What GAO Found GAO convened a panel discussion to gather industry perspectives on potential duplication or conflict among federal cybersecurity regulations affecting selected critical infrastructure sectors. The industry participants identified multiple federal cybersecurity regulations within their sectors as duplicative or conflicting with other regulations (see figure below). In such cases, participants said it could be difficult to fully satisfy all reporting requirements while remediating cyber threats. Number of Duplicative or Conflicting Federal Cybersecurity Regulations Identified by Selected Industry Sector Representatives For example, participants in all three sectors noted that the Department of Homeland Security’s proposed rule for cyber incident reporting or the Securities and Exchange Commission’s cybersecurity disclosure rules were duplicative and in conflict with their own sector’s regulations. Participants also identified duplication or conflict in sector-specific cybersecurity reporting requirements. While participants in all three sectors noted that progress in harmonizing federal cybersecurity regulations has been made over the past year—such as federal agencies providing increased regulatory guidance for financial institutions—half the participants agreed that this progress was limited. Participants also identified several opportunities for harmonizing federal cybersecurity regulations, including those related to cybersecurity incident reporting. Participants stated that defining reporting timeframes and thresholds in consistent ways could streamline requirements and reduce duplication. Participants also stated that having a lead agency to coordinate and receive incident reports would increase collaboration between government agencies and industry. Why GAO Did This Study Nearly all the nation’s critical infrastructure is supported by computer-based information systems. Because this infrastructure is mostly owned by the private sector, having the public and private sectors work together to protect the information systems is vital. Cognizant federal agencies have issued numerous regulations to help protect health data and ensure smooth operation of financial systems, among other things. However, according to the Office of the National Cyber Director, when critical infrastructure sectors are subject to multiple cybersecurity regulations, it can lead to conflicting guidance, inconsistencies, increased compliance costs, and redundancies for regulated entities. GAO was asked to gather perspectives of industry participants on the progress that federal agencies are making to harmonize cybersecurity regulations. This report summarizes industry views from selected sectors on duplication or conflicts among federal cybersecurity regulations that affect critical infrastructure sectors. GAO convened a panel discussion on July 16, 2026. The panel included six representatives from different industry organizations within three critical infrastructure sectors that GAO’s prior work has identified as subject to a significant number of cybersecurity regulations: energy, financial services, and healthcare and public health. The representatives included chief and senior executives overseeing cybersecurity, medical, and industry operations, as well as regulatory affairs and legal specialists. For more information, contact David B. Hinchman at HinchmanD@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The average number of noncitizens incarcerated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) each year decreased 44 percent from fiscal year 2017 (approximately 36,300) through fiscal year 2024 (approximately 20,300). This includes noncitizens with lawful immigration status. During this time, noncitizens, as a proportion of all BOP-incarcerated individuals, also decreased. Immigration-related offenses accounted for more than half of the offenses for which BOP-incarcerated noncitizens were convicted; another 30 percent were drug-related. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed approximately 84,800 (76 percent) of the 111,200 noncitizens who completed, at least one term of BOP incarceration from fiscal years 2017 through 2024, as of December 2025. Individuals Incarcerated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons by U.S. Citizenship Status, Fiscal Years 2017 – 2024 There are no reliable comprehensive data on all noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities. GAO analyzed data from the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). SCAAP is a Department of Justice (DOJ) program that reimburses jurisdictions for a portion of the eligible costs attributable to incarcerating noncitizens who meet program requirements. Though SCAAP data represent only a portion of all noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities, it provides valuable insights. In state fiscal year 2022, there were a total of approximately 73,500 SCAAP-eligible incarcerations, a decrease of 43 percent from state fiscal year 2016 when there were approximately 128,000 such incarcerations. SCAAP-eligible noncitizens incarcerated by the five state prison systems with the greatest number of SCAAP-eligible incarcerations were convicted of various offenses, including sex crimes, homicide, and drug offenses. DOJ spent more than $9 billion incarcerating noncitizens from fiscal years 2016 through 2023 (the most recent cost information available at the time of our audit work). This includes approximately $8 billion for BOP’s incarceration of noncitizens from fiscal year 2016 through fiscal year 2023 and approximately $1.44 billion for SCAAP reimbursements to states and localities for incarcerations in state fiscal years 2016 through 2022. This does not reflect costs paid by state and localities that were not reimbursed by the federal government. Why GAO Did This Study Depending on the nature of the offense, noncitizens who are arrested and convicted of crimes may be incarcerated by federal, state, or local authorities. These entities each bear the costs of incarcerating them. Following their incarceration, noncitizens may be subject to removal from the U.S. Since 2005, GAO has periodically reported available information on noncitizens incarcerated in the U.S. GAO was asked to update its body of work on this topic (including, GAO-18-433). This report addresses, among other things, the number and citizenship of noncitizens incarcerated in the U.S., and the cost of incarcerating them. Noncitizens, in the context of this report, refers to all individuals who are not U.S. citizens, regardless of their immigration status. GAO analyzed data separately for noncitizens incarcerated by BOP and for SCAAP-eligible noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities. GAO analyzed the most recent data available for each group at the time of our audit work. Generally, analyses of BOP-incarcerated noncitizens span fiscal years 2017 through 2024; analyses of SCAAP-eligible noncitizens incarcerated by states and localities span state fiscal years 2016 through 2022. To calculate the costs of incarcerating noncitizens, GAO analyzed BOP data and information on the annual per person cost of incarcerating an individual in various types of BOP facilities. GAO also analyzed data from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and information collected directly from selected states and localities. For more information, contact Gretta L. Goodwin at GoodwinG@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) in Mexico seek to acquire semi-automatic firearms—AR-15s, AK-47s, and .50-caliber rifles—which they often convert to fully automatic firearms, according to agency officials. Armed with these weapons, TCOs pose a serious threat to Mexican law enforcement and military. TCOs acquire firearms from the U.S. primarily through straw purchasers—third parties who buy them on the TCOs’ behalf—and middlemen who smuggle the firearms through ports of entry on the border. U.S. agencies collect data on trafficked firearms, but some data have limitations that limit their utility. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) reported that 68 percent (82,785) of firearms recovered in Mexico and traced from January 2020 to December 2024 had a U.S. source. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data show that CBP seized 4,944 firearms bound for Mexico at land ports of entry on the border from January 2020 through December 2025. However, CBP’s data system does not consistently capture information on the semi-automatic rifles sought by TCOs, and some officers may have difficulty identifying specific types. Improved data on these types of rifles would strengthen federal agencies’ ability to generate intelligence to combat firearms trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico. U.S. agencies conduct various efforts to combat firearms trafficking but do not assess effectiveness. For example, in the U.S., CBP conducts targeted outbound inspections along the U.S.–Mexican border and DHS’s Homeland Security Investigations and ATF seek to disrupt firearms trafficking along the border. In Mexico, ATF helps Mexican authorities conduct investigations and trace firearms. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provides security assistance to Mexican authorities to combat firearms trafficking. In fiscal years 2020–2025, ATF and INL provided about $126 million for these efforts. But DHS has not established goals, desired outcomes, or performance measures that include baselines and targets for its efforts. ATF also lacks performance measures, after discontinuing measures it established in fiscal year 2023, and INL lacks baselines, targets, and results for some of its measures. As a result, the agencies do not know the extent to which their efforts are meeting objectives and cannot determine whether they are directing resources to the most effective programs. This could lead to waste and, potentially, missed opportunities to more effectively counter firearms trafficking. Vehicle Inspected, Hidden Compartment, and Firearms Seized at U.S.–Mexican Border Why GAO Did This Study Estimates indicate that hundreds of thousands of firearms are trafficked from the U.S. into Mexico each year, presenting a serious threat to Mexican and U.S. security. TCOs in Mexico use increasingly deadly firearms as well as technology and drones. In February 2025, State designated six Mexican cartels as foreign terrorist organizations and as specially designated global terrorists. GAO was asked to review U.S. efforts to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico. This report examines (1) the types of firearms TCOs in Mexico seek in the U.S. and the methods they use to illegally acquire and transport them into Mexico; (2) data U.S. agencies have collected on Mexico-bound firearms seized in the U.S. and on U.S.-sourced firearms recovered in Mexico, as well as the agencies’ uses of these data; and (3) efforts that U.S. agencies have made to combat firearms trafficking to Mexico, as well as the extent to which they have monitored these efforts’ performance. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; El Paso, Dallas, and Houston, Texas; and Nogales, Tucson, and Phoenix, Arizona. GAO also interviewed U.S. and Mexican officials at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City. GAO analyzed CBP data on seizures of southbound firearms at the U.S.–Mexican border in 2020–2025 as well as ATF data on firearms recovered in Mexico and submitted to ATF for tracing in 2020–2024.

