What GAO Found
The Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA) requires the federal banking agencies to solicit and review public comments on their regulations to identify and eliminate outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations on insured depository institutions, as appropriate.
How Federal Banking Agencies Conduct Decennial EGRPRA Reviews
Outcomes from the EGRPRA reviews are often difficult to identify, and their connection to subsequent regulatory actions is often unclear. As a result, it can be difficult to determine the extent to which actions described in the EGRPRA report were driven by the review itself. For example, some actions described in the 2017 EGRPRA report were initiated in response to other statutory requirements, while other actions were initiated before or concurrently with the review. Representatives from six of eight organizations GAO interviewed said the reviews do not often lead to actions to modify or eliminate unnecessary regulations, and a public interest group representative noted that it is difficult to connect the EGRPRA reviews with concrete regulatory changes.
Another reason EGRPRA reviews’ outcomes are unclear is that the agencies do not have documented procedures for identifying outdated or unnecessary regulations or determining whether issues raised in the reviews warrant action. Two agencies have draft procedures that could help address these gaps, but they have not yet been fully developed or demonstrated in practice. Implementing documented procedures would help ensure that issues identified through the review are systematically evaluated and lead to clear determinations about whether they warrant action and, where appropriate, regulatory changes. Having documented procedures also is important given the long time frame between EGRPRA reviews.
Additionally, the agencies’ EGRPRA review processes reflect some leading practices for retrospective regulatory reviews, such as coordinating across agencies and soliciting public input, but do not fully reflect others. In particular, the agencies have not incorporated practices related to prioritizing which rules to analyze, conducting cost-benefit analysis, and assessing the combined burden of multiple regulations. As a result, they may not consistently focus on the most significant issues, assess regulatory impacts and trade-offs, or understand how multiple regulations collectively affect regulated entities.
Why GAO Did This Study
EGRPRA requires the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to review their regulations at least once every 10 years and submit a joint report to Congress. As of July 2026, the agencies were conducting their third such review.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act includes a provision for GAO to report annually on financial services regulations. This report examines (1) how the federal banking agencies have conducted their EGRPRA reviews, (2) the outcomes of those reviews, and (3) the extent to which they reflect leading practices.
GAO reviewed reports by federal agencies; examined available documentation from the previous and current EGRPRA reviews, guidance, and regulations issued by the federal banking agencies; and interviewed agency officials and eight organizations selected because they submitted EGRPRA comments in the previous and current reviews.
What GAO Found
Most of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) major projects in development reported no schedule delays or cost overruns in the last year. These projects are in the phase of building and testing their designs. Two of these 18 projects reported annual schedule delays (totaling 2 months) and three reported cost overruns (totaling $501.4 million). Similarly, the portfolio’s cumulative costs and delays increased slightly, from $4.4 billion to nearly $4.7 billion and from 13.1 years to 14 years, respectively. The Orion crew capsule accounts for over half of the major projects’ annual cost overruns and almost 75 percent of their cumulative cost overruns.
Cost and Schedule Performance for NASA’s Major Projects Portfolio, 2025–2026
In February and March 2026, NASA announced significant changes to its Artemis missions—its effort to create a sustained lunar operations. The changes included revising the focus of the planned Artemis III, IV, and V missions, and pausing work on three Artemis projects. These projects include the Gateway, a small space station in lunar orbit that would have supported lunar missions. Under its new plan, NASA plans to shift its focus to infrastructure that enables sustained lunar surface operations.
Implementing changes to the Artemis missions will create acquisition management challenges for NASA as each Artemis-related project adjusts to the new plans. For example, two Artemis projects were reporting technical and programmatic risks that were likely to delay their schedules. Acting on GAO’s prior recommendations to improve cost transparency, establish cost and schedule controls, and better manage acquisition risk could provide opportunities for NASA to strengthen its acquisition management.
In response to the administration’s directive to reduce the size of the federal workforce, NASA reduced its civil servant workforce by 4,000 staff—or nearly 22 percent—in 2025. To date, 25 of 36 projects have reported effects from the reduced staffing. Subsequently, in February 2026, the NASA Administrator announced plans to resume hiring and address skill gaps. The President’s fiscal year 2027 budget request, however, proposes to reduce funding for NASA by more than 20 percent. This request contributes to the ongoing uncertainty as to whether NASA will be able to hire the workforce needed to address skills gaps.
GAO will continue to closely monitor NASA’s management of the Artemis projects, as well as the agency’s efforts to address workforce challenges.
Why GAO Did This Study
NASA plans to invest at least $70 billion in estimated life-cycle costs for its portfolio of major projects (those with costs over $250 million). These projects aim to explore the solar system, return U.S. astronauts to the lunar surface, and advance aeronautic technologies. House explanatory statements have included provisions for GAO to prepare status reports on these projects. This is GAO’s 18th annual report in response to those provisions.
GAO assessed (1) the cost and schedule performance of NASA's major projects in development; (2) the risks that could affect major project performance in the future; and (3) how NASA’s workforce reductions since March 2025 have impacted its ability to manage its portfolio of major projects. This report also includes summaries of NASA's 36 major projects.
GAO collected and analyzed data on the 36 current NASA major projects; visited NASA facilities; interviewed officials; analyzed cost and schedule performance for the 18 projects in development; reviewed NASA’s recent changes to the Artemis missions; analyzed workforce data; and reviewed documents and reports.
What GAO Found
The Office of Isotope Research and Development and Production (IRP), within the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Science, produced, sold, and distributed 265 isotopes during fiscal years 2020 through 2025. Many of these isotopes are critical to medical diagnosis and treatment, national security, industrial processes and manufacturing, and quantum science. IRP made over 7,700 isotope shipments, most of which were for medical purposes.
Department of Energy Isotope Production Facility
IRP assesses market needs for isotopes on a case-by-case basis and manually tracks interactions with industry, customers, and others. However, IRP has not systematically assessed needs or aligned production activities to address those needs. A university production site representative told GAO that clearer market analysis or forecasting would have enabled earlier production preparations for a critical isotope with imminent supply failure. Without a mechanism to systematically assess needs proactively and actions to address isotopes in short supply, IRP may be too slow to respond to customers, who could be forced to rely on sensitive countries to meet their needs or face supply problems.
IRP gathers information from industry and others to assess risks to isotope production and supplies, but IRP has not developed timely actions to mitigate such risks. According to IRP data, isotopes with market disruptions decreased from 40 in 2023 to 25 in 2025, but the U.S. continues to rely on sensitive countries for a majority of those remaining isotopes. Without mitigating risks, IRP may be unable to respond to emerging risks in a timely manner. This could lead to disruptions in isotope production and supplies, which have real-world implications for cancer patients, national security, and domestic industries.
Why GAO Did This Study
IRP is the only domestic supplier for many of the isotopes it sells. Many isotopes are rare or are too expensive or technically difficult for private industry to produce profitably, making IRP critical for producing them. Demand for isotopes is growing, and many of these isotopes are in short supply or represent a supply chain risk for U.S. industries.
