What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers three primary programs that mitigate flood risk for properties insured by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). A small number of these properties—known as repetitive loss properties, which have flooded and received claim payments multiple times—contribute to the program’s fiscal challenges. According to FEMA, unmitigated repetitive loss properties make up about 2.5 percent of NFIP policies, but 48 percent of NFIP claims by dollar value have been paid to properties with two or more losses. From 1989 through 2025, 77 percent of the properties FEMA mitigated were funded by the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. FEMA supports four mitigation strategies—acquisition, elevation, relocation, and floodproofing. FEMA has mitigated flood risk primarily through acquisitions, which accounted for 69,415 (about 72.5 percent) of the properties mitigated from 1989 through 2025. FEMA Hazard Mitigation, by Grant Program and Method, Fiscal Years 1989–2025 While acquisitions offer benefits, the process faces significant challenges that can discourage communities and homeowners from participating. These challenges include a lengthy and complex process, limited state and community capacity, and financial constraints. NFIP represents a fiscal exposure to the federal government because FEMA is statutorily required to charge premium rates that do not fully reflect flood risk. Although mitigation reduces flood losses, it also requires substantial investment. Without addressing mitigation challenges, the number of repetitive loss properties will continue to grow, increasing costs to NFIP policyholders and federal taxpayers. One way to address the program’s fiscal exposure is to target mitigation efforts to those properties contributing most to the premium shortfall. These may disproportionately include repetitive loss properties, which face greater flood risk and higher full-risk premiums. By reducing risk, mitigation could also address affordability in the long term. Why GAO Did This Study Flooding is the most expensive natural disaster in the U.S., and in 2024, it caused over $8 billion in damages, according to FEMA. Congress created NFIP in 1968 to protect homeowners from flood losses, minimize property exposure to flood damage, and limit taxpayers' fiscal exposure to flood losses. However, the program faces multiple serious and longstanding challenges, primarily because it has two competing goals: keeping flood insurance affordable while maintaining the program’s fiscal solvency. This statement discusses (1) the role of mitigation in addressing NFIP’s fiscal exposure from repetitive loss properties and (2) how targeting mitigation efforts could reduce NFIP’s exposure and address affordability. This statement is based on GAO work issued in 2017–2023, including GAO-17-425, GAO-20-508, GAO-22-106037, and GAO-23-105977. Detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology can be found within each report.

What GAO Found Scams occur in a variety of forms and are a growing risk to consumers. Examples of a Scam Execution Process Note: Other types of contact methods, scams, and payment methods exist. At least 13 federal agencies engage in a range of activities related to countering scams. The agency activities cover a spectrum of roles intended to prevent, detect, and respond to scams. However, each agency largely carries out these activities independently. None of the 13 federal agencies that GAO spoke with were aware of a government-wide strategy to guide efforts to combat scams, nor did GAO independently identify such a strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lead a federal effort, in collaboration with other agencies, to develop and implement a government-wide strategy to counter scams and coordinate related activities. The FBI recently outlined actions to address this recommendation. The Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB), FBI, and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) collect and report on consumer complaints both directly and from other agencies. Data limitations prevent agencies from determining a total number of scam complaints and financial losses. Accordingly, there is no single, government-wide estimate of the total number of scams and financial losses. Similarly, federal agencies have not produced a common, government-wide definition of scams. A government-wide estimate would capture the scale of scams, and a common definition is necessary for producing such an estimate and for developing a government-wide strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO made separate recommendations to CFPB, FBI, and FTC to (1) develop a common definition of scams, (2) harmonize data collection, (3) report an estimate of the number of scam complaints each receives and (4) produce a single, government-wide estimate of the number of consumers affected by scams. In a recent update, the FBI and FTC outlined various concerns with these recommendations, such as differing authorities and mandates among agencies. However, GAO maintains that these recommendations remain valid. In October 2025, CFPB stated that it will monitor FBI and FTC actions before determining if any actions of its own are warranted. Why GAO Did This Study Scams, a method of committing fraud, involve the use of deception or manipulation intended to achieve financial gain. Scams often cause individual victims to lose large sums—in some cases their entire life savings. Federal agencies such as the FBI and FTC have responsibilities that include preventing and responding to scams against Americans. This statement discusses (1) federal agencies’ activities to prevent and respond to scams and the need for a comprehensive, government-wide strategy to guide their efforts and (2) federal agencies’ activities to compile scam-related consumer-complaint data and estimate the total number of scams and related financial losses. It also provides updates on the status of 3 agencies’ actions to address applicable recommendations. This statement is based on GAO’s April 2025 report on federal efforts to combat scams (GAO-25-107088). For that report, GAO analyzed publicly available information (including prior GAO reports) and relevant agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials from 13 different federal agencies involved in countering scams.