What GAO Found The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has faced longstanding challenges in hiring and retaining adequate staff. NRC officials and most of the stakeholders GAO interviewed stated that increased attrition and industry competition have affected NRC’s workforce more in recent years. GAO found that from July 2024 through June 2026, NRC lost, on net, about 500 staff in various positions, most of which were due to voluntary retirements. This loss of staff has increased concerns about the stability of NRC’s workforce. Total Number of NRC Employees from July 2024 Through June 2026 In July 2024, the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (ADVANCE Act), was enacted, granting NRC three enhanced authorities to support its workforce: (1) direct hire, (2) compensation flexibility, and (3) bonuses for hiring and performance. Between July 2024 and July 2026, NRC used the authority to award a total of $335,000 in performance bonuses to 18 staff but had not used the other two authorities. NRC officials cited various reasons for not using all of the authorities, including a recently completed agency reorganization and the need to conduct a comprehensive workforce evaluation and inventory to identify current workforce, project critical staffing needs, and forecast agency performance using its new strategic workforce planning tool. According to officials, the results can clarify the agency’s current and future workforce needs to effectively carry out licensing and oversight activities. However, NRC’s time frame for finalizing the tool has been delayed multiple times and is now planned for the first quarter of fiscal year 2027. Until it is finalized, NRC may not be able to effectively conduct strategic workforce management and planning to best use the ADVANCE Act authorities to enhance its workforce going forward. NRC officials and most of the stakeholders GAO interviewed agreed that the ADVANCE Act authorities offer NRC additional flexibilities to better meet agency needs in the future. However, they were unsure if these authorities are enough to fully address NRC’s significant workforce challenges and gaps. As of July 2026, NRC had developed a plan to use the authorities but had not established metrics to measure or assess the effectiveness of the ADVANCE Act authorities in supporting hiring and retention. Doing so could provide NRC with data to evaluate whether its workforce authorities adequately address its identified workforce needs. Why GAO Did This Study NRC is responsible for regulating civilian use of nuclear materials in the U.S., carrying out licensing activities, and conducting inspections and oversight. Policymakers’ interest in strengthening U.S. nuclear energy capacity has increased in recent years. In addition, NRC anticipates an increase in applications for new nuclear reactor licenses. In section 502 of the ADVANCE Act of 2024, Congress granted NRC additional authorities to enhance its recruitment and retention of specialized staff. The act also included a provision for GAO to evaluate the extent to which NRC has used the workforce authorities. This report examines the extent to which NRC has used the ADVANCE Act authorities and describes challenges NRC officials and stakeholders identified related to NRC’s workforce. GAO reviewed the ADVANCE Act, other relevant laws, policy, and agency documents; analyzed agency workforce data; and interviewed NRC officials and representatives from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 nuclear industry and policy organizations.

What GAO Found Visitor visa adjudications, which account for most nonimmigrant visas (NIV), have surpassed pre-COVID numbers. The Department of State adjudicated 9.2 million visitor visas pre-COVID in fiscal year (FY) 2019. That number dropped to 1.5 million in FY 2021. By FY 2025, the number of adjudications surpassed pre-pandemic levels, reaching 11.7 million. The average wait time to obtain an interview for a visitor visa was almost 8 times higher than before the pandemic, increasing from 26 days in FY 2019 to 201 days in FY 2025. In addition, the number of consular officers working on NIVs almost recovered from a COVID-era low of 1,104 in FY 2021 to pre-pandemic levels in FY 2024, reaching 1,342, but dropped to 904 in FY 2025 due to hiring freezes and attrition. State officials in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico—the countries GAO selected for more in-depth analysis—identified low staffing levels relative to demand for visitor visas as the main factor, among others, contributing to wait times to obtain an interview. According to data provided by State, wait times to obtain an interview in Mexico and India are longer than in China and Brazil, in part because they have fewer staff working on NIVs relative to the number of applications they receive (see table). Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) Applications, CA Officers working on NIVs, NIV Applications per CA Officer, and Weighted Average Interview Wait Times to Obtain an Interview by Selected Countries, Fiscal Year 2025 Country NIV applications CA officers working on NIVs NIV applications per CA officer Weighted average wait times, in days Brazil 1,141,235 87 13,118 32 China 1,206,011 119 10,135 34 India 1,455,255 68 21,401 346 Mexico 2,658,627 124 21,441 283 Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. | GAO-26-107902 Since FY 2019, State has conducted and implemented one Global Repositioning Exercise (GREX), which provides information used to bring consular staffing levels into alignment with workloads, according to State officials. Although the GREX is not required by policy, State officials said that the exercise is designed to be conducted annually. However, officials said they did not conduct the exercise in FY 2021 and FY 2022 because of issues related to COVID and in FY 2024 and FY 2025 because of changing policy priorities. Having a mechanism to require the exercise would help ensure State consistently and fully assesses workloads and NIV demand at posts and adequately addresses its staffing needs, particularly in years when significant changes are affecting workload. Why GAO Did This Study Millions of travelers to the U.S. apply for NIVs each year, which include visitor visas for tourism and business purposes, as well as visas for foreign students, diplomats, and temporary workers. According to the U.S. Travel Association, international travel and tourism contributed $176 billion to the U.S. economy in 2025. In adjudicating visas, State must balance speed and efficiency with national security concerns. One key issue that can affect efficiency is long wait times for an interview, which is required in most cases to obtain a visa. A House Committee on Appropriations report and the explanatory statement accompanying legislation that became the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision for GAO to examine the efficiency of consular operations, including visa processing times. This report examines (1) trends in the number of applications and adjudications for NIVs, associated wait times to obtain an interview, and staffing levels from FY 2019 through FY 2025; and (2) how staffing levels affect wait times and to what extent State determines posts’ staffing needs; among other objectives. GAO analyzed State’s data for NIVs and interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C. GAO also conducted interviews and discussion groups with consular officers and management in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, the countries with the highest demand for NIVs in FY 2025.

