC’s significant workforce challenges and gaps. As of July 2026, NRC had developed a plan to use the authorities but had not established metrics to measure or assess the effectiveness of the ADVANCE Act authorities in supporting hiring and retention. Doing so could provide NRC with data to evaluate whether its workforce authorities adequately address its identified workforce needs. Why GAO Did This Study NRC is responsible for regulating civilian use of nuclear materials in the U.S., carrying out licensing activities, and conducting inspections and oversight. Policymakers’ interest in strengthening U.S. nuclear energy capacity has increased in recent years. In addition, NRC anticipates an increase in applications for new nuclear reactor licenses. In section 502 of the ADVANCE Act of 2024, Congress granted NRC additional authorities to enhance its recruitment and retention of specialized staff. The act also included a provision for GAO to evaluate the extent to which NRC has used the workforce authorities. This report examines the extent to which NRC has used the ADVANCE Act authorities and describes challenges NRC officials and stakeholders identified related to NRC’s workforce. GAO reviewed the ADVANCE Act, other relevant laws, policy, and agency documents; analyzed agency workforce data; and interviewed NRC officials and representatives from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 nuclear industry and policy organizations.

What GAO Found Visitor visa adjudications, which account for most nonimmigrant visas (NIV), have surpassed pre-COVID numbers. The Department of State adjudicated 9.2 million visitor visas pre-COVID in fiscal year (FY) 2019. That number dropped to 1.5 million in FY 2021. By FY 2025, the number of adjudications surpassed pre-pandemic levels, reaching 11.7 million. The average wait time to obtain an interview for a visitor visa was almost 8 times higher than before the pandemic, increasing from 26 days in FY 2019 to 201 days in FY 2025. In addition, the number of consular officers working on NIVs almost recovered from a COVID-era low of 1,104 in FY 2021 to pre-pandemic levels in FY 2024, reaching 1,342, but dropped to 904 in FY 2025 due to hiring freezes and attrition. State officials in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico—the countries GAO selected for more in-depth analysis—identified low staffing levels relative to demand for visitor visas as the main factor, among others, contributing to wait times to obtain an interview. According to data provided by State, wait times to obtain an interview in Mexico and India are longer than in China and Brazil, in part because they have fewer staff working on NIVs relative to the number of applications they receive (see table). Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) Applications, CA Officers working on NIVs, NIV Applications per CA Officer, and Weighted Average Interview Wait Times to Obtain an Interview by Selected Countries, Fiscal Year 2025 Country NIV applications CA officers working on NIVs NIV applications per CA officer Weighted average wait times, in days Brazil 1,141,235 87 13,118 32 China 1,206,011 119 10,135 34 India 1,455,255 68 21,401 346 Mexico 2,658,627 124 21,441 283 Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. | GAO-26-107902 Since FY 2019, State has conducted and implemented one Global Repositioning Exercise (GREX), which provides information used to bring consular staffing levels into alignment with workloads, according to State officials. Although the GREX is not required by policy, State officials said that the exercise is designed to be conducted annually. However, officials said they did not conduct the exercise in FY 2021 and FY 2022 because of issues related to COVID and in FY 2024 and FY 2025 because of changing policy priorities. Having a mechanism to require the exercise would help ensure State consistently and fully assesses workloads and NIV demand at posts and adequately addresses its staffing needs, particularly in years when significant changes are affecting workload. Why GAO Did This Study Millions of travelers to the U.S. apply for NIVs each year, which include visitor visas for tourism and business purposes, as well as visas for foreign students, diplomats, and temporary workers. According to the U.S. Travel Association, international travel and tourism contributed $176 billion to the U.S. economy in 2025. In adjudicating visas, State must balance speed and efficiency with national security concerns. One key issue that can affect efficiency is long wait times for an interview, which is required in most cases to obtain a visa. A House Committee on Appropriations report and the explanatory statement accompanying legislation that became the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision for GAO to examine the efficiency of consular operations, including visa processing times. This report examines (1) trends in the number of applications and adjudications for NIVs, associated wait times to obtain an interview, and staffing levels from FY 2019 through FY 2025; and (2) how staffing levels affect wait times and to what extent State determines posts’ staffing needs; among other objectives. GAO analyzed State’s data for NIVs and interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C. GAO also conducted interviews and discussion groups with consular officers and management in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, the countries with the highest demand for NIVs in FY 2025.