What GAO Found Debt limit impasses impose avoidable costs. As a projected date nears when the U.S. will be unable to meet all its financial obligations—the X date—investors often demand higher yields on new Treasury securities maturing near that date to compensate for the added risk. This increases the government’s borrowing costs. GAO estimates that Treasury securities issued during periods of acute market concern over impasses between 2011 and 2023—the most recent impasses with complete data available at the time of GAO’s analysis—incurred a total of roughly $107 million to $161 million in increased immediate borrowing costs (in 2024 dollars), depending on the measure used to estimate market concern. Impasses also impose additional, hard-to-quantify costs, including long-term costs from reduced investor confidence in the Treasury market. Estimated Immediate Treasury Borrowing Costs Associated with Debt Limit Impasses Note: For each impasse, GAO used two distinct measures of market concern to estimate increased borrowing costs. For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-107872. Debt limit impasses have also reduced the market value of outstanding Treasury securities. Market participants avoided securities maturing near a projected X-date, as those maturing after this date would be the first to default if the impasse were not resolved in time. GAO’s analysis found that these securities lost value relative to comparable ones maturing just before the X-date. Impasse disruptions to Treasury markets can spread to short-term funding markets and funds closely tied to Treasury securities. In 2011 and 2013, such disruptions included higher borrowing rates and money market fund outflows. These disruptions prompted market participant actions to limit risk and manage future impasse effects. However, other disruptions can occur after impasses are resolved, as fluctuations in the Department of the Treasury’s cash balance create volatility in some markets. GAO’s prior work has identified longstanding concerns about the debt limit (GAO-25-107089). The current debt limit process creates an unnecessary risk of U.S. default, with potentially devastating consequences for individuals, financial institutions, and the broader economy. The costs and market disruptions documented in this report further underscore the need for debt limit reform. Why GAO Did This Study Congress imposes a legal limit on federal borrowing, known as the debt limit. Under the current process, Congress can approve spending increases or tax cuts without also ensuring that Treasury has sufficient borrowing authority to finance these decisions. In recent years, when the federal government has approached the debt limit, prolonged congressional negotiations on increasing or suspending the limit have repeatedly brought it close to being unable to continue paying obligations stemming from past spending and revenue decisions. If Treasury exhausts its borrowing authority and runs out of cash, a default will occur. In this report, GAO examines how debt limit impasses—where outstanding debt reached the limit and Congress did not immediately raise or suspend it—between 2011 and 2023 affected Treasury’s borrowing costs and U.S. financial markets more broadly. GAO analyzed financial market data and developed a suite of econometric models to estimate increased borrowing costs attributable to these impasses. GAO also reviewed relevant research, documentation, and laws. In addition, GAO interviewed agency officials and 17 financial market participants, selected to reflect a range of institution types and sizes.

What GAO Found The Army relies on what it calls vertical lift systems, primarily helicopters, to accomplish reconnaissance and attack missions and move troops and equipment to and around the battlefield. In its 2019 modernization strategy, the Army identified developing its Future Vertical Lift portfolio as a priority. This portfolio included two crewed and one uncrewed aircraft. Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA)—intended to provide reconnaissance, attack, and aerial security capabilities, and estimated to cost $5.3 billion for development and procurement. Future Long Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA)—a medium-sized assault and utility aircraft that would deliver speed, range, agility, endurance, and sustainability improvements compared to current Black Hawk helicopters. Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (FTUAS)—intended to execute reconnaissance operations as a rapidly deployable uncrewed aircraft with vertical take-off and landing capabilities. The portfolio also included a variety of aircraft to be deployed from larger aircraft and development of an improved turbine engine. Aircraft in the Future Vertical Lift Portfolio prior to February 2024 In February 2024, the Army made significant changes to this portfolio. According to Army officials, Army leadership collaborated with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to restructure the portfolio. This restructuring ended the development of FARA, continued investment in FLRAA, and increased investment in FTUAS. In addition, the restructuring increased investment in uncrewed aircraft while delaying production of the improved turbine engine. Army budget officials stated that these changes were due to concerns about the long-term affordability of developing and acquiring FARA and FLRAA simultaneously. Army officials stated that the restructuring decision shifted about $7.3 billion in planned spending to other priorities. These priorities included other programs with vertical lift capabilities as well as improvements to Army barracks. Planned Spending from Fiscal Years 2025 through 2029 as a Result of Future Vertical Lift Portfolio Restructuring Because of its decision to end development of FARA, the Army reduced planned capabilities for crewed