What GAO Found To meet its mission to protect the security of our nation and provide warfighters the assets they need, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on the use of information technology (IT). According to DOD’s Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), the department planned to spend $10.3 billion on the 18 major IT business programs from fiscal years (FY) 2024 through 2026. The four largest programs account for 50 percent of the planned spending (see figure). The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Planned Costs for the Four Largest Information Technology (IT) Business Programs Compared to the Remaining 14 Selected Programs from Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 through FY 2026 To help determine whether operational programs are meeting their business or mission purpose, programs are required by the General Services Administration to identify and track a minimum of five performance metrics across the categories of customer satisfaction, strategic and business results, financial performance, and innovation. Of the 18 programs, 17 were operational. Of these, 15 identified the minimum required number of performance metrics in each category. However, the remaining two did not. Accordingly, the extent to which these two programs were improving customer satisfaction, increasing financial performance, and delivering innovative approaches is unknown. GAO has previously reported on DOD IT business programs not fully reporting performance metric data and made recommendations to the department to do so (see GAO-22-105330 and GAO-25-107649). Regarding achieving performance goals, of the 17 programs that identified metrics, six programs met all performance targets, 10 programs met more than one target but not all, and one program met no targets. The IT programs demonstrated mixed progress in implementing key practices for fraud risk awareness, software development, and key cybersecurity initiatives. Developing fraud risk awareness—particularly in staff who manage key IT programs—is an important step toward maturing DOD in fraud risk management. Of the 18 programs, seven programs reported via GAO’s questionnaire that program staff were either unaware of or did not receive training to recognize and report signs of fraud or tampering in IT systems (see table). In response, DOD officials indicated that the department does not currently require training to recognize and report signs of fraud in IT systems, rather that personnel receive mandatory, general fraud awareness training. While these broad efforts are important, programs’ reported lack of awareness of training to manage or report fraud can increase the risk of software development- and cybersecurity-related fraud within IT programs, making them vulnerable to exploitation. Department of Defense (DOD) Major Information Technology (IT) Business Programs Reporting Fraud Risk Awareness Fraud risk awareness practice Number of programs that reported practice Receiving training or knowing about available training over the past two years to recognize and report signs of fraud in IT systems 11 of 18 Assessing fraud risks facing the program 10 of 18 Source: GAO analysis of DOD program questionnaire responses as of April 2026. | GAO-26-108596 Further, 10 of the 18 DOD IT business programs reported actively developing software using recommended Agile and iterative software development approaches and practices. However, in areas related to tracking customer satisfaction and progress of software development, eight of the 10 programs did not report or demonstrate using required metrics and management tools. GAO previously recommended that DOD address this issue. Additionally, six of the 18 programs had not developed plans to implement zero trust in their cybersecurity frameworks by DOD’s 2027 deadline (see table). In addition, while five programs reported using artificial intelligence (AI) tools to secure their systems, three programs did not have an approved cybersecurity strategy. GAO has previously recommended that all programs develop one (see GAO-22-105330). Department of Defense (DOD) Major Information Technology (IT) Business Programs That Reported Having an Approved Cybersecurity Strategy or Implementing Zero Trust Architecture Development approach or practice Number of programs that reported using each approach or practice Having a DOD approved cybersecurity strategy 15 of 18 Implementing zero trust architecture as part of the security framework 12 of 18 Source: GAO analysis of DOD program questionnaire responses as of April 2026. | GAO-26-108596 DOD continues to make efforts to improve its management of IT investments as a result of legislative and policy changes. These efforts include revising its business systems investment management guidance, modernizing its business enterprise architecture, adopting a zero trust cybersecurity strategy, developing AI acquisition guidance, updating its agency strategic plan, and implementing cost efficiency initiatives. GAO will continue to monitor DOD’s efforts to improve how the department manages its IT investments. Why GAO Did This Study IT is critical to the success of DOD’s major business functions. These functions include such areas as health care, human capital, financial management, logistics, and contracting. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019, as amended, includes a provision for GAO to conduct assessments of selected DOD IT programs annually through March 2029. GAO’s objectives for this seventh review were to (1) examine what progress selected DOD IT business programs have made on cost, schedule, and performance; (2) assess the extent to which DOD has implemented key fraud risk management, software development, and cybersecurity practices for selected programs; and (3) describe actions DOD has taken to implement legislative and policy changes that could affect its IT acquisitions. To address the first objective, GAO selected the 18 IT business programs listed as DOD’s major IT investments in its FY 2026 submission to the Federal IT Dashboard. GAO analyzed data from DOD’s OCIO to examine DOD’s planned expenditures for these programs from FY 2024 through FY 2026. GAO also administered a questionnaire to the 18 program offices to obtain and analyze information about cost and schedule changes that the programs reported experiencing since January 2024. Further, GAO compared programs’ performance metrics data provided by DOD’s OCIO to guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. To address the second objective, the questionnaire also sought information about the selected programs’ practices in fraud risk management, software development, and cybersecurity. GAO compared the responses and documentation against relevantguidance and leading practices to identify gaps and risks. For programs that did not demonstrate having documentation or strategies, GAO followed up with DOD officials for clarification. For the third objective, GAO reviewed and summarized (1) policy, plans, and guidance associated with the department’s efforts to implement changes to its defense business systems investment management guidance and business enterprise architecture and (2) efforts to adopt zero trust cybersecurity principles, develop AI acquisition guidance, update its strategic plan, and implement cost efficiency initiatives. GAO also met with DOD OCIO officials to discuss their efforts in these areas.

What the OIG Found Proper contract administration is critical to ensure GAO complies with contract terms and conditions. In FY 2019, GAO entered into a blanket purchase agreement for commercial facility maintenance (the BPA), which it awarded under the General Services Administration (GSA) Schedule program. After subsequent modification, the BPA’s maximum value was about $119 million. Although the contractor submitted adjusted labor rates from a collective bargaining agreement, GAO did not modify the BPA and associated time-and-materials orders to reflect these higher rates before payment. As a result, the agency paid about $94,000 more than the previously negotiated rates during the second option year. GAO was unable to explain why the BPA and the associated orders were not modified prior to payment. The OIG also observed that GAO’s standard operating procedures for procurements did not provide clear guidance on evaluating a contractor’s charges for indirect costs or profit on work performed by a subcontractor when the contractor adds no or only negligible value (excessive pass-through charges). The OIG also found that GAO could clarify its policies and procedures regarding the applicability of federal regulations for contracting by negotiation to GSA schedule procurements. The lack of clarity could result in procurement staff taking unnecessary steps. The agency indicated it had updated its procedures regarding subcontracting and was in the process of updating its policies for GSA schedule procurements. By enhancing its oversight of contract modifications and invoice approvals, GAO could ensure that payments are consistent with negotiated rates. Further, GAO’s updated policies and procedures regarding excessive pass-through charges and future updates to the applicable procurement processes when using the GSA schedule could strengthen GAO’s acquisition program and improve efficiencies for procurement staff. Why the OIG Did This Audit Careful contract administration, especially concerning invoice review and approval, is critical to ensure GAO pays the correct labor rates for time-and-materials orders. The OIG conducted this audit to assess time-and-materials orders issued under the BPA.

