What GAO Found The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to telecommunications services. Six agencies GAO selected to review recently completed their transitions from expired, legacy telecommunications contracts to the replacement Enterprise Infrastructure Solutions (EIS) contract. However, their transitions were delayed by more than three years past GSA’s September 2022 revised deadline. Due to continued delays, GSA took actions to extend the service period of the legacy contracts until May 2026 at the latest to avoid service disruptions. The delays exposed the agencies to price increases due to the ability of vendors to raise prices during the extended service periods and the phasing out of legacy telecommunications technologies. In particular, there was a total 206 percent price increase from February to March 2025 for the selected agencies’ Networx contracts—the largest of the legacy contracts. Amount Billed for Selected Agencies’ Legacy Networx Contracts in February 2025 and March 2025 Agency February 2025 costs March 2025 costs Percent change Department of Agriculture $227,986.93 $543,645.43 138% Department of Commerce $1,768,695.34 $5,761,127.10 226% Department of Defense $4,842,079.74 $15,012,896.07 210% Department of Homeland Security $5,855,206.65 $16,853,049.42 188% Department of the Interior $399,435.26 $1,858,077.70 365% Department of Transportation $282,652.93 $896,799.13 217% Total $13,376,056.85 $40,925,594.85 206% Source: GAO analysis of billing data provided by the General Services Administration. | GAO-26-107919 Note: Agencies’ increases varied due to prevalence of legacy telecommunication technologies. The six agencies collectively identified 21 factors that contributed to their transition delays. The most commonly reported factors included performance issues with EIS vendors, the COVID-19 pandemic, and legacy connections. For example, officials from four selected agencies identified supply chain disruptions and staffing challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Three of the six agencies identified and mitigated risks related to over half of their cited delay factors. Further, GSA and the six agencies were inconsistent in identifying and mitigating the risk of service disruptions due to missed final deadlines. For example, two of the six agencies’ related risks were either closed (i.e., resolved) or did not specify the final 2026 deadlines. GSA does not currently know whether all selected agencies experienced service disruptions due to these inconsistent risk mitigation efforts. This is because, among other reasons, GSA is not notified whether a replacement service was in place before an expiring legacy service was disconnected. GSA has begun planning for the follow-on to EIS but has not determined which agencies had disruptions, if there were any impacts, and the effectiveness of any mitigation efforts. Until GSA determines the success of agencies’ mitigation efforts, it will be missing key information that could help inform the next transition and ultimately prevent excess costs and delays going forward. Why GAO Did This Study GSA was responsible for successfully managing 221 agencies’ transitions from expired legacy telecommunications contracts to the replacement contract: EIS. Agencies’ transitions to EIS were marked with significant delays, prompting GSA to extend the deadlines of the expiring legacy contracts multiple times. The final deadline was May 31, 2026. GAO was asked to review federal agencies’ efforts to transition to EIS. This report (1) describes the status and cost implications of selected agencies' efforts to transition to EIS, (2) identifies key factors that selected agencies reported contributing to delays in transitioning, and (3) determines the extent to which these agencies and GSA mitigated risks related to the identified delay factors and the risk of missing final transition deadlines. GAO reviewed transition billing data and interviewed agency officials to identify transition status and key delay factors. GAO also analyzed risk management documentation from GSA, as well as six agencies that had a significant amount of transition work remaining as of September 2024: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Transportation.

What GAO Found Since 2020, four federal agencies administered the bulk of federal funding for broadband deployment through the nine programs GAO reviewed. These were the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and Departments of Agriculture and the Treasury. For example, NTIA oversees the over $42-billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program, which provides grants to states and territories that select providers to deploy broadband networks to underserved areas. As of February 2026, all nine programs had begun distributing funding. Expected Completion Date for Selected Programs’ Broadband Deployment Program (agency) Date State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (Treasury) 2026 Broadband Infrastructure Program (NTIA); Capital Projects Fund (Treasury) 2027 Selected High Cost subprograms (FCC) 2028 Tribal Broadband Connectivity Program rounds one and two (NTIA) 2029 Tribal Broadband Connectivity Program round three (NTIA); selected High Cost subprograms (FCC); Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment Program (NTIA) 2030 and beyond Source: Documentation and officials from National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Department of the Treasury. | GAO-26-107725 Note: Table excludes the U.S. Department of Agriculture programs that GAO reviewed because expected completion dates vary by funding round. Federal agencies target funding to underserved areas using FCC mapping data showing which locations do and do not have broadband access, as reported by providers. To improve data accuracy, FCC accepts challenges from the public and makes updates if needed. Some program participants and stakeholders said this challenge process was burdensome and unclear. For example, challenging a large number of locations in an area could be difficult for smaller communities and providers with limited resources. Without targeted outreach to smaller communities and providers to address such difficulties, FCC may not be able to obtain the most accurate information about broadband availability and therefore may not be able to effectively identify and target funding to underserved areas. As one of the largest programs focused on broadband deployment GAO reviewed, BEAD holds great potential to make broadband available to areas that have been underserved. GAO has previously reported on issues providers face in high-cost areas, including financial sustainability. In October 2025, NTIA announced a requirement that BEAD providers certify that they will not accept federal funding from other sources for broadband deployment and operations costs for locations funded by BEAD for at least 10 years. This provision is intended to ensure that BEAD projects are financially