reconnaissance and attack missions. The Army plans to rely on future uncrewed systems for some reconnaissance and attack missions and existing helicopters for attack. The Army is currently considering further changes to its vertical lift capabilities. In April 2025, the Secretary of Defense announced the Army Transformation Initiative. This Initiative directs the Army to consider changes to both its acquisitions and force structure. As a result, the Army has proposed a number of other changes to its aviation portfolio, including: accelerating FLRAA development and fielding, accelerating fielding of launched uncrewed aircraft, distributing existing vertical lift capabilities across the Army, and ending development of FTUAS. In GAO’s discussions with Army officials, the officials stated that none of these decisions have been finalized and will depend on the outcome of the fiscal year 2026 budget. Why GAO Did This Study In 2019, the Army identified six modernization priority areas – including capabilities for Future Vertical Lift – to improve its ability to operate in the modern battlefield. In 2024, the Army made significant changes to the portfolio of vertical lift systems it had been developing. A Senate Report contains a provision for GAO to review and assess the capabilities affected by the Army’s restructuring decisions and the analyses that informed them. GAO’s report describes the revisions resulting from the restructuring, the reasons for the changes, how the changes impacted programs and vertical lift capabilities, and Army plans to address potential capability gaps. To identify why the restructuring decision was made, who made it, what analyses may have been used, and potential effects on capabilities, GAO assessed and compared requirements documents preceding and subsequent to the Army’s 2024 restructuring decision, traced funding by analyzing budget documents, and interviewed numerous Army officials. These officials included the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, officials from the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology; the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, which is the office responsible for aligning funding to the Army’s acquisition plans; and the Future Vertical Lift Cross-Functional Team, as well as officials from individual vertical lift-related programs. For more information, contact Alex Winograd at winograda@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up waste resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, a process used to produce plutonium. Generally, EM manages this waste associated with reprocessing as if it is high-level radioactive waste (HLW) unless the waste can be classified as low-level radioactive waste (LLW) or transuranic (TRU) waste. LLW and TRU waste are expected to be less expensive to treat and dispose of compared with HLW. To classify its waste, EM relies in part on the statutory definition of HLW in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. However, GAO, DOE, and others have raised concerns that ambiguities in this definition have impeded EM’s cleanup progress. Examples of Waste Associated with Reprocessing EM has three processes—known as waste classification tools—it can use to determine that certain waste associated with reprocessing can be treated and disposed of as LLW or TRU waste, rather than HLW. While these tools help EM address ambiguities in the HLW definition, they have shortcomings that hinder EM’s progress. For example, one tool cannot be used at the Hanford Site, EM’s most complex and expensive site. EM also faces the risk of litigation due to the lack of clarity in the HLW definition, which could affect EM’s ability to successfully use the tools. Until the HLW definition is clarified, EM will continue to face significant barriers to completing its cleanup mission. Given the complexity of this issue, any efforts to revise the HLW definition would benefit from input and ideas from experts across government, industry, and academia. While EM has applied the three tools to treat and dispose of some waste associated with reprocessing as non-HLW, EM has not pursued additional opportunities that GAO and others have identified. Many studies over the last 2 decades—including analyses conducted by EM—have shown that opportunities exist for EM to expedite its cleanup efforts and realize significant cost savings while ensuring safe disposal. For example, in a 2020 report, EM estimated that classifying a portion of tank waste as LLW at its Hanford Site could potentially generate a cost savings of $73 to $210 billion. By systematically evaluating these opportunities and pursuing them to the maximum extent possible, EM could accelerate its cleanup mission and save at least tens of billions of dollars. Why GAO Did This Study Since 1989, EM has been responsible for cleaning up waste resulting from plutonium production for the nation’s nuclear arsenal. EM has faced many challenges in determining how best to treat and dispose of this waste, and the estimated future cost for addressing this and other waste is more than half a trillion dollars. Senate Report 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to review DOE’s implementation of certain tools to treat and dispose of waste associated with reprocessing as something other than HLW. GAO’s report examines (1) EM’s efforts to treat and dispose of such waste and the barriers it faces in doing so and (2) potential opportunities to realize cost savings by treating certain waste as something other than HLW. GAO analyzed laws, EM policies and documentation, and prior GAO and independent entities’ studies. GAO interviewed EM officials regarding EM’s plans to treat and dispose of waste associated with reprocessing. GAO also visited two EM sites and evaluated documentation to identify opportunities for EM to treat and dispose of certain waste as LLW or TRU waste.