What GAO Found The Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) will surpass $200 billion and take over 50 more years to execute, based on GAO’s analysis of Navy plans. Developing the plans and cost estimates to rebuild the Navy’s four public shipyards has taken the Navy years longer—and will cost much more—than originally anticipated due to multiple challenges and changes involved in the program. For example, environmental issues led to additional projects and more extensive work affecting project plans and costs at the shipyards, including Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (see figure). Seismic Risks Identified at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard The Navy established an oversight framework to guide SIOP plans and decisions over the duration of the program. The framework includes tools and requirements typically used for major defense acquisition programs—like for missiles, aircraft, or ships. However, the Navy has not outlined steps in the framework to reevaluate program objectives and resources as the program progresses over the next several decades. Without building such reviews into key future decision points, the Navy is limiting its ability to ensure that capabilities in SIOP’s plans today continue to be aligned or adjusted to support future fleet warfighting needs. Further, while the Navy provides Congress with reports and briefings on various aspects of SIOP, the Navy does not provide Congress with consolidated, standardized information on full program costs and risks because there is no requirement to do so. In contrast, major defense acquisitions are required to provide annual program status reports with detailed metrics, including total costs to date, cost and schedule baselines, and risks, to track and monitor progress. Without a full picture of how much has been spent, what remains to be funded, and what risks may affect SIOP progress, Congress could make consequential decisions for SIOP based on incomplete information, thus risking billions in taxpayer dollars and a lack of program oversight for the decades to come. Finally, the Navy created several organizations to manage SIOP projects and challenges. For example, the Navy created organizations for project oversight and program integration teams to coordinate issues with shipyards. However, the Navy has not fully documented the organizations’ roles and responsibilities. Doing so would formalize their new SIOP roles and help to ensure not only their ability to effectively implement SIOP’s essential projects but also the continuity of the critical shipyard operations to maintain and modernize the U.S. naval fleet now and throughout SIOP’s extended timeline. Why GAO Did This Study The Navy’s four public shipyards are essential to maintaining and modernizing the U.S. fleet of nuclear-powered vessels and its critical warfighting capabilities. The Navy initiated SIOP in 2018 to address poor shipyard conditions and capability gaps affecting fleet readiness. GAO has reported on the shipyards’ persistently poor condition and found that preliminary SIOP cost estimates were understated by billions of dollars. The joint explanatory statement accompanying the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2024 includes a provision for GAO to report on SIOP oversight and management. This report examines (1) Navy planning and implementation of SIOP, including costs, timing, and challenges; (2) Navy oversight of SIOP; and (3) Navy establishment of project management organizations to oversee SIOP construction projects. GAO analyzed SIOP program documents and project cost and schedule data; visited the shipyards to observe SIOP projects and ship maintenance; and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found GAO found that veterans face multiple challenges in accessing health care in the Freely Associated States (FAS), according to VA assessments and interviews with VA and FAS officials. These challenges include limited availability of specialty services, such as mental health and cardiology, and the inability to utilize telehealth services with VA health providers. FAS veterans must travel to VA health facilities in U.S. states or territories to utilize their health benefits, but do not receive beneficiary travel reimbursement for travel to the U.S. Map of Health Care Facilities Providing Veteran Care in Pacific Region VA completed a variety of assessments from March 2024 to March 2025 on the implementation of veteran health benefits authorized under the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024. These assessments included an environmental scan of the health care landscape in the FAS, and an analysis of policy implications of changes to FAS veteran benefits. VA described potential costs and regulatory requirements for implementation options, ranging from maintaining the current status quo to full implementation of authorized health care for FAS veterans. For example, changes to reimbursement and beneficiary travel benefits would necessitate additional staffing to process claims. In an April 2025 memo provided to Congress, VA stated that it would not exercise its new authorities, asserting this decision was “to ensure equity with all U.S. veterans.” VA confirmed in June 2026 it had concluded its engagement with the FAS. However, in July 2026, VA officials told GAO that they intended to resume engagement with the FAS and, in August 2026, confirmed they were pursuing partial implementation of its authorities, including telehealth services, delivery of pharmaceutical products and medical surgical products, reimbursements for care in the FAS, and beneficiary travel benefits to service-connected veterans in the FAS. They did not provide a timeline for doing so. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. maintains compacts of free association with three foreign countries in the Pacific—the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Republic of Palau—collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS). Under these compacts, citizens of the FAS can enlist in the U.S. military. Some are eligible for certain VA benefits. The Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024 gave VA discretionary authority to expand health care services for eligible veterans in the FAS by providing hospital care, medical services, and beneficiary travel payments. GAO was asked to examine implementation of veteran health benefits as part of our mandate under the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024. This report (1) identifies challenges veterans face in obtaining health benefits in the FAS and (2) describes analysis completed by VA to assess implementation of veteran health service benefits authorized under the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2024. For more information, contact Nagla'a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO estimated that annual federal tax fraud loss is between $116 billion and $304 billion based on data and information from 2018 through 2024. GAO’s estimate is informed by data on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cases of fraud and potential fraud, potential fraud in the tax gap, and tax evasion from economic activities purposefully hidden from the government (i.e., shadow economy). The estimated range reflects approximately 2 percent to 6 percent of estimated tax owed to the federal government (tax liability) if applied to tax year 2022, the most recent year for which an estimate of the tax liability is available. GAO Estimated Range of Tax Fraud Loss as a Percentage of Estimated Total Tax Owed to the Federal Government, Tax Year 2022 The estimated range represents GAO’s best estimate of the extent of tax fraud based on the available evidence and analytical methods. The methodology accounts for the inherent uncertainties associated with fraud estimation and data limitations. The estimate could help Congress and agency officials understand the potential scale and scope of tax fraud loss and decide how to allocate resources for fraud risk management. For example, the estimate could inform decisions about the costs and benefits of implementing new controls to prevent, detect, and respond to tax fraud. While it is not possible to eliminate fraud completely, different divisions within IRS undertake a broad range of activities that help manage tax fraud risk and safeguard taxpayer dollars. Some of these activities are directly aimed at preventing, detecting, and responding to tax fraud. Other activities are aimed at improving overall taxpayer compliance but nonetheless help the agency reduce tax fraud risk. For example, IRS’s Return Review Program screens certain individual tax returns for characteristics indicative of fraud. Through this program, according to IRS, it prevented $88 billion in invalid, and potentially fraudulent, tax refund payments from 2018 through 2024. Additionally, tax return audits play a key role in helping IRS detect fraud. IRS trains auditors to recognize indicators of fraud when reviewing tax returns for overall compliance. Once IRS detects potential fraud in a tax return, it may respond in various ways, including through assessing civil penalties, criminal investigation, and referral for prosecution. Example of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Fraud Detection and Fraud Response IRS has routinely assessed fraud risks consistent with leading practices for fraud risk management. However, the agency has not developed an antifraud strategy or designated an antifraud entity to mitigate fraud risks in a strategic and coordinated manner. An antifraud strategy could help IRS better manage fraud risks, which in turn could help reduce revenue lost to tax fraud. Further, designating an antifraud entity to undertake key fraud risk management activities—such as coordinating antifraud initiatives across the agency—would help IRS better mitigate the billions of dollars lost to fraud each year. Why GAO Did This Study Each year, the federal government collects trillions of dollars in revenue, the single largest source of which comes from taxes that IRS collects. Most taxpayers pay their taxes voluntarily and on time. However, some taxpayers do not comply with tax law, including by committing fraud—willful misrepresentation to obtain something of value. Tax fraud diverts revenue that could be used for critical government operations and services and exacerbates budget deficits. This report (1) describes the estimated amount of federal tax revenue lost to fraud annually and (2) examines the ways in which IRS safeguards federal tax revenue and manages fraud risks. GAO estimated the amount of federal tax revenue lost to fraud annually using a well-established probabilistic method for estimating ranges of outcomes under different assumptions and scenarios where there is a high degree of uncertainty, such as with fraud estimation. The simulation incorporated IRS data from 2018 through 2024, as well as information on tax fraud from other sources, such as academic literature. GAO also analyzed IRS documentation and interviewed IRS officials.

