What GAO Found The electromagnetic spectrum is a critical resource for many uses including national defense and commercial wireless services. Since more than one user operating on the same frequency can disrupt transmissions, the Department of Defense (DOD) must coordinate its spectrum use. It does so with other federal agencies and nonfederal entities, such as private sector companies and other organizations. This coordination occurs through a National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) committee. In doing so, DOD generally follows leading collaboration practices. For instance, DOD policy and practices provide for defined roles, established processes, and regular communication, which are each leading collaboration practices. Agency officials and private-sector stakeholders said DOD secures the frequency assignments it needs while addressing potential interference and other concerns with other users. Selected Spectrum Uses of the Department of Defense DOD and NTIA conduct spectrum repurposing studies to determine if continuous portions of the spectrum—called bands—can be designated for different categories of use (e.g., radar, mobile phone networks, GPS, or users [i.e., federal or nonfederal users]). DOD and NTIA followed most collaboration leading practices in conducting two such studies recently but did not consistently provide transparency to stakeholders or establish documented processes for the studies. For a major 2023 study for sharing spectrum bands DOD currently uses for radar, DOD collaborated with federal and nonfederal stakeholders. However, DOD did not clearly communicate to nonfederal stakeholders whether and how their input would be evaluated or used in decision-making. According to some stakeholders, this lack of transparency led to uncertainty about the value of their participation in the study. For a separate 2024 spectrum-sharing report, DOD and NTIA did not develop documented plans or establish formal processes to guide their work. Improved NTIA and DOD transparency, documentation of policies, and clearer expectations for collaboration could help reduce uncertainty and build trust. Considering that spectrum sharing and repurposing collaborations can potentially last years, these changes would also support more informed decision-making by nonfederal stakeholders about whether to invest time and resources in participating. Without addressing these uncertainties, nonfederal stakeholders may decide not to participate in future DOD- and NTIA- led studies, even though their input is valuable in determining how to repurpose spectrum effectively. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, private-sector demand for spectrum has increased, creating debate over whether some DOD frequency assignments could be repurposed for nonfederal use. DOD coordinates with NTIA, which manages federal agencies’ spectrum use, in the processes to obtain frequency assignments and study the feasibility of repurposing spectrum. GAO was asked to review DOD’s use of spectrum and its collaboration with NTIA and other stakeholders. Among other objectives, this report evaluates (1) the extent to which DOD’s processes for obtaining frequency assignments follow leading practices for collaboration; and (2) the extent to which DOD’s and NTIA’s processes for developing spectrum repurposing studies follow leading collaboration and information-sharing practices, among other objectives. GAO reviewed DOD and NTIA documentation and interviewed officials from DOD components, NTIA, and federal and nonfederal stakeholders. GAO also compared DOD and NTIA practices with leading collaboration and other leading management practices.

What GAO Found In general, small communities continue to face declining scheduled passenger air service, especially at nonhub airports—airports that have more than 10,000 annual commercial passenger boardings but less than 0.05 percent of the annual total of U.S. commercial passenger boardings. At these airports, the average number of daily departures per route in 2024 was 19 percent lower than the 2018 level. Over 70 percent of nonhub airports that were not receiving federal support from the Essential Air Service (EAS) program experienced a decline in average daily departures per route from 2018 to 2024. Percentage Change from 2018 to 2024 in Average Daily Departures per Route for Nonhub Airports Not Receiving Subsidized Essential Air Service According to GAO’s prior work, stakeholders have cited pilot and maintenance workforce supply challenges, increased airline operating costs, and heightened airline expectations for revenue guarantees as among the market factors contributing to changes in air service to small communities in recent years. Some of these factors also contributed to higher EAS subsidy costs, which increased about 31 percent from 2018 to 2023. Higher airline operating costs also limited the effect of Small Community Air Service Development Program (SCASDP) grants that communities used to incentivize airlines to initiate air service. As GAO has previously reported, selected stakeholders and recent studies have identified options to improve air service to small communities. These include increasing aviation workforce supply and supporting other transportation modes, such as bus service, or new technologies, such as electric aircraft, that could lower airline operating costs. Stakeholders also identified options to change EAS—such as focusing EAS assistance on more remote communities or expanding EAS to better ensure small airports do not lose air service—and to modify SCASDP in response to rising airline operating costs. Why GAO Did This Study Communities of all sizes seek access to air transportation services. However, the economics of the airline industry have traditionally made it difficult to establish or sustain viable air service in small communities. Small communities are generally served by small airports, which for scheduled passenger air service typically include small hub, nonhub, and non-primary nonhub airports. The Department of Transportation administers federal programs that provide subsidies and grants to help eligible small communities retain a link to the national aviation system. This testimony discusses (1) changes in scheduled passenger air service to small communities in recent years; (2) market factors affecting air service to small communities and related federal programs; and (3) options that aviation stakeholders and recent studies identified to improve air service to small communities. It draws from GAO’s September 2024 report on air service to small communities (GAO-24-106681), December 2025 report on nonhub airports (GAO-26-107751), and April 2026 report on regional airline pilots (GAO-26-107856). Details about the scope and methodology for each report are included in those reports.