What GAO Found To meet its mission to protect the security of our nation and provide warfighters the assets they need, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on the use of information technology (IT). According to DOD’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), the department planned to spend $10.3 billion on the 18 major IT business programs from fiscal years (FY) 2024 through 2026. The four largest programs account for 50 percent of the planned spending (see figure). The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Planned Costs for the Four Largest Information Technology (IT) Business Programs Compared to the Remaining 14 Selected Programs from Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 through FY 2026 To help determine whether operational programs are meeting their business or mission purpose, programs are required by the General Services Administration to identify and track a minimum of five performance metrics across the categories of customer satisfaction, strategic and business results, financial performance, and innovation. Of the 18 programs, 17 were operational. Of these, 15 identified the minimum required number of performance metrics in each category. However, the remaining two did not. Accordingly, the extent to which these two programs were improving customer satisfaction, increasing financial performance, and delivering innovative approaches is unknown. GAO has previously reported on DOD IT business programs not fully reporting performance metric data and made recommendations to the department to do so (see GAO-22-105330 and GAO-25-107649). Regarding achieving performance goals, of the 17 programs that identified metrics, six programs met all performance targets, 10 programs met more than one target but not all, and one program met no targets. The IT programs demonstrated mixed progress in implementing key practices for fraud risk awareness, software development, and key cybersecurity initiatives. Developing fraud risk awareness—particularly in staff who manage key IT programs—is an important step toward maturing DOD in fraud risk management. Of the 18 programs, seven programs reported via GAO’s questionnaire that program staff were either unaware of or did not receive training to recognize and report signs of fraud or tampering in IT systems (see table). In response, DOD officials indicated that the department does not currently require training to recognize and report signs of fraud in IT systems, rather that personnel receive mandatory, general fraud awareness training. While these broad efforts are important, programs’ reported lack of awareness of training to manage or report fraud can increase the risk of software development- and cybersecurity-related fraud within IT programs, making them vulnerable to exploitation. Department of Defense (DOD) Major Information Technology (IT) Business Programs Reporting Fraud Risk Awareness Fraud risk awareness practice Number of programs that reported practice Receiving training or knowing about available training over the past two years to recognize and report signs of fraud in IT systems 11 of 18 Assessing fraud risks facing the program 10 of 18 Source: GAO analysis of DOD program questionnaire responses as of April 2026. | GAO-26-108596 Further, 10 of the 18 DOD IT business programs reported actively developing software using recommended Agile and iterative software development approaches and practices. However, in areas related to tracking customer satisfaction and progress of software development, eight of the 10 programs did not report or demonstrate using required metrics and management tools. GAO previously recommended that DOD address this issue. Additionally, six of the 18 programs had not developed plans to implement zero trust in their cybersecurity frameworks by DOD’s 2027 deadline (see table). In addition, while five programs reported using artificial intelligence (AI) tools to secure their systems, three programs did not have an approved cybersecurity strategy. GAO has previously recommended that all programs develop one (see GAO-22-105330). Department of Defense (DOD) Major Information Technology (IT) Business Programs That Reported Having an Approved Cybersecurity Strategy or Implementing Zero Trust Architecture Development approach or practice Number of programs that reported using each approach or practice Having a DOD approved cybersecurity strategy 15 of 18 Implementing zero trust architecture as part of the security framework 12 of 18 Source: GAO analysis of DOD program questionnaire responses as of April 2026. | GAO-26-108596 DOD continues to make efforts to improve its management of IT investments as a result of legislative and policy changes. These efforts include revising its business systems investment management guidance, modernizing its business enterprise architecture, adopting a zero trust cybersecurity strategy, developing AI acquisition guidance, updating its agency strategic plan, and implementing cost efficiency initiatives. GAO will continue to monitor DOD’s efforts to improve how the department manages its IT investments. Why GAO Did This Study IT is critical to the success of DOD’s major business functions. These functions include such areas as health care, human capital, financial management, logistics, and contracting. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019, as amended, includes a provision for GAO to conduct assessments of selected DOD IT programs annually through March 2029. GAO’s objectives for this seventh review were to (1) examine what progress selected DOD IT business programs have made on cost, schedule, and performance; (2) assess the extent to which DOD has implemented key fraud risk management, software development, and cybersecurity practices for selected programs; and (3) describe actions DOD has taken to implement legislative and policy changes that could affect its IT acquisitions. To address the first objective, GAO selected the 18 IT business programs listed as DOD’s major IT investments in its FY 2026 submission to the Federal IT Dashboard. GAO analyzed data from DOD’s OCIO to examine DOD’s planned expenditures for these programs from FY 2024 through FY 2026. GAO also administered a questionnaire to the 18 program offices to obtain and analyze information about cost and schedule changes that the programs reported experiencing since January 2024. Further, GAO compared programs’ performance metrics data provided by DOD’s OCIO to guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. To address the second objective, the questionnaire also sought information about the selected programs’ practices in fraud risk management, software development, and cybersecurity. GAO compared the responses and documentation against relevantguidance and leading practices to identify gaps and risks. For programs that did not demonstrate having documentation or strategies, GAO followed up with DOD officials for clarification. For the third objective, GAO reviewed and summarized (1) policy, plans, and guidance associated with the department’s efforts to implement changes to its defense business systems investment management guidance and business enterprise architecture and (2) efforts to adopt zero trust cybersecurity principles, develop AI acquisition guidance, update its strategic plan, and implement cost efficiency initiatives. GAO also met with DOD OCIO officials to discuss their efforts in these areas.

What the OIG Found Proper contract administration is critical to ensure GAO complies with contract terms and conditions. In FY 2019, GAO entered into a blanket purchase agreement for commercial facility maintenance (the BPA), which it awarded under the General Services Administration (GSA) Schedule program. After subsequent modification, the BPA’s maximum value was about $119 million. Although the contractor submitted adjusted labor rates from a collective bargaining agreement, GAO did not modify the BPA and associated time-and-materials orders to reflect these higher rates before payment. As a result, the agency paid about $94,000 more than the previously negotiated rates during the second option year. GAO was unable to explain why the BPA and the associated orders were not modified prior to payment. The OIG also observed that GAO’s standard operating procedures for procurements did not provide clear guidance on evaluating a contractor’s charges for indirect costs or profit on work performed by a subcontractor when the contractor adds no or only negligible value (excessive pass-through charges). The OIG also found that GAO could clarify its policies and procedures regarding the applicability of federal regulations for contracting by negotiation to GSA schedule procurements. The lack of clarity could result in procurement staff taking unnecessary steps. The agency indicated it had updated its procedures regarding subcontracting and was in the process of updating its policies for GSA schedule procurements. By enhancing its oversight of contract modifications and invoice approvals, GAO could ensure that payments are consistent with negotiated rates. Further, GAO’s updated policies and procedures regarding excessive pass-through charges and future updates to the applicable procurement processes when using the GSA schedule could strengthen GAO’s acquisition program and improve efficiencies for procurement staff. Why the OIG Did This Audit Careful contract administration, especially concerning invoice review and approval, is critical to ensure GAO pays the correct labor rates for time-and-materials orders. The OIG conducted this audit to assess time-and-materials orders issued under the BPA.