What GAO Found As of July 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has pursued an approach to expand detention capacity that has resulted in millions of dollars of waste. Since January 2025, ICE invested billions of dollars in six new initiatives without conducting necessary analysis and planning. For example, ICE purchased 11 warehouses to renovate for detention purposes at a reported cost of about $1.07 billion. In June 2026, ICE officials told GAO they were working to sell seven of the warehouses. ICE reported spending over $20 million on nonrecoverable costs, such as zoning assessments and security, on the warehouses it intends to sell. Waste, which occurs when agencies spend government resources carelessly or extravagantly, is also evident in other initiatives. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) New Detention Expansion Initiatives, January 2025–July 2026 ICE pursued these detention expansion initiatives without developing a comprehensive strategic plan to guide its efforts. For example, ICE has not developed consistent goals or objectives for the size and characteristics of its detention bed space. ICE also has not assessed the risks and benefits of using facilities with high operating costs compared to other less costly options in ICE's traditional detention portfolio. Developing a comprehensive strategic plan—which includes goals, activities, and resource needs—is a critical element of successful program management. Such a plan could help ICE better manage its multibillion-dollar detention expansion efforts and reduce waste associated with scaling back inefficient detention initiatives. These planning efforts would also better position ICE to select the approaches most likely to achieve its goals while making more efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars. Why GAO Did This Study A January 2025 Executive Order directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain individuals apprehended for violations of immigration law to the extent permitted by law and to allocate all available resources for ICE detention purposes. GAO was asked to review ICE’s expansion of immigration detention and operations. This report examines ICE’s efforts to expand detention capacity since January 2025. GAO reviewed agency documentation on detention expansion efforts and interviewed headquarters and field officials at eight detention facilities in Texas and Florida. GAO selected these locations because, among other factors, they were the sites of new ICE detention expansion initiatives. GAO reviewed data on operating costs of expansion initiatives and compared ICE detention expansion efforts to program management and DHS guidance.

What GAO Found As of March 2025, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) awarded 1,245 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) subgrants to communities over its first four grant cycles in fiscal years 2020 through 2023. These subgrants were for mitigation activities to address hazards, such as floods. FEMA allocated about $2.5 billion for these subgrants, half the $4.8 billion available. FEMA reimbursed $62 million, and 37 subgrants had completed work and initiated the closeout process. From April 2025 to March 2026, FEMA did not award subgrants nor obligate funds. GAO found the median time for FEMA to finalize its review of subapplications and award BRIC subgrants was 7 to 9 months. As of March 2025, FEMA had not made award decisions for 700 subapplications because it had not completed the second of its two review stages. These subapplications were associated with about $2.2 billion of the $4.8 billion. Communities said these review timeframes could extend project timelines and increase costs. Identifying efficiencies to shorten FEMA’s review may enable communities to begin hazard mitigation activities sooner and minimize additional costs. Number of BRIC Subapplications Pending FEMA’s Award Decision and BRIC Funds Associated with These Subapplications, Across Four Grant Cycles and as of March 2025 FEMA announced it was ending BRIC in April 2025, but it did not communicate key information internally and externally until March 2026 when it announced it was restarting BRIC. For example, FEMA did not clarify which subgrants would be terminated. Officials and stakeholders said the lack of actionable information from FEMA headquarters created challenges and delayed mitigation efforts. State officials told GAO that some subrecipients stopped work due to funding uncertainty, which may increase project costs. Moving forward, identifying and applying lessons learned from this period will help ensure FEMA communicates relevant, timely program information internally and externally. FEMA established performance goals, but it did not consistently establish methods and targets to measure results. For example, one of FEMA’s goals in fiscal year 2023 included a goal to spread grants across the U.S. but FEMA did not set a target to determine if it had achieved its goal. FEMA officials also told GAO it did not use performance information to inform its announcement ending BRIC. By establishing results-oriented performance goals and generating annual performance information, FEMA could use this information to determine BRIC’s effectiveness and inform agency decision-making. Why GAO Did This Study Disasters caused by natural hazards have become costlier and more frequent in recent years. Independent research has found that investing in disaster resilience can reduce costs of future disasters. FEMA launched its BRIC grant program in 2020 to fund activities that enhance resilience and lower disaster costs. In April 2025, FEMA announced it was ending BRIC. In March 2026, FEMA announced it was restarting BRIC. GAO was asked to review FEMA’s implementation of BRIC, and explanatory statement language includes a provision for GAO to conduct oversight of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, which made appropriations for BRIC. This report examines (1) communities that applied for and received grants and activities funded, (2) challenges that communities identified and the extent to which FEMA addressed them, (3) the extent to which FEMA communicated BRIC’s status and the impact of announcing its end, and (4) the extent to which FEMA measured the program’s performance and used this information to inform agency decisions. GAO reviewed FEMA documentation, analyzed BRIC data from four grant cycles as of March 2025, interviewed a nongeneralizable selection of 6 states and 6 communities, and interviewed FEMA officials.