self-sustainable without additional federal funding. NTIA’s BEAD documentation for states and territories states that there may be a basis for them to request certain data from providers. However, NTIA did not detail the circumstances that could warrant such a request. By providing more details, NTIA would help states anticipate potential problems and prevent service lapses to underserved areas when providers cannot continue providing services due to financial issues. Why GAO Did This Study Federal programs have received billions of dollars in recent years, including over $50 billion from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, to deploy broadband networks to areas that lack service. These areas are typically remote and harder or more expensive to serve than other areas. This effort involves multiple federal agencies, states, territories, Tribes, and broadband providers. House Report 118-124 includes a provision for GAO to review the efficacy of recent federal broadband deployment programs. This report examines selected agencies’ progress in deploying broadband, their approaches to targeting underserved areas, and NTIA’s efforts to encourage sustainability in its BEAD program, among other things. GAO analyzed broadband program data, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials from the four selected broadband funding agencies. GAO selected seven programs administered by these agencies with broadband deployment as a main purpose and two Treasury programs due to the significant amount of funding used for broadband deployment. GAO compared FCC’s efforts to improve data in its maps and NTIA’s efforts to encourage sustainability to relevant federal internal control standards.

What the OIG Found In 2021, GAO established a 5-year IT modernization plan with initiatives that were projected to cost about $29 million. As GAO’s IT modernization efforts evolved, the agency transitioned from a comprehensive 5-year IT modernization plan to an ongoing modernization strategy. The decision to evolve away from the approximately $1 million plan occurred less than 18 months after it was finalized. However, due to a lack of documentation, current officials were not fully aware of the decision-making process that led to the transition. Documenting strategic changes as they occur is critical for ensuring decisions are justified, preserving institutional knowledge, and keeping stakeholders informed. GAO incorporated most of the initiatives from the plan into the modernization strategy. As of May 2026, the agency reported that 39 of the 61 initiatives had been completed. While GAO tracked its IT modernization costs, some smaller initiatives were tracked under larger projects in the cost-tracking system. As a result, it would be difficult to determine the actual costs for all IT modernization initiatives. Fully tracking the costs of future IT projects would help ensure more effective reporting to stakeholders. By designing controls to document significant changes and identify all costs for efforts, GAO could help ensure that decisions are justified and costs are easily reportable. Why the OIG Did This Audit GAO is working to modernize its IT systems. In its public Fiscal Year 2024 Performance Plan, the agency identified IT modernization as a management challenge due to the effort required. In fiscal year 2021, GAO paid $1 million to establish an IT modernization plan with initiatives to prepare the agency’s workforce for cloud capabilities, develop governance processes, and migrate applications to the cloud. The plan roadmap estimated a 5-year time frame at a cost of about $29 million. The OIG conducted this audit to assess GAO’s progress implementing its IT modernization plan. Recommendations GAO concurred with the OIG’s recommendations to enhance controls to ensure that major decisions are appropriately documented and design controls to ensure that costs for major future projects are fully tracked and can be reported to key stakeholders. For more information, contact at oig@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Navy has not fully mitigated attack submarine fleet maintenance and other challenges affecting readiness. Over the last 10 years, the U.S. Navy has lost more than 15,000 operational days due to maintenance delays and idle time on active attack submarines. These delays resulted in an estimated $3.4 billion in costs to sustain crews and submarines that provided no operational capability. U.S. Navy Attack Submarine Depot Maintenance Delays, Length of Depot Maintenance Periods, and Idle Time, Fiscal Years 2016–2025 Lost operational days include delays completing depot maintenance and active idle time. Active idle time describes a period when an attack submarine and its crew must remain pier-side because they are no longer certified to conduct normal operations and cannot be inducted into a maintenance period. In addition to lost operational days, the Navy faces significant challenges with managing inactive idle time for attack submarines. Inactive idle time describes when an attack submarine designated for decommissioning cannot be inducted into a dry dock in a shipyard. As a result, the submarine and its crew must remain pier-side until a shipyard has the capacity in a dry dock to defuel their nuclear reactor. While the U.S. Navy has made recent progress in reducing active idle time, inactive idle time for submarines has grown and is projected to worsen. Without mitigation, 15 attack submarines will enter inactive idle time from fiscal year 2026 through fiscal year 2030—during which time the Navy could incur more than 14,000 days of inactive idle time and $3.1 billion in costs to operate and support these inactive submarines. The U.S. Navy has not fully evaluated alternative options to more efficiently decommission attack submarines and develop and implement an inactivation plan that could allow them to reduce inactive idle time for crews and save billions. Why GAO Did This Study According to the U.S. Navy, its 44 attack submarines, as of fiscal year 2025, provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected and attack enemy targets, among other missions. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most requested assets by the global combatant commanders. House Report 118-529 includes a provision for GAO to assess the readiness and availability of the U.S. Navy’s attack submarine fleet. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy has effectively maintained its attack submarine fleet and has mitigated any challenges. GAO analyzed U.S. Navy attack submarine maintenance data from fiscal years 2016 through 2025, reviewed U.S. Navy documentation, and interviewed officials. This report is a public version of a classified report GAO issued July 16, 2026. GAO omitted information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine operational availability and how the U.S. Navy’s approach to attack submarine force generation compares to strategic competitors’ approaches.