What GAO Found The Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) will surpass $200 billion and take over 50 more years to execute, based on GAO’s analysis of Navy plans. Developing the plans and cost estimates to rebuild the Navy’s four public shipyards has taken the Navy years longer—and will cost much more—than originally anticipated due to multiple challenges and changes involved in the program. For example, environmental issues led to additional projects and more extensive work affecting project plans and costs at the shipyards, including Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (see figure). Seismic Risks Identified at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard The Navy established an oversight framework to guide SIOP plans and decisions over the duration of the program. The framework includes tools and requirements typically used for major defense acquisition programs—like for missiles, aircraft, or ships. However, the Navy has not outlined steps in the framework to reevaluate program objectives and resources as the program progresses over the next several decades. Without building such reviews into key future decision points, the Navy is limiting its ability to ensure that capabilities in SIOP’s plans today continue to be aligned or adjusted to support future fleet warfighting needs. Further, while the Navy provides Congress with reports and briefings on various aspects of SIOP, the Navy does not provide Congress with consolidated, standardized information on full program costs and risks because there is no requirement to do so. In contrast, major defense acquisitions are required to provide annual program status reports with detailed metrics, including total costs to date, cost and schedule baselines, and risks, to track and monitor progress. Without a full picture of how much has been spent, what remains to be funded, and what risks may affect SIOP progress, Congress could make consequential decisions for SIOP based on incomplete information, thus risking billions in taxpayer dollars and a lack of program oversight for the decades to come. Finally, the Navy created several organizations to manage SIOP projects and challenges. For example, the Navy created organizations for project oversight and program integration teams to coordinate issues with shipyards. However, the Navy has not fully documented the organizations’ roles and responsibilities. Doing so would formalize their new SIOP roles and help to ensure not only their ability to effectively implement SIOP’s essential projects but also the continuity of the critical shipyard operations to maintain and modernize the U.S. naval fleet now and throughout SIOP’s extended timeline. Why GAO Did This Study The Navy’s four public shipyards are essential to maintaining and modernizing the U.S. fleet of nuclear-powered vessels and its critical warfighting capabilities. The Navy initiated SIOP in 2018 to address poor shipyard conditions and capability gaps affecting fleet readiness. GAO has reported on the shipyards’ persistently poor condition and found that preliminary SIOP cost estimates were understated by billions of dollars. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision for GAO to report on SIOP oversight and management. This report examines (1) Navy planning and implementation of SIOP, including costs, timing, and challenges; (2) Navy oversight of SIOP; and (3) Navy establishment of project management organizations to oversee SIOP construction projects. GAO analyzed SIOP program documents and project cost and schedule data; visited the shipyards to observe SIOP projects and ship maintenance; and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found GAO found that veterans face multiple challenges in accessing health care in the Freely Associated States (FAS), according to VA assessments and interviews with VA and FAS officials. These challenges include limited availability of specialty services, such as mental health and cardiology, and the inability to utilize telehealth services with VA health providers. FAS veterans must travel to VA health facilities in U.S. states or territories to utilize their health benefits, but do not receive beneficiary travel reimbursement for travel to the U.S. Map of Health Care Facilities Providing Veteran Care in Pacific Region VA completed a variety of assessments from March 2024 to March 2025 on the implementation of veteran health benefits authorized under the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024. These assessments included an environmental scan of the health care landscape in the FAS, and an analysis of policy implications of changes to FAS veteran benefits. VA described potential costs and regulatory requirements for implementation options, ranging from maintaining the current status quo to full implementation of authorized health care for FAS veterans. For example, changes to reimbursement and beneficiary travel benefits would necessitate additional staffing to process claims. In an April 2025 memo provided to Congress, VA stated that it would not exercise its new authorities, asserting this decision was “to ensure equity with all U.S. veterans.” VA confirmed in June 2026 it had concluded its engagement with the FAS. However, in July 2026, VA officials told GAO that they intended to resume engagement with the FAS and, in August 2026, confirmed they were pursuing partial implementation of its authorities, including telehealth services, delivery of pharmaceutical products and medical surgical products, reimbursements for care in the FAS, and beneficiary travel benefits to service-connected veterans in the FAS. They did not provide a timeline for doing so. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. maintains compacts of free association with three foreign countries in the Pacific—the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau—collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). Under these compacts, citizens of the FAS can enlist in the U.S. military. Some are eligible for certain VA benefits. The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 gave VA discretionary authority to expand health care services for eligible veterans in the FAS by providing hospital care, medical services, and beneficiary travel payments. GAO was asked to examine implementation of veteran health benefits as part of our mandate under the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024. This report (1) identifies challenges veterans face in obtaining health benefits in the FAS and (2) describes analysis completed by VA to assess implementation of veteran health service benefits authorized under the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024. For more information, contact Nagla'a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO estimated that annual federal tax fraud loss is between $116 