Why This Matters To counter China’s growing military reach, the U.S. military has been strengthening its forces in the Indo-Pacific. In 2021, Congress required annual budget reporting on Department of Defense funding for the region. However, there are concerns that the reporting does not provide the intended visibility into deterrence efforts and funding priorities in the region. GAO Key Takeaways The Department of Defense’s (DOD) annual Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) budget exhibits for fiscal years 2023 through 2025 do not consistently reflect department-wide priorities or requirements and present an inconsistent mix of programs and funding. Because guidance is not clear about how programs should be selected, we found inconsistencies in the types of programs included in the PDI budget exhibits. For example: The Air Force and Marine Corps selected facilities sustainment programs, while the Army and Navy did not. Some military services included efforts east of the International Date Line, although the guidance focuses on efforts primarily west of it. Some DOD organizations included development programs unlikely to be effective within 5 years—despite the guidance’s near-term focus. Additionally, the programs and funding presented in the annual budget exhibit are different from those included in the Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) independent assessment, which is based on its strategy and assumes unlimited resources. While some of the differences can be attributed to that assumption, there are also differences in the types of funded programs prioritized. This raises questions about the extent of DOD’s resourcing needs for the Indo-Pacific region. These inconsistencies make it difficult for Congress to assess whether DOD’s resources are aligned with strategic goals and increase uncertainty about which priorities DOD considers most critical for the region. Comparison of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) Budget Exhibits and the Indo-Pacific Command Independent Assessment, Fiscal Years 2022–2025 How GAO Did This Study We reviewed DOD’s PDI budget exhibits from fiscal years 2023 through 2025 and conducted quantitative analysis of over 500 budget line items. We also conducted site visits to INDOPACOM and its supporting commands.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard urgently needs Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to replace aging cutters that conduct law enforcement and search and rescue operations. The Coast Guard plans to acquire 25 OPCs in stages: stage 1 initially included OPCs 1-4, stage 2 includes OPCs 5-15, and stage 3 will include OPCs 16-25. Construction for stages 1 and 2 is underway by two different shipbuilders. But each shipbuilder’s design remains incomplete, and both have yet to deliver any ships. The stage 1 shipbuilder made limited progress since GAO last reported on OPC. In 2023, GAO found that construction of OPCs 1-4 began without a stable design, contrary to shipbuilding leading practices. This led to rework, which delayed ship deliveries. The Coast Guard took steps in 2024 to prioritize delivery of OPC 1, such as adding payments at certain milestones, but these steps were largely unsuccessful. As of July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated construction of OPCs 3 and 4 as part of an ongoing review of the current stage 1 contract, and delivery of OPC 1 was expected more than 5 years late. Offshore Patrol Cutters 1 (left) and 2 (right) Construction Status in December 2024 The stage 2 shipbuilder and Coast Guard incorporated some leading practices while developing the stage 2 design, such as conducting collaborative design reviews that supported timely decisions. But construction of OPC 5 began in August 2024 without a stable design. Starting construction of more stage 2 OPCs before stabilizing the design, as the Coast Guard plans to do, increases the risk that stage 2 will also encounter costly rework and schedule delays. The OPC program is at risk of not meeting its cost goals, in part, because the program used outdated cost information to establish them. The program is updating this information to account for recent stage 1 cost increases. GAO also found that the program reported an aggregated cost goal for all 25 OPCs instead of by stage. Reporting cost goals by stage would enable decision-makers to hold the program and OPC shipbuilders accountable for their performance. The program plans to acquire stage 3 ships after testing whether the existing designs meet OPC’s performace goals, which is consistent with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy. However, the program is unlikely to have the test results before starting stage 3 procurement activities, such as developing the request for proposals. Incorporating the knowledge gained from testing—as well as other shipbuilding leading practices—into the procurement process for stage 3 could help the Coast Guard make better investment decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future OPC deliveries. Why GAO Did This Study The Coast Guard—a component of DHS—plans to spend over $17 billion to acquire a fleet of 25 OPCs. Since 2020, GAO has found that the Coast Guard is using a high-risk approach to acquire OPCs that involves significant overlap in design and construction. GAO was asked to review the status of the OPC acquisition program. This report examines the extent to which (1) progress has been made on OPC design and construction; and (2) the OPC program is meeting its cost and performance goals. GAO analyzed OPC documents and data; compared the status of OPC stage 1 design and construction to what GAO reported in June 2023 (GAO-23-105805); and compared stage 2 design and construction to leading practices for commercial shipbuilding. GAO also conducted site visits to both OPC shipbuilders to observe stage 1 and stage 2 construction progress; and interviewed Coast Guard officials and shipbuilder representatives.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) leases space from various external parties, including academic affiliates—medical schools and health education programs with an established relationship with VA. According to VA, its local officials leverage these relationships to identify leasing opportunities. In a 2022 law, VA received the authority to noncompetitively award (sole source) a lease to an academic affiliate if certain conditions are met. VA officials said that when sole sourcing a lease, they must still ensure VA receives a fair and reasonable rate. As of June 2025, VA had signed five leases using this authority, according to VA officials. VA officials and academic affiliate representatives GAO interviewed identified benefits and challenges of entering into leases together, including sole source leases. Benefits they identified included (1) increased collaboration to enhance research; (2) improved veterans’ access to care and more modern facilities; and (3) for sole source leases, potentially quicker access to space. However, VA officials and academic affiliates also identified challenges specific to sole source leases, including (1) issues with VA’s communication