Why This Matters Solar geoengineering seeks to cool Earth’s temperature by reflecting incoming sunlight back into space, but effects on the environment and public health are uncertain. Several private companies are beginning to develop and use these methods, raising concerns about the lack of oversight. Key Takeaways Solar geoengineering methods might mitigate Earth’s rising temperatures, but effects are highly uncertain. More research and field testing of solar geoengineering methods would improve understanding of effects. Limited understanding of outcomes may heighten geopolitical risks and complicate governance. The Technology What is it? Solar geoengineering, also referred to as solar radiation modification, includes several proposed methods to reflect sunlight back into space. These methods could create a cooling effect on Earth’s climate and reduce the effect of temperature increases from greenhouse gas emissions. A range of technologies are being explored for use in space, in the atmosphere, and through land surface modifications. How does it work? Two atmospheric methods of solar geoengineering are generally considered the most feasible and cost effective. The first, stratospheric aerosol injection, adds aerosols—small particles or gases such as sulfur dioxide—high above Earth in the stratosphere using balloons or aircraft (see figure). This method attempts to cool the Earth at a global scale. It mimics the temporary cooling effect of some major volcanic eruptions. The second method, marine cloud brightening, injects sea salt aerosols into low clouds over the ocean, aiming to cool the water, reefs, and coasts at a regional scale. This effect is similar to the “ship tracks” created when ship exhaust unintentionally increases the reflectivity of clouds along their routes. Injected aerosols from both methods are removed from the atmosphere by natural processes. Solar geoengineering would therefore require a long-term commitment of regular applications of aerosols to maintain cooling effects. Figure 1. Stratospheric Aerosol Injection How mature is it? The scientific concepts underlying solar geoengineering have been understood for decades. Potential deployment strategies have been demonstrated largely through computer models, laboratory experiments, and case studies. Additional research and field testing are needed to better understand key aspects of the methods, including how aerosols change over time and interact with clouds. The technological capabilities needed to deploy aerosols at scales large enough to significantly change atmospheric reflectivity are also immature. Researchers have conducted just a few outdoor experiments, including a marine cloud brightening test in Australia. Other experiments, including one in the U.S., have been cancelled due to public concerns about safety or the ethics of solar geoengineering use. At least two startup companies have received private funding in recent years to pursue stratospheric aerosol injection. One company has delivered sulfur dioxide gas to the stratosphere with balloons since 2022. In 2025, a second company reported it had received $75 million to develop and test technologies for aircraft-based aerosol deployment. Potential Opportunities Mitigate rising global temperatures. Conducting solar geoengineering research now may help identify scenarios in which the risks of geoengineering would be less than the effects of rising global temperatures. Reduce regional temperatures. Beneficial uses may also include dampening a local heat wave or protecting heat-sensitive ecosystems like the Great Barrier Reef. Challenges Unknown consequences. Potentially harmful effects on human health and the environment from solar geoengineering use have been identified but are poorly understood. These include increased air pollution, damage to the ozone layer, and changes in rain or snowfall patterns. There may be other detrimental effects still unidentified. Geopolitical risks. The effects of solar geoengineering are almost certain to cross state or international boundaries, creating risks of geopolitical disputes or conflicts. Lack of governance. There is no international consensus on how to regulate use of or coordinate research on solar geoengineering. In the U.S., several statutes apply to solar geoengineering, but federal oversight is limited. Some U.S. states, however, have already enacted bans on solar geoengineering activities, and how intrastate effects would be addressed is unclear. Public opinion. Several studies suggest that most U.S. survey respondents view solar geoengineering research negatively. In the U.S., a lack of transparency and public engagement has been reported as a reason why an outdoor experiment was cancelled. Policy Context And Questions What information is needed to inform public policy discussions about the use of solar geoengineering, such as the effects and ethical implications, and how might policymakers facilitate its collection? What domestic or international coordination could help reduce geopolitical risks resulting from possible solar geoengineering deployment? Selected GAO Work Weather Modification: NOAA Should Strengthen Oversight to Ensure Reliable Information, GAO-26-108013. Climate Engineering: Technical status, future directions, and potential responses, GAO-11-71. Selected Reference National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Reflecting Sunlight: Recommendations for Solar Geoengineering Research and Research Governance (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2021). https://doi.org/10.17226/25762. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD at HowardK@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Large institutional investors with access to cash or low-cost financing purchased foreclosed single-family homes in bulk across the country following the 2007–2009 financial crisis, helping to stabilize the housing market. Over time, these investors built large portfolios of single-family housing and became a growing presence in the single-family rental market, as GAO previously reported. In more recent years, these investors have increased their holdings through additional acquisitions and new construction. GAO found the following trends in institutional investor homeownership from 2018 through 2024 in six metropolitan statistical areas—Cincinnati, Dallas, Jacksonville, Nashville, Phoenix, and Seattle: The number of single-family rental homes owned by institutional investors increased in all six metro areas (see figure). Number of Single-Family Rental Homes Owned by Institutional Investors in Six Selected Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2018–2024 The share of homes owned by institutional investors varied in all six areas but remained relatively low overall. While these investors owned from 4 percent (Seattle) to 22 percent (Jacksonville) of single-family rental homes, they owned from less than 1 percent (Cincinnati and Seattle) to 3 percent of all single-family homes. The largest year-to-year increases generally occurred during 2021–2023 and declined in 2024. Institutional investors acquired homes from owner-occupants, non-owner-occupants (such as smaller investors), and new construction. For example, 35 percent of institutional investor-owned homes in Nashville were acquired from owner-occupants and 15 percent were newly constructed as of 2024. Institutional investors also sold homes from their portfolios, including to owner-occupants. However, these sales represented a small share of the homes they owned—never exceeding 8 percent of institutional investors’ holdings in any year in any of the six selected metro areas. Why GAO Did This Study Few public data are available on the number and share of single-family rental homes owned by institutional investors. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to study the prevalence and location of institutional investment in single-family housing. This report—the second in a series—presents institutional investor ownership trends from 2018 through 2024 for a nongeneralizable sample of six metropolitan statistical areas (selected to reflect a range of estimated investment concentrations and geographic diversity). GAO used property-level ownership and mailing address information from Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. and its affiliates to identify homes owned by institutional investors—defined for this analysis as those with 5,000 or more single-family homes nationwide and with homes in at least five metro areas—and to assess the locations and characteristics of those homes. GAO also used the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 1-year estimates to describe housing market characteristics of the six selected metro areas. For more information, contact Jill Naamane at NaamaneJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relies on more than 30 advisory committees to provide expert advice on numerous scientific topics, including opioid drugs for pain. Government-wide requirements prohibit committee members from taking part in meetings that could affect their financial interest. FDA checks for conflicts of interest by reviewing a form that committee members fill out to disclose financial interests, such as investments in drug companies. Regulations also require FDA to check for issues that could give the appearance that a committee member lacks impartiality. In some situations, FDA may grant a waiver or authorize a member to take part in a meeting, such as when the need for the member’s expertise outweighs the potential conflict. FDA also has policies to similarly review financial interests and appearance issues for guest speakers, who may be invited to meetings to present scientific information. Examples of Financial Interests Between June 2018 and May 2025, FDA invited an average of about 29 committee members to each of the 17 most recent meetings for committees that discuss opioids. Across these meetings, FDA’s conflict of interest review process resulted in members being recused from taking part in the meetings 15 times. FDA also granted a financial conflict of interest waiver to allow a member to participate because the agency determined their expertise was needed and that their financial interest was not substantial. In addition, FDA authorized members with appearance issues to take part in meetings seven times. These results are comparable to those of other FDA committees that GAO reviewed. FDA uses a combination of government-wide requirements and internal policies to guide its conflict of interest review process. However, FDA does not publicly share information on how it determines whether members have financial conflicts of interest and whether they should participate in committee meetings. This is because FDA has not yet finalized required guidance on the matter more than 13 years after a law required it. In addition, FDA has not posted to its website how it makes these decisions in the interim. Further, the agency does not publicly share how it determines whether guest speakers have financial conflicts or appearance issues and whether they should participate in meetings. Publicly sharing information on how FDA makes these determinations would be consistent with the law and FDA’s own best practices. Making this information public would increase transparency and provide the public with greater assurance that FDA has steps in place to manage conflicts of interest for advisory committees, and therefore help to ensure accountability and consistency in decision making. Why GAO Did This Study Conflict of interest rules and guidelines are essential to ensure FDA receives independent, unbiased professional expertise from advisory committees to help its efforts to assure the safety and effectiveness of drugs, medical devices, and other products. Federal requirements for advisory committees emphasize the importance of public access, input, and accountability, including addressing conflicts of interest. A Senate Appropriations Committee report includes a provision for GAO to review how FDA addresses conflicts of interest for advisory committee meetings, particularly for opioids. This report (1) describes FDA’s advisory committee conflict of interest policies and review process, (2) describes the results of FDA’s review process for advisory committees related to opioids, and (3) examines the extent to which FDA publicly shares its conflict of interest policies for advisory committees. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, as well as FDA documentation on advisory committees. GAO also reviewed published research about the results of FDA’s conflict of interest review process and interviewed FDA officials and stakeholders familiar with advisory committee meetings.

This supplement is a companion to GAO's report titled Artificial Intelligence: IRS Actions Needed to Address Skills Gaps, Information Quality, and Strategic Management, GAO-26-107522. The purpose of this supplement is to provide key information about active, non-sensitive AI use cases in IRS's AI inventory as of June 2025.