This letter provides GAO's comments on the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Professional Ethics Executive Committee's (PEEC) Proposed Revised Definition of "Attest Engagement Team". GAO promulgates generally accepted government auditing standards, which provide professional standards for auditors of government entities in the United States.

What GAO Found The U.S. Center for SafeSport (the Center) is a nonprofit organization that plays a key role in ensuring the safety of amateur athletes. The Center has jurisdiction over the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee (the Corporation) and its affiliated organizations (known as national governing bodies) with regard to safeguarding amateur athletes against abuse in sports. The Empowering Olympic, Paralympic, and Amateur Athletes Act of 2020 (the Act) contains several provisions related to the independence of the Center from the Corporation. Based on certification provisions in the Act and GAO's methodology, GAO certifies that the Center was independent from the Corporation during fiscal year 2025 (January 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025). GAO found no evidence that a former employee or board member of the Corporation worked for the Center during its fiscal year 2025 in violation of the cooling-off period in the Act. Further, for the Center's fiscal year 2025, GAO found no evidence of a conflict of interest, as defined by the Act, between the Center's executives or attorneys and the Corporation. According to the Act, an executive or attorney for the Center shall be considered to have an inappropriate conflict of interest if the executive or attorney also represents the Corporation. In addition, GAO's review of the Center's investigative process found no evidence of interference or influence by the Corporation. Why GAO Did This Study The Act includes a provision for GAO to annually "make available to the public a certification relating to the Center's independence from the Corporation," including findings on whether a violation of the prohibition on employment (2-year cooling-off period) of former employees or board members of the Corporation has occurred during the year preceding the certification; an executive or attorney for the Center has had an inappropriate conflict of interest during that year; and the Corporation has interfered in, or attempted to influence the outcome of, an investigation by the Center. GAO reviewed information provided by the Center about its employees and individuals who worked or volunteered for the Center at any point during its fiscal year 2025. This includes reviewing conflict-of-interest verification forms that the Center requires of all such individuals. GAO cross-checked the information provided by the Center with information received from the Corporation about its employees, such as information about attorneys employed, hired, or retained. GAO reviewed the Center's written responses to questions. GAO also reviewed documents such as the Center's employee handbook, standard operating procedures, and the SafeSport Code, which establishes acceptable standards of conduct for all individuals who participate in U.S. Olympic and Paralympic events and training. For more information, please contact Kathryn A. Larin at larink@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Transport of livestock animals can extend over thousands of miles. If not managed properly, this can lead to injury, illness, or death. The Twenty-Eight Hour law is the primary federal law addressing the interstate transport of livestock animals. Historically, the law’s purpose has been to prevent cruelty to animals during transport by limiting the duration of confinement to 28 hours without humanely unloading them for feed, water, and rest. However, the law does not address other factors GAO identified that could help prevent such cruelty, including the animals’ fitness for transport and unsanitary vehicles and equipment. Industry and other stakeholders have noted that addressing these factors provides multiple economic, safety, and health benefits, such as preventing the spread of disease. Truck Transporting Sheep on a U.S. Highway The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken limited action to monitor interstate transport of livestock animals for potential violations because, according to officials, they do not have regulatory authority. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has not taken any such action because it does not have a role in or authority for ensuring welfare of livestock animals during transport, according to DOT officials. From 2013 through 2025, USDA referred one case involving a potential violation of the Twenty-Eight Hour law to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for enforcement, but no enforcement action was taken in that case. In general, the penalties and enforcement mechanisms are inadequate to incentivize enforcement, according to DOJ officials and other stakeholders GAO interviewed. By amending the law or passing new legislation to (1) address factors beyond the duration of travel, (2) authorize federal agencies to monitor transport of livestock animals, and (3) enhance the penalties and authorize administrative enforcement actions, Congress would improve federal agencies’ ability to prevent cruelty to livestock animals during interstate transport. Congress would also be better positioned to hold agencies accountable for ensuring compliance. Why GAO Did This Study Hundreds of millions of livestock animals, such as cattle, goats, horses, mules, pigs, and sheep, are transported each year for various purposes, primarily by truck. Some of these trips may span many hours. GAO was asked to assess federal agencies’ efforts to oversee the interstate transport of livestock animals. This report reviews the extent to which the Twenty-Eight Hour law addresses factors that could help prevent cruelty to livestock animals, and federal agency actions to monitor compliance with and enforce the law. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; conducted site visits to two USDA-approved Feed, Water, and Rest stations; analyzed USDA data on potential violations of the law and assessed the reliability of these data; obtained and analyzed documents, when provided, and views from officials at USDA, DOJ, and DOT, and 17 nonfederal stakeholders, including industry and animal health and welfare groups.