about the status of these leases; and (2) difficulties determining how to apply VA’s standard processes when pursuing a more unique project. Interviewees also identified general challenges regardless of lease type, such as limited space availability and the time it takes to obtain VA funding for a project. Examples of Research Space Leased by the Department of Veterans Affairs VA has taken actions to support implementation of its sole source leasing authority, such as providing training and guidance to VA staff. But VA has not developed and implemented a lessons-learned process to systematically identify and address any challenges. GAO previously reported that a lessons-learned process can be particularly important when an agency is implementing a new approach, and it is helpful to collect lessons learned during implementation rather than waiting until the end. VA officials said they informally review some leases to identify lessons, and they plan to implement a lessons-learned process after 10 sole source leases have been signed. However, it is unclear whether the plan as described aligns with key practices, such as validating lessons with academic affiliates. In addition, waiting until 10 leases have been signed before identifying lessons learned risks compounding existing challenges that VA and academic affiliates have already identified. This includes challenges that have led to confusion or delays for projects that improve veterans’ access to care and support VA research. Why GAO Did This Study VA provides health care to over 9 million veterans each year through its medical centers and outpatient clinics. However, VA faces challenges in managing its capital assets, including a significant maintenance backlog and aging infrastructure. To meet its capital asset needs, VA may construct, purchase, or lease medical facilities. VA received the authority to enter into sole source leases with academic affiliates as part of the 2022 Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act. GAO was asked to review VA’s use of its new leasing authority. This report addresses (1) how VA identifies opportunities to lease from academic affiliates, (2) the benefits and challenges that VA and academic affiliates identified in entering into leases together, and (3) VA’s actions to support implementation of its sole source leasing authority. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed VA officials. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of four academic affiliates with current or potential VA leases, selected to ensure variation in the purpose and status of the academic affiliates’ leases, among other things. For each lease, GAO reviewed available documents and interviewed regional and local VA officials, as well as representatives from the academic affiliate.

What GAO Found Digital surveillance tools can provide employers with information to help improve their operations and may have positive and negative effects on workers. Sometimes referred to as "bossware," these tools include cameras, microphones, computer monitoring software, geolocation trackers, phone applications, and devices worn by workers, among other tools. GAO's work is based on interviews with stakeholders from 11 organizations: two trade associations, three advocacy organizations, and six research organizations. It is also based on a review of 122 studies that met GAO's standards for methodological quality. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed and studies GAO reviewed, digital surveillance can have the following effects on workers: Physical health and safety. Digital surveillance can both positively and negatively affect workers' physical health and safety. For example, some digital surveillance tools can identify cardiac issues, an indication of potential heart disease. Conversely, they can increase workers' risk of injuries by pushing them to move faster to meet productivity metrics. Mental health. Digital surveillance can both positively and negatively affect workers' mental health. Positive effects can include increasing workers' sense of safety. Negative effects can include increased stress and anxiety. These effects can depend on employers' practices, including how transparent they are about what information they collect. Employment opportunities. The design or incorrect use of some digital surveillance tools could limit their ability to accurately assess performance. For example, digital surveillance tools may use flawed productivity benchmarks, may not account for the full range of worker tasks and responsibilities, or may be used by the employer for unintended purposes. These types of limitations could make some workers more prone to experiencing negative effects on employment opportunities such as low performance evaluations, lower pay, disciplinary actions, or termination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the Department of Labor's (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration investigate claims that could involve digital surveillance. Several federal agencies have also previously provided guidance or resources to employers about the use of digital surveillance, but in 2025 these agencies have either rescinded these prior efforts or are reassessing their alignment with the current administration's priorities. Why GAO Did This Study Employer surveillance of workers has become more widespread as the number of people working remotely has increased and the types of surveillance technologies available have expanded. Employers monitor workers for a variety of reasons, such as tracking their performance, productivity, and health and safety. Some worker advocates have expressed concern about the effects of digital surveillance on workers. GAO was asked to examine the potential effects of digital surveillance on workers' physical health and safety, mental health, and employment opportunities, as well as federal agencies' oversight of employers' use of this technology. This report provides information on these topics and follows a report GAO issued in 2024 that summarized public comments submitted to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) about employers' use of automated digital surveillance tools to monitor workers and the effects of such surveillance on workers (GAO-24-107639). GAO identified stakeholders to interview based on their published research or advocacy in this area, and the recommendations of other experts. GAO identified and reviewed 122 studies about the effects of digital surveillance on workers' physical health and safety, mental health, and employment opportunities. All studies were published from 2020 through 2024 and were assessed by GAO for methodological rigor. While the studies were subject to certain limitations that could potentially affect their findings, GAO deemed them sufficiently robust for inclusion in this review. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency information. GAO interviewed knowledgeable officials from the DOL, EEOC, NLRB, OSTP, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and requested updated information from them in spring of 2025. For more information, contact Thomas Costa at costat@gao.gov.