GAO was asked to review IRP’s management of isotopes. This report examines (1) which isotopes IRP produced, sold, and distributed during fiscal years 2020 through 2025; (2) the extent to which IRP has assessed isotope market needs and aligned its activities to meet them; and (3) the extent to which IRP has assessed risks affecting the supply of selected isotopes and taken action to mitigate those risks.
GAO analyzed agency documents and data on isotope revenues, costs, sales, and shipments. GAO also reviewed documentation on IRP’s assessment of demand and risks to isotope production and supply chains. GAO interviewed IRP officials and a nongeneralizable sample of entities that received isotopes from IRP and represented the medical, industrial, and research and development sectors. GAO also visited isotope production facilities and interviewed officials at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers enters into Project Partnership Agreements (PPA) with nonfederal sponsors to execute water resources projects. These PPAs include a clause to “hold and save the Government from damages arising from the project” except those due to the fault or negligence of the U.S. or its contractors. Corps officials said the clause may protect the federal government from legal costs by discouraging litigation—a key advantage.
Nonfederal sponsors described disadvantages they perceive with the clause. These include concerns about the scope of liability and conflicts with certain state laws. Corps officials said the agency has taken steps to address these reported disadvantages, such as including a provision in PPAs stating that the PPA does not obligate future appropriations where it would conflict with state law. Both Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors said that the clause has not been tested in court, so the financial impact of the clause remains uncertain.
Nonfederal sponsors and other stakeholders offered a range of recommendations to address what they reported as disadvantages of the clause. However, Corps officials told GAO that implementing such recommendations would increase costs for the Corps and conflict with statutory requirements. Even in light of the reported disadvantages, Corps officials and nonfederal sponsors continue to enter into PPAs, and they described a strong partnership.
Examples of Recommendations by Nonfederal Sponsors and Stakeholders to Address Reported Disadvantages of the Hold and Save Clause
The Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, and U.S. Forest Service also include clauses in agreements to protect the U.S. against damages. To address related concerns, these agencies have taken steps such as allowing parties to purchase insurance instead. However, Corps officials said their legal requirements differ from other agencies, and therefore they cannot offer similar flexibilities.
Why GAO Did This Study
Through its Civil Works program, the Corps plans, designs, and constructs water resources projects nationwide for purposes including flood risk management, navigation, and ecosystem restoration. In fiscal year 2025, the Corps received approximately $8.8 billion to carry out these projects.
For such projects, the Corps enters into PPAs with nonfederal sponsors, which can include states, local governments and Tribes. Nonfederal sponsors have reported concerns about the statutorily required hold and save clause in these agreements.
The Thomas R. Carper Water Resources Development Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to federal legal protections in PPAs, among other things. This report provides information on reported advantages and disadvantages of the clause, actions taken to address the reported disadvantages, recommendations by nonfederal sponsors and others regarding such clauses, approaches used by selected federal agencies to address concerns about similar clauses that protect the U.S. against damages, and Corps responses.
GAO reviewed relevant federal regulations, statutes, agency policies, and sample agreements. GAO also interviewed a group of 12 nonfederal sponsors, two other relevant stakeholders, and Corps headquarters and district officials based on certain criteria.
For more information, contact Steve D. Morris at Morriss@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
The Technology Modernization Fund (TMF) invests funding in agency projects to, among other things, modernize aging federal information technology (IT) systems. From fiscal years 2018 through 2025, the TMF received over $1 billion in net appropriations, of which the Technology Modernization Board invested about $1.03 billion in 68 unclassified projects (see figure).
As of June 2025 (the latest data available at the time of this analysis), 24 TMF projects expected to achieve total savings of about $1.06 billion. Eleven of these projects had collectively realized savings of about $13.5 million, and 13 had not yet begun to achieve savings. While savings thus far have been small, the amount is not unexpected given that 21 projects—with expected savings of about $1.04 billion, or 98.3 percent of the total—anticipate achieving their savings in fiscal year 2027 or later. Thirty-seven projects did not expect any cost savings, but are intended to provide other value, such as mitigating security risks. Seven other projects were cancelled prior to June 2025 and no longer expect savings.
Most of the projects were still active as of June 2025. Of the six completed TMF projects that expected cost savings, two met or were on track to meet their expected savings (within 10 percent) and four did not meet or were not on track to meet their savings. Officials for the projects that did not meet their expected savings attributed it to various reasons, such as the removal of planned functionality and higher system migration costs than planned, which led to tens of millions less in actual savings than estimated.
As required under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, all procurements, with certain exceptions, must use full and open competition so that any qualified entity can submit an offer. Of 177 TMF contract actions, the majority (154, or 87 percent) were awarded using competitive procedures. This accounted for about $713.1 million (96 percent) of the total funding awarded. In 23 instances where agencies awarded contract actions without such procedures, the agencies documented authorized exceptions.
Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has faced longstanding problems in managing its IT. The Modernizing Government Technology Act established the TMF to help address key IT modernization challenges. The Act stated that TMF funds should be used to procure commercial products and services using full and open competition to the greatest extent practicable. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance to agencies applying for TMF funds, directing that project proposals include a reliable estimate of any project-related cost savings.
The act includes a provision for GAO to report biennially on the TMF and the expected cost savings of projects that received funding. This fourth report identifies the (1) approved TMF projects, their invested funds, and their expected and actual cost savings; (2) extent to which agencies' completed projects met their expected cost savings targets; and (3) extent to which the agencies used full and open competition for any acquisitions related to TMF invested projects.
GAO analyzed and summarized TMF financial data and documentation, including cost estimates, associated with 68 projects in which GSA had invested funds as of June 2025. For applicable completed projects, GAO compared the difference between expected and realized cost savings to OMB’s variance threshold of 10 percent.
GAO analyzed contract documentation for 32 projects that issued 177 contract actions between March 1, 2023, and June 2, 2025. GAO determined whether each one was awarded using full and open competition, in accordance with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. GAO also interviewed relevant agency officials.
For more information, contact Carol C. Harris at HarrisCC@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
Twenty programs, supporting a broad range of services from health care to disaster assistance, made up nearly 90 percent of federal obligations among programs administered by state and other government entities with obligations of over $100 million in fiscal year 2025. The 20 programs collectively accounted for $1.1 trillion in total federal obligations that year. Subrecipients, contractors, and others can also be involved in these programs, which can be helpful in delivering benefits and services. However, this decentralized structure can leave programs vulnerable to fraud schemes involving all these groups.
Information about fraud risks specific to each of the 20 selected programs varies, in part, because federal agencies have not fully assessed their risks. Of the 20 programs, five documented evidence consistent with identifying risks and assessing the likelihood of those risks to prioritize action; the other 15 did not have such documented evidence.
GAO’s review of information from GAO, Office of Inspector General, and state audit reports identified both general and specific fraud risks facing federally funded, state-administered programs.
Examples of General Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs
Examples of specific fraud risks GAO identified in the 20 selected programs included cases where a consultant was convicted of falsifying permits used during a $4.3 million airport improvement project; households receiving housing assistance vouchers were underreporting income and landlords were receiving payments for vacant units; and an individual allegedly ran a fraud scheme involving student financial aid applications for over 1,200 people to over 100 schools in 24 states.