What GAO Found Stakeholders and available literature identified occupation, culture, and personal life stressors that may negatively affect the mental health of law enforcement officers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Stressors that Department of Homeland Security Law Enforcement Officers May Face Selected law enforcement agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)—reported that at least 99 suicide-related deaths occurred in fiscal years 2016 through 2025. During this period, CBP reported 81 of these deaths and had an average suicide rate of 17.6, which varied annually compared to nationwide trends. ICE and TSA reported a total of 18 deaths. GAO found that the agencies face challenges collecting all data specified in DHS’s suicide prevention directive, in part due to privacy concerns and their need to rely on external sources for death information. DHS’s Office of Health Security (OHS) has taken steps to centralize data collection on deaths through a new system but still relies on agencies’ data. Assessing and updating the directive and ensuring the new system reflects any changes would allow for more consistent data collection and assist in prevention efforts. OHS and DHS law enforcement agencies have policies and programs related to mental health and suicide prevention that apply to law enforcement officers. CBP and ICE have also developed initiatives that provide additional support for officers’ mental health. For example, CBP’s Safe Harbor initiative, which is unique within DHS, offers a path for officers to seek help for mental health concerns without risking job loss or removal from duty. OHS, CBP, ICE, and TSA have taken some steps to assess mental health and suicide prevention programs and initiatives. However, they did not consistently collect and report sufficient data to OHS to support an overall program assessment. By developing a process to consistently collect and assess relevant information, such as annual reports on program implementation, OHS could improve analysis of comparable information across agencies and strengthen oversight of mental health and suicide prevention programs. Also, while CBP has taken steps to assess the implementation of Safe Harbor, it lacks key information, such as the extent of employee awareness, to understand whether the initiative is working as intended. Developing a plan to assess the initiative’s effectiveness would better position CBP to determine which efforts best support law enforcement officers who need mental health services. Why GAO Did This Study DHS is the largest federal law enforcement agency, with more than 77,000 officers across nine agencies and offices. DHS officers perform critical work to protect national security, but this work may expose them to stress that could adversely affect their mental health. GAO was asked to review DHS’s mental health and suicide prevention efforts related to its law enforcement officers. This report examines (1) stakeholder perspectives and available literature on mental health and suicide among these officers, (2) data on law enforcement officers’ deaths by suicide, (3) mental health and suicide prevention policies and programs, and (4) efforts to assess related programs. GAO analyzed policies and documents and reviewed literature on mental health and suicide among DHS law enforcement officers. GAO selected three agencies—CBP, ICE, and TSA—for closer review based on total officers and magnitude of mental health resources provided. GAO analyzed agency data on officers’ suicide-related deaths. GAO interviewed DHS officials, a total of ten randomly selected officers from CBP, ICE, and TSA, and stakeholders from relevant employee organizations.

What GAO Found As GAO reported in December 2024, the Forest Service did not meet its annual targets for amount of timber sold in fiscal years 2014 through 2023, averaging about 90 percent of its targets during this time frame. During interviews with GAO for this review, agency officials identified factors that limited their ability to attain these targets, including staffing and legal challenges. For example, officials said staff capacity limited their ability to complete work needed to manage timber sales. Officials said staff reductions in 2025 further strained their capacity. The agency’s workforce decreased by about 20 percent in response to a February 2025 executive order for large-scale workforce reductions. Given these reductions, officials said increasing timber sales in response to a March 2025 executive order on expanding timber production would be challenging. Timber Harvest Operations (left) and a Forest Service Official at the Site of a Timber Sale (right) Agency officials and stakeholders identified opportunities to improve the Forest Service’s management of timber sales, such as the following: Expanding practices to more effectively use staff and conduct strategic workforce planning. Officials and several stakeholders said that increasing the use of partners and contractors and newer tools and technologies could help the agency address its staffing challenges. Officials and industry, conservation, and nonfederal government stakeholders also said the Forest Service needs more staff and staff with the right expertise to manage timber sales. The agency has not assessed how recent and ongoing changes to its workforce and organizational structure will affect its capacity. By conducting strategic workforce planning, the Forest Service could better understand how to recruit and retain the critical staff it needs to effectively manage timber sales. Improving communication. Officials and several stakeholders said that improving the frequency and consistency of communication with stakeholders and the public could improve the Forest Service’s management of planned timber sales. For example, an industry stakeholder said the agency could provide more current, comprehensive information on timber sales on its website. By more frequently and consistently communicating information about planned timber sales to stakeholders and the public, the Forest Service could better manage its timber sales. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Forest Service sells billions of board feet of timber each year as part of its mission to manage the National Forest System for multiple uses and to provide sustained yields of various resources, including timber. Some congressional members, industry and conservation groups, and others have raised concerns, including about the amount of timber sold or negative effects of timber sales on wildlife habitat and recreation. A congressional committee report includes a provision for GAO to review Forest Service timber harvest levels. GAO was also asked by multiple congressional requesters to review this topic. This report, the second in a two-part series, (1) describes factors Forest Service officials identify as limiting the agency’s ability to meet its targets for annual timber sales and (2) examines agency officials’ and stakeholders’ views on how to improve management of Forest Service timber sales. GAO reviewed relevant agency documents and data; conducted in-person site visits to seven national forests in three regions, selected based on variation in volume of timber sold and geography; and interviewed officials from Forest Service headquarters, officials from all nine regions, and nonfederal stakeholders, such as industry and conservation groups.