What GAO Found The federal judiciary’s administrative space, such as the district clerks’ and probation offices that support the judiciary’s mission, made up 40 percent of the judiciary’s total space in fiscal years 2021 through 2025. In fiscal year 2025, the judiciary’s administrative space totaled 12.2 million usable square feet across 716 of the 772 facilities the judiciary occupied nationwide, a decrease of 1 percent from fiscal year 2021. GAO found that administrative space was the sole type of space in over a third of judiciary occupied facilities in fiscal year 2025. Most of these facilities (234 of 272) were commercially owned. Ninety-six percent of the 234 commercially owned facilities were occupied by federal public defender organizations and probation offices. The proportion of the judiciary’s annual rent payments spent on administrative space, in both nominal and inflation adjusted dollars, remained steady—between 39 and 40 percent from fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year 2025. The Federal Judiciary’s Fiscal Year 2025 Administrative Space Distribution, in Usable Square Feet Note: The remaining court units include the courts of appeals clerks’ offices (including bankruptcy appellate panels); courts of appeals central legal staff; circuit executives’, bankruptcy administrators’, and pretrial services offices; and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-108603. While the judiciary has data on the amount of administrative space it occupies and the associated rent costs, it does not collect or review occupancy data. Without occupancy data, the judiciary is unable to measure the extent to which its administrative space is utilized, as utilization is the ratio of the average daily occupancy of a space compared to the usable square feet of the space. Judiciary policies and guidance identify the importance of maximizing the use of its space and taking a data-based approach when doing so. For example, part of the judiciary’s Asset Management Planning process includes a physical assessment of how well court units’ space functions and meets the judiciary’s space standards. But, according to judiciary officials, measuring utilization is not part of the judiciary’s practices because it has not identified a business need to do so. Measuring the utilization of its administrative space and identifying utilization benchmarks would enhance the judiciary’s decision-making, bolster its efforts to meet its stated goals to efficiently manage and maximize the use of its space, and help ensure it is not wasting resources by leasing more space than it needs. Why GAO Did This Study Chronic underutilization of federal buildings is one of the main reasons that federal real property management has been on GAO’s High Risk List for more than 20 years. In fiscal year 2025, the judiciary paid over $1 billion in rent, making rent one of its largest expenses. GAO was asked to examine the judiciary’s utilization of its administrative space. This report (1) describes the characteristics of the judiciary’s administrative space and how it has changed from fiscal years 2021 through 2025 and (2) assesses the extent to which the judiciary is measuring the utilization of its administrative space. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of nine judiciary facilities and interviewed officials about the utilization of their administrative space. GAO observed the use of administrative space at four of these facilities. GAO surveyed the 13 judiciary circuit executives who represent all court units nationwide about using occupancy data to measure utilization. GAO also reviewed and analyzed judiciary data and documents and interviewed officials from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) and General Services Administration.

What GAO Found The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided federal funding to agencies, including the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Department of Energy (DOE), for a wide range of efforts. These efforts included projects to reduce wildfire risk, improve rural power production, and develop clean energy technologies. Of the $37 billion provided to USDA that was not later rescinded by Public Law 119-21, commonly known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, USDA obligated $32.2 billion for fiscal years 2022 through 2025. Of the $78 billion provided to DOE that was not later rescinded, DOE obligated $51 billion for fiscal years 2022 through 2025. Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) Funding for USDA and DOE as of September 30, 2025 Note: This figure does not include budget authority for which the entire period of availability occurs after September 30, 2025, or obligations, disbursements, or rescissions of that budget authority. USDA. In response to the President’s directive in 2025 to review IIJA and IRA funding for alignment with executive orders, USDA reported that it reviewed awards for the use of racial, ethnic, and gender preferences and for promoting climate change or environmental justice initiatives. Senior leadership ultimately made final decisions on whether to approve to continue, modify, or cancel awards, according to USDA officials and documentation. According to agency officials, USDA completed its review of IIJA- and IRA-funded awards by June 30, 2025. The agency terminated 34 contracts, totaling $67 million, according to its data. However, GAO concluded that USDA data were not sufficiently reliable to determine the status of all awards reviewed. Specifically, USDA officials could not specify which awards the agency approved to continue or modified as a result of its review or if the agency canceled additional awards. DOE. In May 2025, DOE created the advisory portfolio review process (PRP) committee to evaluate awards for consistency with executive orders. According to DOE officials, the relevant program office head made the final decision for each award under review, with the PRP committee serving in an advisory role. According to agency officials, DOE completed its review of IIJA and IRA awards in April 2026. According to agency data, DOE reported approving to continue 381 awards ($19.6 billion) and canceling 155 awards ($9.1 billion). Why GAO Did This Study The IIJA and IRA provided billions in federal funding to agencies to distribute through mechanisms like grants and loans. Beginning in January 2025, executive orders directed agencies to pause this funding to review it for consistency with administration priorities. Grant recipients have raised concerns that delays in distributing these funds affect their ability to implement their projects. GAO was asked to review the status of IIJA and IRA funding. This report describes USDA’s and DOE’s (1) IIJA and IRA budget authority, rescissions, obligations, and disbursements for fiscal years 2022 to 2025; (2) processes for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding in response to executive orders; and (3) IIJA and IRA funding review status. GAO analyzed the IIJA and IRA and financial data from USDA’s and DOE’s accounting systems and the agencies’ policies and guidance for reviewing IIJA and IRA funding. GAO also analyzed and summarized agency review data. GAO also interviewed selected agency officials. GAO found USDA’s and DOE’s data to be sufficiently reliable for reporting aspects of the agencies’ funding review status, with some limitations, as discussed in the report. For more information, contact Anne Sit-Williams at sitwilliamsa@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In 2024, about 82 percent of women of reproductive age reported using some form of contraception in the past 12 months, according to research from KFF. Most private health plans are generally required to cover the full range of contraceptives for women. The Department of Labor (DOL), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services—and states each have responsibilities for overseeing private health plans, including plans' coverage of contraception. See table for descriptions of their general oversight responsibilities and activities. DOL, CMS, and States’ General Responsibilities for Overseeing Private Health Plans   Oversight authority Oversight activities DOL Private employer-sponsored group health plans Responding to enrollee complaints Conducting investigations in response to systemic concerns identified from various sources, such as complaints CMS Non-federal governmental plans Qualified health plans offered through the federally-facilitated exchanges Group and individual plans in certain states that do not have authority to enforce federal requirements or are not otherwise enforcing requirements Conducting annual plan reviews and certification Conducting individual complaint investigations Conducting market conduct examinations of potential systemic compliance issues States Individual health plans and some group health plans sold in their state Conducting premarket health plan reviews Collecting individual complaints Carrying out market conduct examinations Source: GAO review of information from CMS, DOL, selected state officials and prior GAO work. | GAO-26-108446 Note: The Department of Treasury oversees certain aspects of PPACA compliance for church plans, which were outside the scope of our report. Of the plans for which they have oversight responsibility, DOL and CMS identified instances of noncompliance within the last 6 years. For example, DOL identified noncompliance with federal contraceptive coverage requirements in three investigations DOL conducted in the last 6 years, according to DOL officials. For example, DOL found that a