What GAO Found The U.S. commercial space sector has grown rapidly over the last few years, and offers data and data-related services—such as the imagery below—that the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to maintain national security. National Reconnaissance Office Purchased Commercial Images of Chinese Aircraft Carriers Within the Space Force, the Joint Commercial Operations Cell (JCO)—the main organization that buys data and services—purchased various types of data and services through the contractor-operated Global Data Marketplace. JCO expended $76.8 million on data and services from the marketplace from January 2023 through September 2025. These purchases supported missions including space domain awareness and tactical surveillance, reconnaissance and tracking. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) also purchased various forms of commercial imagery and commercial analytic products, respectively, from fiscal years 2021 through 2025. Some Space Force officials told GAO about challenges they have faced related to purchasing and using commercial space data such as licensing costs, perceived use restrictions, and concerns over long-term access to the data. These challenges led to hesitation to purchase and use commercial data among these potential users. JCO leads an informal working group to discuss and coordinate current and future commercial space data purchases made by various federal organizations. This working group meets monthly and coordinates purchases. GAO found that many of the challenges reported by Space Force officials could have been addressed with discussions at the working group, but the Space Force officials were not part of the working group and information about the working group is not widely available. JCO officials said they would be supportive of information about the working group being listed to increase awareness. Increased communication about the working group could lead to additional Space Force and other officials engaging in discussions that could address perceived issues and improve the use of commercial space data and services for national security purposes. Why GAO Did This Study Threats to DOD’s space assets from strategic competitors have grown substantially in number and intensity. DOD is working to integrate commercial space solutions, such as data and services, to mitigate these threats as well as enhance its capabilities. Members of Congress included a provision in a committee report for GAO to review DOD’s purchases of commercial space data and services. GAO’s report examines (1) the types of commercial space data and data-related services DOD purchased from fiscal years 2021 through 2025, and (2) the extent to which DOD faced challenges when purchasing and using these data and related services. GAO analyzed expenditures for orders JCO made through the Global Data Marketplace from January 27, 2023, to September 30, 2025. In the case of NRO and NGA, GAO obtained unclassified summary information. GAO attended an informal working group meeting led by JCO, reviewed the contract for the marketplace, and interviewed relevant DOD agency officials and contractor representatives. “Commercial space data” are data collected from commercial assets, and “commercial space data-related services” is the range of services for commercial space data.