What GAO Found To support its health care budget projection each year, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) contracts with an actuarial consultant to assist VHA with the annual Enrollee Health Care Projection Model update. The model produces three basic outputs: enrollment, utilization, and unit cost. Each output is subject to several complex adjustments to account for the characteristics of VHA health care and the veterans who access VHA’s health care services. Basic Outputs of VHA’s Enrollee Health Care Projection Model GAO found VHA’s processes for developing the model’s estimates align with most but not all relevant standards. For example, VHA’s Office of Enrollment and Forecasting (E&F) does not have a formalized process requiring VHA’s actuarial consultant to incorporate newly emerging data into the model after initial model delivery. According to VHA officials, incorporating newly emerging data after the delivery of its initial model scenario is not required because it depends on factors such as data availability, the timing of the President’s budget, and requests from the VHA Office of Finance. However, incorporating newly emerging data, when possible, could ensure that VHA’s health care cost estimates reflect the most current data, improve the accuracy and completeness of the model estimates, and potentially support a more informed budget request. VHA uses performance measures to assess its actuarial consultant, but VHA’s standard operating procedure does not specify what E&F staff should be doing to ensure that the consultant adequately performs the tasks outlined in the performance work statement. According to VHA documents, VHA conducts a monthly review of the actuarial consultant’s invoices to ensure it is producing the deliverables laid out in the contract. However, because the invoices only indicate when the work was done, this review does not allow VHA to assess the quality of the consultant’s work. By not including specific oversight tasks in its standard operating procedures, such as establishing a formalized process for assessing the quality of specific tasks in the performance work statement, VHA may miss opportunities to improve the accuracy of its budgetary support provided by its actuarial consultant. Why GAO Did This Study VHA, within the Department of Veterans Affairs, serves about 9.1 million enrollees. In its budget request, VHA estimated the fiscal year 2025 medical care total obligational level to be $149.5 billion. Determining needed funding to ensure veterans have access to quality health care involves accurately projecting potential costs. VHA and its actuarial consultant use a model to project cost estimates for health care services. These estimates are used to inform VA’s budget projection included in the President’s budget request. For fiscal year 2025, VA requested $6 billion in additional funding, beyond the level included in the President’s budget. Given this and that VHA has underestimated its funding needs for health care services in prior years, Congress has raised questions about VHA’s process for developing its budget estimates. In this report, GAO (1) describes VHA’s current process for updating the actuarial model used to estimate its health care funding needs; (2) examines the extent to which VHA’s processes for developing VA’s health care model estimates align with relevant professional standards; and (3) examines VHA’s oversight of the performance of its actuarial consultant. GAO reviewed documents from VHA and its actuarial consultant on the processes used to develop health care model estimates, as well as documents for assessing contractor performance. GAO also interviewed VHA officials and VHA's actuarial consultant.

What GAO Found The Census Bureau fully implemented leading practices for risk management for its enterprise-wide data storage and processing modernization program (known as the Enterprise Data Lake). It also substantially implemented leading practices for managing requirements and cost estimating. However, the Bureau partially implemented leading practices for developing and maintaining the schedule for the program, as shown in the table. Extent to Which the Census Bureau Implemented Leading Practices for Managing the Enterprise Data Lake Program Management Area Overall Assessment Assessment by Leading Practice Risk Management ⬤  Fully implemented ⬤  ⬤  ⬤  ⬤  ⬤ Requirements Management ◕  Substantially implemented ⬤  ⬤  ⬤  ◐  Cost Estimation ◕  Substantially implemented ◕  ⬤  ⬤  ◕  Schedule ◐  Partially implemented ◐  ◔  ◔  ◐  Source: GAO analysis of Census Bureau data. | GAO-26-107629 The program’s management of risk and requirements improves its ability to mitigate risks and deliver on the program. However, the program’s requirements management plan was not in alignment with its process for managing low-level requirements. Thus, the program may have difficulty ensuring that low-level requirements are documented consistently. Documenting requirements can ensure that there is consistency between the requirements and the solution, which increases the likelihood that the solution will meet user needs. Additionally, the program fully met two of the four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable cost estimate (well documented and accurate), and substantially met the remaining two characteristics (comprehensive and credible). As a result, GAO found that the program’s cost estimate was reliable. However, the program’s schedule estimate was unreliable. The program did not substantially meet any of the four characteristics of a reliable schedule: comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled. Without fully implementing leading practices for a reliable schedule, the Bureau faces schedule uncertainty that may result in unreliable completion dates, time extension requests, and delays in the program. The Bureau partially implemented leading practices for managing selected interdependencies among its four IT modernization programs. For example, to manage stakeholder interdependencies among the programs, it is holding regular meetings with stakeholders to discuss program status, risks, and issues. However, the Bureau does not have a process to ensure that changes to survey onboarding dates are incorporated, if applicable, into the schedules for the related IT modernization programs. Without a documented process for managing interdependent schedule changes, the Bureau may not identify schedule disconnects early enough to allow program management sufficient time to make decisions. Potential schedule disconnects may also hinder the ability to predict the consequences of managerial action or inaction on events and increase the risk that the Bureau is unable to deliver a set of integrated systems for future surveys, such as the 2030 Census. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Census Bureau’s IT systems are essential to collecting and providing data about the nation’s people and economy. Prior to the 2020 Census, the Bureau, a component of the Department of Commerce, faced challenges in modernizing and consolidating its IT systems. For future surveys, including the 2030 Census, the Bureau has embarked on four modernization programs to collect, store, process, and disseminate data. GAO was asked to review the Bureau’s implementation of key modernization programs. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Bureau is implementing leading practices in managing risks, requirements, cost estimates, and schedule for a selected enterprise-wide IT program; and (2) determines the extent to which the Bureau is managing selected interdependencies among the enterprise-wide IT programs. GAO selected the data storage and processing program due to its critical role to the agency’s mission, and the maturity of its cost and schedule documentation. GAO assessed the program’s management of risks, requirements, cost, and schedule against leading practices. In addition, GAO reviewed prior GAO reports and Bureau documentation related to interdependencies among the four IT modernization programs and interviewed Bureau officials.

What GAO Found Executive branch agencies are required to report improper payment estimates for each risk-susceptible program. GAO identified seven agencies with programs reporting estimated improper payment rates of 10 percent or higher for 2, 3, or 4 consecutive fiscal years from 2021 through 2024. Consecutive Fiscal Years of Noncompliance Reported for Agencies’ Improper Payment Rates Since Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 Implementation To improve transparency, agencies that are noncompliant under the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) are required to report annually to Congress and GAO. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance on PIIA requirements to agencies. However, GAO found that the guidance does not direct noncompliant agencies to submit the required annual reports. Unless OMB updates its guidance, Congress may not have the information it needs to assess agencies’ actions to address improper payments and hold them accountable. Reporting requirements for noncompliant agencies vary, depending on how many consecutive fiscal years programs are noncompliant with PIIA. GAO found that all agencies with noncompliant programs for 2 consecutive years had either submitted additional program integrity proposals to OMB, as required, or taken other actions to help bring their programs into compliance. Four of the six agencies with programs found noncompliant for 3 consecutive years submitted the required 3-year noncompliance information to Congress, OMB, and GAO. The Departments of Labor (DOL) and the Treasury did not submit the information timely, and the Treasury did not report to GAO. All four agencies with programs found noncompliant for 4 consecutive years submitted reports to Congress and OMB as required by PIIA and OMB guidance. Five of the seven agencies did not have sufficient documented policies and procedures to ensure consistent timely reporting for their noncompliant programs. When agencies do not meet PIIA’s annual and consecutive year reporting requirements, Congress loses visibility into which programs continue to pose elevated risks and whether agencies are taking meaningful steps to address them. Having such policies and procedures will help ensure that Congress receives timely information needed to inform legislative decision-making and support efforts for reducing government-wide improper payments and saving taxpayer dollars. Why GAO Did This Study Executive branch agencies have reported cumulative improper payment estimates of about $3 trillion since fiscal year 2003, including $186 billion for fiscal year 2025. To help save taxpayer dollars, it is imperative that agencies prioritize reducing their improper payments and timely report on their efforts to do so. House Report 117-389, which accompanied the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to provide quarterly reports on improper payments. This is GAO’s 11th and final report. This report examines actions that agencies have taken to meet certain PIIA reporting requirements for programs that had estimated improper payment rates of 10 percent or higher for 2 or more consecutive years. For programs with reported noncompliance, GAO reviewed relevant laws and OMB guidance and analyzed agencies’ policies and procedures, budget information, and information on PaymentAccuracy.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense’s (DOD) decisions to partner with civilian medical facilities to train military medical personnel for the battlefield are influenced by various factors that can support or hinder the use of partnerships, according to officials. One type of partnership that DOD can establish through an external resource sharing agreement allows active-duty providers to provide medical care to beneficiaries in civilian medical facilities within DOD’s network. Using these partnerships can reduce costs by avoiding certain professional fees and by keeping patient care within the network. However, DOD has not fully explored the benefits of increasing the use of these partnerships. Developing strategies to identify opportunities for using such agreements could ultimately help reduce costs, increase clinical readiness, and improve access to care. Factors Influencing DOD’s Decision to Use Civilian Medical Partnerships The Defense Health Agency (DHA)—the combat support agency responsible for providing the necessary clinical workload to meet the military departments’ medical readiness requirements—does not know the total number of partnerships department-wide. DHA has taken some steps to inventory partnerships with civilian entities consistent with DOD policy to do so. However, these steps have been ad hoc and have not resulted in a complete or updated inventory. Without a standardized process for collecting information on partnerships for such an inventory, DHA has limited visibility of partnerships with civilian entities that can be used to provide additional readiness opportunities for its military medical personnel. DOD also has not fully assessed the contributions of partnerships to clinical readiness. The military departments have implemented some efforts to collect clinical activity data to assess the clinical