billion and $304 billion based on data and information from 2018 through 2024. GAO’s estimate is informed by data on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cases of fraud and potential fraud, potential fraud in the tax gap, and tax evasion from economic activities purposefully hidden from the government (i.e., shadow economy). The estimated range reflects approximately 2 percent to 6 percent of estimated tax owed to the federal government (tax liability) if applied to tax year 2022, the most recent year for which an estimate of the tax liability is available. GAO Estimated Range of Tax Fraud Loss as a Percentage of Estimated Total Tax Owed to the Federal Government, Tax Year 2022 The estimated range represents GAO’s best estimate of the extent of tax fraud based on the available evidence and analytical methods. The methodology accounts for the inherent uncertainties associated with fraud estimation and data limitations. The estimate could help Congress and agency officials understand the potential scale and scope of tax fraud loss and decide how to allocate resources for fraud risk management. For example, the estimate could inform decisions about the costs and benefits of implementing new controls to prevent, detect, and respond to tax fraud. While it is not possible to eliminate fraud completely, different divisions within IRS undertake a broad range of activities that help manage tax fraud risk and safeguard taxpayer dollars. Some of these activities are directly aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to tax fraud. Other activities are aimed at improving overall taxpayer compliance but nonetheless help the agency reduce tax fraud risk. For example, IRS’s Return Review Program screens certain individual tax returns for characteristics indicative of fraud. Through this program, according to IRS, it prevented $88 billion in invalid, and potentially fraudulent, tax refund payments from 2018 through 2024. Additionally, tax return audits play a key role in helping IRS detect fraud. IRS trains auditors to recognize indicators of fraud when reviewing tax returns for overall compliance. Once IRS detects potential fraud in a tax return, it may respond in various ways, including through assessing civil penalties, criminal investigation, and referral for prosecution. Example of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Fraud Detection and Fraud Response IRS has routinely assessed fraud risks consistent with leading practices for fraud risk management. However, the agency has not developed an antifraud strategy or designated an antifraud entity to mitigate fraud risks in a strategic and coordinated manner. An antifraud strategy could help IRS better manage fraud risks, which in turn could help reduce revenue lost to tax fraud. Further, designating an antifraud entity to undertake key fraud risk management activities—such as coordinating antifraud initiatives across the agency—would help IRS better mitigate the billions of dollars lost to fraud each year. Why GAO Did This Study Each year, the federal government collects trillions of dollars in revenue, the single largest source of which comes from taxes that IRS collects. Most taxpayers pay their taxes voluntarily and on time. However, some taxpayers do not comply with tax law, including by committing fraud—willful misrepresentation to obtain something of value. Tax fraud diverts revenue that could be used for critical government operations and services and exacerbates budget deficits. This report (1) describes the estimated amount of federal tax revenue lost to fraud annually and (2) examines the ways in which IRS safeguards federal tax revenue and manages fraud risks. GAO estimated the amount of federal tax revenue lost to fraud annually using a well-established probabilistic method for estimating ranges of outcomes under different assumptions and scenarios where there is a high degree of uncertainty, such as with fraud estimation. The simulation incorporated IRS data from 2018 through 2024, as well as information on tax fraud from other sources, such as academic literature. GAO also analyzed IRS documentation and interviewed IRS officials.

What GAO Found As of July 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has pursued an approach to expand detention capacity that has resulted in millions of dollars of waste. Since January 2025, ICE invested billions of dollars in six new initiatives without conducting necessary analysis and planning. For example, ICE purchased 11 warehouses to renovate for detention purposes at a reported cost of about $1.07 billion. In June 2026, ICE officials told GAO they were working to sell seven of the warehouses. ICE reported spending over $20 million on nonrecoverable costs, such as zoning assessments and security, on the warehouses it intends to sell. Waste, which occurs when agencies spend government resources carelessly or extravagantly, is also evident in other initiatives. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) New Detention Expansion Initiatives, January 2025–July 2026 ICE pursued these detention expansion initiatives without developing a comprehensive strategic plan to guide its efforts. For example, ICE has not developed consistent goals or objectives for the size and characteristics of its detention bed space. ICE also has not assessed the risks and benefits of using facilities with high operating costs compared to other less costly options in ICE's traditional detention portfolio. Developing a comprehensive strategic plan—which includes goals, activities, and resource needs—is a critical element of successful program management. Such a plan could help ICE better manage its multibillion-dollar detention expansion efforts and reduce waste associated with scaling back inefficient detention initiatives. These planning efforts would also better position ICE to select the approaches most likely to achieve its goals while making more efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars. Why GAO Did This Study A January 2025 Executive Order directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain individuals apprehended for violations of immigration law to the extent permitted by law and to allocate all available resources for ICE detention purposes. GAO was asked to review ICE’s expansion of immigration detention and operations. This report examines ICE’s efforts to expand detention capacity since January 2025. GAO reviewed agency documentation on detention expansion efforts and interviewed headquarters and field officials at eight detention facilities in Texas and Florida. GAO selected these locations because, among other factors, they were the sites of new ICE detention expansion initiatives. GAO reviewed data on operating costs of expansion initiatives and compared ICE detention expansion efforts to program management and DHS guidance.