What GAO Found In school year 2024–2025, about 10 percent of the approximately 60,000 K-12 students attending Department of Defense Education Activity’s (DODEA) schools full time received strategic instruction. This is short-term extra help in a small group setting (see figure). About 5 percent had a “specific learning disability” (SLD). SLDs are a group of disorders, such as dyslexia and dyscalculia, related to understanding language or doing mathematical calculations. The number of DODEA students with SLDs increased 29 percent from school years 2018–2019 through 2024–2025. DODEA Instructional Materials for Students with Literacy and Math Deficits Most staff in the 11 selected schools GAO visited—in five districts that serve 63 percent of DODEA students with SLDs—outlined obstacles to timely identifying students needing strategic instruction or special education for SLDs. These included limited screening tools, challenges with submitting complete student referrals for strategic instruction and special education, and delayed special education evaluations. For example, at nine of 11 schools, staff said they needed more or better screening tools to identify students. DODEA’s screening tools do not directly assess elementary school students’ foundational phonics skills, which help identify reading deficits. They also are not available for all students. These limitations make it difficult to identify students who are behind grade level when they arrive at a school—which is important given DODEA’s highly mobile population. In July 2026, DODEA officials said that they procured universal screening tools for all grades and plan to start administering them in late 2026. When implemented, these tools will provide key data to fill gaps in identifying students’ needs and connect them to support. DODEA staff at all 11 schools we visited also cited obstacles to helping students meet their literacy and math goals. These included strategic instruction and special education teachers not receiving professional learning relevant to their roles, not having adequate access to data on students’ grades, and varied practices across DODEA schools that result in eligible students not receiving needed help to meet grade-level expectations. For example, during GAO’s interviews, 32 of 44 strategic instruction and special education teachers rated their professional learning opportunities as “bad” or “very bad.” Further, staff at all 11 schools said they wanted teachers to be able to provide input on needed professional learning—for example, opportunities focused on identifying students with literacy and math deficits and SLDs. DODEA guidelines say that professional learning should advance teachers’ ability to apply acquired knowledge and skills targeted to their role. Asking for and acting on teacher feedback would help DODEA advance teachers’ ability to apply the skills needed to help students with literacy and math deficits and SLDs meet their learning goals. Why GAO Did This Study Students in military families—many of whom attend DODEA schools—face unique challenges due to frequent moves. DODEA families have raised concerns about access to literacy and math supports and special education services. Research shows that instruction tailored to students’ needs can improve academic outcomes and reduce the number of students referred to special education. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision for GAO to examine services for DODEA students with literacy and math deficits and SLDs. GAO examined (1) the number of students receiving strategic instruction or having an SLD, (2) the extent DODEA provides guidance and tools to identify these students, and (3) the extent DODEA supports teachers in helping students. GAO analyzed DODEA data from school years 2018-2019 through 2024-2025 on student enrollment and reviewed relevant federal laws and DOD policies. GAO conducted in-person site visits to schools in five of nine DODEA districts, selected for variation in number of students with SLDs, among other things. GAO interviewed DODEA officials and held 47 group interviews with teachers, administrators, and other stakeholders. GAO also administered a nongeneralizable opt-in online questionnaire to parents of DODEA students with SLDs.

What GAO Found Selected field offices in Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) have taken steps to evaluate effectiveness of contractor assurance systems (CAS) in accordance with DOE policy, though neither DOE nor EM have defined effectiveness or specified evaluation criteria. The basis on which the selected field offices made their respective effectiveness determinations was unclear (see table). In addition, all selected field offices reported examples of poor CAS performance and recurring issues that undermined the reliability of the effectiveness determinations. How Selected EM Field Offices Assessed Contractor Assurance System (CAS) Effectiveness Selected field office CAS effectiveness determination Was CAS effectiveness defined? Were effectiveness criteria included? Hanford Effective No No Idaho Effective No No Los Alamos Not determined No No Source: GAO analysis of Office of Environmental Managment (EM) information. | GAO-26-107850 Hanford: The field office reported that the contractor demonstrated poor work planning and conduct of operations, requiring EM to formally request a corrective action plan in several areas. Also, the contractor’s review of issues between January 2022 and October 2023 found that it improperly closed and insufficiently documented nearly 40 percent of sampled issues at the two highest significance levels. These are issues that should not recur or are typically related to misuse of resources, according to field office officials. Idaho: The field office reported that the number and severity of conduct of operations and maintenance-related abnormal events indicated a need for improved rigor and discipline in operations. The contractor noted trends that showed a continuing need for attention to detail and personnel awareness. Additionally, the contractor reported 15 radiological events over 8 months that put personnel at risk of radiological overexposure. Los Alamos: The field office identified concerns with CAS effectiveness, including that the contractor did not have effective processes for self-identifying significant issues. Furthermore, a widespread breakdown of the contractor’s training and qualification program in 2023 resulted in a stop work order—an indicator that a CAS is not functioning well, according to a field office official. The stop work order resulted in a 90-day delay for nuclear waste disposal and environmental remediation efforts. Without defining what constitutes an effective CAS—including establishing specific, measurable evaluation criteria—field offices do not have concrete guidelines for evaluating CASs and their determinations may be less informative or meaningful as a result. Additionally, the lack of a clear definition hinders EM’s ability to hold the contractor accountable, and EM cannot be assured that contractors can effectively and efficiently manage risks. Why GAO Did This Study EM relies on contractors to execute its mission to clean up contaminated sites from decades of nuclear-related activities. EM expects certain contractors to design and use a CAS—management systems and processes to oversee their own performance, identify and report potential problems, and take actions to prevent their recurrence. According to EM policy, EM is to rely on outcomes and information from CASs to inform and optimize their respective oversight programs. However, in 2024, an independent entity found that contractors inadequately managed issues, leading to compromised safety and increased likelihood of significant consequences. Senate Report 118-58, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to examine EM’s oversight of contractors’ assurance systems. This report examines the extent to which EM has evaluated the effectiveness of selected CASs. GAO reviewed EM and contractor documents, conducted a site visit, and interviewed DOE officials and contractors. GAO selected three contracts and associated CASs, contractors, and field offices to review based on factors including contract value and purpose.