What GAO Found IRS had 126 active artificial intelligence (AI) use cases—applications of AI for a particular business need—in its inventory as of June 2025. These 126 use cases included 65 that were either too sensitive for public reporting or were research and development efforts exempt from public reporting. Although IRS has been using AI for several years, its inventory has grown rapidly since reporting 10 use cases in August 2022. IRS categorized most use cases in the June 2025 inventory as either improving (1) operational efficiency or (2) tax compliance and fraud detection. IRS listed 61 percent (77 of 126) of use cases as in development in June 2025 (see figure). Major staffing reductions at IRS in 2025 could greatly affect its ability to use AI. For example, officials in the Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics group said they lost 63 employees who had been working full- or part-time on AI. Other IRS units also reported reductions in staff that support AI efforts, in addition to organizational and contractual changes. Still, IRS officials stated that the agency plans to use more AI in the future. However, IRS officials said they had not identified skills needed to support AI or developed a plan to address the skills gaps. The recent staff reductions, the intent to pursue additional AI initiatives, and the absence of a plan to address AI skills gaps increase the risk that IRS AI efforts will not succeed. In addition, IRS’s inventory did not always include quality information. For example, GAO determined that over 25 percent of use cases did not include information on how the use case was to benefit the agency. GAO also identified use case inventory omissions. For example, GAO identified several AI-enabled tools IRS officials said were contracted to help build criminal cases. These tools were not included in the inventory. Improved IRS processes and internal communications can address these shortcomings. IRS’s AI governance process had several entities with oversight of individual AI use cases. However, none were responsible for managing AI investments across the agency. Further, IRS does not have a process to ensure its AI investments are contributing to agency-wide goals. Given the risks facing IRS, a more strategic approach is warranted that enables IRS to identify high-value AI initiatives that contribute to agency-wide goals. Why GAO Did This Study IRS has used AI for many years. It has numerous AI initiatives under development and in operation, including in areas such as taxpayer service and audit selection. However, future IRS funding, strategy, and staffing levels are uncertain. This dynamic environment highlights the importance of understanding how AI can deliver results for IRS. GAO was asked to review IRS’s use of AI. This report assesses (1) how IRS uses AI and how resource changes at IRS could affect AI efforts; (2) the quality of information in IRS’s AI inventory; and (3) how IRS strategically manages its AI investments. GAO reviewed IRS’s internal and public AI inventories, and relevant Department of the Treasury and IRS documents. GAO compared information in and processes for managing IRS’s AI inventory to IRS policy and guidance, law, government-wide guidance, and leading practices. In addition, GAO compared IRS’s efforts to manage its AI investments against federal guidance and leading practices. GAO also interviewed Treasury and IRS officials.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) spends billions of dollars annually for IT and cyber-related investments, including commercial software licenses. In a January 2024 government-wide report, GAO noted that while VA identified its five most widely used software vendors with the highest quantity of licenses installed, it faced challenges in determining whether it was purchasing too many or too few of these software licenses. Specifically, VA was not tracking the appropriate number of licenses for each item of software currently in use. Additionally, the department did not compare inventories of software licenses that were currently in use to purchase records on a regular basis (see table). GAO January 2024 Report Assessing the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Management of Widely Used Software Licenses Key activity Assessment Track software licenses that are currently in use Not met Regularly compare the inventories of software licenses that are currently in use to purchase records Not met Source: GAO analysis of agency data. I GAO-26-109060 Until VA adequately assesses the appropriate number of licenses, it cannot determine whether it is purchasing too many licenses or too few. In January 2024, GAO recommended that the department track licenses in use within its inventories and compare them with purchase records. VA concurred with the recommendations and is taking preliminary actions to track software license usage. In early March 2026, VA officials reported that the department plans to implement initial functionality for a centralized software license inventory in late March 2026. If successful, this could be a critical first step in improving the department’s ability to track and analyze licenses across the department. Implementation of these recommendations would allow VA to identify opportunities to reduce costs on duplicate or unnecessary licenses. In a November 2024 report, GAO found that restrictive software licensing practices (e.g., certain vendors’ processes) adversely impacted federal agencies’ cloud computing efforts, including those of VA. These practices either increased costs of cloud software or services or limited the department’s options when selecting cloud service providers. VA had not established guidance for effectively managing impacts from restrictive practices for cloud computing or determined who is responsible for managing these impacts. Until VA establishes guidance and assigns responsibility for mitigating the impacts of restrictive software licensing practices, it will likely miss opportunities to avoid or minimize these impacts. GAO made two recommendations to VA to mitigate the impacts of restrictive software licensing practices. The department concurred with the recommendations. In May 2025, VA officials reported that the department planned to stand up a working group composed of IT and acquisition subject matter experts to identify, analyze, and mitigate the impacts of restrictive software licensing practices on cloud computing efforts by September 2026. However, it has not provided an update on the status of the working group. GAO will continue to monitor VA’s actions to fully implement these recommendations. Why GAO Did This Study VA depends on critical underlying IT systems to manage benefits and provide care to millions of veterans and their families. For fiscal year 2025, the department planned to spend about $985 million on software, including commercial software licenses. In 2015, GAO identified the management of software licenses as a focus area in its High-Risk report. GAO has also previously reported on the need for federal agencies—including VA—to ensure better management of software licenses. This statement summarizes two 2024 GAO reports on VA software license management, including VA’s efforts to track software license usage and manage restrictive licensing practices. The statement also addresses the status of VA’s actions in response to recommendations from those reports. GAO reviewed its prior work, VA documentation related to the status of efforts to implement the recommendations, and information provided by VA in March 2026 as part of GAO’s ongoing work.