What GAO Found As of March 2025, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) awarded 1,245 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) subgrants to communities over its first four grant cycles in fiscal years 2020 through 2023. These subgrants were for mitigation activities to address hazards, such as floods. FEMA allocated about $2.5 billion for these subgrants, half the $4.8 billion available. FEMA reimbursed $62 million, and 37 subgrants had completed work and initiated the closeout process. From April 2025 to March 2026, FEMA did not award subgrants nor obligate funds. GAO found the median time for FEMA to finalize its review of subapplications and award BRIC subgrants was 7 to 9 months. As of March 2025, FEMA had not made award decisions for 700 subapplications because it had not completed the second of its two review stages. These subapplications were associated with about $2.2 billion of the $4.8 billion. Communities said these review timeframes could extend project timelines and increase costs. Identifying efficiencies to shorten FEMA’s review may enable communities to begin hazard mitigation activities sooner and minimize additional costs. Number of BRIC Subapplications Pending FEMA’s Award Decision and BRIC Funds Associated with These Subapplications, Across Four Grant Cycles and as of March 2025 FEMA announced it was ending BRIC in April 2025, but it did not communicate key information internally and externally until March 2026 when it announced it was restarting BRIC. For example, FEMA did not clarify which subgrants would be terminated. Officials and stakeholders said the lack of actionable information from FEMA headquarters created challenges and delayed mitigation efforts. State officials told GAO that some subrecipients stopped work due to funding uncertainty, which may increase project costs. Moving forward, identifying and applying lessons learned from this period will help ensure FEMA communicates relevant, timely program information internally and externally. FEMA established performance goals, but it did not consistently establish methods and targets to measure results. For example, one of FEMA’s goals in fiscal year 2023 included a goal to spread grants across the U.S. but FEMA did not set a target to determine if it had achieved its goal. FEMA officials also told GAO it did not use performance information to inform its announcement ending BRIC. By establishing results-oriented performance goals and generating annual performance information, FEMA could use this information to determine BRIC’s effectiveness and inform agency decision-making. Why GAO Did This Study Disasters caused by natural hazards have become costlier and more frequent in recent years. Independent research has found that investing in disaster resilience can reduce costs of future disasters. FEMA launched its BRIC grant program in 2020 to fund activities that enhance resilience and lower disaster costs. In April 2025, FEMA announced it was ending BRIC. In March 2026, FEMA announced it was restarting BRIC. GAO was asked to review FEMA’s implementation of BRIC, and explanatory statement language includes a provision for GAO to conduct oversight of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which made appropriations for BRIC. This report examines (1) communities that applied for and received grants and activities funded, (2) challenges that communities identified and the extent to which FEMA addressed them, (3) the extent to which FEMA communicated BRIC’s status and the impact of announcing its end, and (4) the extent to which FEMA measured the program’s performance and used this information to inform agency decisions. GAO reviewed FEMA documentation, analyzed BRIC data from four grant cycles as of March 2025, interviewed a nongeneralizable selection of 6 states and 6 communities, and interviewed FEMA officials.