GAO’s prior work and experiences from the United States and other countries provide insights that can help federal and state agencies, Congress, and others combat fraud. Federal and state agencies can better manage fraud risks and prevent fraud by
applying GAO frameworks for managing fraud risks and improper payments, as well as other leading practices;
leveraging available federal analytic resources, such as the Do Not Pay program, to verify recipient identity and eligibility before issuing federal funds; and
implementing recommendations from GAO and other oversight entities that would address existing program vulnerabilities.
Key insights for Congress and federal agencies focus on efforts in three areas: (1) enhancing analytics for detecting fraud, (2) increasing transparency with prevention activities through reporting and data, and (3) adapting approaches to federal programs and professions to address evolving fraud threats.
Why GAO Did This Study
GAO estimated that the federal government loses between $233 billion and $521 billion annually to fraud, according to data from fiscal years 2018 through 2022. This represented 3 percent to 7 percent of average federal obligations government-wide. While fraud risks can vary substantially by program, every dollar or resource diverted to fraudsters hinders the federal government’s ability to achieve its goals.
GAO was asked to review fraud risks in federally funded, state-administered programs. This report—the first in a body of work—provides information on 20 of the largest programs, how they are administered and overseen, what is known about fraud risks and related risk factors in these programs, and examples of leading practices and controls to address the risks.
GAO reviewed USAspending.gov data for fiscal year 2025 to identify and select programs. It also reviewed program information, such as from GAO, Congressional Research Service, Office of Inspector General, and state audit organization reports; federal laws, regulations, and agency documents requested from the 20 selected programs; and fraud cases adjudicated by the Department of Justice. GAO reviewed existing research and criteria on practices and controls to address fraud risks, including GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and those identified by experts within the U.S. and internationally.
What GAO Found
According to U.S. Census Bureau data, an estimated 13.8 million adults enrolled in Medicaid and 10.6 million adults living in households that received Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits worked at some point during 2024. This is out of approximately 28 million and 20 million adults ages 19–64 in these programs, respectively. GAO’s analysis of Census data showed that about two-thirds of these adults in each program worked full-time (35 hours or more a week). However, when compared to other wage-earning adults not participating in either program, wage-earning adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients were less likely to work full-time hours for 50 or more weeks per year.
Estimated Percentage of Wage-Earning Adults Working Full-Time and Part-Time Work Schedules in 2024
Most of these wage-earning adults in both programs (88 percent) were employed in the private sector in 2024, which is higher than the percentage of wage-earning adults in the private sector who were not enrolled or not receiving benefits. Wage-earning adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients were also more likely than wage earners who did not participate in the programs to work in food service and food preparation occupations.
According to GAO’s analysis of state-level data for September 2025, the employers with the most nondisabled, nonelderly Medicaid enrollees or SNAP beneficiaries varied across the 11 states that provided data. However, 46 companies (about one-third of the total companies across all 11 states) were among the top 25 employers of Medicaid enrollees or SNAP beneficiaries in at least two states. Seventeen of these 46 companies were among the 50 largest Fortune 500 companies by number of employees.
Why GAO Did This Study
Each year millions of wage-earning adults participate in federally funded social safety net programs to help pay for basic needs including health care and food assistance. GAO was asked to update information provided on wage-earning Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients in its October 2020 report (GAO-21-45).
This report includes an analysis estimating (1) the labor characteristics of working adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients and (2) employers of adult Medicaid enrollees and SNAP recipients in selected states.
To conduct this work, GAO analyzed recent Census data on the labor characteristics of wage-earning adults in the two programs. GAO also analyzed data on the employers of nondisabled, nonelderly working adult Medicaid enrollees and working adult SNAP recipients obtained from 15 state agencies across 11 states as of September 2025.
For more information, contact Kathryn Larin at larink@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
The Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record (ILER) is a web application that links service members’ and veterans’ military toxic exposures and related information from Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) databases. DOD and VA intend ILER to be a multi-purpose tool to support clinicians in providing diagnoses and treatment decisions, researchers in conducting health surveillance and epidemiological research, and Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) claims benefits staff in processing disability claims. Use of the ILER web application among DOD and VA staff increased after the Honoring our PACT Act of 2022 (PACT Act) was enacted in August 2022. This act expanded eligibility for VA health care and disability benefits to veterans who experienced certain toxic exposures during their military service. The increase in ILER use after the PACT Act’s enactment was driven largely by VBA staff. VBA staff have also been the largest group of users since enactment.
Percentage of Individual Longitudinal Exposure Record (ILER) Account Logins, by Agency as Identified by Staff During Account Registration, September 2022 Through January 2026
In March 2026, service members gained the ability to access the ILER web application and add self-reported updates to their record. ILER officials said they plan to also provide service members with a way to request corrections by September 2026. For veterans, officials said they plan to provide access to ILER and a way to request corrections by October 2026.
ILER officials and officials from eight stakeholder organizations said some potential benefits of service member and veteran access to their ILER information include increased transparency and knowledge. For example, service members and veterans may be able to have more informed conversations with clinicians about diagnoses and risks of future health effects. Those officials said one of the potential challenges includes frustration if service members and veterans see missing or incomplete records. ILER officials are providing information about ILER’s capabilities and limitations in education and outreach efforts to help mitigate this challenge.
Why GAO Did This Study
Military service members and veterans may experience adverse health outcomes associated with toxic exposures experienced during military service. For example, those who deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11th have reported health concerns from toxic exposures, particularly to smoke and harmful emissions produced by open-air burn pits. In April 2026, VA estimated that about 48 percent of veterans who have been screened since 2022 (approximately 3.2 million of 6.8 million total veterans screened) had at least one potential toxic exposure during military service.
DOD and VA launched ILER in 2019 as a tool to compile information on individuals’ service-related toxic exposures and health assessments from several databases. Staff can use ILER to process disability claims, provide health care, and conduct research.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review ILER. This report describes available information on the use of ILER by DOD and VA staff and service members’ and veterans’ access to their ILER record.
GAO analyzed data on ILER use among DOD and VA staff from October 2019 through January 2026; reviewed related documents and interviewed officials managing ILER; and interviewed stakeholder organizations, including six military and veterans service organizations and two toxic exposure non-profit organizations. GAO selected these organizations as they represent service members or veterans and have knowledge or expertise related to military toxic exposures.
For more information, contact Alyssa M. Hundrup at hundrupa@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided budget authorities for transportation, infrastructure, and energy projects. Together, the four agencies selected for this review—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of the Interior (Interior), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Department of Transportation (DOT)—obligated a majority of their IIJA or IRA funding.
IIJA. Of the approximately $574.7 billion provided to them, the four agencies obligated about 76 percent and disbursed about 54 percent of obligated funds for fiscal years 2022 to 2025.
IRA. Of the around $53.7 billion provided to them, EPA, Interior, and DOT obligated about 72 percent and disbursed about 60 percent of obligated funds for fiscal years 2022 through 2025. In July 2025, Congress rescinded $6.4 billion of the three agencies’ unobligated IRA funds per agencies’ data.