What GAO Found According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data for 2020 through 2024, helicopter operators cumulatively averaged over 32,000 flights and 20,000 flight hours annually in the Washington, D.C. area (D.C. area). During this 5-year period, operators conducted an average of 91 flights per day, ranging from one to 202 flights. Military, air medical, and state and local law enforcement operators accounted for most helicopter flights and flight hours. Military operators include the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Air Force, Army, D.C. Army National Guard, and Marine Corps, and Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Coast Guard. FAA-Reported Helicopter Flights and Flight Hours in the Washington, D.C. Area by Operator Type, 2020–2024 Operator type Number of flights (flight hours) Percentage of total flights (flight hours) Military 56,811 (46,891) 35% (46%) Air medical 53,984 (16,838) 33 (16) State and local law enforcement 23,614 (14,888) 15 (15) Other 14,209 (9,338) 9 (9) Federal law enforcement and emergency support 7,844 (7,430) 5 (7) News 5,568 (6,993) 3 (7) Source: GAO analysis of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data. | GAO-26-107758 Note: In this table, the Washington, D.C. area comprises the area within 30 nautical miles of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. For more details, see table 1 in GAO-26-107758. According to FAA, it has taken steps to address helicopter noise in the D.C. area, including collecting and sharing noise complaint data. For example, FAA collects complaints through a centralized system and posts summaries of D.C.-area helicopter noise complaints on its website. Air medical, local law enforcement, and military helicopter operators GAO spoke with have also taken steps to reduce noise impacts. These steps include flying along designated helicopter routes, avoiding certain residential areas, and conducting training flights outside the D.C. area. However, military operators have not engaged in continuous awareness and outreach programs to communities affected by helicopter noise, as required by DOD’s Operational Noise Program. Helicopter route changes near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport after the January 2025 midair collision may heighten the need for military operators to engage in community outreach, because some new areas will experience noise impacts. By conducting additional outreach, military operators could help these communities better understand the purposes of helicopter flights and their efforts to reduce noise. Selected operators said they use drones infrequently for their D.C.-area operations. As such, drones have little effect on overall aircraft noise. GAO spoke with three local law enforcement operators that use drones, and they said drones are not a substitute for helicopters for their missions. Military and air medical operators told GAO they cannot use drones in the D.C. area due to the nature of their operations. In addition, selected stakeholders said the potential effects that electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft may have on noise are unclear, in part because none are currently in operation, and operators do not have immediate plans to use them in the D.C. area. Why GAO Did This Study Helicopter noise is an ongoing concern for some D.C.-area residents. The D.C. area is unique among areas with high concentrations of helicopter activity due to its highly restricted and constrained airspace and the presence of many federal agencies and military installations. Studies have suggested that aircraft noise exposure can be annoying, disturb sleep, and increase the risk of more serious medical issues. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to report on reducing rotorcraft noise in the D.C. area. This report examines, in the D.C. area, (1) the extent to which helicopter operations are conducted and for what purposes, (2) the extent to which FAA and selected operators have addressed helicopter noise, and (3) the views of selected operators and stakeholders on how the use of drones and electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft may affect helicopter noise. GAO reviewed FAA regulations, relevant laws, DOD and DHS policies, and relevant literature, and analyzed FAA and military operators’ helicopter flight data for 2020 through 2024. GAO also interviewed FAA officials; 11 helicopter operators, selected based on the number of flights in the D.C. area; and seven stakeholders, selected based on experience with drone and electric vertical takeoff and landing aircraft noise.