readiness opportunities provided by partnerships they established. However, each military department maintains partnerships that have not been fully assessed. Similarly, DHA does not have complete data needed to fully assess partnerships department-wide because it has not issued guidance for collecting complete clinical activity data. Without such guidance, DOD risks having less information to evaluate partnership performance and trading off opportunities to send personnel to a partnership for skills sustainment in lieu of them working in a DOD medical facility to provide beneficiary care. Why GAO Did This Study DOD has had a longstanding concern that some military medical personnel may not be prepared to provide lifesaving medical care on the battlefield. To address this issue, DOD has, among other things, established partnerships with civilian trauma centers and other medical facilities to provide opportunities for training its military medical personnel. Committee reports accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 include provisions for GAO to assess DOD’s partnerships. This report examines (1) the factors influencing DOD’s decisions to use a partnership and efforts to reduce health care costs; (2) DHA’s inventory of partnerships; and (3) DOD’s assessment of partnership contributions to the readiness of its medical personnel. GAO reviewed DOD guidance and documentation and analyzed timecard and readiness data, where available, from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024. GAO also interviewed DOD officials, including officials from seven medical facilities selected based on military department affiliation and size, as well as officials from civilian partners.

What GAO Found The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2026 Census Test will not produce data on the viability of certain proposed 2030 Census design features as originally envisioned. The Bureau reduced the scope of the 2026 test in two ways. First, it reduced the number of test locations from six to two. Second, it reduced or eliminated 10 of 19 operational activities that the Bureau originally had planned to test for viability. These activities include, for example, changing how the Bureau uses administrative data to enumerate certain households and providing an internet self-response option for residents of university halls. As a result of the Department of Commerce’s review of the 2026 Test, the Bureau determined that the 2026 Test would focus on two key priorities, according to agency officials: (1) piloting in-field enumeration by U.S. Postal Service (USPS) staff, and (2) enhancements and innovations to field infrastructure, staffing, and training. GAO’s prior work identified evidence-based policymaking practices, including that agencies should build a portfolio of high-quality, credible sources of evidence to support decision-making. As a result of the narrowed scope and other changes to the 2026 Test, there is a risk that the Bureau will not collect information on the efficacy of certain design features before it finalizes the Census design. Consequently, the Bureau could experience cost and quality challenges in managing the 2030 Census. Not having evidence to inform decisions may also harm congressional and public confidence in the Census. The figure below displays the four canceled 2026 Test sites and two remaining sites—Huntsville, Alabama, and Spartanburg, South Carolina. The Bureau scaled down the 2026 Test in part to focus on piloting the use of USPS staff for in-field enumeration at the two remaining locations. The Bureau also changed the questionnaire to ask more questions, including on citizenship status, from respondents. In addition, the Bureau previously called for Spanish and Chinese language versions of the questionnaire but approved an English-only language version. Four Original Sites Eliminated from 2026 Census Test The Bureau has agency-wide skills gaps that could affect mission-critical areas such as modern IT engineering and cybersecurity, but has not completed an agency-wide workforce assessment that would be needed to identify and address any additional gaps. A key principle for effective strategic workforce planning is to develop strategies that are tailored to address gaps in number, deployment, and alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all critical skills and competencies. Given the statutory deadline for tabulating census results, the Bureau must have sufficient staff with the right skill sets in place to manage an effective enumeration. As of February 2026, though, Bureau officials said the agency-wide workforce assessment is paused until the Bureau establishes roles for employees participating in the assessment, which may be delayed until the agency completes a broader reorganization effort (slated for fiscal year 2027). Such a timeline would create challenges to addressing skills gaps in time to effectively manage the 2030 Census. Moreover, without better understanding its workforce needs, whether through an agencywide workforce assessment or other means, the Bureau may not be addressing existing skills gaps through actions it is currently taking. Why GAO Did This Study The Constitution mandates the recurring conduct of a census for purposes of apportioning political representation among the states, which is carried out by the Bureau and provides vital data for the nation. GAO was asked to report on a range of topics related to preparations for the 2030 Census. The Bureau is implementing the 2026 Test as the first of two major field tests planned to help the agency examine new methods, processes, and approaches to the census. The stated purpose of the 2026 Test is to assess the viability of new or revised design elements for the 2030 Census. This is the first of a series of products reporting on the status of preparations, planning decisions, and testing for the 2030 Census, as well as emerging challenges that could affect the Bureau's approach for the 2030 Census. GAO reviewed operational and staffing plans for the 2026 Test and 2030 Census, and data on Bureau-wide personnel actions for 2025. GAO also interviewed Bureau officials and sought a rationale from Commerce regarding changes made to the focus of the 2026 Test. As of May 2026, Commerce has yet to respond.