Most selected agencies reported developing new processes to review IIJA and IRA funding in response to dozens of executive orders issued starting January 20, 2025. The agencies used a variety of approaches to implement reviews, such as searching for terms from executive orders like “diversity” or “environmental justice.” Senior leadership for all selected agencies made final decisions on whether awards should be approved without modification, modified (funded with changes to terms or amounts), or canceled (discontinued), according to selected agencies’ officials and documentation. The extent to which agencies continued to obligate and disburse IIJA and IRA funds during their reviews varied within and across agencies.
As a result of their reviews, selected agencies reported approving about 9,500 awards ($128 billion) and canceling about 800 ($17.8 billion). More than 2,500 awards were pending a decision ($33.6 billion) as of varying dates shown below.
Status of Selected Agencies’ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act Funding Reviews, as of the Dates Indicated
Note: Canceled awards include terminated, rescinded, or withdrawn awards, or awards discontinued by a recipient.
Why GAO Did This Study
The IIJA and IRA provided billions in federal funding to agencies to distribute through mechanisms like grants and loans. Beginning in January 2025, executive orders directed agencies to pause this funding to review it for consistency with administration priorities. Grant recipients have raised concerns that delays in distributing these funds affect their ability to implement their projects.
GAO was asked to review the status of IIJA and IRA funding. This report describes selected agencies’ (1) IIJA and IRA budget authority, obligations, rescissions, and disbursements for fiscal years 2022 to 2025; (2) processes for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding in response to executive orders; and (3) IIJA and IRA funding review status.
To address these objectives, GAO selected agencies with among the highest amount of combined IIJA and IRA funding. Of these agencies, GAO selected EPA, Interior, NTIA, and DOT for this report. GAO will report on the Department of Energy and Department of Agriculture separately.
GAO analyzed the IIJA and IRA and financial data from agencies’ accounting systems and the agencies’ policies and guidance for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding. GAO also analyzed and summarized selected agency review data and found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of describing the status of reviews with some limitations. For example, EPA and NTIA did not provide all requested data. GAO also interviewed selected agency officials for each of the objectives.
For more information, contact Anne Sit-Williams at sitwilliamsa@gao.gov or Elizabeth Repko at repkoe@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 117 cybersecurity regulations established by 37 federal agencies for private entities, spanning nine critical infrastructure sectors. Most of those regulations either contain the same kind of reporting requirement applicable to a sector or the same reporting requirement as at least one other regulation, which may lead to duplication. Specifically, 80 of the 117 regulations (about 70 percent) had at least 125 total reporting requirements (see figure), with some regulations requiring multiple types of reporting.
Cybersecurity Regulations with Reporting Requirements, as of June 2026
These regulations included sector-specific and cross-sector reporting requirements for private sector entities that may be required to report similar or different cybersecurity information to multiple agencies. For example, a proposed rule from the Department of Homeland Security related to cybersecurity incident reporting by critical infrastructure sectors acknowledged that it may be potentially duplicative with one or more of the 15 existing financial sector regulations that also require such incident reporting. Additionally, cross-sector regulations may duplicate or conflict with regulations focused on a specific sector. For example, one from the Securities and Exchange Commission that requires publicly traded companies across different sectors to provide cybersecurity plans may duplicate or conflict with regulations focused on a specific sector. GAO has ongoing work to obtain additional industry perspectives on federal cybersecurity regulations, including where they perceive overlap and duplication within selected critical infrastructure sectors.
Federal law and the April 2024 National Security Memorandum-22 established the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) as the lead agency responsible for coordinating efforts to streamline, or harmonize, the development and adoption of consistent standards and regulations. ONCD and other federal agencies have initiated actions in recent years to harmonize cybersecurity regulations but have made limited progress. In March 2026, the White House issued a new national cyber strategy which established harmonization and reducing compliance burdens as a priority. According to the strategy, the administration intends to release implementation plans, which could help identify clear lead agency roles, responsibilities, and next steps while enhancing the cybersecurity of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Why GAO Did This Study
Nearly all the nation’s critical infrastructure are supported by computer-based information systems, and it is vital that public and private sectors work together to protect them. Federal agencies have issued numerous regulations to help protect the nation’s critical infrastructure, which is mostly owned by the private sector. However, according to ONCD, when critical infrastructure sectors are subject to multiple cybersecurity regulations, the result can lead to conflicting guidance, inconsistencies, increased compliance costs and redundancies for regulated entities. Consistency is important to avoid overlap, duplication, or conflicting requirements.
GAO was asked to review federal cybersecurity regulations to identify opportunities for harmonization. This report determines the extent to which federal cybersecurity regulations and requirements are potentially duplicative or conflicting for regulated private sector entities.
GAO reviewed the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations to identify cybersecurity regulations and assess them for potentially duplicative and conflicting reporting requirements. GAO also reviewed available harmonization plans and analyses from ONCD and the Department of Homeland Security. GAO also interviewed relevant officials.
We provided a draft of this report to ONCD for review and comment. ONCD did not provide comments on the report.
For more information, contact David Hinchman at hinchmand@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has not fully implemented selected leading planning and management practices for its enterprise software asset management (eSAM) program. eSAM is a department-wide effort intended to change how VA manages software assets by, among other things, requiring VA offices to coordinate with, and centrally report software license data to, VA’s IT management organization. This will require a change in organizational practices, given that VA programs have historically acquired their software independently.
Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Implementation of Selected Leading Program Planning and Management Practice Areas for the Enterprise Software Asset Management (eSAM) Program
Selected practice area
Overall assessment
Strategic alignment
◔ Minimally implemented
Stakeholder engagement
◑ Partially implemented
Life cycle management planning
◑Partially implemented
Managing changes needed to support the program
◔ Minimally implemented
Governance framework
○ Not implemented
Software license management
◔ Minimally implemented
Source: GAO analysis of VA eSAM program documentation. | GAO-26-108641
In addition, VA has not fully implemented selected leading planning and management practices for its software license inventory project. Of the six selected practice areas, VA partially implemented two areas (scope management and risk management) and minimally implemented the other four areas (project governance, stakeholder engagement, resource management, and software license management). For example, VA documented certain project risks but did not document all identified risks in a register. It also did not develop planned responses (e.g., mitigation strategies) for them all, which limits VA’s ability to address the risks before they become issues. Further, VA has not engaged with all stakeholders to identify their needs, nor developed plans for doing so. As such, eSAM is at risk of performing work that does not meet stakeholder needs.
Part of the reason for the shortfalls noted in the practice areas is that VA did not perform oversight to ensure that eSAM and the inventory project (1) finalized and received approval for several key plans and (2) followed the leading practices. VA officials stated that turnover in the IT management organization—including the absence of a permanent Chief Information Officer (CIO) since January 2025—impacted VA’s oversight of eSAM and the project. VA officials anticipated that, once a permanent CIO is on board, VA would consider implementing a new (1) IT governance board to oversee programs such as eSAM and (2) IT governance process. However, there are opportunities for current VA officials to provide oversight to the program and inventory project to ensure they continue moving forward to meet intended outcomes. Until VA fully implements the selected practices for eSAM and the inventory project, it may not achieve departmentwide software asset management. As such, it is also at risk of missing opportunities to achieve significant cost savings possible from analyzing departmentwide software license data to make informed investment decisions.