What GAO Found The federal judiciary’s administrative space, such as the district clerks’ and probation offices that support the judiciary’s mission, made up 40 percent of the judiciary’s total space in fiscal years 2021 through 2025. In fiscal year 2025, the judiciary’s administrative space totaled 12.2 million usable square feet across 716 of the 772 facilities the judiciary occupied nationwide, a decrease of 1 percent from fiscal year 2021. GAO found that administrative space was the sole type of space in over a third of judiciary occupied facilities in fiscal year 2025. Most of these facilities (234 of 272) were commercially owned. Ninety-six percent of the 234 commercially owned facilities were occupied by federal public defender organizations and probation offices. The proportion of the judiciary’s annual rent payments spent on administrative space, in both nominal and inflation adjusted dollars, remained steady—between 39 and 40 percent from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025. The Federal Judiciary’s Fiscal Year 2025 Administrative Space Distribution, in Usable Square Feet Note: The remaining court units include the courts of appeals clerks’ offices (including bankruptcy appellate panels); courts of appeals central legal staff; circuit executives’, bankruptcy administrators’, and pretrial services offices; and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-108603. While the judiciary has data on the amount of administrative space it occupies and the associated rent costs, it does not collect or review occupancy data. Without occupancy data, the judiciary is unable to measure the extent to which its administrative space is utilized, as utilization is the ratio of the average daily occupancy of a space compared to the usable square feet of the space. Judiciary policies and guidance identify the importance of maximizing the use of its space and taking a data-based approach when doing so. For example, part of the judiciary’s Asset Management Planning process includes a physical assessment of how well court units’ space functions and meets the judiciary’s space standards. But, according to judiciary officials, measuring utilization is not part of the judiciary’s practices because it has not identified a business need to do so. Measuring the utilization of its administrative space and identifying utilization benchmarks would enhance the judiciary’s decision-making, bolster its efforts to meet its stated goals to efficiently manage and maximize the use of its space, and help ensure it is not wasting resources by leasing more space than it needs. Why GAO Did This Study Chronic underutilization of federal buildings is one of the main reasons that federal real property management has been on GAO’s High Risk List for more than 20 years. In fiscal year 2025, the judiciary paid over $1 billion in rent, making rent one of its largest expenses. GAO was asked to examine the judiciary’s utilization of its administrative space. This report (1) describes the characteristics of the judiciary’s administrative space and how it has changed from fiscal years 2021 through 2025 and (2) assesses the extent to which the judiciary is measuring the utilization of its administrative space. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of nine judiciary facilities and interviewed officials about the utilization of their administrative space. GAO observed the use of administrative space at four of these facilities. GAO surveyed the 13 judiciary circuit executives who represent all court units nationwide about using occupancy data to measure utilization. GAO also reviewed and analyzed judiciary data and documents and interviewed officials from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) and General Services Administration.

What GAO Found The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided federal funding to agencies, including the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Energy (DOE), for a wide range of efforts. These efforts included projects to reduce wildfire risk, improve rural power production, and develop clean energy technologies. Of the $37 billion provided to USDA that was not later rescinded by Public Law 119-21, commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, USDA obligated $32.2 billion for fiscal years 2022 through 2025. Of the $78 billion provided to DOE that was not later rescinded, DOE obligated $51 billion for fiscal years 2022 through 2025. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) Funding for USDA and DOE as of September 30, 2025 Note: This figure does not include budget authority for which the entire period of availability occurs after September 30, 2025, or obligations, disbursements, or rescissions of that budget authority. USDA. In response to the President’s directive in 2025 to review IIJA and IRA funding for alignment with executive orders, USDA reported that it reviewed awards for the use of racial, ethnic, and gender preferences and for promoting climate change or environmental justice initiatives. Senior leadership ultimately made final decisions on whether to approve to continue, modify, or cancel awards, according to USDA officials and documentation. According to agency officials, USDA completed its review of IIJA- and IRA-funded awards by June 30, 2025. The agency terminated 34 contracts, totaling $67 million, according to its data. However, GAO concluded that USDA data were not sufficiently reliable to determine the status of all awards reviewed. Specifically, USDA officials could not specify which awards the agency approved to continue or modified as a result of its review or if the agency canceled additional awards. DOE. In May 2025, DOE created the advisory portfolio review process (PRP) committee to evaluate awards for consistency with executive orders. According to DOE officials, the relevant program office head made the final decision for each award under review, with the PRP committee serving in an advisory role. According