Why This Matters Health savings accounts (HSA) allow eligible people to save funds tax-free to pay for qualified medical expenses and can earn interest, be invested, and be carried into retirement. In 2023, HSAs held about $123 billion in assets. Some policymakers have raised concerns that wealthier people may use HSAs to accumulate tax-free savings and people with lower incomes may lack the funds to contribute. GAO Key Takeaways To open or contribute to an HSA, an individual must be enrolled in an HSA-eligible high-deductible health plan. These plans have relatively high deductibles, but often lower premiums and may be available to individuals through their employers, health insurance marketplaces, or issuers. Of the nine HSA providers we interviewed, eight focused their marketing efforts on employers, and all had at least one fee associated with their HSA that account holders may have to pay. In 2022, an estimated $43.6 billion in contributions and $25.4 billion in withdrawals were reported among the 16.5 million tax returns reporting HSA activity, according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data. Of the reported contributions, about 84 percent were from an employer or employee through payroll deductions, and 16 percent were from individuals directly to their HSAs. Of the reported withdrawals, over 97 percent were for qualified medical expenses; the remaining were for non-qualified expenses—such as groceries—that are subject to taxes. We found that, among individuals in plans with high deductibles, HSAs and similar medical expense accounts were more common among those with higher incomes, Asian or White individuals, those in excellent or very good health, and those with employer-sponsored plans.  Total Health Savings Account Contributions and Withdrawals by Type, 2022 Note: Internal Revenue Service data from 2022 was the most recent year available at the time of our review. How GAO Did This Study We obtained responses from nine HSA providers that varied by size and geography. We also reviewed information from federal agencies, including the IRS and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and from stakeholder groups, including those representing consumers and industry. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at dickenj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion, donors of recovery assistance, including the U.S., aimed to help Ukraine build a strong economy and stable democracy on a path to European Union membership. As of December 2024, donors reported having collectively committed more than $130 billion in loans and grants for these objectives. Donors linked their assistance to Ukraine’s implementation of reforms, such as governance for state-owned enterprises. From February 2022 through December 2024, the Department of State successfully facilitated interagency collaboration as it led early recovery planning for Ukraine but did not fully develop ways to measure progress toward U.S. goals or estimate costs for its assistance strategy. The strategy does not contain indicators for measuring progress toward strategic goals, though State officials said they intended to develop them. In addition, State had not determined the funding resources needed to achieve these goals. Doing so would give the U.S. information it needs to make the most effective use of any future recovery assistance it provides to Ukraine. Through December 2024, donors and the government of Ukraine (GoU) used a coordination mechanism called the Ukraine Donor Platform to support collaborative decisions and generate support for key recovery initiatives. These initiatives included financing and technical assistance to enhance Ukraine’s ability to prepare and implement recovery projects. Donors cited U.S. leadership during this period as critical for coordination and advancing initiatives. Ukrainian entities have been building a system for managing public projects and implementing reforms designed to strengthen institutions and spur economic growth, in support of recovery. However, effects of the war, such as population displacement, and continuing corruption risks may interfere with their efforts to manage recovery in an accountable and transparent manner. Municipalities Present Recovery Projects at the 2024 Ukraine Recovery Conference Why GAO Did This Study Ukraine, with support from the U.S. and other donors, has taken early steps toward recovery, despite the ongoing conflict. The World Bank estimated recovery could cost nearly $524 billion over 10 years. The U.S. reported committing more than $56 billion for Ukraine’s recovery from 2022 through 2024. However, the U.S. has paused some assistance amid changes to its foreign assistance priorities. GAO was asked to evaluate U.S. planning for assisting Ukraine’s recovery. This report examines, from February 2022 through December 2024, (1) U.S. and other donor goals for Ukraine’s recovery, (2) the extent to which U.S. government strategic planning and interagency collaboration for Ukraine’s early recovery incorporated best practices, (3) mechanisms for coordination among donors and the GoU, and (4) Ukrainian efforts to improve transparency and accountability, supporting recovery. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from State and other federal agencies, the GoU, and other donors. GAO also conducted a site visit to Kyiv, Ukraine.