Why GAO Did This Study
VA spends billions of dollars annually on its IT and cyber-related investments, including for purchases of commercial software licenses. For fiscal year 2025, the department planned to spend about $985 million on software, including commercial software licenses.
In 2015, GAO identified the management of software licenses as a focus area in its High-Risk report. GAO has also previously reported on the need for VA to ensure better management of software licenses. VA has taken actions intended to improve its software license management, including establishing the eSAM program, which includes a project to implement a centralized software license inventory, among other things.
GAO was asked to review VA’s software asset management policies and practices. This report examines the extent to which VA implemented selected leading planning and management practices for its (1) eSAM program and (2) software license inventory project.
GAO reviewed industry guidance on program and project management and leading software license management practices identified in its prior work and selected 12 planning and management practice areas to review (six for the eSAM program and six for the inventory project). The selected areas and practices relate to early planning and execution of the program and inventory project. GAO compared the guidance in these 12 areas to VA documentation and interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2000, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the National Shooting Sports Foundation (NSSF) have managed and launched the Don’t Lie for the Other Guy campaign across various cities in the U.S. The campaign is intended to educate the public about the legal consequences of “straw purchases”—when someone who is prohibited from buying a firearm has someone else (a “straw buyer”) make the purchase for them. The campaign also educates federal firearms licensees (FFLs)—which include individuals or businesses that have obtained a federal firearm license to sell, manufacture, or import firearms—on how to identify and stop illegal straw purchases. ATF seeks to inform the public about these campaigns by conducting press conferences and advertising the campaign’s message. NSSF provides FFL retailers with training and education materials.
In fiscal years 2023 through 2025, ATF launched at least 20 campaigns across the U.S. and expended over $870,000 each year to support them. ATF used most of the campaign funding to pay for costs associated with hiring a marketing firm to produce, advertise, and distribute campaign marketing materials, as well as costs associated with the use of digital ads and streaming audio.
Examples of Don’t Lie for the Other Guy Campaign Marketing Materials
ATF has established three broad program goals for the Don’t Lie for the Other Guy campaign. ATF also collects and tracks metrics for the campaign. However, as of June 2026, the agency has not used those metrics to fully assess progress towards meeting the campaign’s broader program goals, or to better inform programmatic decisions such as resource allocation.
By developing measurable performance goals and using this performance information to assess progress towards achieving the campaign’s broader program goals, ATF will be in a better position to evaluate the campaign and make important management and resource allocation decisions, such as which marketing efforts are more cost-effective at increasing public awareness.
According to ATF and NSSF officials, ATF does not manage or provide any federal funding for the Operation Secure Store firearms industry education and outreach campaign. These officials stated that NSSF manages and provides sole funding for this campaign, which provides FFLs with educational materials to help identify potential security risks and ways to deter and prevent thefts of firearms stored at FFL retail locations. During GAO’s review, ATF updated the agency’s public facing website to correct information about ATF’s role in NSSF’s Operation Secure Store campaign.
Why GAO Did This Study
According to a 2024 Department of Justice report, one of the most common sources of illegally trafficked firearms are straw purchases. While legislation has been passed to attempt to prevent these types of purchases, FFLs play an important role in safeguarding the public by helping to prevent straw purchasing. ATF issues and renews FFL licenses and investigates potential noncompliance with federal laws and regulations. ATF also works with firearms industry groups such as NSSF to deliver firearms education and outreach campaigns.
GAO was asked to review ATF’s work with the firearms industry on education and outreach to better understand the impact of these campaigns. This report provides information about ATF’s role and federal funding provided for two such firearms education and outreach campaigns—Don’t Lie for the Other Guy and Operation Secure Store— including whether the efficacy of these campaigns has been evaluated.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed ATF program documentation, assessed funding data from fiscal year 2023 through fiscal year 2025, and interviewed ATF officials and firearms industry representatives. GAO compared actions taken to monitor and assess the campaign against selected key practices for evaluating the effectiveness of media campaigns and evidence-based policymaking.
What GAO Found
Technologies like batteries and semiconductors are essential to the U.S. economy but rely on imports of lithium, gallium, and other critical minerals. GAO found that substitution and recycling technologies could help reduce U.S. reliance on these imports. But progress is likely to take many years in some cases.
Potential for technologies to reduce critical mineral import reliance
For batteries, substitution and recycling technologies offer near-term potential. For example, using lithium iron phosphate batteries for stationary grid energy storage might reduce imports of cobalt, manganese, and nickel in the next 2 to 3 years. But these batteries do not perform as well in other applications, like long-haul electric vehicles, due to their lower energy density. Lithium-free batteries are not yet commercially mature. Battery recycling technologies are mature and offer a pathway to reduce imports for copper, cobalt, lithium, and nickel in 2 to 3 years. These technologies aim to recover critical minerals at high rates through chemical leaching and smelting. Experts told GAO, however, that U.S. battery recyclers lack capacity. Additionally, available inputs for recycling (referred to as feedstock) are often landfilled or exported for processing.
For semiconductors, most substitution and recycling technologies are likely years away from maturity. Substitution is unlikely to have a near-term effect on import reliance of minerals, such as gallium and indium, because other materials do not perform as well as these critical minerals across the same conditions. Experts told GAO that industry will not adopt substitutes until they can perform at the same level as current semiconductor materials in the intended application. Technologies to recycle minerals from semiconductors also face challenges, such as an underdeveloped market. Semiconductor manufacturing scrap is a potential source of recycled minerals, though this is not yet standard practice in the U.S. Discarded electronics are another potentially large source, but their critical mineral content is low, and those minerals are generally mixed and bonded with other materials. Technologies to recycle this form of electronic waste are in pilot-stage development.
GAO identified four policy options that could support the goal of reducing critical mineral import reliance and help address challenges to recycling and substitution technologies. These options identify possible actions by policymakers, which include legislative bodies, government agencies (federal, state, and local), academia, standards-setting organizations, industry, and other groups. In general, these technologies have potential, with policy action, to reduce some of this reliance in the near, medium, or long term. See below for details on these options.
Policymakers could also choose to pursue non-technological policy approaches, such as increased domestic mining. Many non-technological approaches are the subject of current and proposed legislation and executive action (see report p. 6).
Policy options to support reducing critical mineral import reliance and address challenges to substitution and recycling technologies
Establish domestic manufacturing capacity for viable substitutes (report p. 23)
Policymakers could consider building or repurposing existing manufacturing capacity to produce substitute technologies for batteries and semiconductors.
Potential implementation approaches
Providing support for private capital investments in manufacturing plants for commercially available battery technologies.
Establishing facilities or partnerships to perform pilot-scale testing of semiconductor substitutes.
Opportunities and Considerations
Domestic manufacturing capacity could allow for near-term production of commercially available substitute technologies like lithium iron phosphate batteries, which could reduce import reliance on critical minerals like cobalt and nickel.
Battery and semiconductor production facilities are costly and tend to be specialized for the production of a particular technology.
Establish domestic recycling capacity (report p. 24)
Policymakers could build domestic infrastructure to bolster the domestic capacity to recycle batteries and semiconductors.
Potential implementation approaches
Providing support for private investment in factories for new battery recycling.