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) has primary responsibility for ensuring the cybersecurity of the federal electronic health record (EHR). The Federal Electronic Health Record Modernization office (FEHRM) is responsible for providing direction and oversight on joint functions. To that end, the FEHRM works to improve interagency cybersecurity and privacy collaboration by providing opportunities for partner agencies to coordinate and by initiating joint activities to enhance the security of the system. Accordingly, the FEHRM facilitated collaboration among partner agencies; however, the collaboration would be improved by fully addressing leading practices. For example, it has not fully articulated specific or common goals or outcomes related to the cybersecurity of the EHR or the privacy of data within it. Further, the FEHRM reported that it did not have related performance measures for monitoring progress towards these outcomes. Extent to Which the FEHRM Followed Leading Interagency Collaboration Practices Addressing the shortfalls in interagency collaboration could provide better understanding of the resources needed to address shared responsibilities and clearer insight into the impacts of joint efforts. As a result, the FEHRM, partner agencies, and Congress could have greater assurance that appropriate actions are being taken to keep the system and its data secure and to prevent its exploitation by adversaries. Why GAO Did This Study The federal EHR is a single system used to store, share, and analyze patient care information. The system is housed in a data center, referred to as the federal enclave. The system supports the delivery of healthcare to millions of beneficiaries across four partner agencies: DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The FEHRM is a joint DOD-VA decision-making authority for the federal EHR with requirements set by Congress. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision for GAO to report on aspects of the federal EHR. This report (1) describes the federal EHR system and its management, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for the cybersecurity of the system and protecting the privacy of the data within it, and (3) examines how agencies are collaborating to keep the system and its data secure. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed interagency agreements regarding the use of the federal EHR and relevant agency cybersecurity and privacy policies, and interviewed agency officials. GAO also compared FEHRM collaboration efforts to leading collaboration practices.

What GAO Found The Bureau of Labor Statistics’s (BLS) Employment Situation report (the Jobs Report) provides key information on the nation’s economy based on data from two surveys—one of households (the household survey) and one of employers (the establishment survey). Stakeholders with jobs data expertise said the report generally meets users’ needs. However, they said occasional large revisions can make the data less useful for informing timely decisions, and BLS faces risks to data quality due to lower survey response rates over time (see figure). BLS met its goals for the data’s precision and size of the revisions from fiscal years 2020 through 2025, but it relaxed one goal during the COVID-19 pandemic. Response Rates to the Jobs Report Surveys, Oct 2015–Sept 2025 BLS obtains input from data users and technical experts through various means to inform improvements to the Jobs Report. However, it does not have a plan to address gaps in obtaining regular user and technical feedback since the Departments of Commerce and Labor eliminated three advisory committees in 2025. Having a plan would help ensure that changes to the Jobs Report meet users’ needs and address technical challenges while preserving data quality. BLS and the Census Bureau—which conducts the household survey for BLS—have met federal requirements for assessing the effects of lower survey response rates on the Jobs Report’s accuracy but released limited information on their findings. Studies by agency staff found limited effects of lower response rates on the accuracy of the household survey data. However, BLS has not released its assessments of the establishment survey due to limitations, including challenges linking the survey data with more comprehensive sources. BLS has started a new establishment survey study designed to address earlier limitations. Releasing the results could help users maintain trust in the data’s accuracy. Agency efforts and additional options identified by stakeholders aim to enhance the quality of the Jobs Report data. For example, BLS and Census are planning to add an online response method to the household survey in 2027 to try to increase response rates and lower data collection costs. However, BLS and Census officials said recent funding constraints may delay full implementation. Also, stakeholders, researchers, and BLS officials identified additional options to address survey challenges. For instance, some suggested incorporating administrative data from private and other government sources (such as unemployment insurance data) to help mitigate lower survey response rates. Why GAO Did This Study Economic policymakers, businesses, and others rely on the monthly Jobs Report for accurate and timely information on the health of the nation’s economy, such as the unemployment rate. However, in recent years, questions have been raised about the quality of the data in the report. GAO was asked to review the quality of the data in the Jobs Report. GAO’s report addresses (1) the extent to which the Jobs Report data meet users’ needs for accurate, useful, and timely information, and challenges BLS faces in producing these data, (2) the extent to which BLS and Census have followed federal requirements for assessing survey response rates and communicating findings to data users, and (3) potential options to address survey challenges and associated considerations. GAO reviewed data on BLS’s performance goals for the quality of the Jobs Report data. GAO also reviewed relevant government and academic studies and agency documentation. GAO interviewed agency officials and 14 stakeholders that were selected to provide a range of expert perspectives on the quality of the data for informing economic policy and business decisions and on options to address survey challenges. GAO compared BLS and Census processes to federal statistical policies and relevant federal standards for internal control.