pharmacy benefit manager required enrollees to try other types of contraception before covering the medically necessary, preferred method at no cost-sharing. According to DOL officials, this pharmacy benefit manager revised its practices and reprocessed the associated claims. CMS identified instances of health plan noncompliance with federal contraceptive coverage requirements in three out of five market conduct examinations conducted in the last 6 years. For example, CMS found that one health plan failed to provide coverage of contraceptive coverage services without cost-sharing. Officials say this health plan revised its practices and reprocessed the associated claims. Why GAO Did This Study Two-thirds of Americans receive their health coverage through private health plans. Private health plans must generally cover a range of contraceptives without cost-sharing including oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, and female sterilization services, among others. Concerns have been raised by stakeholders and researchers that health plan enrollees have been denied coverage for certain contraceptive products or services. GAO was asked to review oversight by federal and state agencies of group and individual health plans’ compliance with federal contraceptive coverage requirements. This report provides information on payments enrollees made for contraceptives, including cost-sharing; perspectives from stakeholder organizations and health plans about contraceptive coverage requirements; and federal and state oversight of federal contraceptive coverage requirements. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed available data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality on contraceptive prescription purchases; reviewed literature to identify information about when enrollees had cost-sharing for contraceptives; reviewed federal guidance issued by CMS and DOL; and interviewed officials from DOL, CMS, six selected states, selected health plans, and selected stakeholder organizations, including those representing enrollees and providers. GAO selected these states to capture variation in rurality and state laws, among other criteria. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services and DOL. The agencies provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact John E. Dicken at dickenj@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Remote and isolated military installations are often away from population centers or located in austere environments, making the delivery of critical support services, such as health care or housing, challenging. GAO found that while remote and isolated installations consistently faced challenges in areas such as recruiting and retaining civilian personnel, the causes and severity of those challenges differed by location. For example, in Alaska, Eielson Air Force Base had the most vacant positions (428) while Fort Greely and Clear Space Force Station had no vacant critical support services positions. In 2024, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued guidance for designating installations as remote and isolated. As of May 2026, the Departments of the Army and Navy compiled lists of remote and isolated installations in accordance with this guidance. The Department of the Air Force has opted not to make a formal designation at this time. A DOD official stated that efforts to fully develop the risk assessment process outlined in the same guidance will begin once the initial designations of remote and isolated installations are complete. However, this guidance does not establish a clear definition for what a remote and isolated installation is. Moreover, other guidance varies in how these installations are defined. A consistent definition of remote and isolated installations would enhance DOD’s ability to produce an accurate picture of what is considered remote and isolated across the enterprise for purposes of identifying and assessing risks among these installations. Photos of Remote and Isolated Military Installations DOD implemented multiple efforts to reduce its civilian workforce since January 2025 that had significant impacts on the ability to staff or hire civilian positions in critical support services at remote and isolated installations. However, DOD has not assessed the effect of these reductions on remote and isolated locations where recruiting and retaining civilian personnel can be difficult. Collecting specific lessons learned at remote and isolated installations from the civilian workforce reduction efforts could assist DOD in understanding the effect of such reductions. Why GAO Did This Study DOD has established policies and programs intended to enhance quality of life and well-being of service members and their families. Installations that could be considered remote and isolated often have reduced support services for service members and their families. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 included a provision for GAO to assess civilian positions supporting critical services at remote installations. This report (1) describes the ability to fill civilian personnel positions in critical support services at remote and isolated installations and challenges providing critical support services at these locations; and assesses the extent to which DOD has (2) designated installations as remote and isolated and assessed risks at these locations; and (3) developed lessons learned from civilian workforce reductions on critical support service positions at remote and isolated installations. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of nine remote and isolated installations to discuss the provision of critical support services at those installations. GAO also collected data from these installations for fiscal years 2023 through 2025 on vacancy rates and time to hire for civilian positions in the critical support services.

What GAO Found The U.S. faces a maternal mortality crisis, with mortality rates that exceed every other high-income country. More than 600 women die during pregnancy or from causes aggravated by pregnancy each year in the U.S.; over 80 percent of these deaths are preventable, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). To help prevent these kinds of deaths, CDC provides funding for Maternal Mortality Review Committees (MMRCs). These committees, typically supported and maintained by state and local health agencies, identify factors contributing to pregnancy-related deaths and make recommendations to patients and their families, providers, hospitals, or state policymakers to help prevent similar deaths. They convene at the state or local level and comprise clinical and non-clinical representatives. GAO found all 10 selected MMRCs consider federal and state laws and policies as potential factors that affect maternal mortality. For example, representatives GAO interviewed from five MMRCs said their states changed state laws to extend Medicaid coverage for certain women to 12 months postpartum, due to MMRC recommendations. Such health care coverage could save lives by treating and reducing chronic disease, such as severe hypertension, that can underlie maternal mortality, according to these representatives. GAO found the 10 selected MMRCs commonly made recommendations in the areas of care coordination, mental health and substance use, health equity, reproductive health, and health care workers. For example: Mental health and substance use. Unintentional drug overdose and suicide were among the leading causes of death among pregnant and postpartum women, according to a recent study. Nine of the selected MMRCs made recommendations in this area, including for screening and referrals for treatment, and to increase funding for access to care. Health equity. There are persistent racial and ethnic disparities in deaths of pregnant women, with both Black and American Indian/Alaska Native women experiencing deaths at a rate of 2.5 or more times higher than White women, according to GAO’s previous work and CDC. Nine of the selected MMRCs made recommendations to address these disparities. For example, one MMRC recommended ensuring American Indian/Alaska Native representation in the planning and implementation of improvements in maternity care. Over the 5-year funding cycle from 2024 through 2029, CDC plans to provide about $134 million to 52 states and territories. To monitor MMRCs that receive this CDC funding, the agency holds regular meetings, reviews required reports, and conducts site visits. GAO found that to assess MMRC performance, CDC has incorporated key performance management practices identified in prior GAO work. For example, CDC set a goal of eliminating preventable deaths and collects information on the number of MMRC recommendations being implemented. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to provide information on MMRCs and federal oversight of them. This report provides information on whether MMRCs consider laws and policies when reviewing factors that contribute to maternal mortality, recommendations by MMRCs to reduce mortality, and CDC’s efforts to evaluate the MMRCs. GAO reviewed the most recently available MMRC reports as of December 2025 and interviewed officials representing a nongeneralizable sample of 10 MMRCs, selected to obtain a mix of geographic locations and rate of maternal mortality, among other characteristics. GAO also reviewed CDC documentation and interviewed CDC officials. Additionally, GAO assessed the extent to which CDC is following key performance management practices. For more information, contact Mary Denigan-Macauley at DeniganMacauleyM@gao.gov.