Collecting and sharing data on manufacturing scrap and end-of-life devices containing batteries and semiconductors.
Reviewing and streamlining permitting requirements and hazardous waste designations.
Opportunities and Considerations
Expanded domestic infrastructure could reduce or eliminate the need to ship partially processed batteries overseas for recycling.
Building domestic recycling infrastructure may not reduce import reliance for selected critical minerals in the near term, since building new or repurposing existing infrastructure can take a decade or more and require significant investment.
Secure inputs for recycling (report p. 24)
Policymakers could support efforts to collect, sort, transport, and store manufacturing scrap and end-of-life devices for recycling and reuse.
Potential implementation approaches
Establishing and overseeing national and local electronic waste collection programs that provide education and resources (e.g., drop-off locations) for consumers.
Providing financial incentives for industry to collect or retain manufacturing scrap and end-of-life devices for recycling.
Opportunities and Considerations
Securing a consistent supply of inputs for recycling and reuse could help reduce the need for critical mineral importation in the near term.
Although mature battery recycling technologies exist, securing additional inputs may exacerbate challenges related to the safety, transportation, and handling of hazardous materials.
Without demand and competitively priced recycled semiconductor materials, it may be difficult for recyclers to scale their operations and offset the amount of imported minerals required in the near term.
Support research, development, and testing (report p. 25)
Policymakers could continue or grow support for research, development, and testing of substitution and recycling technologies.
Potential implementation approaches
Supporting research to improve performance of lithium-free batteries.
Supporting research into battery recycling technologies that reduce or avoid the cost, waste issues, and environmental impact of current techniques.
Encouraging targeted materials research focused on semiconductor substitutes that maintain or enhance material performance and reduce the use of critical minerals when possible.
Supporting research on more efficient semiconductor recycling technologies that recover more critical minerals.
Opportunities and Considerations
Increased research could help overcome current limitations of existing technologies, resulting in better performance (e.g., higher energy density batteries, larger bandgap semiconductors) or higher commercialization potential (e.g., improved recovery of minerals from semiconductors).
Research, development, and testing efforts may not yield mature technologies in the near term.
Source: GAO. | GAO-26-108687
Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. considers 60 minerals as critical because they are essential to the nation’s economy or security and have supply chains vulnerable to disruption.
Several critical minerals are key to the functioning of batteries and semiconductors, which have applications in electric vehicles, stationary grid energy storage, consumer electronics, and the defense industry. For example, lithium is a key component of modern batteries that are both lightweight and energy-dense. Semiconductors rely on the unique electrical properties of critical minerals such as gallium, germanium, arsenic, and indium.
U.S. executive and legislative branch policymakers have a long-standing goal to reduce critical mineral import reliance, through technological innovations and other approaches.
This report examines: (1) substitution and recycling technologies to reduce import reliance on critical minerals within the battery and semiconductor industries, (2) challenges to the development and adoption of these technologies, and (3) policy options to support reducing reliance.
To conduct this technology assessment, GAO interviewed federal officials and experts and reviewed academic papers, agency and expert documentation, and federal policy. GAO identified four policy options in this report (see next page).
For more information, contact Sarah Harvey at HarveyS@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
Federal broadband efforts are fragmented, with over 100 programs administered by 15 agencies, as GAO reported in May 2022. Some programs support broadband as their main purpose, while others support broadband as one possible purpose (see figure).
The Mosaic of Federal Programs with Broadband as a Main Purpose as of November 2021, by Purpose Category
GAO has found that a national strategy, continued interagency coordination, and better mapping data could strengthen federal broadband efforts.
National Strategy. Strategies to coordinate programs that address issues of broad national need can help mitigate the negative effects of fragmented federal programs, but no national strategy exists for federal broadband efforts. In May 2022, GAO recommended creating such a strategy to synchronize these efforts.
Interagency Coordination. With or without a national strategy, effective coordination among agencies that administer broadband programs is also important. In April 2025, GAO reported that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and the Treasury coordinate to administer the bulk of federal broadband funding and have mechanisms in place to do so. GAO recommended improvements to further strengthen those efforts. Agency officials reported taking steps to implement these recommendations, but have not yet fully addressed them, as of July 2026.
Mapping Data. Agencies rely on FCC’s National Broadband Map—which displays where broadband is already available—to target tens of billions of dollars in federal broadband funding, but the accuracy of the map’s availability data is uncertain. In April 2025, GAO recommended FCC document and evaluate the effectiveness of its processes for ensuring the map’s data quality. Not doing so could increase the risk of inaccurate data on the map, which could jeopardize agencies’ ability to make effective funding decisions. FCC has not yet addressed the recommendations as of July 2026, but officials reported taking steps to do so.
Why GAO Did This Study
Access to broadband is critical for employment, education, health care, and other daily activities. The federal government has invested tens of billions of dollars over the past decade across a myriad of broadband-related programs managed by different agencies. Yet millions of Americans lack broadband access.
Information on where broadband is already available is key to expanding access. Coordination among the federal agencies that administer the various federal programs is also key, particularly since U.S. broadband efforts are not guided by an overarching national strategy.
This testimony discusses findings from GAO’s previous reports on (1) a national broadband strategy and interagency coordination efforts, and (2) FCC’s efforts to ensure the quality of data in its National Broadband Map. It is primarily based on GAO’s May 2022 and April 2025 reports.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) proposed 236 tax regulations and finalized 231 regulations between January 21, 2017, and March 31, 2026. These regulations included those that implemented provisions of the sweeping tax law changes of 2017, 2022, and 2025. IRS rulemaking procedures generally provided the public with an opportunity to comment on proposed tax regulations.
GAO found that Treasury and IRS could improve the usefulness of regulatory economic analyses required for economically significant tax regulations which have $100 million or more in economic effects, with 28 tax regulations designated as such in the period GAO reviewed. Treasury and IRS consistently used one of the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) recommended practices for the economically significant regulations reviewed. This practice of analyzing alternative ways to design the regulations resulted in decisions that made it easier for taxpayers to claim new tax benefits. However, Treasury and IRS used other recommended practices less consistently. These practices, if used, would help Treasury and IRS make more informed selections of regulatory alternatives by providing specific cost, benefit, and revenue estimates.
Use of Recommended Analysis Practices for Selected Final Tax Regulations
Treasury and IRS are not following leading practices for public engagement in rulemaking and risk not being prepared to address voluminous public comments, sometimes tens of thousands, on proposed tax regulations. IRS faces increasing challenges with AI-generated public comments which make it more difficult for IRS to identify duplicate comments. IRS has not developed policies for addressing mass public comments or comments written with the assistance of AI. Treasury and IRS hold public hearings on proposed regulations in Washington, D.C., upon request. Effective virtual participation by members of the public from across the United States is challenging because IRS only uses dial-in technology rather than widely available video conferencing technology. A federal advisory agency recommends that agencies reduce barriers to public regulatory participation. GAO also identified additional opportunities to document public comments made at hearings to ensure important concerns are considered.
Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, Treasury and IRS have been affected by significant legal decisions, changes in the requirements for rulemaking, and rapidly evolving technologies that enable mass public comments.