What GAO Found To operate as effectively and efficiently as possible, Congress, the administration, and federal managers must have ready access to reliable and complete financial and performance information—both for individual federal entities and for the federal government as a whole. GAO’s report on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements for fiscal years 2025 and 2024 discusses progress that has been made but also underscores that much work remains to improve federal financial management and that the federal government continues to face an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. The federal government’s net costs were about $7.3 trillion in fiscal year 2025. Fiscal Year 2025 Net Costs of U.S. Government Operations ($7.3 Trillion) GAO found the following: Certain material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and other limitations resulted in conditions that prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements as of and for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2025, and 2024. Significant uncertainties, primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth, and a material weakness in internal control prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the sustainability financial statements (e.g., Statements of Long-Term Fiscal Projections and social insurance statements). Material weaknesses resulted in ineffective internal control over financial reporting for fiscal year 2025. Material weaknesses and other scope limitations, discussed above, limited tests of compliance with selected provisions of applicable laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements for fiscal year 2025. Three major impediments have continued to prevent GAO from rendering an opinion on the federal government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities, and (3) weaknesses in the federal government’s process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. In addition, several other significant federal entities, such as the Small Business Administration, were not able to obtain opinions on their fiscal years 2025 and 2024 financial statements. Efforts are under way to resolve these issues. The material weaknesses underlying the three major impediments and the other financial management challenges (1) affect the federal government’s ability to reliably measure the full cost, as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance, of certain programs and activities; (2) impair the federal government’s ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions; (3) hamper the federal government’s ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; and (4) hinder the federal government from having reliable, useful, and timely financial information to operate effectively and efficiently. Two other continuing material weaknesses are the federal government’s inability to (1) determine the full extent to which improper payments, including fraud, occur and reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them and (2) identify and resolve information system control deficiencies and manage information security risks on an ongoing basis. The fiscal year 2025 government-wide total of reported improper payment estimates was $186 billion, but it did not include estimates for certain government programs. Thirteen of the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 reported material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in information system controls. The Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections and related information show that based on current revenue and spending policies, the federal government continues to face an unsustainable long-term fiscal path. Since 2017, GAO has suggested that Congress develop a strategy to place the federal government on a sustainable fiscal path. In commenting on a draft of this report, Department of the Treasury officials expressed their continuing commitment to addressing the problems this report outlines. Why GAO Did This Study The Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, is required to annually submit audited financial statements for the U.S. government to the President and Congress. GAO is required to audit these statements. The Government Management Reform Act of 1994 has required such reporting, covering the executive branch of government, beginning with financial statements prepared for fiscal year 1997. The consolidated financial statements include the legislative and judicial branches. For more information, contact Dawn B. Simpson at simpsondb@gao.gov. or Robert F. Dacey daceyr@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Water Resources Development Act of 2018, as amended in 2022 (the 2022 act), authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to use other transaction (OT) agreements to carry out certain projects to support research activities for its Civil Works program. OT agreements are generally not subject to the same federal laws and regulations as procurement contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants. OT agreements allow agencies more flexibility and help advance the development and use of new technologies more rapidly, which can help agencies to meet mission needs and project requirements. The Corps's first civil works OT agreement was for the design of a prototype model of a waterway channel. Once assembled, this model will allow for research on hydraulic structures, such as testing the operation of lock gates and how they could fail. The Corps reported to GAO that, as of October 2025, the design was roughly 20 percent complete. Should the Corps determine that the design is satisfactory upon its completion, planned for April 2026, Corps officials expect to proceed with assembly of the model as a separate follow-on project. These officials said that for assembly of the model, they could choose to award a new follow-on OT agreement consistent with Corps's authority or a traditional contract subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and other federal laws and regulations. Additionally, in September 2025, the Corps awarded three more OT agreements to examine effects of harmful freshwater algal blooms on Corps infrastructure. The research to be conducted under these OT agreements will investigate innovative, cost-effective, and scalable technologies for early detection and management of algal blooms. Why GAO Did This Study The 2022 act authorized the Corps to use OT agreements for research and development to support its civilian civil works missions and authorities. This research can aid the Corps's management of its water resources infrastructure, such as dams and levees, by, for example, helping to mitigate the risks posed by natural disasters and severe weather. The 2022 act includes a provision for GAO to annually report on the Corps's use of its OT authority for research supporting its Civil Works mission. In December 2024, GAO issued its second report on the Corps's use of this authority. This third report updates the status of the Corps's efforts since the 2024 report. GAO reviewed documents and conducted interviews with Corps and Department of the Army officials. Contact: Hilary Benedict at BenedictH@gao.gov.