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) offers eligible military families with special needs dependents coverage for additional services beyond what is covered by TRICARE health plansthrough the TRICARE Extended Care Health Option (ECHO) program and its ECHO Home Health Care (EHHC) benefit. EHHC provides coverage for additional services to enrollees who are homebound with medically complex conditions. Together, ECHO and its EHHC benefit provide coverage for habilitative services (provided to help individuals keep, learn, or improve skills and functioning for daily living) and respite care (in which a provider temporarily cares for the individual with special needs). EHHC also covers skilled nursing care. TRICARE Programs Providing Health Care Services to Military Families with Special Needs, 2024 Military families with special needs dependents also may be eligible for coverage for home- and community-based services, such as skilled nursing care and respite care, through their state Medicaid program. GAO found that 14 of the 24 programs in seven states it reviewed offered coverage for all three services, and some programs covered more respite care than currently provided by ECHO. GAO also found that military families may experience challenges accessing services through ECHO, which DOD has taken some steps to address. For example, of the 734 authorizations approved for respite care services from 2022 through 2024, less than one third were used. According to ECHO case managers, this lower usage is partly due to the lower number of respite care hours the program covers. Officials from the Defense Health Agency (DHA)—the agency within DOD responsible for managing ECHO—reported taking steps to increase ECHO respite care hours from 16 to 32 hours per month. GAO also found that ECHO’s coverage limit—$36,000 per enrollee, per calendar year—has remained the same since 2009. As such, the coverage limit may not have kept pace with increased health care costs. Additionally, while DHA officials said that the agency plans to compare ECHO benefits with those offered through Medicaid, it has not set goals or a timeline to complete this review. Assessing ECHO’s coverage limit and establishing goals and a timeline for its planned review of ECHO benefits would help DHA determine whether the program is effectively meeting enrollees’ needs. Why GAO Did This Study Individuals with special health care needs navigate complicated health care systems. Military families with special needs children may face additional challenges due to frequent moves across military installations. To address the needs of these military families, DOD provides coverage for health care services through the TRICARE ECHO program. A House report included a provision for GAO to review certain services available to military families. This report describes coverage for nursing care, habilitative services, and respite care available to military families with special needs children through (1) ECHO and (2) Medicaid. It also examines (3) challenges military families may face when seeking access to these services through ECHO and steps DOD has taken to address any challenges. GAO reviewed DOD and Medicaid program policies and documents in seven states with high active-duty military member presence. GAO also interviewed DOD officials, TRICARE representatives, state Medicaid officials, and stakeholder organizations representing military families and the special needs community.

What GAO Found Service coordinators employed by owners or managers of affordable housing link residents to supportive services, such as health care, meals, and transportation. Comprehensive data on service coordinators in rural federally assisted housing are not available. Some agencies, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Internal Revenue Service, support rental properties that may employ service coordinators. But they do not administer service coordinator programs, so they do not collect service coordinator data. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) operates two programs that fund and collect data on service coordinators in public housing and in privately owned multifamily housing. However, GAO found weaknesses in the quality and use of HUD’s data for the multifamily housing program: HUD has not developed uniformly applied procedures for entering data in its IT system on multifamily properties that fund service coordinators. As a result, HUD cannot accurately determine how many properties have service coordinators or whether these properties comply with program requirements. HUD does not routinely analyze performance reports it requires service coordinators at multifamily properties to prepare. Doing so could help HUD assess program effectiveness. Tasks of HUD-Funded Service Coordinators Stakeholders that GAO interviewed reported that service coordinators in federally assisted housing benefit residents’ well-being, and selected studies reported varied effects. For example, during GAO’s site visits to four rural locations, local stakeholders said service coordinators helped residents avoid eviction and apply for Medicaid. Four of the five studies GAO reviewed that measured potential effects of service coordination reported mixed results on certain resident health, financial, or housing outcomes. According to selected stakeholders and researchers GAO interviewed, key challenges to service coordination in rural areas include managing multiple funding sources, limited service providers, and long distances between properties and services. They also described ways they have tailored efforts to meet these challenges, such as by inviting service providers to meet residents at the properties. Federal agencies also have taken some actions that may help address certain rural service coordination challenges. For example, one of HUD’s programs allows participating housing providers to use some grant funds to directly provide services to residents (e.g., on-site financial literacy classes). Why GAO Did This Study The federal government supports the development or operation of rural affordable rental housing through several agencies. Some residents of federally assisted housing may need supportive services to remain independent and in their homes. Rural populations may face a greater need for these services because they generally have higher percentages of older adults and people with disabilities than their urban counterparts. This report examines (1) the availability and quality of data on service coordinators in rural federally assisted housing, (2) available evidence of their effect on residents' well-being, and (3) any challenges to rural service coordination and approaches to address them. GAO reviewed HUD’s collection and use of service coordinator data, including data entry procedures, and reviewed selected studies on the effect of service coordinators. GAO also interviewed or received written responses from researchers and officials of four federal agencies that support rural housing or supportive services and conducted site visits to four geographically diverse rural areas to interview local service coordinators and stakeholders.