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) directed GAO to oversee the use of IRA funds including Treasury and IRS regulatory actions. GAO’s objectives included assessing: (1) the development of regulations in light of recent tax law changes, (2) the extent to which Treasury and IRS perform economic analysis for major tax regulations and measure revenue effects, and (3) the extent to which Treasury and IRS follow leading practices for public engagement in rulemaking.
GAO analyzed regulatory activity between January 2017 and March 2026; compared four selected regulatory economic analyses against recommended practices by OMB with the regulations selected, in part, because the economic analyses were the most relevant examples in selecting alternative regulatory designs; and compared public comment and regulatory hearing procedures against leading practices.
What GAO Found
In May 2025, GAO identified 14 priority recommendations for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Since then, ODNI has implemented one of those recommendations.
In June 2026, GAO identified one additional priority recommendation, and removed the priority status from eight recommendations, bringing the total to six. GAO is highlighting the following two areas that warrant timely and focused attention:
Mitigating personnel vetting risks
Addressing intelligence enterprise management challenges
Addressing GAO's recommendations in these areas would improve the personnel security clearance process and enhance programs that have impacts across the intelligence community (IC). Taking action to implement all of GAO's open recommendations would help enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of operations across the IC.
Why GAO Did This Study
Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or make progress toward addressing a high risk or duplication issue, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations.
For more information, contact Cathy Berrick at berrickc@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates and determines the probable cause of transportation accidents in the United States, among other responsibilities, thus playing a vital role in advancing transportation safety. To support its mission, NTSB procures a variety of products (e.g., laboratory equipment) and services (e.g., services to develop and maintain systems and applications used to investigate accidents). NTSB is generally required to promote full and open competition in awarding contracts. However, in some cases, NTSB may award contracts through noncompetitive procedures. According to NTSB officials, the agency awards contracts pursuant to applicable statutes, federal regulations, executive orders, and internal guidance. NTSB’s policies and procedures for contracts include multiple reviews. Additional reviews or senior-level approvals are required for noncompetitive contract awards valued over $100,000 and for competitive contract awards valued over $500,000. In response to a February 2025 executive order, NTSB changed its policies to include that all new NTSB contract requirements with a value greater than $100,000 are approved by NTSB’s Chairwoman prior to awarding a contract, unless approval has been delegated to NTSB’s Managing Director.
For fiscal years 2020 through 2024, NTSB obligated a total of about $86 million on awarded contracts, adjusted for inflation to fiscal year 2024 dollars. About 84 percent of these obligations were on competitively awarded contracts and about 16 percent were on noncompetitively awarded contracts.
Obligations on competitively awarded contracts nearly doubled from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2024, from about $10 million in fiscal year 2020 to nearly $20 million in fiscal year 2024. NTSB officials attributed most of the increase in obligations on competitively awarded contracts to increased investments in information technology products and services. According to NTSB officials, these investments have allowed NTSB to improve investigation timeliness and to meet congressional expectations for efficient data and knowledge sharing. Obligations on noncompetitively awarded contracts also increased, though slightly, rising from about $2.5 million to about $2.6 million over that same time frame.
National Transportation Safety Board’s Obligations on Competitively and Noncompetitively Awarded Contracts, Fiscal Years 2020–2024
Why GAO Did This Study
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review NTSB’s procurement and contracting planning, policies, and practices. This report describes NTSB’s policies and procedures for competitively and noncompetitively awarded contracts and provides information on NTSB’s obligations on awarded contracts for fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024.
GAO reviewed NTSB’s contract obligation data for fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024, the most recent years of complete data available at the time of GAO’s analysis. GAO downloaded the data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), as of September 25, 2025, and determined that FPDS’s obligation data were sufficiently reliable for GAO’s purposes of describing NTSB’s obligations on awarded contracts. GAO also reviewed statutes, regulations, an executive order, and guidance documents governing NTSB’s contracting activities and interviewed NTSB officials about (1) contracting policies and procedures and (2) the reasons for obligation changes over time.
For more information, contact Derrick Collins at CollinsD@gao.gov.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget annually designates a list of programs considered high-priority for improper payments. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Community Care program and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS) Medicare Advantage program are two of the 30 programs designated as high priority for fiscal year 2025. VA reported a Community Care improper payment estimate of $608 million for fiscal year 2025, or 2.4 percent of the program’s outlays. CMS reported a Medicare Advantage improper payment estimate of $23.7 billion for fiscal year 2025, or 6.1 percent of the program’s outlays. GAO found gaps in the agencies’ efforts to reduce improper payment and fraud risks.
Agency Efforts to Reduce Improper Payments and Fraud Risks
Community Care Program
Medicare Advantage Program
Developed and implemented a process to identify and assess the root causes of improper payments
●
●
Developed, implemented, and monitored corrective action plans that adequately address the identified root causes of improper payments
●
◐
Conducted a fraud risk assessment that identifies inherent fraud risks, assesses their likelihood and impact, determines risk tolerance, evaluates controls, and documents a fraud risk profile
○
○
Legend: ● Met; ◐ Partially met; ○ Not met.
Source: GAO. | GAO-26-107946
Note: Analysis based on the results of GAO work completed from November 2024 through June 2026.
For the fiscal years included in GAO’s review, VA developed and implemented a process to identify and assess the root causes of improper payments in the Community Care program. VA also developed, implemented, and monitored corrective action plans that adequately address the identified root causes. While VA has taken steps to identify and assess fraud risks, these efforts do not meet the key elements of a fraud risk assessment and have not resulted in a comprehensive fraud risk assessment for the program, leaving it vulnerable to fraud.
For the fiscal years included in GAO’s review, CMS developed and implemented a process to identify and assess the root causes of improper payments in the Medicare Advantage program. However, its estimated improper payment rate has not decreased but remained steady. CMS’s corrective action plans are not sufficiently detailed and do not adequately monitor progress. Specifically, CMS does not have a detailed plan for expediting Risk Adjustment Data Validation (RADV) audits. These audits are CMS’s primary corrective action for identifying and recovering improper payments. CMS’s backlog of RADV audits contributes to significant delays in its recovery efforts. Furthermore, CMS has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment for the program. CMS’s efforts to reduce improper payments and fraud in the Medicare Advantage program will be inadequate without comprehensive corrective action plans and fraud risk assessments.
Why GAO Did This Study
Reducing improper payments and fraud is critical to safeguarding federal funds and could help achieve cost savings and improve the government’s fiscal position.
GAO was asked to assess agency efforts to identify and address root causes of improper payments and fraud. In this report, GAO examines to what extent (1) VA has taken steps to identify and address the root causes of improper payments and mitigate fraud risks in the Community Care program and (2) CMS has taken steps to identify and address the root causes of improper payments and mitigate fraud risks in the Medicare Advantage program.
GAO examined documentation from VA, CMS, PaymentAccuracy.gov, and prior reports from agency Offices of Inspector General (OIG). GAO also interviewed agency officials, OIG staff, and trade association representatives.