What GAO Found All states that receive funding under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended (ESEA) are required to develop statewide accountability systems. Thirty-six states have chosen to include indicators related to chronic absenteeism in their statewide accountability systems. ESEA also has certain chronic absenteeism reporting requirements for all states, regardless of whether a state includes chronic absenteeism in its accountability system. In 2026, the Department of Education discontinued its most comprehensive monitoring of ESEA’s programmatic and fiscal requirements. The ESEA provision intended to improve oversight of funds does not explicitly direct Education to monitor grantees, nor does it include specific requirements regarding the method or frequency of monitoring and oversight activities. Suspending its most comprehensive monitoring has broad oversight implications that extend beyond chronic absenteeism. Given that Education is not currently assessing ESEA compliance with Title I fiscal requirements, there is higher risk that these federal funds—comprising about two-thirds of the nearly $27 billion in ESEA funding in 2025—could be subject to undetected fraud, waste, or abuse. While Education requires states to report data on chronically absent students using a standard method, the way Education uses those data to calculate chronic absenteeism rates can be unreliable. For example, Education directs states to report the number of chronically absent students over a school year, but to report total enrollment based on a single date. Calculating rates using mismatched timeframes has resulted in unreliable and implausible chronic absenteeism rates (e.g., rates over 100 percent), according to GAO’s analysis. GAO calculated rates at the school level and found this was especially true in low-performing schools where enrollment fluctuates more often, and shared-time schools which students attend for partial days, such as those housing career and technical education programs. Specifically, over 30 percent of these schools had implausible rates compared to under 2 percent for other schools. Methods of Calculating the Chronic Absenteeism Rates Missing school means missing valuable instructional time and poses serious implications for students' overall academic success and wellbeing. Absent quality chronic absenteeism data, this nationwide data source cannot be used to reliably track trends or evaluate the effectiveness of accountability efforts and interventions to address chronic absenteeism. Why GAO Did This Study Chronic absenteeism, which Education defines as missing 10 percent or more school days, is associated with decreased academic performance. As recently as February 2026, Education cited chronic absenteeism as a key challenge. Education has also noted that chronic absenteeism remains elevated following the COVID-19 pandemic. At least one-quarter of K-12 students were estimated to be chronically absent in recent years. GAO was asked to examine federal oversight related to chronic absenteeism. This report examines (1) how states have incorporated chronic absenteeism into their statewide accountability systems and the extent to which Education’s monitoring addresses relevant federal requirements and (2) the extent to which Education has leveraged its data to help address chronic absenteeism. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and analyzed Education’s guidance and relevant monitoring reports since 2019, when Education fully implemented its main ESEA monitoring strategy. GAO also analyzed Education’s school year 2022–2023 chronic absenteeism data (the most recent available).

What GAO Found Under the Controlled Substances Act, substances that pose a risk of abuse and dependence are placed in categories—referred to as schedules. To carry out certain scheduling actions, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is required to obtain a scheduling recommendation from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) based on a scientific and medical evaluation from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Evaluations and recommendations from HHS or DEA are not required for substances scheduled through legislation. Of the 208 substances for which DEA took scheduling actions from 2020 through 2025, DEA considered HHS evaluations and recommendations for all 95 substances for which they were required. Of those 95 substances, DEA’s final scheduling decision aligned with HHS’s recommendation for all 84 substances for which DEA had published a final rule as of December 31, 2025. The remaining 11 substances were still under extended temporary scheduling orders. We selected this timeframe to assess DEA scheduling actions during the most recent 6 calendar years. DEA and FDA have policies that address aspects of the scheduling process, including a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for sharing information; however, these policies have gaps. For example, DEA does not have policies that identify roles, responsibilities, and procedures related to scheduling. FDA does not have policies or procedures specifying how its staff are to conduct evaluations or develop recommendations. Developing such policies and procedures could help ensure operational consistency, especially if key personnel with longstanding subject matter expertise depart. The below figure shows DEA and FDA methods for coordinating regarding evaluations and recommendations for substances. Figure: DEA and FDA Methods for Coordinating Regarding Evaluations and Recommendations for Substances FDA has another MOU with the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) that describes procedures for FDA to consult NIDA when developing recommendations, but the MOU is over 40 years old and does not reflect the current entities involved or procedures. Without updating and regularly reviewing the MOU, FDA and NIDA staff may not know the entities and procedures to follow to ensure that NIDA’s expertise about drug abuse informs scheduling recommendations. According to DEA and FDA officials, differences of scientific opinion between the two agencies about a substance’s schedule have occurred rule but are rare. In such cases, they usually discuss their differences, share information, and resolve differences prior to soliciting public comments. Why GAO Did This Study The use of illicit drugs and misuse of prescription drugs has been a long-standing public health issue in the U.S. DEA, in consultation with HHS, may schedule such substances. Scheduling and quantity of a controlled substance control the extent to which criminal penalties under the Controlled Substances Act may be levied. Members of Congress have raised questions about how DEA considers HHS evaluations and recommendations. This report identifies when DEA is required to request and consider HHS evaluations and recommendations, the extent to which DEA requested and considered HHS evaluations and recommendations for scheduling actions from 2020 through 2025, and the extent to which the agencies have related policies. GAO analyzed relevant statutes and regulations, available agency policies, and DEA and FDA data on substances for which DEA took scheduling actions. GAO analyzed regulatory dockets to validate and supplement data. GAO also interviewed officials from DEA and HHS, including FDA and NIH.

What GAO Found The Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) and Medicaid home- and community-based services (HCBS) programs are the primary sources of federal funds supporting employment services for individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities (I/DD), according to officials. The VR and I/DD agencies that administer these programs within three selected states—Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Washington—generally compensated employment service providers based on either units of services rendered, such as billed time, or when supported individuals achieved milestones, such as job placement. These compensation models can present different drawbacks. For example, according to one employment service provider, compensation based on units of services rendered does not incentivize providers to reduce the services they provide as an individual develops job skills. In contrast, milestone-based compensation may not cover a provider’s actual costs, which can vary in unforeseen ways, according to employment service providers that GAO interviewed. The VR and I/DD agencies within the selected states established procedures for funding employment services and collaborating with service providers to jointly support individuals with I/DD. In these states, VR and I/DD agencies generally funded employment services sequentially with the VR agency funding them before the I/DD agency followed through Medicaid HCBS. According to state VR and I/DD officials, such sequencing of services was more common than braiding, which uses multiple funding streams separately and simultaneously to provide services to an individual. Strategies for Using Different Funds to Increase Employment for Individuals with Disabilities Employment service providers that GAO interviewed in these states identified challenges in using funds from the VR and Medicaid HCBS programs in combination to support individuals. They described the administrative burden of navigating two state agencies as a challenge that contributed to service gaps. For instance, according to a service provider in Pennsylvania, I/DD service coordinators experienced confusion about whether a closure letter from the state’s VR agency was necessary before employment services through Medicaid HCBS were allowed, creating unnecessary service gaps for some individuals. The federal Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor have issued guidance and provided some technical assistance on using different program funds to increase employment for individuals with disabilities that could address these challenges. For example, a letter issued jointly in 2022 encouraged state agencies and others to coordinate different funding streams to support individuals with disabilities seeking employment. The guidance cited specific strategies for using different funds in combination, such as sequencing and braiding, to increase such employment. Why GAO Did This Study An estimated 2 million adults in the United States have I/DD, such as Down syndrome and cerebral palsy. Although many want to and can work, they are less likely to be employed than those without disabilities. Given concerns that employment service providers for individuals with I/DD often struggle to secure funding, GAO was asked to review how the federal government supports individuals with I/DD in employment and the degree to which separate federally funded programs could lead to inefficiencies. This report provides information about how VR and I/DD agencies in selected states compensated employment service providers and coordinated funding from VR and Medicaid HCBS programs, challenges the employment service providers experienced in using these program funds, and related federal guidance. GAO examined how the state VR and Medicaid HCBS programs operated in a nongeneralizable sample of three states selected based on variation in programmatic factors and geography. In each state, GAO reviewed VR and I/DD agency documents and interviewed state officials and employment service providers. GAO also reviewed relevant federal guidance and spoke with representatives of professional associations supporting individuals with I/DD. For more information, contact Elizabeth H. Curda at CurdaE@gao.gov.