to agency officials, DOE completed its review of IIJA and IRA awards in April 2026. According to agency data, DOE reported approving to continue 381 awards ($19.6 billion) and canceling 155 awards ($9.1 billion). Why GAO Did This Study The IIJA and IRA provided billions in federal funding to agencies to distribute through mechanisms like grants and loans. Beginning in January 2025, executive orders directed agencies to pause this funding to review it for consistency with administration priorities. Grant recipients have raised concerns that delays in distributing these funds affect their ability to implement their projects. GAO was asked to review the status of IIJA and IRA funding. This report describes USDA’s and DOE’s (1) IIJA and IRA budget authority, rescissions, obligations, and disbursements for fiscal years 2022 to 2025; (2) processes for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding in response to executive orders; and (3) IIJA and IRA funding review status. GAO analyzed the IIJA and IRA and financial data from USDA’s and DOE’s accounting systems and the agencies’ policies and guidance for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding. GAO also analyzed and summarized agency review data. GAO also interviewed selected agency officials. GAO found USDA’s and DOE’s data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting aspects of the agencies’ funding review status, with some limitations, as discussed in the report. For more information, contact Anne Sit-Williams at sitwilliamsa@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In 2024, about 82 percent of women of reproductive age reported using some form of contraception in the past 12 months, according to research from KFF. Most private health plans are generally required to cover the full range of contraceptives for women. The Department of Labor (DOL), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services—and states each have responsibilities for overseeing private health plans, including plans' coverage of contraception. See table for descriptions of their general oversight responsibilities and activities. DOL, CMS, and States’ General Responsibilities for Overseeing Private Health Plans   Oversight authority Oversight activities DOL Private employer-sponsored group health plans Responding to enrollee complaints Conducting investigations in response to systemic concerns identified from various sources, such as complaints CMS Non-federal governmental plans Qualified health plans offered through the federally-facilitated exchanges Group and individual plans in certain states that do not have authority to enforce federal requirements or are not otherwise enforcing requirements Conducting annual plan reviews and certification Conducting individual complaint investigations Conducting market conduct examinations of potential systemic compliance issues States Individual health plans and some group health plans sold in their state Conducting premarket health plan reviews Collecting individual complaints Carrying out market conduct examinations Source: GAO review of information from CMS, DOL, selected state officials and prior GAO work. | GAO-26-108446 Note: The Department of Treasury oversees certain aspects of PPACA compliance for church plans, which were outside the scope of our report. Of the plans for which they have oversight responsibility, DOL and CMS identified instances of noncompliance within the last 6 years. For example, DOL identified noncompliance with federal contraceptive coverage requirements in three investigations DOL conducted in the last 6 years, according to DOL officials. For example, DOL found that a pharmacy benefit manager required enrollees to try other types of contraception before covering the medically necessary, preferred method at no cost-sharing. According to DOL officials, this pharmacy benefit manager revised its practices and reprocessed the associated claims. CMS identified instances of health plan noncompliance with federal contraceptive coverage requirements in three out of five market conduct examinations conducted in the last 6 years. For example, CMS found that one health plan failed to provide coverage of contraceptive coverage services without cost-sharing. Officials say this health plan revised its practices and reprocessed the associated claims. Why GAO Did This Study Two-thirds of Americans receive their health coverage through private health plans. Private health plans must generally cover a range of contraceptives without cost-sharing including oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, and female sterilization services, among others. Concerns have been raised by stakeholders and researchers that health plan enrollees have been denied coverage for certain contraceptive products or services. GAO was asked to review oversight by federal and state agencies of group and individual health plans’ compliance with federal contraceptive coverage requirements. This report provides information on payments enrollees made for contraceptives, including cost-sharing; perspectives from stakeholder organizations and health plans about contraceptive coverage requirements; and federal and state oversight of federal contraceptive coverage requirements. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed available data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality on contraceptive prescription purchases; reviewed literature to identify information about when enrollees had cost-sharing for contraceptives; reviewed federal guidance issued by CMS and DOL; and interviewed officials from DOL, CMS, six selected states, selected health plans, and selected stakeholder organizations, including those representing enrollees and providers. GAO selected these states to capture variation in rurality and state laws, among other criteria. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services and DOL. The agencies provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at dickenj@gao.gov.