What GAO Found
The size of passenger vehicles on U.S. roads has grown over the past 30 years. Selected studies that GAO reviewed generally found that larger vehicles, certain design features (see figure), and turning maneuvers may limit a driver’s visibility and pose greater risks to pedestrians and cyclists. Data on driver visibility, such as the size of blind zones around a vehicle, are not readily available. As such, GAO used turning maneuvers to analyze the potential relationship between vehicle type and involvement in fatal pedestrian crashes. GAO found that larger vehicles had higher odds of turning compared with going straight in fatal pedestrian crashes than cars in the same scenarios. For example, heavy-duty trucks (e.g., semi-trucks) had at least 12 times the odds compared with cars.
Vehicle Design Features and Their Potential Relationship to Driver Visibility
Auto and truck manufacturers that GAO interviewed have developed technologies to help mitigate limited driver visibility, such as side bicyclist alerts and pedestrian automatic emergency braking. Manufacturers have also conducted testing and benchmarking of their vehicles to assess driver visibility.
Two selected foreign jurisdictions—the European Union (EU) and London, England—have taken steps to reduce risks to pedestrians and cyclists related to limited driver visibility. The EU has adopted driver visibility standards that auto and truck manufacturers must meet. While similar regulations also apply in the United Kingdom, London has developed a driver visibility standard that requires some commercial truck operators to install additional safety equipment.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has recognized risks to pedestrians and cyclists related to driver visibility but has not fully analyzed those risks or developed responses. DOT has conducted some research and begun to collect data that could be useful in conducting such an analysis. However, it has not analyzed specific risks that limited driver visibility may pose to pedestrians and cyclists, such as those related to turning maneuvers or vehicle design features. DOT has not done so because, in part, it has not determined a method to measure driver visibility in cars and trucks. Such a method could provide data on the size of blind zones and enable DOT to fully analyze the extent to which they pose risks to pedestrians and cyclists. Fully analyzing specific risks would also provide DOT with the information it needs to respond to them, and would better position DOT to meet its goal of reducing roadway fatalities
Why GAO Did This Study
In 2024, about 9,200 pedestrians and cyclists were killed on U.S. roadways—an increase of about 65 percent since 2010. A range of factors can contribute to increased pedestrian and cyclist fatalities, including larger vehicles, which make up an increasing share of vehicles on U.S. roadways and may limit driver visibility.
GAO was asked to review issues related to driver visibility. This report examines (1) what studies and federal data show about the relationship between vehicle characteristics, driver visibility, and pedestrian and cyclist fatalities; (2) actions selected auto and truck manufacturers have taken related to driver visibility; (3) approaches selected foreign jurisdictions have used to reduce driver visibility–related risks to pedestrians and cyclists; and (4) the extent to which DOT has analyzed and responded to potential driver visibility–related risks to pedestrians and cyclists.
GAO reviewed selected studies published from 2015 to 2025, analyzed DOT pedestrian fatality data, and selected and interviewed five auto and five truck manufacturers. GAO also reviewed driver visibility standards adopted by the EU and London and interviewed officials about their approaches. Finally, GAO reviewed DOT studies and planning documents and interviewed DOT officials.
GAO’s work regularly finds that federal programs are unable to assess their performance to determine if they are solving the problem they were created to fix. By defining goals and collecting and using relevant data, agencies could make informed decisions to improve their programs’ results.
The Big Picture
Each year, the federal government spends trillions of dollars on programs that Americans depend on, such as health care, public safety, and disaster support. Our recent reports have found that many federal programs do not have clearly defined goals to identify what they seek to achieve or relevant data to assess progress. Without this information, Congress and agency leaders cannot determine if federal programs funded by taxpayer dollars are delivering intended results and supporting the American people.
What GAO’s Work Shows
Through a three-step process, federal agencies can monitor and manage the results of their programs.
The program performance management process
Federal programs do not consistently manage their performance. Our work often finds programs are focused on inputs (such as money to spend) and outputs (such as number of individuals who received benefits). By contrast, outcomes are the results of a program (such as number of individuals whose lives improved in an intended way).
Programs often lack information on outcomes because they operate without clear, measurable goals or data to assess their results. Agency leaders and Congress need this information to determine if programs are solving the problems they were created to fix, and in turn, if they are a good return on investment for taxpayer money.
Selected Federal Programs that GAO Previously Found Had Incomplete Performance Management Processes
Moreover, federal programs rarely work in isolation. Our work often identifies sets of related programs—within an agency or across multiple agencies—that seek to achieve the same outcomes and may create overlapping efforts.
We also find these related programs have not always defined goals or collected data to manage their performance. This creates the potential for waste and inefficiency. It limits decision-makers’ abilities to (1) assess relative performance across programs and (2) make informed decisions to streamline efforts or provide resources to more effective programs.
Most Programs that Solely Support Pregnant Women, Young Children, and Their Families Had Established Performance Management Processes
Many pregnant women, children through age 5, and their families use support services like food assistance or childcare. In 2026, we identified 15 federal programs at five agencies that provide direct services only to this population.
Twelve of these 15 programs had performance management processes that set goals, collect data, and use the information to assess whether the programs are meeting goals. We recommended that the remaining three programs without these processes—one each at the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs—fully develop them to ensure programs are meeting goals, identifying potential improvements, and targeting resources appropriately.
Source: GAO. | GAO-26-109130
When we have identified opportunities to improve program performance by developing goals and collecting and using data, agencies have taken action to implement our recommendations.
Actions to Improve Performance Management for the Securing the Cities Program
The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Securing the Cities program seeks to help state and local governments detect and deter nuclear terrorism. In 2019, we found that DHS did not collect information to fully track cities' use of the program’s funds or assess performance. We recommended DHS do so.
Subsequently, we found in 2024 that the program had established goals, performance measures, and milestones, and conducted quarterly financial assessments. DHS is now better positioned to monitor the program’s performance and identify any needed actions to improve results.
Source: GAO. | GAO-26-109130
Additional evidence is needed to determine program effectiveness. Because of its ongoing nature, performance management can serve as an early-warning system to identify the need for real-time improvements. Collecting evidence beyond performance data can help determine whether a program is working and why. This includes robust studies known as program evaluations, which can provide valuable insights on program performance.
Types of Program Evaluations and Insights
Process evaluations assess the extent to which a program is being implemented as intended.
Outcome evaluations assess whether (1) program activities are aligned with desired outcomes and (2) changes in outcomes are consistent with program goals.
Impact evaluations assess the effect of a program by comparing results to what would have happened in its absence.
Source: GAO. | GAO-26-109130
When we asked federal managers in a 2020 survey about these robust evaluations, about one-third of respondents reported having access to them to help manage their programs.
Challenges and Opportunities
Statutory requirements provide a solid foundation for effective federal performance management. They have also increased agencies’ use of performance data in decision-making, such as identifying program problems to address and developing new strategies.
In contrast, Congress and the administration often do not have the performance data and evidence they need to make informed improvements and target resources to individual programs or across related programs.
Our work has identified approaches to help ensure decision makers have sufficient information, including
practices to help individual or sets of related programs manage performance and build evidence;
practices to effectively coordinate, and a guide to evaluate and manage, related programs; and
a guide to design program evaluations.
Consistently using these approaches could help agencies manage and assess their programs and provide policymakers and the public with vital information about federal program performance.
For more information, contact Lori Atkinson at atkinsonl@gao.gov.
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